Thlayli
Le Pétit Prince
I haven't finished it yet, Dachs...but it's great.
Alternate History Thread III
- Thread starter Luckymoose
- Start date
das
Regeneration In Process
Very interesting althist you've got there. It really carries the spirit of the time, perhaps a bit too much on the early stages, which are about as confusing as the OTL Diadochi period.
The Antigonids did have lots of good military luck on certain occasions, though nothing completely out of the realm of possible. It also seems to me that the reunification of the Empire went a bit too smoothly, but meh. Is interesting to see how the widened Hellenic world will evolve; the Empire is likely to disintegrate further, becoming something like a huge HRE perhaps. The North African megasatrapy sounds particularily promising.
Btw, the Ides of September would be September 13th, I think. Its only the 15th for March, May, July and October.
Also, what happened to Alexander's plans for an Arabian campaign? It sounds like something some Antigonid could've picked up and followed through while bored of peace...
The Antigonids did have lots of good military luck on certain occasions, though nothing completely out of the realm of possible. It also seems to me that the reunification of the Empire went a bit too smoothly, but meh. Is interesting to see how the widened Hellenic world will evolve; the Empire is likely to disintegrate further, becoming something like a huge HRE perhaps. The North African megasatrapy sounds particularily promising.
Btw, the Ides of September would be September 13th, I think. Its only the 15th for March, May, July and October.
Also, what happened to Alexander's plans for an Arabian campaign? It sounds like something some Antigonid could've picked up and followed through while bored of peace...
About that...I sort of didn't have a single PoD, just had things happen a little differently in general.
The "good military luck" bit had a lot more to do with killing Seleucus than anything else: I just used examples from OTL a lot in planning the later campaigns especially. The real Ipsus would probably have been an Antigonid victory without Seleucus on the allied side anyway. Your predictions for the rest of the Empire are interesting - the Empire will certainly last, but not in current form, not by any means. It'll be a lot smaller.
Yeah...whoops. Two days off, not too big of a deal.
I toyed around with that, but decided against.
das
Regeneration In Process
Well, yes. The siege of Carthage sounded a bit fishy; wouldn't the Carthaginians do anything to try and relieve it if the siege takes so long? I mean, rally the rest of their fleet, perhaps look for allies, promise concessions, etc, anything?
And speaking of Carthage, whereas the shofet in ancient Israel did play the role that you attributed to him, the Carthaginian judges were more of noble oligarchs/patricians than religious dictators. Although in the conditions of Carthago Nova, I'd imagine that a switch towards theocracy (the non-oligarchic kind) would be likely. Incidentally, how will the proximity of a Punic capital (and thus, presumably, a cultural center) influence the Iberian and Celtiberian tribes?
Another interesting issue of this kind could be the Gaelic one, IMHO. Even in OTL there were some Greek-influenced protostates. Though the Hellenic rule in Massilia didn't last, it is doubtless that Hellenic influence in this world will be considerably stronger than in OTL. Might a south Gaelic state - like Grandmaster's Arvernii state from ITNES - rise in this world, allying with the Antigondis against Rome?
Oh, and does this mean that you are coming back to NESing now/soon?
The Strategos
Thanatos
- Joined
- Jul 21, 2002
- Messages
- 1,175
Summary of events thus far: Aristagoras rebelled against Persia, persuading most of Ionia to join him. He then goes to Hellas in order to get some more allies there. He manages to convince Sparta to help him, as well as Athens, since Athens was ruled by a tyrant put in place by Sparta. With their help, the Ionian revolt is able to succeed, winning their independence and "liberating" Cyprus. This basically causes a Persian implosian, Egypt and Phonecia also revolt and Darius is assasinated, causing a succession war to occur between Darius' sons Xerxes and Artobazanes. This section focuses on the events in Hellas as the victorious Greeks return to their homes after deciding that their part in the Ionian War was over.
Part IV (Hellas: 493-488 BCE)
At this time, the Hellenes believing that their promise to Aristagoras has been fulfilled, go to him, demanding the payment he promised them. Now while the Ionians had appeared to gain their independence, no Persian cities had been taken, so there was little profits made in the war and Aristagoras could not keep his promises. Yet the Hellenes were tired of the war, fighting in a far off land with little gain from it and therefore left empty-handed, each to their own cities.
Now when the Hellenes returned each one to their homes, they thought that they would have a time of peace. However, the gods had decreed that this was not to be the case. For no long time passed after the Lacadaemonians had returned home, that there arose a revolt among the helots against their rule. Now some say that this revolt was instigated by the agents of Darius, who had been sent to Sparta before his death in revenge for the help given to the Ionians, but others say that the helots revolted on their own, because of the long absence of some of the Spartan army and their own longing for freedom. Because of this revolt, Dorieos, the king of Sparta, raised a large army to fight the helots. With this force, Dorieos defeated the rebellion, killing its leaders and many of those who participated in it.
Now while the Lacadaemonians were busy fighting their own rebels, some in Athens determined to overthrow their tyrant Isagoras. For Isagoras had, from the beginning of his rule until the end, been supported by Lacadaemon but hated by the Athenians. Therefore, seeing their chance to rid themselves of a hated tyrant, the people of Athens rose up against him led by one Themistocles the son of Neocles. Now although Neocles himself was a man of no distinction or means, Themistocles, had won for himself a name in the fighting in Ionia. Now Themistocles was a man who sought after power, therefore, seeing that the Athenians hated Isagoras and that the Spartans were preoccupied with the helots, he led a revolt against Isagoras, causing Isagoras to flee to Sparta. After this, Themistocles rushed to secure his power, killing many supporters of Isagoras, and rewarding his own supporters.
Now after Dorieos defeated the helots, he determined to overthrow Themistocles and make Isagoras tyrant of Athens again. However, Themistocles, had previously made an alliance with the men of Argos, who have always been enemies of Sparta. But when Dorieos went to fight this alliance, he was frustrated by his fellow king, Demaratos, who did not want to see Sparta embroiled in the affairs of others. For he thought that the Lacadaemon interference in Ionia brought no good, but only evil, and likewise thought that any war outside Peloponnesia would likewise bring nothing but evil. Because of this interference, Dorieos was forced to return to Lacadaemon without engaging in the Athenian alliance in battle. However, in retaliation for Demaratos interference, Dorieos urged Leotychides, a relative and personal enemy of Demaratos, to claim the throne on the ground that the latter was not really the son of Ariston but of Agetus, who was Demaratos mother's first husband. To solve this dispute, the Lacadaemonians appealed to the oracle at Delphi. Now the oracle pronounced in favor of Leotychides, but there are those who say Dorieos bribed the priestess. Therefore, Demaratos fled to Sicily and Leotychides was made king in his place.
After this, Dorieos again raised an army to punish the Athenians, and to restore Isagoras as tyrant. Thus, Dorieos, having received ships from Aegina, landed near Tyrinth with his army. Now when the Argivian army heard about this, they assembled at Sepea, which was between Argos and the sea without waiting for their allies, the Athenians to arrive. It was here the Spartans attacked the Argivian army and defeated them. Now those Argivians who had survived the attack tried to find refuge in the sacred grove of the hero Argos. But Dorieos, not willing that the Argivians escape him, set fire to the grove. Thus, between the battle and the fire, six thousand Argivians lost their lives.
During this time, however, Athens had not been idle. For from the beginning of Themistocles reign, he had been busy strengthening his position. The first alliance he made was with Eretria, with whom he had previously fought in the Ionian War, and thus was on friendly terms with. Together with the Eretrians came an alliance with the Chalkidians, who were dependents of the Eretrians, and thus the entirety of Euboea allied with Athens. With these allies, Athens invaded Corinth, in support of Megara, who has always been rivals of Corinth. Originally, Corinth was pushed back, but then Dorieos arrived with the Spartan army and, together with the Corinthians, defeated the Athenians. The Athenians then retreated to the pass of Geraneia near Megara, which they fortified. Now this pass is small, and guards the only approach to Attica, so that because of this, a small army could hold off a much larger army, which prevented the Lacadaemons from invading Athens by land.
Seeing this, the Lacadaemons decided that their only recourse to invade Athens was by sea. To this end, they enlisted the help of Aegina, who was a great naval power and rival of Athens, along with Corinth, and many other of their allies who had a navy. This fleet assembled at Aegina and sailed north, meeting the Athenian fleet off the island of Salamis. Now the Athenian fleet had been significantly strengthened by the efforts of Themistocles. For Themistocles had taken part in the Ionian War as a strategos stationed with the Athenian fleet. During this war, he had seen the importance of the navy for the Ionian cause, and had become convinced that Athens needed a stronger fleet if it was to survive. Thus, while the Ionian War was still going on, Themistocles had persuaded Isagoras to expand the Athenian fleet from seventy ships to two hundred ships. Now at this time, one hundred and fifty of the proposed two-hundred had been built. With these ships sailed twenty ships from Chalkidia, forty ships from Eretria, and twenty ships made up from Athens other allies, with the majority of these coming from Megara. This fleet was led by Themistocles, for he figured that if the Athenians lost here, he would not be able to stop the Spartans and would be deposed. Against this fleet were one hundred and twenty ships from Aegina, together with sixty ships from Corinth, twenty ships from Lacadaemon and thirty ships from other of Lacadaemons allies. This fleet was led by King Leotychides of Sparta. Now although the Lacadaemons were outnumbered, the Aeginans were considered superior to the Athenian fleet while the Corinthians were considered better than the ships from Euboea. However, the Lacadaemon fleet was under worse leadership. For the Aeginans wanted one of their own to lead the fleet, as they were the most experienced with naval warfare, but King Leotychides thought it shameful that Spartans would take orders from anyone else, and thus insisted that he himself lead the fleet, though he was inexperienced. Because of this, the Lacadaemon fleet was thrown into confusion, receiving poor orders from Leotychides, some of them even being contradictory. In contrast, Themistocles, having received experience in the Ionian War, handled his fleet with expertise. Thus, though the Lacadaemon ships individually fought bravely, they were no match for the Athenian fleet, who fought as though they were one, sending reinforcements where they were needed, either to reinforce their own lines or to exploit a break in the Lacadaemon lines. Because of this, the Lacadaemons were defeated, losing over a hundred ships, some being sunk and some captured. Leotychides himself was killed, when the ship he was on was sunk. After his death, the Lacadaemon fleet retreated with the Aeginains, who received the least amount of casualties, covering the retreat to Aegina, thus preventing the complete destruction of the Lacadaemon fleet.
