Would von Manstein's alternative to Kursk have succeeded?

[Lotus49]

Reference map:

Spoiler :

First, a little background:

German plans

Von Manstein pressed for a new offensive along the same lines he had just successfully pursued at Kharkov, when he cut off an overextended Soviet offensive. He suggested tricking the Soviets into attacking in the south against the desperately re-forming Sixth Army, leading them into the Donets Basin in the eastern Ukraine. He would then turn south from Kharkov on the eastern side of the Donets River towards Rostov and trap the entire southern wing of the Red Army against the Sea of Azov.

OKH did not approve von Manstein's plan, and instead turned their attention to the obvious bulge in the lines between Orel and Kharkov.

...and the rest is history. So, you are the experts - let's presume the Russians took the bait, and this plan was put into action with the full resources of the Wehrmacht & Waffen-SS. Would it have succeeded? A Dunkirk on the Azov, if you will. As I see it, this was the plan that should have been executed. And then, presuming it did fully succeed as planned, what would the strategic ramifications be, going forward?


P.S. Instead of saying 'going forward', could I have correctly used 'thenceforth'?? *cough* nevermind.

 

[Maimonides]

Anything would have been better for the Germans than what they chose to do at Kursk. They tried a classic pincer move amassing more tanks seen in a single battle before or since...but they failed because the Soviets knew they were coming & had time to prepare. If Kursk had been a suprise to the Soviets, the story would have been much different. As it happened, the German war effort would have been better off if they had stopped their offensive & focused their efforts on brewing beer. They never could fully recover from their massive losses at Kursk & Stalingrad.

 

[onejayhawk]

I have to agree that almost anything would have improved the German position at Kursk. However, I dont think surprise was that much of an issue, simply because there was never any real chance of it.

The biggest problem was the enormous delay for preparation. The Russians, obviously in hindsight, used the time more effectively. Had the Wehrmacht simply chose a point in the line and ordered a general attack focused there, the outcome would have been very different, and almost inevitably better than the disaster that did occur.

I can think of no situation where the Germans maintained fluidity of operation that they did not succeed, even when badly outnumbered. God help any Russian forces attempting pursuit. Small counterattack engagements tended to be lopsided in favor of the Germans. It was when the fight bogged down into static lines that the Russians would bring overwhelming numbers to bear.

J

 

[Adler17]

Manstein's plan was the better. But perhaps the best would simply wait another year until have enough troops ready to go into the offensive as Guderian suggested. In the meantime becoming defensive: Let the Russians overstetch their lines and then attack.

Adler

 

[onejayhawk]

Manstein's plan was the better. But perhaps the best would simply wait another year until have enough troops ready to go into the offensive as Guderian suggested. In the meantime becoming defensive: Let the Russians overstetch their lines and then attack.

Adler

Attacking dug in German infantry, with an armor reserve is still the Russian's greatest nightmare.

J

 

[Serutan]

Would it have succeeded?

I doubt it very much. If Manstein tries this immediately after Kharkov, his forces wouldn't be strong enough to succeed, since they weren't in great shape. Also, Kharkov finally convinced Stalin that he had to close out the winter campaign, and consolidate his forces; making it unlikely he would take the bait.

If he waits for reinforcement/re-equipment, he is in the Kursk dilemma again, since the Soviets knew as much about German military plans as the OKH, and,
importantly, Stalin had begun to believe his spies.

A Dunkirk on the Azov, if you will.

I think a Stalingrad part II more likely. And with that attacking force wiped out, Manstein has nothing to keep the Red Army away from the Dnepr.

 

[Ace]

Manstein wanted to hit the salient right after Kharkov, but AH wanted to wait for more troops, especially the new Panther tanks. If Manstein had attacked the Kursk salient in early May with the troops available, he might have been able to pull it off. The better option was to wait for the Russians to attack first and than wipe out their attacking force. The Russians were tough, but they had not mastered moble warfare as well as they had a year later. Another possiblity would have been for the Kursk attack to go straight East than turn in after bypassing all the fortified lines along the flanks of the salient. It would have been more risky than waiting for the Russians to attack, but it would have had a better chance than smashing the panzer divisions head on into 5 lines of anti-tank defense lines.

 

[Lotus49]

Another possiblity would have been for the Kursk attack to go straight East than turn in after bypassing all the fortified lines along the flanks of the salient. It would have been more risky than waiting for the Russians to attack, but it would have had a better chance than smashing the panzer divisions head on into 5 lines of anti-tank defense lines.

I've always wondered why they didn't modify the plans in light of the insanely high levels of fortifications (which can stil be seen there today) made by the Russians, and do exactly that. Anyway, it's like the Germans didn't have any intel whatsoever. Another thing they (Russians) were able to do during the delay, was train, train, and train some more.

I've always though of Kursk as; "into the meat grinder, with all your best armor!" I mean, they might has well have just attacked the Maginot Line directly while they were at it. It was just bad tactics. In the end, the indecisiveness of 1941, the foolishness of 1942, and then the stubbornness of 1943 finally broke the back of the Wehrmacht and made the war in the east a done deal, all thanks to bad leadership from the top. It could have been a lot more interesting, but they were careless.

 

[Ancient Grudge]

I've always though of Kursk as; "into the meat grinder, with all your best armor!" I mean, they might has well have just attacked the Maginot Line directly while they were at it. It was just bad tactics.

What are you talking about? The Germans did attack the Maginot Line directly and succedded in breaking through and also capturing Strasbourg.

On topic: Personally I feel such a discussion as useless. To me Manstein plan seems to be of the like of Hitlers of directing troups to Kiev instead of heading straight for Moscow. In so much as it might of producded another great vicotry but could the Wehrmacht really exploit such a victory to such an extent?

