Ron Paul is an isolationist in the truest sense and fails to recognize the importance of of heading of threats before they can build up strong enough to strike on the home front. As for the 9/11 Report...
p.66
"There is also evidence that around this time Bin Ladin sent out a number of feelers to the Iraqi regime, offering some cooperation. None are reported to have received a significant response. According to one report, Saddam Hussein's efforts at this time to rebuild relations with the Saudis and other Middle Eastern regimes led him to stay clear of Bin Ladin.
In mid-1998 the situation reversed;
it was Iraq that reportedly took the initiative. In March 1998, after Bin Ladin's public fatwa against the United States,
two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin's Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties on his own to the Iraqis. In 1998, Iraq was under intensifying U.S. pressure, which culminated in a series of large air attacks in December.
Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin or his aides may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some reported strains with the Taliban. According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Ladin declined, apparently judging that his circumstances in Afghanistan remained more favorable than the Iraqi alternative.
The reports describe friendly contacts and indicate some common themes in both sides' hatred of the United States."
p.134
"In February 1999,Allen proposed flying a U-2 mission over Afghanistan to
build a baseline of intelligence outside the areas where the tribals had coverage. Clarke was nervous about such a mission because he continued to fear that Bin Ladin might leave for someplace less accessible. He wrote Deputy National Security Advisor Donald Kerrick that one reliable source reported Bin Ladin’s having met with Iraqi officials, who 'may have offered him asylum.' Other intelligence sources said that some Taliban leaders, though not Mullah Omar, had urged Bin Ladin to go to Iraq.
If Bin Ladin actually moved to Iraq, wrote Clarke, his network would be at Saddam Hussein’s service, and it would be 'virtually impossible” to find him. Better to get Bin Ladin in Afghanistan, Clarke declared.' Berger suggested sending one U-2 flight,but Clarke opposed even this. It would require Pakistani approval, he wrote; and 'Pak[istan’s] intel[ligence service] is in bed with' Bin Ladin and would warn him that the United States was getting ready for a bombing campaign: 'Armed with that knowledge, old wily Usama will likely boogie to Baghdad.' Though told also by Bruce Riedel of the NSC staff that
Saddam Hussein wanted Bin Ladin in Baghdad, Berger conditionally authorized a single U-2 flight.Allen meanwhile had found other ways of getting the information he wanted. So the U-2 flight never occurred."
As for the interview... The link looks like it was switched... My bad...
Here is the correct link for the interview and I also fixed it in my other posts as well.
Link.
Here is a report about pre-war events that were discovered after the invasion had taken place.
ABC News article about a Bin Laden contact meeting with Iraq
Link.
dated: 3/23/'06
Excerpt:"Osama bin Laden Contact With Iraq"
"A newly released prewar Iraqi document indicates that
an official representative of Saddam Hussein's government met with Osama bin Laden in Sudan on February 19, 1995, after receiving approval from Saddam Hussein. Bin Laden asked that Iraq broadcast the lectures of Suleiman al Ouda, a radical Saudi preacher, and
suggested "carrying out joint operations against foreign forces" in Saudi Arabia. According to the document, Saddam's presidency was informed of the details of the meeting on March 4, 1995, and Saddam agreed to dedicate a program for them on the radio. The document states that further "development of the relationship and cooperation between the two parties to be left according to what's open [in the future] based on dialogue and agreement on other ways of cooperation." The Sudanese were informed about the agreement to dedicate the program on the radio.
(Editor's Note: This document is handwritten and has no official seal. Although contacts between bin Laden and the Iraqis have been reported in the 9/11 Commission report and elsewhere (e.g., the 9/11 report states "
Bin Ladn himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum
in late 1994 or early 1995) this document indicates the
contacts were approved personally by Saddam Hussein.
It also indicates the discussions were substantive, in particular that
bin Laden was proposing an operational relationship, and that the Iraqis were, at a minimum, interested in exploring a potential relationship and prepared to show good faith by broadcasting the speeches of al Ouda, the radical cleric who was also a bin Laden mentor."