After this battle, the Athenians went on the offensive, aiming their efforts against Aegina, who, except for Corinth, was the only naval power allied to Sparta. Thus, the Athenians and their allies moved their fleets off the island of Aegina, searching for the remnants of the Lacadaemon fleet, who now more accurately could be called the Aeginian fleet, for after the death of Leotychides, the Aeginians took over command of the fleet. This fleet, knowing that if they did not stop the Athenians, they would most likely attempt to land troops on the island itself, decided to attack the Athenian fleet. Now although the Aeginian fleet was smaller than the Lacadaemon fleet that had been earlier defeated by the Athenians, it still remained formidable, for it the Aeginian sailors were still widely renowned for their skill, and this time were ably led by one of their own. Since the Athenian fleet outnumbered the Aeginian, the Aeginian fleet planned to launch a quick attack against the Athenian fleet, hoping to defeat it before it could bring all of its numbers to bear. However, Themistocles made skillful use of his ships, and reinforced the center, where the brunt of the Aeginian attack was concentrated, so that though the center bent, the Aeginians were unable to completely break through. This allowed time for the allied wings to use their superior numbers to surround the Aeginian fleet. From this encirclement only forty ships were able to escape, fleeing to Corinth. After this victory, Themistocles landed troops on the island of Aegina, besieging the city itself.
King Dorieos of Sparta, seeing that the Athenians were concentrated in the Saronic gulf, and because of his naval inferiority he could not challenge them there, decided to strike elsewhere while the Athenians were tied down in besieging Aegina. Therefore, the Corinthians attacked Megara while he himself took the Lacadaemon army and, using Corinthian vessels, sailed across the Corinthian gulf to Boeotia. There, he intended to march south, in order to attack Attica from the north. This started out well, for the Athenian fleet was concentrated in the Saronic gulf and so the Spartans were able to land safely in Boeotia. There, they allied themselves with Thebes and, together with their help, subjugated the entirety of Boeotia placing it under Theban control. After this, the combined Theban-Lacadaemon army marched south, towards Attica. At this, Athens was in grave danger, for their best troops were either defending against the Corinthians at Megara or besieging Aegina. Nevertheless, an allied army was mustered together by Athens and quickly dispatched northward. The Athenian army, commanded by the strategos Aristides, numbered about six thousand troops while the Theban-Lacadaemon army numbered around fifteen thousand. These armies met at Tanagra, where the Athenian army had taken up defensive positions. Here the Athenians were defeated, but Aristides managed to keep the army mostly intact, and continued to harass the Lacadaemon army, slowing it down considerably. Because of this, Themistocles was able to have time to transfer the majority of the troops who had been besieging Aegina to Attica, where he joined the remnants of Aristides troops at Marathon.
Unlike at Tanagra, the armies here were more evenly matched, the Lacadaemons having about thirteen thousand troops while the Athenians, bolstered by Themistocles reinforcements as well as Euboean reinforcements, numbered slightly more with sixteen thousand, though not of the same quality as the Spartan troops. Nevertheless, the Athenians were in good position, for they were in an easily defendable location, and had the added motivation of fighting to defend their homes. The Spartans, however, feeling that they could not be defeated on land, immediately attacked. The right, where the Spartans were, faced the Athenian left, which had been strengthened by Themistocles before the battle, knowing that those troops would be facing the Spartans. The center, however, where the Spartans also were, pushed forward, slowly beating the Athenian center back. Eventually the center broke, causing the entire Athenian line to retreat towards Athens. However, as darkness was starting to fall, and on account of the large number of casualties caused by the Athenians, the Spartans were unable to immediately pursue. As the Spartans continued marching towards Athens, the Athenians continued to conduct a fighting retreat, slowing the Spartans down considerably. Thus, when the Lacadaemon army finally reached the walls of Athens, they were forced to stop, for their supply line did not permit them to besiege Athens. In addition, the Spartan army was in danger of being trapped, for the Athenians controlled the seas and still held sections of the isthmus of Corinth, preventing an easy retreat. Because of this, Dorieos offered a cease-fire to Athens, where in return for safe passage back to Peloponnesia and Athenian withdraw from Aegina, Themistocles would be recognized as tyrant of Athens and Athens would be allowed to keep its alliances intact. Themistocles agreed to this, for although Athens itself appeared to be safe, many of his allies seemed restless, and he feared that they would abandon him, leaving Athens alone against Lacadaemon. Thus, an uneasy peace again descended upon Hellas, though the gods had ordained that it would not be a lasting one.
Part IV (Hellas: 493-488 BCE)
At this time, the Hellenes believing that their promise to Aristagoras has been fulfilled, go to him, demanding the payment he promised them. Now while the Ionians had appeared to gain their independence, no Persian cities had been taken, so there was little profits made in the war and Aristagoras could not keep his promises. Yet the Hellenes were tired of the war, fighting in a far off land with little gain from it and therefore left empty-handed, each to their own cities.
Now when the Hellenes returned each one to their homes, they thought that they would have a time of peace. However, the gods had decreed that this was not to be the case. For no long time passed after the Lacadaemonians had returned home, that there arose a revolt among the helots against their rule. Now some say that this revolt was instigated by the agents of Darius, who had been sent to Sparta before his death in revenge for the help given to the Ionians, but others say that the helots revolted on their own, because of the long absence of some of the Spartan army and their own longing for freedom. Because of this revolt, Dorieos, the king of Sparta, raised a large army to fight the helots. With this force, Dorieos defeated the rebellion, killing its leaders and many of those who participated in it.
Now while the Lacadaemonians were busy fighting their own rebels, some in Athens determined to overthrow their tyrant Isagoras. For Isagoras had, from the beginning of his rule until the end, been supported by Lacadaemon but hated by the Athenians. Therefore, seeing their chance to rid themselves of a hated tyrant, the people of Athens rose up against him led by one Themistocles the son of Neocles. Now although Neocles himself was a man of no distinction or means, Themistocles, had won for himself a name in the fighting in Ionia. Now Themistocles was a man who sought after power, therefore, seeing that the Athenians hated Isagoras and that the Spartans were preoccupied with the helots, he led a revolt against Isagoras, causing Isagoras to flee to Sparta. After this, Themistocles rushed to secure his power, killing many supporters of Isagoras, and rewarding his own supporters.
Now after Dorieos defeated the helots, he determined to overthrow Themistocles and make Isagoras tyrant of Athens again. However, Themistocles, had previously made an alliance with the men of Argos, who have always been enemies of Sparta. But when Dorieos went to fight this alliance, he was frustrated by his fellow king, Demaratos, who did not want to see Sparta embroiled in the affairs of others. For he thought that the Lacadaemon interference in Ionia brought no good, but only evil, and likewise thought that any war outside Peloponnesia would likewise bring nothing but evil. Because of this interference, Dorieos was forced to return to Lacadaemon without engaging in the Athenian alliance in battle. However, in retaliation for Demaratos interference, Dorieos urged Leotychides, a relative and personal enemy of Demaratos, to claim the throne on the ground that the latter was not really the son of Ariston but of Agetus, who was Demaratos mother's first husband. To solve this dispute, the Lacadaemonians appealed to the oracle at Delphi. Now the oracle pronounced in favor of Leotychides, but there are those who say Dorieos bribed the priestess. Therefore, Demaratos fled to Sicily and Leotychides was made king in his place.
After this, Dorieos again raised an army to punish the Athenians, and to restore Isagoras as tyrant. Thus, Dorieos, having received ships from Aegina, landed near Tyrinth with his army. Now when the Argivian army heard about this, they assembled at Sepea, which was between Argos and the sea without waiting for their allies, the Athenians to arrive. It was here the Spartans attacked the Argivian army and defeated them. Now those Argivians who had survived the attack tried to find refuge in the sacred grove of the hero Argos. But Dorieos, not willing that the Argivians escape him, set fire to the grove. Thus, between the battle and the fire, six thousand Argivians lost their lives.
During this time, however, Athens had not been idle. For from the beginning of Themistocles reign, he had been busy strengthening his position. The first alliance he made was with Eretria, with whom he had previously fought in the Ionian War, and thus was on friendly terms with. Together with the Eretrians came an alliance with the Chalkidians, who were dependents of the Eretrians, and thus the entirety of Euboea allied with Athens. With these allies, Athens invaded Corinth, in support of Megara, who has always been rivals of Corinth. Originally, Corinth was pushed back, but then Dorieos arrived with the Spartan army and, together with the Corinthians, defeated the Athenians. The Athenians then retreated to the pass of Geraneia near Megara, which they fortified. Now this pass is small, and guards the only approach to Attica, so that because of this, a small army could hold off a much larger army, which prevented the Lacadaemons from invading Athens by land.
Seeing this, the Lacadaemons decided that their only recourse to invade Athens was by sea. To this end, they enlisted the help of Aegina, who was a great naval power and rival of Athens, along with Corinth, and many other of their allies who had a navy. This fleet assembled at Aegina and sailed north, meeting the Athenian fleet off the island of Salamis. Now the Athenian fleet had been significantly strengthened by the efforts of Themistocles. For Themistocles had taken part in the Ionian War as a strategos stationed with the Athenian fleet. During this war, he had seen the importance of the navy for the Ionian cause, and had become convinced that Athens needed a stronger fleet if it was to survive. Thus, while the Ionian War was still going on, Themistocles had persuaded Isagoras to expand the Athenian fleet from seventy ships to two hundred ships. Now at this time, one hundred and fifty of the proposed two-hundred had been built. With these ships sailed twenty ships from Chalkidia, forty ships from Eretria, and twenty ships made up from Athens other allies, with the majority of these coming from Megara. This fleet was led by Themistocles, for he figured that if the Athenians lost here, he would not be able to stop the Spartans and would be deposed. Against this fleet were one hundred and twenty ships from Aegina, together with sixty ships from Corinth, twenty ships from Lacadaemon and thirty ships from other of Lacadaemons allies. This fleet was led by King Leotychides of Sparta. Now although the Lacadaemons were outnumbered, the Aeginans were considered superior to the Athenian fleet while the Corinthians were considered better than the ships from Euboea. However, the Lacadaemon fleet was under worse leadership. For the Aeginans wanted one of their own to lead the fleet, as they were the most experienced with naval warfare, but King Leotychides thought it shameful that Spartans would take orders from anyone else, and thus insisted that he himself lead the fleet, though he was inexperienced. Because of this, the Lacadaemon fleet was thrown into confusion, receiving poor orders from Leotychides, some of them even being contradictory. In contrast, Themistocles, having received experience in the Ionian War, handled his fleet with expertise. Thus, though the Lacadaemon ships individually fought bravely, they were no match for the Athenian fleet, who fought as though they were one, sending reinforcements where they were needed, either to reinforce their own lines or to exploit a break in the Lacadaemon lines. Because of this, the Lacadaemons were defeated, losing over a hundred ships, some being sunk and some captured. Leotychides himself was killed, when the ship he was on was sunk. After his death, the Lacadaemon fleet retreated with the Aeginains, who received the least amount of casualties, covering the retreat to Aegina, thus preventing the complete destruction of the Lacadaemon fleet.