 

[FriendlyFire]

I've always though of Kursk as; "into the meat grinder, with all your best armor!" I mean, they might has well have just attacked the Maginot Line directly while they were at it. It was just bad tactics. In the end, the indecisiveness of 1941, the foolishness of 1942, and then the stubbornness of 1943 finally broke the back of the Wehrmacht and made the war in the east a done deal, all thanks to bad leadership from the top. It could have been a lot more interesting, but they were careless.

Probably more of "into a battle of attrition" which was the Russians game.
In 1944 the destrution of army group center was the real annihilation. but by that time the germans had become very undermanned, shortages of everykind and poor moral

 

[Dachs]

What are you talking about? The Germans did attack the Maginot Line directly and succeeded in breaking through and also capturing Strassburg.

...after tanks were already in the Maginot Line's rear. Besides, Army Group C was mostly infantry anyway, so the Line wasn't really meant to hold against them.

 

[Ace]

...after tanks were already in the Maginot Line's rear. Besides, Army Group C was mostly infantry anyway, so the Line wasn't really meant to hold against them.

What are you talking about? The Maginot Line was designed to stop a 1918 type army! Which was primarily an infantry army with a few tanks supporting the infantry!!

 

[Ace]

I've always wondered why they didn't modify the plans in light of the insanely high levels of fortifications (which can stil be seen there today) made by the Russians, and do exactly that. Anyway, it's like the Germans didn't have any intel whatsoever. Another thing they (Russians) were able to do during the delay, was train, train, and train some more....

AH was fixated on the attack and to date in the war, the German tanks had always broken through the Russian lines at the first blow, they just did not realize how well dug in the Russians were.

Once an immediate follow up attack after kharkov was not launched, Manstein really wanted to wait and counter attack the Russians after they had committed to an attack, at least, thats what he says in his autobio..."Lost Victories".

The real problem for the Germans is that they had to do something because the Russians had built up sufficient forces to launch an attack in the summer of 1943. The German choice was between attacking or letting the Russians attack and than counter attack, as in the follow up to the Stalingrad offensive. The attack at Kursk was an a grand plan to win the war, but to buy them time to rebuild the German Army. Unfortunately for them, Kursk did just the opposite, it was the death ride of the panzer divisions.

 

[Dachs]

What are you talking about? The Maginot Line was designed to stop a 1918 type army! Which was primarily an infantry army with a few tanks supporting the infantry!!

Hence the installation of vast amounts of anti-tank barriers in multiple lines, batteries of AT guns, and artillery with which to smash open the tanks from the points at which their armor is weakest - on the top. The Maginot Line would have worked well against pretty much any attacking force had anyone been stupid enough to try to run straight into its defenses, but a large amount of attacking infantry backed up by fair amounts of artillery, demoralized defenders, and the critical collapses of the French army after Dunkirk and the Somme breakthrough (which led to German panzers in the rear of the Maginot Line) allowed von Leeb to break through at two points along the line before the French capitulated.

 

[Ace]

Which only goes to prove that fixed fortifications are a waste of money against "modern" armies. I repeat, the exact type of army that the Maginot Line was designed to stop is exactly what broke through the line.

 

[innonimatu]

I must disagree. Fortifications have always been used to divert or delay attackers, and the Maginot Line succeeded at that. It wasn't expected to be unbreakable.

 

[Ace]

That is the whole point of the criticism of the Maginot Line. The French spent a fortune on it, and the Germans just made an end run around it.

Against "modern" weapons, fortications are useful, but not invincible. Look at how quickly the
Belgian forts were smashed by the German guns in ww1

 

[Lotus49]

The point IS that you have all these great Panzer divisions, and you're using them in just about the most inefficient way possible - attacking a densely defended, heavily fortified death trap. Then next thing you know, someone comes in and says the Germans did directly attack the Maginot line, and from then on it's been a sad state of affairs. Oh, well.

And by the way, Manstein's plan WAS for the Russians to attack, let them over-extend themselves while falling into a trap... then counter. No matter what, it would have been using the strengths of the Wehrmacht much more effectively, and who knows what the implications might have been, afterwards (plan succeeding, or not). As it was, the Wehrmacht's back was broken unnecessarily at Kursk.

"Into the ambush, with all your best tanks!"

-A far cry from the effective tactics they had once used so successfully.

 

[Verbose]

That is the whole point of the criticism of the Maginot Line. The French spent a fortune on it, and the Germans just made an end run around it.

And instead the French should have allowed the Germans the ability to attack across the entire Franco-German border at their will? A situation where they could really have made their manpower advantage bear to the full.

The Maginot Line worked exactly as intended. The problem is that the Germans successfully hit the swing-point between the line of fortifications and almost all the available mobile French forces, which where subsequently cut off and destroyed in their pocket. That's why the Ardennes was so damn decisive. It makes all the difference if the Germans had pulled it off or not.

 

[Ace]

And instead the French should have allowed the Germans the ability to attack across the entire Franco-German border at their will? A situation where they could really have made their manpower advantage bear to the full.

The Maginot Line worked exactly as intended. The problem is that the Germans successfully hit the swing-point between the line of fortifications and almost all the available mobile French forces, which where subsequently cut off and destroyed in their pocket. That's why the Ardennes was so damn decisive. It makes all the difference if the Germans had pulled it off or not.

No, the French should have spent the money to upgrade their 1919 style army and develop their own panzer divisions. Instead, they threw it away on fortifications that failed to protect them. What the French really needed in 1940 was a mobile army capable of counter-attacking an invading army. Sorta like a Panzer Group!!!