After this battle, the Athenians went on the offensive, aiming their efforts against Aegina, who, except for Corinth, was the only naval power allied to Sparta. Thus, the Athenians and their allies moved their fleets off the island of Aegina, searching for the remnants of the Lacadaemon fleet, who now more accurately could be called the Aeginian fleet, for after the death of Leotychides, the Aeginians took over command of the fleet. This fleet, knowing that if they did not stop the Athenians, they would most likely attempt to land troops on the island itself, decided to attack the Athenian fleet. Now although the Aeginian fleet was smaller than the Lacadaemon fleet that had been earlier defeated by the Athenians, it still remained formidable, for it the Aeginian sailors were still widely renowned for their skill, and this time were ably led by one of their own. Since the Athenian fleet outnumbered the Aeginian, the Aeginian fleet planned to launch a quick attack against the Athenian fleet, hoping to defeat it before it could bring all of its numbers to bear. However, Themistocles made skillful use of his ships, and reinforced the center, where the brunt of the Aeginian attack was concentrated, so that though the center bent, the Aeginians were unable to completely break through. This allowed time for the allied wings to use their superior numbers to surround the Aeginian fleet. From this encirclement only forty ships were able to escape, fleeing to Corinth. After this victory, Themistocles landed troops on the island of Aegina, besieging the city itself.
King Dorieos of Sparta, seeing that the Athenians were concentrated in the Saronic gulf, and because of his naval inferiority he could not challenge them there, decided to strike elsewhere while the Athenians were tied down in besieging Aegina. Therefore, the Corinthians attacked Megara while he himself took the Lacadaemon army and, using Corinthian vessels, sailed across the Corinthian gulf to Boeotia. There, he intended to march south, in order to attack Attica from the north. This started out well, for the Athenian fleet was concentrated in the Saronic gulf and so the Spartans were able to land safely in Boeotia. There, they allied themselves with Thebes and, together with their help, subjugated the entirety of Boeotia placing it under Theban control. After this, the combined Theban-Lacadaemon army marched south, towards Attica. At this, Athens was in grave danger, for their best troops were either defending against the Corinthians at Megara or besieging Aegina. Nevertheless, an allied army was mustered together by Athens and quickly dispatched northward. The Athenian army, commanded by the strategos Aristides, numbered about six thousand troops while the Theban-Lacadaemon army numbered around fifteen thousand. These armies met at Tanagra, where the Athenian army had taken up defensive positions. Here the Athenians were defeated, but Aristides managed to keep the army mostly intact, and continued to harass the Lacadaemon army, slowing it down considerably. Because of this, Themistocles was able to have time to transfer the majority of the troops who had been besieging Aegina to Attica, where he joined the remnants of Aristides troops at Marathon.
Unlike at Tanagra, the armies here were more evenly matched, the Lacadaemons having about thirteen thousand troops while the Athenians, bolstered by Themistocles reinforcements as well as Euboean reinforcements, numbered slightly more with sixteen thousand, though not of the same quality as the Spartan troops. Nevertheless, the Athenians were in good position, for they were in an easily defendable location, and had the added motivation of fighting to defend their homes. The Spartans, however, feeling that they could not be defeated on land, immediately attacked. The right, where the Spartans were, faced the Athenian left, which had been strengthened by Themistocles before the battle, knowing that those troops would be facing the Spartans. The center, however, where the Spartans also were, pushed forward, slowly beating the Athenian center back. Eventually the center broke, causing the entire Athenian line to retreat towards Athens. However, as darkness was starting to fall, and on account of the large number of casualties caused by the Athenians, the Spartans were unable to immediately pursue. As the Spartans continued marching towards Athens, the Athenians continued to conduct a fighting retreat, slowing the Spartans down considerably. Thus, when the Lacadaemon army finally reached the walls of Athens, they were forced to stop, for their supply line did not permit them to besiege Athens. In addition, the Spartan army was in danger of being trapped, for the Athenians controlled the seas and still held sections of the isthmus of Corinth, preventing an easy retreat. Because of this, Dorieos offered a cease-fire to Athens, where in return for safe passage back to Peloponnesia and Athenian withdraw from Aegina, Themistocles would be recognized as tyrant of Athens and Athens would be allowed to keep its alliances intact. Themistocles agreed to this, for although Athens itself appeared to be safe, many of his allies seemed restless, and he feared that they would abandon him, leaving Athens alone against Lacadaemon. Thus, an uneasy peace again descended upon Hellas, though the gods had ordained that it would not be a lasting one.
das
Regeneration In Process
Good to see that this is still alive.
das
Regeneration In Process
In the wake of the Third World War (lets use this instead of all the different names, if only because it covered the whole issue best), a whole new era dawned upon the world. The Age of Steam, subtly-started a few decades ago, now entered its prime, between British trains and steamers and the French artillery-haulers. Great advances were made every year in all spheres of science and technology, but especially in engineering and industry. From the military point of view, of particular importance was the development of the ironclad steamer and the tracked haulers ("universal trains"), which were now also used to transport troops and supplies. Though they would have to wait for decades until seeing use in actual warfare, these haulers performed well in the training maneuvers. The same went for the ironclads (which were developed separately by Britain and France; it must be noted that their military technology competition did much to encourage general progress).
The Third World War saw many features that were, though sometimes present in previous wars, never noticed on such a scale before. This primarily included the massive national conscription and economic mobilisation, the deployment of various new military technology (steamers, artillery-haulers, the Suez Canal, the flintlock rifles - especially "sharp" ones, i.e. these used by the British and Austrian sharpeshooters), and the French use of "la grande strategie" - massive, aggressive military operations and strategic-level maneuvers, backed up by an efficient comissariat and assisted by various unconventional methods (though the latter, most famously representated by the "partisans", was actually mostly used by the Poles in the late Polish campaign and by the Austrians during Erzherzog Karl's grand counter-offensive). Likewise, French operations in Prussia were marked down - erroneously - as the first instance of "total warfare" in world history. Lazare Carnot was particularily famous for his theories of "la guerre totale" and "la grande strategie", propagated in likewise-named books a few years after the war. Though the military old guard was outraged at his "unchivalrous" theories, the said guard had been thoroughly humbled and discredited by the war, and the new commanders, such as Napoleon Bonaparte and Erzherzog Karl, were more willing to listen to Carnot and other military theoreticians of the "new school". Military reforms were undertaken by many countries, based both on these theories and on the lessons learned during the war. Also, greater emphasis was now placed on the development of new military technologies, though in a way this has already been said in the previous paragraph. On a tactical level, a major change in attitude also took place during the war - a general shift favouring aggressiveness, as opposed to the previous, more conservative and cautious "cordon" tactics on the land and "line of battle" tactics on the sea.
Culturally, the Age of Steam was also the Age of Nationalism, or of Secondary/National Enlightenment as some call it. The Third World War had basically put an end to the old, Cosmopolitian Enlightenment; however, it would probably be more correct to say that it simply withered away during the late 18th/early 19th centuries, with the War only speeding up the process. It is not to say that a cultural dark age had come, ofcourse; simply one generation of philosophers and their pupils was replaced by a new generation that, while inheriting their ideals, changed them, sometimes beyond recognition. The Enlightenment achieved many of its goals, became unnecessary and so - died, or rather was replaced by the National Enlightenment; similariliy, the enlightened absolute monarchies had either succesfully been reformed into parliamentary or semi-parliamentary ones, either collapsed, either fell back into reaction. The defining trait of the Age of Nationalism was, ofcourse, nationalism - the growth of national consciousness in Europe. This not only hampered the previous spirit of cosmopolitianism, but also resulted in the integration of several national areas: this latter effect was especially noticeable in such culturally-decentralised areas as Germany, Scandinavia and the Byzantine Balkans. A brand of clerical nationalism grew increasingly powerful in France, despite Fouche's attempts to thwart it; a Spanish national revival also occured; and the earlier growth of a British (as opposed to English, Scottish or Irish) national identity, which continued into this era, is also often classed here. A proto-nationalist sentiment arose in Russia as well, though not all that strong outside of the heartlands. The nationalist movements weren't always succesful, especially there where they went against the local governments. Irish nationalism, as already implied, had pettered out. The Italian nationalists were confounded by the phenomenon of "pocket nationalism" - the growth of separate national indetities, especially in Naples (due to its Spanish ties and the status of a regional power in the Central Mediterranean) and Piedmont ("the Alpine kingdom", influenced by both the Swiss, the French and the Germans). Polish and Hungarian nationalists had achieved some degree of success in reviving the national consciousness, with particular emphasis on religion in both cases (probably a reaction to the Holy Roman Empire's secularity and anti-clericalism).
Europe was badly-shaken by the war. Much damage had been done to trade. The territories of the Holy Roman Empire (including the new gains) were lying in varying degrees of devastation and ruin. Virtually all of Europe had participated in the war, and as it was even more expensive than the previous ones, even such countries as Naples - that were basically untouched by the war itself, fighting at a comfortable distance - were left in war debt, the situation further worsened by the normal post-war recession. Thus the rest of the 1800s were spent on rest, reconstruction and reorganisation by most of the countries. This continued into 1810s, though by then the nations were naturally strenghthened, and free to involve themselves in colonial ventures - and certain major developments within Europe itself.
Meanwhile, in the greater world, European influence and power grew: early on in the shape of renewed Anglo-French dualism, and later in a somewhat more multilateral colonial competition with the resurgence of "alternative" European colonial powers. Nevertheless, several non-European states too had thrived and prospered in this era, playing the Europeans off against each other whilst reforming and modernising their nations to better face the challenges of the new age...
And now, in some more detail, we will go over these two decades and their "end products":
The war period saw the resolution of many issues that had dominated the British Commonwealth since the very Revolution of 1770. For one thing, the Battle of Salvora caused a revival of national pride and confirmed the renaissance of British sea power. At the same time, the British Atlantic victory was incomplete, while most remaining Indian ambitions had to be abandoned for good in the wake of Decaen's Franco-Mysorean invasion of Bengal. Yet by contrast, the gains made in the Pacific were much greater than either the losses elsewhere or the victories expected here. Though Pitt had fallen, his Pacific strategy had triumphed, as from Van Diemen's Land to Kamchatka and the Quadra Island, the British ruled supreme, and many other opportunities for expansion were only beginning to appear: Australia, Japan and Spanish America all looked promising. Thus Britain now was a confirmed great power, and furthermore, a great power with clear goals. Nevertheless, France remained a threat. Lastly, with the rise of the Washingtonian Republic, Britain's influence and interest in the eastern coast of North America diminished (much like France's, it must be admitted), but on the other hand the remaining east American colonies were fully integrated, their loyalty to the Commonwealth assured, especially as many of the frustrated, increasingly ostracised (for "selling Pennsylvania to French lackeys") New Englander radicals begun fleeing to the Republic. Similar developments took place in Ireland, where the anti-British party's collapse became apparent when it tried to force a rebellion upon Fouche's instigation; it didn't even get off the ground, and the increasingly-"Britified" Ireland became only closer to Birmingham, in fact becoming "more British than Britain itself" (some even proposed moving the capital to the British-majority Dublin, in the name of trans-Atlantic solidarity of the Commonwealth's core components - Britain, Ireland and New England). Meanwhile, it also became clear that innovation and industrialisation had paid off, and greater emphasis was placed on that. A series of crises in 1806 and 1807 saw the culmination of many long-standing political and social tensions, as Pitt the Younger's government fell, and John Cartwright formed a peculiar Radical-Moderate government. Whilst commanding loyal support amongst the more radical and liberal of the Moderates and the more moderate of the Radicals, Cartwright alienated both the conservative wing of the Moderates and the Radical die-hards. His control over and authority in his own Radical party disintegrated. As this became increasingly apparent, he decided upon a daring maneuver that destroyed the Two-Party system - declaring that if the Radicals don't want to follow him, he won't lead them, he stepped down, left the party and created the new "Reform Party", which was immediately joined by many of his supporters from both camps. Nevertheless, this gamble didn't pay off and in 1807 the Moderates came back to power under George Canning (who concentrated on foreign issues - distancing Britain from much of Europe (notably the HRE), but on the other hand confirming the alliance with Britain and establishing ties with several Russian governments as they replaced one another; thus Britain was able to concentrate on the colonial affairs, especially the "Pacific Project"). However, the Reformers retained great support and influence, and Cartwright became Prime Minister again in 1812, introducing a series of social reforms, most notably initiating a worker housing programme. As for the Radicals, they retreated into the fringe, though still maintaining a certain presence in the Parliament; some of them turned to illegal activism, trying to incite a revolution, with not much success apart from the occasional riot or assassination.
In many regards France was similar to Britain, yet in many others it differed. Here, too, the war resulted in a growth of national pride - but it was dimmed by the perceived "defeat without a defeat", as the nationalists had labelled the Paris Congress. Although in truth it was a victory - the Holy Roman Empire was put in its place and considerably weakened, Portugal, Belgium and most Italian states were all forced into the French diplomatic sphere, and French hegemony in the Indian Ocean was asserted - this national frustration continued to haunt Joseph Fouche for the rest of his political career, and in a way became his undoing. In any case, it was indeed true that the Central Powers had held, and thus there weren't many opportunities to pursue in Europe - and so, much like Britain, France initially concentrated on colonial pursuits, especially in the Indian Ocean where East Africa was conquered, a greater presence was set up in India with several new trade outposts and forts, and exploring other territories: this latter activity resulted in the establishment of French holdings in Dauphin-Terre (West Australia) and a few small Central Indian Ocean islands. Meanwhile, a general loosening of control occured in the Americas: Nouvelle France gained autonomy and near-free trade with other countries, while in the Carribean possessions a programme of gradual compensated emancipation of slaves was introduced, if only to rub the noses of the more-liberal-and-progressive-than-thou British into it, causing more intense debates between the emancipationists and the Moderates (ultimately, Prime Minister Cartwright introduced a similar programme in 1816, also placing restrictions on slave trade); basically, the French had mostly given up on the continent. Not so in Africa, where not only the last Omani colonies were grabbed, but also Senegal and Algiers colonies expanded and new ones founded in West and Central Africas. Meanwhile, in Europe, the French diplomats concentrated on playing people off against each other. Their efforts had mixed results in the end; while Russia and Byzantium ended up on the French side, Scandinavia was firmly aligned with Britain, while the Austro-Prussian alliance grew only stronger and closer. A new series of dramatic developments commenced in 1811, when Louis XVI finally died.
His son, Louis XVII, was far more strong-minded and independent; and so he resented the all-powerful Premier Joseph Fouche, who had by then gained so many enemies that he had to use blackmail, assassinations and so forth to maintain his power on a daily level. Although in this manner he had defeated a coup attempt on May 5th 1809 and attained de facto dictatorial powers in the aftermath, he himself already realised that by entrenching himself he had allowed his power to be under constant siege from all the factions of the political opposition. Not much of a fan of the parlementary system, Louis XVII did realise - if only because of Fouche's example - that it was possible to manipulate it to his means. In the Versailles, he carefully conspired with leaders of the First and Second Estates, with the Paris garrison, with the industrialists and the Physiocrats, gradually bringing those opposing factions together. Fouche, who had grown lax in the regards of the monarchy which he perceived to be powerless and discredited, was very surprised when after a faked assassination attempt Louis XVII moved to Tuileries, while the army occupied the streets and the Parlement refused to gather. Realising his situation to be dire, Fouche attempted to flee but was captured by the military patrols. Negotiating a truce with Louis XVII, he agreed to relinquish power and retire from political life; in the end, it was a honourable retire and a priveleged exile. Most of the French political world would greatly regret their decision to let Fouche go when a decade later his memoirs were published... but for now, it seemed that the all-powerful Premier, the head of the parliamentary police state, the head of the "Godless bourgoise", was firmly and perpetually "out". A huge political vacuum appeared; and it was filled in by Louis XVII, who again used the same factions that removed Fouche to assert control over France for himself. His uncle Charles d'Artois became the new Premier, to the dismay and outrage of the radicals and the republicans. The Ultramontanes asserted their power, and introduced measures that favoured the new state ideology of "clerical nationalism" - a product of fruitful "back-scratching" cooperation between the King and the Pope, who became and remained very close allies both politically and ideologically. A new emphasis on Catholicism was placed in education, missionaries were sent to the colonies (this provoked uprisings... precisely as was planned, for after those uprisings were defeated the various local religious leaders were physically removed), and in a full contrast to the Imperial ongoings the various "uncatholic" philosophers were actively persecuted; the Jews were mostly tolerated, but also limited in their progress. The Parlement's powers were gradually and carefully "redefined" - basically it became an advisory organ again, with great powers... and the unalienable rights of Royal Veto and Royal Prerogative. This shift coincided with the desamortisation in Spain and the secularisation in Naples; thus, in a supreme irony of history, the traditionally-clericalist Spain and the traditionally-secularist France changed their places, causing a north-south schism amongst the Bourbon powers, although in name at least the Family Compact was preserved. This was however a political change also (if anything, the disagreements on religion, though also important, were secondary from the historical viewpoint; rather, the main issue was that Spain grew increasingly independent in its foreign policies) - Spain, after its little coup d'etat, gradually switched towards a clearly more independent foreign policy and was generally supported by Naples and Portugal, while France retained the loyalty of the Papacy, Genoa and the Ultramontane Belgium. This diplomatic revolution caused major changes elsewhere; the French alliance with Russia was ultimately confirmed in exchange for Russian tolerance of Catholics and Uniates in their territory (this compromise was caused by greater necessity of such an alliance between the two countries), but the decline of French influence in the Mediterranean caused the Byzantine alignment with Spain (whilst France continued to ally with Egypt... even if the Egyptians thought it to be more of a blatant betrayal and conquest, but the heathens are always silly like that). Meanwhile, both Piedmont and Holland used this opportunity to leave the French block altogether, though their subsequent actions were rather different.
Yet it was not all loss for the French. The disintegration of the Bourbon Powers urged it to establish a greater decree of control over the Mediterranean. Using France's vast influence amongst the Knights Hospitaller and his own reputation and title of "Rex Christianissimus", he attained the status of Protector of the Order of the Knights of Saint John; while the Order ruled on in Malta and Tripolitania, it now ruled there in the name of King Louis XVII (and outside of any other French authority, it must be added; however, this status was a hereditary one). Meanwhile, as the situation in Egypt detiriorated after the death of Murad Bey in 1807, it was made even worse by French and Order proselytising efforts and the Byzantine invasion of the Levant. In 1814 the French had invaded Egypt and crushed the various warlords and heirs one-by-one with stunning ease and advancing down the Nile to assert control there. A slightly more difficult situation came in the Holy Land, but ultimately Pierre Dupont d'Etang defeated the outdated Byzantine army at Jaffa. A fully-fledged Franco-Byzantine (or even Mediterranean, as Spain finally dared to make its stance clear, launching the polarisation of the Bourbon powers along the lines already mentioned) war seemed to be a distinct possibility, but ultimately peac was signed; the Byzantines had to content themselves with Syria, Lebanon and pilgrim access to the holy sites in the Holy Land, which was placed under the Order's jurisdiction (whereas the rest of Egypt, plus Hejjaz, was put under the control of French colonial authorities, which tended to be more flexible and tolerant towards the Muslims, often working with their local leaders with the quiet consent of King Louis, who was at this point more pragmatical than fanatical). This conquest was of great value and revived French supremacy in the Mediterranean, although not an unchallenged one. The capture of Jerusalem was also lauded by the clerical propagandists: where Friedrich the Red-Bearded and Richard the Lion-Hearted had failed, Rex Christianissimus Louis XVII, the modern-day Saint Louis, had triumphed. Indeed, he had largely triumphed at home and abroad, and the Ultramontane France had weathered the storms. The radicals, humbled, were increasingly ostracised by king and country, and often fled abroad (the HRE being a surprisingly promising destination due to its anticlericalism, but Spain being even better in most cases as it actively invited French specialists in) or went into the underground, carrying out operations of agitation and individual terror. Those that remained in the Parlement were basically the ones that betrayed their causes, transforming into mild liberals - or, as was actually more widespread, attaining nobility and becoming die-hard reactionaries just as they were once die-hard revolutionaries (such political polarity is natural for certain temperaments). Abroad, the HRE, Spain and Britain were obvious opponents, yet none of them were openly hostile, or even necessarily enemies. And yet, Louis XVII couldn't but feel that his various enemies were conspiring against him... In the meantime, he rested and consolidated his gains, whilst modernising the French military.
In the face of the bitter ideological divides, the powerful modern technology and the theory of Total War, it was becoming increasingly obvious that any future European war would be far more horrible than any of those that had occured in the past... But this is a digression.
While the outcome of the Third World War for France was at worst dubious, for Spain the war was a definite defeat; the Spanish had failed to annex Portugal, to destroy British naval power or even to maintain control over the Philippines, which effectively meant the end of the serious Spanish presence in the Pacific (beyond the American coasts, anyway). The Spanish fleet, both commercial and military, was nearly crippled. Control over the colonies was disrupted by rebellions. Yet the situation in Spain itself was even worse, as the economy stumbled and the government united the society against it. Under government in this case we mean the royal favourite Manuel de Godoy, who held de facto absolute power in Spain. In the wake of the defeat and the socioeconomic crisis, Spain simply craved some sort of a change, which de Godoy was unwilling - and unable, for he had long since lost any real social support base - to provide. This seemed to be a pretty standard "hated minister" situation, but the issue was complicated by King Carlos IV's fanatical loyalty to his minister. Furthermore, whilst the lower classes mostly concentrated their hated on de Godoy, both the rising Spanish bourgoise and the liberal afrancesado noblemen and courtiers were increasingly opposed to Carlos IV for his complete incompetence. To many of them, it seemed that even if they could remove de Godoy without having to remove Carlos IV, it would only result in some other minister, or perhaps Carlos' domineering wife Maria Luisa, concentrating undue power over the weakling king - and thus, Spain - in their hands. Instead, many proposed a change of monarch, and the liberal, progressive, and at the same time independent infante Fernando became a natural leader for this faction. It also received clandestine British support and, via the liberal (or simply anti-Carlist) officerdom, the support of large segments of the army. On June 26th 1809, in a classical coup d'etat, Manuel de Godoy was arrested and incarcerated (later hanged - an unusual disgrace) by the Spanish army, and when Carlos tried to protest this he himself was declared mentally unfit to rule, and later allowed to move to Paris with his wife and retainers, living out the rest of his days in obscurity apart from a few unsavoury incidents of him trying to regain power, at the urging from Maria Luisa.
The Infante came to power as King Fernando VII. Immediately he had to secure his new position from hypothetic attacks from within and without; in that he was masterfully assisted by Don Miguel Ricardo de Alava, who travelled to Paris and there attained the French recognition of the new government (de Godoy's incompetence and corruption were so great that their benefits to France (namely, the comparative easiness with which de Godoy could be manipulated) were, it was thought, well outweighed by the negative impact they had on Spain in all other regards; and Fouche wasn't about to launch a war over some cretin Bourbon). Britain too was remarkably quick to recognise the new government. Having defeated a countercoup attempt, Fernando VII proceeded to reform the Cortes, expanding it and basically changing it into a semblance of the pre-1785 French Parlement (representative, but with social discrimination and the monarchy still retaining de jure absolute power). Though not very powerful, the Cortes proved a very important innovation as it basically allowed Fernando to properly assess the situation all over Spain's still-vast empire, and to pick out capable cadres to execute the reforms which he had decided upon. In this manner, he managed to introduce sweeping changes. The Spanish colonial empire was re-organised and decentralised, decreasing opportunities for abuse or betrayal amongst the local elites and the same time, with state investment and incentives, speeding up the development of the colonies. The tariff policy was not a one Fernando seemed to have a firm opinion about; at first he lowered them at the demands of the liberal bourgoise, but when the British threatened Spanish America with economic conquest he raised them heavily again, re-starting the Anglo-Spanish tariff war. Eventually a compromise was worked out and the tariffs went back to something like normal, the Spanish government investing heavily into Spain's own industrial development. All those investments were fruitful, but obviously drained the treasury, initiating the highly-controversial desamortisation - the large-scale confiscation of church property, combined with a general secularisation. That was not taken well at all in Spain, especially in Castille where a major rebellion forced Fernando to briefly flee to Seville in September 1815. The rebels invited Carlos IV to take back the throne, but the ex-king and his family were arrested again while trying to cross the border. Rallying his own troops, Fernando lifted the siege of Madrid and defeated the rebels in a key battle at Valladolid, yet his relations with the Pope and with France were never the same again. At this point the French had actually threatened intervention in the favour of the retreating rebels, but the clericalists were quickly finished off, while Britain officially declared that it intends to help defend Spanish sovereignity should it be threatened "by any third power". This, along with the Holy Land crisis, made the Franco-Spanish schism apparent, though not irreversable. Still, having covered his reform expenses, Fernando VII decided to capitalise on his military success by forcing through a land reform that finally ended serfdom. Though it was compensated in most areas, in Castille it was basically forceful and uncompensated except for those that remained actively loyal during the rebellion. This ensured the peculiar situation in which Castille, once Spain's heart, now became the center of opposition to central power - which still was wielded from Madrid (which, it must be noted, was by now quite liberal and Gallicised, and out of touch with its reactionary surroundings) - and more specifically, separatism, no doubt supported by the French. Aristocratic (and other, especially those of the various arcane economic organisations such as the Mesta) priveleges were curtailed, though not quite to the same extent as in France. In the sphere of economy, as already mentioned, the emphasis was placed on industrialisation and competing with the foreign traders; many of Fernando's economical reforms and policies were inspired by the writings of the late Pedro Rodriguez, Conde de Campomanes.
Lastly, in foreign affairs, Spain forged greater ties with Naples and Portugal, and another alliance with Byzantium, whilst continuing the reconciliation with Britain, signing the important Treaty of Seville in 1818 (which settled various Anglo-Spanish colonial, commercial and other disputes, chiefly in the Americas). Spain wasn't very expansionist in this time period; it still was busy consolidating and developing the vast amounts of land gained during the late 18th century landgrab in central North America; still, some parts of west Sahara were claimed during this time.
The Third World War saw many features that were, though sometimes present in previous wars, never noticed on such a scale before. This primarily included the massive national conscription and economic mobilisation, the deployment of various new military technology (steamers, artillery-haulers, the Suez Canal, the flintlock rifles - especially "sharp" ones, i.e. these used by the British and Austrian sharpeshooters), and the French use of "la grande strategie" - massive, aggressive military operations and strategic-level maneuvers, backed up by an efficient comissariat and assisted by various unconventional methods (though the latter, most famously representated by the "partisans", was actually mostly used by the Poles in the late Polish campaign and by the Austrians during Erzherzog Karl's grand counter-offensive). Likewise, French operations in Prussia were marked down - erroneously - as the first instance of "total warfare" in world history. Lazare Carnot was particularily famous for his theories of "la guerre totale" and "la grande strategie", propagated in likewise-named books a few years after the war. Though the military old guard was outraged at his "unchivalrous" theories, the said guard had been thoroughly humbled and discredited by the war, and the new commanders, such as Napoleon Bonaparte and Erzherzog Karl, were more willing to listen to Carnot and other military theoreticians of the "new school". Military reforms were undertaken by many countries, based both on these theories and on the lessons learned during the war. Also, greater emphasis was now placed on the development of new military technologies, though in a way this has already been said in the previous paragraph. On a tactical level, a major change in attitude also took place during the war - a general shift favouring aggressiveness, as opposed to the previous, more conservative and cautious "cordon" tactics on the land and "line of battle" tactics on the sea.
Culturally, the Age of Steam was also the Age of Nationalism, or of Secondary/National Enlightenment as some call it. The Third World War had basically put an end to the old, Cosmopolitian Enlightenment; however, it would probably be more correct to say that it simply withered away during the late 18th/early 19th centuries, with the War only speeding up the process. It is not to say that a cultural dark age had come, ofcourse; simply one generation of philosophers and their pupils was replaced by a new generation that, while inheriting their ideals, changed them, sometimes beyond recognition. The Enlightenment achieved many of its goals, became unnecessary and so - died, or rather was replaced by the National Enlightenment; similariliy, the enlightened absolute monarchies had either succesfully been reformed into parliamentary or semi-parliamentary ones, either collapsed, either fell back into reaction. The defining trait of the Age of Nationalism was, ofcourse, nationalism - the growth of national consciousness in Europe. This not only hampered the previous spirit of cosmopolitianism, but also resulted in the integration of several national areas: this latter effect was especially noticeable in such culturally-decentralised areas as Germany, Scandinavia and the Byzantine Balkans. A brand of clerical nationalism grew increasingly powerful in France, despite Fouche's attempts to thwart it; a Spanish national revival also occured; and the earlier growth of a British (as opposed to English, Scottish or Irish) national identity, which continued into this era, is also often classed here. A proto-nationalist sentiment arose in Russia as well, though not all that strong outside of the heartlands. The nationalist movements weren't always succesful, especially there where they went against the local governments. Irish nationalism, as already implied, had pettered out. The Italian nationalists were confounded by the phenomenon of "pocket nationalism" - the growth of separate national indetities, especially in Naples (due to its Spanish ties and the status of a regional power in the Central Mediterranean) and Piedmont ("the Alpine kingdom", influenced by both the Swiss, the French and the Germans). Polish and Hungarian nationalists had achieved some degree of success in reviving the national consciousness, with particular emphasis on religion in both cases (probably a reaction to the Holy Roman Empire's secularity and anti-clericalism).
Europe was badly-shaken by the war. Much damage had been done to trade. The territories of the Holy Roman Empire (including the new gains) were lying in varying degrees of devastation and ruin. Virtually all of Europe had participated in the war, and as it was even more expensive than the previous ones, even such countries as Naples - that were basically untouched by the war itself, fighting at a comfortable distance - were left in war debt, the situation further worsened by the normal post-war recession. Thus the rest of the 1800s were spent on rest, reconstruction and reorganisation by most of the countries. This continued into 1810s, though by then the nations were naturally strenghthened, and free to involve themselves in colonial ventures - and certain major developments within Europe itself.
Meanwhile, in the greater world, European influence and power grew: early on in the shape of renewed Anglo-French dualism, and later in a somewhat more multilateral colonial competition with the resurgence of "alternative" European colonial powers. Nevertheless, several non-European states too had thrived and prospered in this era, playing the Europeans off against each other whilst reforming and modernising their nations to better face the challenges of the new age...
And now, in some more detail, we will go over these two decades and their "end products":
The war period saw the resolution of many issues that had dominated the British Commonwealth since the very Revolution of 1770. For one thing, the Battle of Salvora caused a revival of national pride and confirmed the renaissance of British sea power. At the same time, the British Atlantic victory was incomplete, while most remaining Indian ambitions had to be abandoned for good in the wake of Decaen's Franco-Mysorean invasion of Bengal. Yet by contrast, the gains made in the Pacific were much greater than either the losses elsewhere or the victories expected here. Though Pitt had fallen, his Pacific strategy had triumphed, as from Van Diemen's Land to Kamchatka and the Quadra Island, the British ruled supreme, and many other opportunities for expansion were only beginning to appear: Australia, Japan and Spanish America all looked promising. Thus Britain now was a confirmed great power, and furthermore, a great power with clear goals. Nevertheless, France remained a threat. Lastly, with the rise of the Washingtonian Republic, Britain's influence and interest in the eastern coast of North America diminished (much like France's, it must be admitted), but on the other hand the remaining east American colonies were fully integrated, their loyalty to the Commonwealth assured, especially as many of the frustrated, increasingly ostracised (for "selling Pennsylvania to French lackeys") New Englander radicals begun fleeing to the Republic. Similar developments took place in Ireland, where the anti-British party's collapse became apparent when it tried to force a rebellion upon Fouche's instigation; it didn't even get off the ground, and the increasingly-"Britified" Ireland became only closer to Birmingham, in fact becoming "more British than Britain itself" (some even proposed moving the capital to the British-majority Dublin, in the name of trans-Atlantic solidarity of the Commonwealth's core components - Britain, Ireland and New England). Meanwhile, it also became clear that innovation and industrialisation had paid off, and greater emphasis was placed on that. A series of crises in 1806 and 1807 saw the culmination of many long-standing political and social tensions, as Pitt the Younger's government fell, and John Cartwright formed a peculiar Radical-Moderate government. Whilst commanding loyal support amongst the more radical and liberal of the Moderates and the more moderate of the Radicals, Cartwright alienated both the conservative wing of the Moderates and the Radical die-hards. His control over and authority in his own Radical party disintegrated. As this became increasingly apparent, he decided upon a daring maneuver that destroyed the Two-Party system - declaring that if the Radicals don't want to follow him, he won't lead them, he stepped down, left the party and created the new "Reform Party", which was immediately joined by many of his supporters from both camps. Nevertheless, this gamble didn't pay off and in 1807 the Moderates came back to power under George Canning (who concentrated on foreign issues - distancing Britain from much of Europe (notably the HRE), but on the other hand confirming the alliance with Britain and establishing ties with several Russian governments as they replaced one another; thus Britain was able to concentrate on the colonial affairs, especially the "Pacific Project"). However, the Reformers retained great support and influence, and Cartwright became Prime Minister again in 1812, introducing a series of social reforms, most notably initiating a worker housing programme. As for the Radicals, they retreated into the fringe, though still maintaining a certain presence in the Parliament; some of them turned to illegal activism, trying to incite a revolution, with not much success apart from the occasional riot or assassination.
In many regards France was similar to Britain, yet in many others it differed. Here, too, the war resulted in a growth of national pride - but it was dimmed by the perceived "defeat without a defeat", as the nationalists had labelled the Paris Congress. Although in truth it was a victory - the Holy Roman Empire was put in its place and considerably weakened, Portugal, Belgium and most Italian states were all forced into the French diplomatic sphere, and French hegemony in the Indian Ocean was asserted - this national frustration continued to haunt Joseph Fouche for the rest of his political career, and in a way became his undoing. In any case, it was indeed true that the Central Powers had held, and thus there weren't many opportunities to pursue in Europe - and so, much like Britain, France initially concentrated on colonial pursuits, especially in the Indian Ocean where East Africa was conquered, a greater presence was set up in India with several new trade outposts and forts, and exploring other territories: this latter activity resulted in the establishment of French holdings in Dauphin-Terre (West Australia) and a few small Central Indian Ocean islands. Meanwhile, a general loosening of control occured in the Americas: Nouvelle France gained autonomy and near-free trade with other countries, while in the Carribean possessions a programme of gradual compensated emancipation of slaves was introduced, if only to rub the noses of the more-liberal-and-progressive-than-thou British into it, causing more intense debates between the emancipationists and the Moderates (ultimately, Prime Minister Cartwright introduced a similar programme in 1816, also placing restrictions on slave trade); basically, the French had mostly given up on the continent. Not so in Africa, where not only the last Omani colonies were grabbed, but also Senegal and Algiers colonies expanded and new ones founded in West and Central Africas. Meanwhile, in Europe, the French diplomats concentrated on playing people off against each other. Their efforts had mixed results in the end; while Russia and Byzantium ended up on the French side, Scandinavia was firmly aligned with Britain, while the Austro-Prussian alliance grew only stronger and closer. A new series of dramatic developments commenced in 1811, when Louis XVI finally died.
His son, Louis XVII, was far more strong-minded and independent; and so he resented the all-powerful Premier Joseph Fouche, who had by then gained so many enemies that he had to use blackmail, assassinations and so forth to maintain his power on a daily level. Although in this manner he had defeated a coup attempt on May 5th 1809 and attained de facto dictatorial powers in the aftermath, he himself already realised that by entrenching himself he had allowed his power to be under constant siege from all the factions of the political opposition. Not much of a fan of the parlementary system, Louis XVII did realise - if only because of Fouche's example - that it was possible to manipulate it to his means. In the Versailles, he carefully conspired with leaders of the First and Second Estates, with the Paris garrison, with the industrialists and the Physiocrats, gradually bringing those opposing factions together. Fouche, who had grown lax in the regards of the monarchy which he perceived to be powerless and discredited, was very surprised when after a faked assassination attempt Louis XVII moved to Tuileries, while the army occupied the streets and the Parlement refused to gather. Realising his situation to be dire, Fouche attempted to flee but was captured by the military patrols. Negotiating a truce with Louis XVII, he agreed to relinquish power and retire from political life; in the end, it was a honourable retire and a priveleged exile. Most of the French political world would greatly regret their decision to let Fouche go when a decade later his memoirs were published... but for now, it seemed that the all-powerful Premier, the head of the parliamentary police state, the head of the "Godless bourgoise", was firmly and perpetually "out". A huge political vacuum appeared; and it was filled in by Louis XVII, who again used the same factions that removed Fouche to assert control over France for himself. His uncle Charles d'Artois became the new Premier, to the dismay and outrage of the radicals and the republicans. The Ultramontanes asserted their power, and introduced measures that favoured the new state ideology of "clerical nationalism" - a product of fruitful "back-scratching" cooperation between the King and the Pope, who became and remained very close allies both politically and ideologically. A new emphasis on Catholicism was placed in education, missionaries were sent to the colonies (this provoked uprisings... precisely as was planned, for after those uprisings were defeated the various local religious leaders were physically removed), and in a full contrast to the Imperial ongoings the various "uncatholic" philosophers were actively persecuted; the Jews were mostly tolerated, but also limited in their progress. The Parlement's powers were gradually and carefully "redefined" - basically it became an advisory organ again, with great powers... and the unalienable rights of Royal Veto and Royal Prerogative. This shift coincided with the desamortisation in Spain and the secularisation in Naples; thus, in a supreme irony of history, the traditionally-clericalist Spain and the traditionally-secularist France changed their places, causing a north-south schism amongst the Bourbon powers, although in name at least the Family Compact was preserved. This was however a political change also (if anything, the disagreements on religion, though also important, were secondary from the historical viewpoint; rather, the main issue was that Spain grew increasingly independent in its foreign policies) - Spain, after its little coup d'etat, gradually switched towards a clearly more independent foreign policy and was generally supported by Naples and Portugal, while France retained the loyalty of the Papacy, Genoa and the Ultramontane Belgium. This diplomatic revolution caused major changes elsewhere; the French alliance with Russia was ultimately confirmed in exchange for Russian tolerance of Catholics and Uniates in their territory (this compromise was caused by greater necessity of such an alliance between the two countries), but the decline of French influence in the Mediterranean caused the Byzantine alignment with Spain (whilst France continued to ally with Egypt... even if the Egyptians thought it to be more of a blatant betrayal and conquest, but the heathens are always silly like that). Meanwhile, both Piedmont and Holland used this opportunity to leave the French block altogether, though their subsequent actions were rather different.
Yet it was not all loss for the French. The disintegration of the Bourbon Powers urged it to establish a greater decree of control over the Mediterranean. Using France's vast influence amongst the Knights Hospitaller and his own reputation and title of "Rex Christianissimus", he attained the status of Protector of the Order of the Knights of Saint John; while the Order ruled on in Malta and Tripolitania, it now ruled there in the name of King Louis XVII (and outside of any other French authority, it must be added; however, this status was a hereditary one). Meanwhile, as the situation in Egypt detiriorated after the death of Murad Bey in 1807, it was made even worse by French and Order proselytising efforts and the Byzantine invasion of the Levant. In 1814 the French had invaded Egypt and crushed the various warlords and heirs one-by-one with stunning ease and advancing down the Nile to assert control there. A slightly more difficult situation came in the Holy Land, but ultimately Pierre Dupont d'Etang defeated the outdated Byzantine army at Jaffa. A fully-fledged Franco-Byzantine (or even Mediterranean, as Spain finally dared to make its stance clear, launching the polarisation of the Bourbon powers along the lines already mentioned) war seemed to be a distinct possibility, but ultimately peac was signed; the Byzantines had to content themselves with Syria, Lebanon and pilgrim access to the holy sites in the Holy Land, which was placed under the Order's jurisdiction (whereas the rest of Egypt, plus Hejjaz, was put under the control of French colonial authorities, which tended to be more flexible and tolerant towards the Muslims, often working with their local leaders with the quiet consent of King Louis, who was at this point more pragmatical than fanatical). This conquest was of great value and revived French supremacy in the Mediterranean, although not an unchallenged one. The capture of Jerusalem was also lauded by the clerical propagandists: where Friedrich the Red-Bearded and Richard the Lion-Hearted had failed, Rex Christianissimus Louis XVII, the modern-day Saint Louis, had triumphed. Indeed, he had largely triumphed at home and abroad, and the Ultramontane France had weathered the storms. The radicals, humbled, were increasingly ostracised by king and country, and often fled abroad (the HRE being a surprisingly promising destination due to its anticlericalism, but Spain being even better in most cases as it actively invited French specialists in) or went into the underground, carrying out operations of agitation and individual terror. Those that remained in the Parlement were basically the ones that betrayed their causes, transforming into mild liberals - or, as was actually more widespread, attaining nobility and becoming die-hard reactionaries just as they were once die-hard revolutionaries (such political polarity is natural for certain temperaments). Abroad, the HRE, Spain and Britain were obvious opponents, yet none of them were openly hostile, or even necessarily enemies. And yet, Louis XVII couldn't but feel that his various enemies were conspiring against him... In the meantime, he rested and consolidated his gains, whilst modernising the French military.
In the face of the bitter ideological divides, the powerful modern technology and the theory of Total War, it was becoming increasingly obvious that any future European war would be far more horrible than any of those that had occured in the past... But this is a digression.
While the outcome of the Third World War for France was at worst dubious, for Spain the war was a definite defeat; the Spanish had failed to annex Portugal, to destroy British naval power or even to maintain control over the Philippines, which effectively meant the end of the serious Spanish presence in the Pacific (beyond the American coasts, anyway). The Spanish fleet, both commercial and military, was nearly crippled. Control over the colonies was disrupted by rebellions. Yet the situation in Spain itself was even worse, as the economy stumbled and the government united the society against it. Under government in this case we mean the royal favourite Manuel de Godoy, who held de facto absolute power in Spain. In the wake of the defeat and the socioeconomic crisis, Spain simply craved some sort of a change, which de Godoy was unwilling - and unable, for he had long since lost any real social support base - to provide. This seemed to be a pretty standard "hated minister" situation, but the issue was complicated by King Carlos IV's fanatical loyalty to his minister. Furthermore, whilst the lower classes mostly concentrated their hated on de Godoy, both the rising Spanish bourgoise and the liberal afrancesado noblemen and courtiers were increasingly opposed to Carlos IV for his complete incompetence. To many of them, it seemed that even if they could remove de Godoy without having to remove Carlos IV, it would only result in some other minister, or perhaps Carlos' domineering wife Maria Luisa, concentrating undue power over the weakling king - and thus, Spain - in their hands. Instead, many proposed a change of monarch, and the liberal, progressive, and at the same time independent infante Fernando became a natural leader for this faction. It also received clandestine British support and, via the liberal (or simply anti-Carlist) officerdom, the support of large segments of the army. On June 26th 1809, in a classical coup d'etat, Manuel de Godoy was arrested and incarcerated (later hanged - an unusual disgrace) by the Spanish army, and when Carlos tried to protest this he himself was declared mentally unfit to rule, and later allowed to move to Paris with his wife and retainers, living out the rest of his days in obscurity apart from a few unsavoury incidents of him trying to regain power, at the urging from Maria Luisa.
The Infante came to power as King Fernando VII. Immediately he had to secure his new position from hypothetic attacks from within and without; in that he was masterfully assisted by Don Miguel Ricardo de Alava, who travelled to Paris and there attained the French recognition of the new government (de Godoy's incompetence and corruption were so great that their benefits to France (namely, the comparative easiness with which de Godoy could be manipulated) were, it was thought, well outweighed by the negative impact they had on Spain in all other regards; and Fouche wasn't about to launch a war over some cretin Bourbon). Britain too was remarkably quick to recognise the new government. Having defeated a countercoup attempt, Fernando VII proceeded to reform the Cortes, expanding it and basically changing it into a semblance of the pre-1785 French Parlement (representative, but with social discrimination and the monarchy still retaining de jure absolute power). Though not very powerful, the Cortes proved a very important innovation as it basically allowed Fernando to properly assess the situation all over Spain's still-vast empire, and to pick out capable cadres to execute the reforms which he had decided upon. In this manner, he managed to introduce sweeping changes. The Spanish colonial empire was re-organised and decentralised, decreasing opportunities for abuse or betrayal amongst the local elites and the same time, with state investment and incentives, speeding up the development of the colonies. The tariff policy was not a one Fernando seemed to have a firm opinion about; at first he lowered them at the demands of the liberal bourgoise, but when the British threatened Spanish America with economic conquest he raised them heavily again, re-starting the Anglo-Spanish tariff war. Eventually a compromise was worked out and the tariffs went back to something like normal, the Spanish government investing heavily into Spain's own industrial development. All those investments were fruitful, but obviously drained the treasury, initiating the highly-controversial desamortisation - the large-scale confiscation of church property, combined with a general secularisation. That was not taken well at all in Spain, especially in Castille where a major rebellion forced Fernando to briefly flee to Seville in September 1815. The rebels invited Carlos IV to take back the throne, but the ex-king and his family were arrested again while trying to cross the border. Rallying his own troops, Fernando lifted the siege of Madrid and defeated the rebels in a key battle at Valladolid, yet his relations with the Pope and with France were never the same again. At this point the French had actually threatened intervention in the favour of the retreating rebels, but the clericalists were quickly finished off, while Britain officially declared that it intends to help defend Spanish sovereignity should it be threatened "by any third power". This, along with the Holy Land crisis, made the Franco-Spanish schism apparent, though not irreversable. Still, having covered his reform expenses, Fernando VII decided to capitalise on his military success by forcing through a land reform that finally ended serfdom. Though it was compensated in most areas, in Castille it was basically forceful and uncompensated except for those that remained actively loyal during the rebellion. This ensured the peculiar situation in which Castille, once Spain's heart, now became the center of opposition to central power - which still was wielded from Madrid (which, it must be noted, was by now quite liberal and Gallicised, and out of touch with its reactionary surroundings) - and more specifically, separatism, no doubt supported by the French. Aristocratic (and other, especially those of the various arcane economic organisations such as the Mesta) priveleges were curtailed, though not quite to the same extent as in France. In the sphere of economy, as already mentioned, the emphasis was placed on industrialisation and competing with the foreign traders; many of Fernando's economical reforms and policies were inspired by the writings of the late Pedro Rodriguez, Conde de Campomanes.
Lastly, in foreign affairs, Spain forged greater ties with Naples and Portugal, and another alliance with Byzantium, whilst continuing the reconciliation with Britain, signing the important Treaty of Seville in 1818 (which settled various Anglo-Spanish colonial, commercial and other disputes, chiefly in the Americas). Spain wasn't very expansionist in this time period; it still was busy consolidating and developing the vast amounts of land gained during the late 18th century landgrab in central North America; still, some parts of west Sahara were claimed during this time.
das
Regeneration In Process
Nevertheless, Spain had no choice but to involve itself in a foreign military venture in 1817. Pedro IV of Portugal's reign seemed secure when the extinction of the Braganzas was confirmed, but the Portuguese nationalists continued plotting against the half-Spanish king. When the British had abandoned them as part of their attempts to properly reconcile with Spain, they only became desperate. The attempted uprising in Lisboa was defeated with the help of an effective police system, but another one sprung up in Brazil in 1815; admittedly, it was at least as much a Brazilian separatist one as a Portuguese nationalist one, if only because its leaders - the most prominent of which were Francisco de Paula Freire de Andrade, Jose Elvares Maciel and Tomas Antonio Gonzaga - were chiefly Brazilian-born, or at least lived there for a long time. The rebellion saw initial success in the southeastern parts of the colony, especially in Minas Gerais, but as the interfighting begun and the loyalists defeated the rebels at Feira de Santana, the Portuguese army was able to invade the rebel heartlands and ultimately capture Rio de Janeiro and several other key cities. The remaining rebels retreated into the countryside - and there, using Brazil's large size, commited to an oft-brutal partisan war. Portuguese losses mounted, and in the meantime another rebellion begun in the north, and slave rebellions also begun to break out (partially due to the efforts of the original rebels, who thus struck back at the slaveowners that had mostly abandoned them after the fall of Rio de Janeiro). Eventually, Spanish forces intervenned, but even then it took until 1819 to restore a semblance of order, and even afterwards, resistance continued in the countryside and in the jungles. Portugal's hold over its single most important colony was severely compromised, as was Portugal's actual independence, for its government had to rely on Spanish troops to put down rebellions. This tendency alarmed both the British and the French, but neither openly expressed this. Meanwhile, Pedro's regime actually begun to settle down, winning the support of considerable segments of the metropolitan population via limited reforms. With Portugal's Far Eastern empire crippled, the Lisboa Bourbons now increasingly turned towards Africa in search for new colonial opportunities, though for now limiting themselves to the development and expansion of their existant colonies in Angola and Mozambique.
Belgium, as already mentioned, went Ultramontane. Although the Belgian Catholic Church was badly-hit by the Josefian Secularisation, it rapidly got back on its feet with popular and French support. The Protestants in the north and the east rebelled as early as in 1809, but were defeated with French help. After Louis XVII came to power in France, French efforts - and pressure - had redoubled, and Louis I, though himself a scandalous libertine, had no choice but to go along and support the Ultramontane faction, that in any case gained heavy support in the Belgian Parlement after the Protestant defeat. In exchange for Belgium retaining the confiscated church lands, the clerics were granted considerable privileges and powers, especially in the government and in education. This "clericalisation" coincided with a Gallification and cultural repression against the pro-Dutch north and the pro-Imperial east. The re-christened Ostende Compagnie revived its colonial efforts in close cooperation with France, despite a few defection attempts in the face of the anti-Protestant policies invoked.
In the wake of the final abolition of the Oranje Monarchy, the United Republics of Holland were left in a troubled state, even if, unlike many other countries, not socially. Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, the first president of Holland, succesfully reconciled most domestic factions by introducing reforms that decentralised and democratised the country in general and granted the radicals an opportunity to peacefully force through any social reforms they may have in mind, and via some other measures as well; meanwhile, the conservatives were relieved from their fear of a radical revolution, and the liberals were appeased by the general course of the government's policies. The only ones that were definitely discontent were the noblemen and the monarchists, who were often the same thing, but they weren't very strong. The main dilemma had more to do with diplomacy and trade. The Patriotten party that was in near-total control of the Staten-Generaal early in the URH history was initially very pro-French, but the balance changed over time with the British entreaties, the defeat of the 1809 rebellion in Belgium and the actions of Louis XVII. At the same time, by a sort of an inertia, Dutch colonial and commercial efforts in West Africa continued despite the British opposition and competition. These ventures ate up much money for little profit. Even after the Patriotten had split into several squabbling factions, both issues remained. It was in 1816, at the initiative of President Isaac Jan Alexander Gogel, that Holland changed its historical course in a dramatic manner, pledging perpetual neutrality - and securing guarantees thereof from Britain and France. Holland also sold its West African colonies to Britain as the highest bidder. After that, the Dutch concentrated on recovering their economy via an European trade network, and particularily - banking, essentially taking over the niche of the extinct Swiss Confederacy.
The map of Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea was utterly redrawn in the period of 1806-1813. No country was quite as frustrated by the Paris Congress' results as Sweden, whose's Gustav III had been denied any gains whatsoever for Sweden's valorous efforts - the Russians merely agreed to leave Swedish Finland, and even then allowed, despite their promises to do the opposite, various dangerous Finnish revolutionaries to take refuge in Vyborg (admittedly, the Russian government wasn't really able to do much about it by this point even if it was willing...). As the Swedes had went to great lenghts economically and militarily, and placed great emphasis on military reform above anything else in the pre-war period, their frustration was understandable. Gustav III incessantly demanded Estonia and Karelia during the negotiations, or at least some other compensation for his efforts, like Bornholm, or some of the Spanish or Portuguese colonies; he desperately needed something to show for the efforts, as resentment grew in Sweden itself. But all he had gained was the reputation of a land-hungry, opportunistic expansionist, and had to accept a territorial status quo ante bellum. Although the feared revolution in Sweden itself didn't come, royal authority was considerably undermined, and in Finland, continued insurgency proved very difficult to deal with. At the same time, the Kamensky Affair with Russia remained unsettled, an issue for much debate. When the Tsar was overthrown in early 1807 (after a coup attempt of his own) and the first Russian senatorial government finally collapsed in late 1807, Gustav III realised just how ramshackle Russia was, and decided to launch a "quick and victorious war", especially as the hated Nikolai Kamensky was an important member of the northern Russian "stavka" (junta, basically). The Swedish troops did everything right this time; they occupied Estonia, defeated a Russo-Finnish army in a pivotal battle at Petrozavodsk and laid overland and oversea siege to Sankt-Peterburg. Kamensky perished in one of the 1808 battles, at Vsevolozhsk to the east from the former empire's capital. The head of the Peterburg stavka, Aleksandr Ivanovich Ostermann-Tolstoy, capitulated on the 7th of August 1808 after a bitter resistance. Sweden "won"... but no peace was signed, for the lack of a legitimate government to negotiate with. Meanwhile, the Swedish landgrab, and the announced intention to annex it all, had alarmed many. The Swedes had particularily been getting on the nerves of the Holy Roman Empire' leaders, who wanted to take over Swedish Pommerania, which Gustav III stubbornly refused to sell. The British were not amused by the Swedish militarism neither, though they left it at that. The Danish sentiments on the issue were also quite clear.
In the wake of the capture of Sankt-Peterburg, Sweden entered a self-declared "golden age", consolidating its gains and taking over Karelia, Arkhangelsk, Pskov, Livonia and some other areas. It wasn't really a golden age apart from territorial gains and perhaps the industrialisation though - the rebels continued rebelling, the war efforts drained the coffers, and the growth of taxes meant that Gustav III's ploy had backfired as far as the domestic situation went. Yet the increasingly-detached monarch did not relent in his course. That caused his doom when in 1811 the Second Russian Empire arose from the First one's ashes, and formally declared war on Sweden, pushing a smaller Swedish force back from Novgorod. The Prussians, who had been helping Victor I (more on him in Russia, naturally), immediately hopped in and captured Stralsund. Assisted by Russian, Finnish and Ostzean German rebels, Emperor Victor and his army had proceeded to recapture Pskov and Petrozavodsk, soon converging on Sankt-Peterburg itself. The Swedish attempt to lift the siege had failed, and amidst fires and rebellion the Russians had succesfully recaptured the city. Although miracilously the Dano-Norwegians refused to intervene, this was clearly the end for Gustav III as rebellions spread into Sweden itself, and most troops were tied down in counter-insurgency operations. A Holy Roman Imperial army had landed in Skane in a very risky operation; though it took major casualties, it had succesfully occupied Malmo, and as reinforcements arrived it captured Goteborg and Kalmar as well. The Russians had meanwhile proceeded to tie down a Swedish army in Estonia, and launch a main thrust into southern Finland. There they were engaged by Sweden's last best hope, an army commanded by Carl Johan Adlercreutz, in the Battle of Hyvinge. The Russians took many casualties, but the Swedes were eventually overwhelmed. That was the end of the end.
A revolution soon toppled Gustav III; his namesake, the infamous Gustav Adolf Reuterholm, formed a provisional government, and quickly signed peace, ceding all Swedish gains and Finland itself to Russia and Swedish Pommerania to the Holy Roman Empire, along with the island of Gotland. This "cowardly peace" was met with outrage, and Sweden soon collapsed into civil war; it was at this point that the wisdom of the Danish king Frederik VI's policy towards Sweden became apparent. Having stayed out of the "Third Northern War", the Dane had gradually forged diplomatic ties within the Swedish corridors of power, especially amongst the liberal bourgoise but also in the liberal and even nationalist intellectual circles. The collapse of the Gustavian system threw Sweden not just into a civil war, but also in an ideological crisis, as a new path of development had to be found. And Frederik offered such a path; though it seemed unlikely at first, gradually it turned out to be quite acceptable and beneficient. Thus on 11th of March 1813, Frederik was crowned as king of Sweden - by then, ofcourse, Stockholm was secured by his supporters and troops, as were various other key cities all over Sweden, although the military nationalist faction still held out in the north (as for Reuterholm, the political adventurist was losing anyway and was thankful for any opportunity to back out of this alive and unharmed). The Kingdom of Denmark-Norway-Sweden was a very loose one, with Sweden in particular retaining considerable internal autonomy... but nonetheless, it was for all purposes an unified state. Its aforementioned advantages were clear - a common front against any further Imperial or Russian aggression, and in addition to that a combination of Danish and Swedish commercial and colonial efforts world-wide, to better compete against Britain and France (nevertheless, the former remained an ally, for now anyway) - and lastly, as the internal tariffs were mostly removed, it meant that Scandinavia's economy was now generally revitalised.
Things did not go all that well in the regards of the Imperials, who had refused to recognise Frederik king of Sweden until he agreed to conceded Schleswig-Holstein. Well, he never did agree to that, but with British and Dutch assistance a compromise was worked out, with only Holstein being conceded (to Brunswick, at that). Yet after that and the defeat of the last Swedish oppositionaries, the new state's existance was recognised de jure and de facto. Having resolved both Sweden's and Denmark-Norway's border issues with the HRE and Russia, how ever unsatisfactorily (but then again, those Germans were nothing but trouble, while the new borders in Jutland were more defensible), Frederik VI (and II) was now free to concentrate on domestic reform and colonial ventures.
Specifically, the domestic side of affairs involved industrialisation, social reform (including the final abolition of serfdom, but not of slavery) and ofcourse greater administrative and economic integration of Sweden. In 1817, a major reform saw the movement of the capital to the commercial center of Goteborg (located near Sweden's borders with both Denmark (after the restoration of Skane) and Norway), the renaming of the state into the Empire of Scandinavia and the formation of a central Senat. In truth the changes weren't as radical as they might seem, as regional authorities still retained their powers, but now also sent representatives to Goteborg to better coordinate their actions with each other and with the imperial government that gradually and quietly established a greater degree of control over issues in all the three kingdoms. Meanwhile, in colonial issues, the considerably-neglected and damaged Swedish trading empire was revived, and the trade outposts near Zhoushan in China and Bantam in Java were recovered. Scandinavian presence in West Africa and India was revived as well, and several new trade outposts and forts were set up, while the Sultan of Gujarat was essentially forced to become a Scandinavian client after a little war. The Scandinavians had also built a noteworthy fleet... All this would have disturbed Britain if not for the continued alliance and the fact that Scandinavia clashed with France at least as much, due to colonial affairs.
The Holy Roman Empire was greatly altered by the Third World War, and practically all the changes spoke in favour of a greater degree of unity, making the transformation of the Empire into a REAL, unified state a distinct possibility. During the war, a greater united national consciousness had evolved, and afterwards it had transformed into German nationalism that served as an example of sorts for nationalist movements elsewhere in Europe. During the war, especially in its alter stages, the armies of the various Imperial state had acted in greater coordination than ever before; this was especially obvious with the Reichskriegsrat. Furthermore, the war had left Prussia devastated in all regards: its morale was dampened by Blucher's late-war defeat, its army was left a shadow of its former self over the course of the war (having trully taken the brunt of both the Russian and the French offensives), and its lands were in ruin after Russian plundering and Cossack raids and even more so after the far more organised and methodical French guerre totale. Brunswick wasn't much better off, and was a minor power in the first place; the same went for Saxony and for Wurttemburg, while Belgium was now an independent (well, more like French puppet, but we are talking de jure here) country. This left Austria - which actually came out stronger out of the war, losing its tenacious Italian holdings in exchange for vast expansion in the east and the south (Austria gained Galicia, Bukovina, Moldavia, Wallachia, northern Bulgaria and Dalmatia), taking over the entirety of the Danube (and thus all the riverine trade associated with it), soon recovering and prospering economically and reforming its military into the second best in Europe thanks to Erzherzog Karl - in a hegemonic position within the Holy Roman Empire, and we should also remember that Franz II still was in the increasingly-meaningful, decreasingly-hollow position of Heiliger Römischer Kaiser. It was only natural now that Austria would reunite the Holy Roman Empire around it, as was planned long ago. The roots of the German unification - and specifically, German-led unification - were indeed platned back in the rule of Josef II, and though he did not live to see the fruits of his labour, it is doubtless that noone had done as much for this process. With the Reichskongress, a greater degree of Imperial coordination was established; the secularisation meant both a somewhat increased degree of regional centralisation (as the various Church lands were annexed by their neighbours) and the minimisation of the influence of religious differences on the Imperial relations (as well as, along with Josef's other social reforms that were largely imitated elsewhere in the HRE, bringing the Empire closer together by the means of introduction of very similar domestic policies); the alliance with Prussia was a visionary move in and of itself, though it was perhaps a dangerous one until the aforementioned crippling of Prussia by the invaders; the near-removal of customs within the Habsburg realms created a good example for a later, international, Imperial customs union. What Franz did was carry on those policies and sometimes add new ones in the same spirit. That was the Reichskriegsrat, for instance, and indeed the 1808's Reichszollverein that allowed the far stronger Austrian economy to dominate the HRE economically. In the same year it was formally decided to revive the Reichskongress (which did not convene during the French occupation of Frankfurt am Main), moving it to Erfurt.
The actual unification of the Holy Roman Empire was a gradual process, not quite finished by 1820; yet major steps were taken towards it. Already, under the Austrian domination, the economy became greatly integrated; soon after, in a series of agreements, an unified Imperial army was created as well, although local armies, considerably-decreased, remained as well. After the regionalist outcry that had followed this had died down, the next measure was taken: the reform of the Imperial Diet (into a more powerful and slightly more democratic (though the age and property census greatly limited the electorate, naturally) body of government; the reformed Imperial Circles now submitted their elected and state-approved representatives) and the creation of a central Imperial government in Erfurt. It was presided over by the Holy Roman Emperor himself (though he delegated that position to an empowered representative for most of the time, except when some really important issue came up), but consulted various representatives of the Imperial states (some had proposed limiting that to just Prussia, Brunswick, Wurttemburg and Saxony). That government's powers were ill-defined, but clearly very minor on the state-level (still, as long as Austria and Prussia were allied they were able to exercise coercion at any time, and in fact Austria was probably strong enough by now to do that by itself); yet on the Imperial level, well, it was the government and so was able to ensure coordination between the various Imperial-level institutes already in place. So in short it could be said that by 1820, a loose confederation existed where once there was but an alliance and some nominal ties. A confederation is already a state, and this already was progress. Some of the Austrian Prussophobes had proposed that Prussia be broken up into separate Imperial states of Westphalia, Brandenburg and Poland, but Friedrich Wilhelm III was absurdly loyal to Franz II and the Erfurt cause, and even had he wanted to provoke Prussia in such a manner it gave no cause for complaint.
Apart from the various Imperial reforms, most the Empire's states continued aping Austrian policies: that meant secularisation, mild liberalisation, and a great emphasis on education and patronage. This was why it was impossible to trully declare the Enlightenment over; while it mostly withered away or evolved elsewhere, its spirit was at its strongest in the Holy Roman Empire, where the concepts of constitutional monarchy and enlightened despotism thrived simultaneously, and the comparative educational and intellectual liberty - a result of the continued feud with the Pope, mostly - meant that various ideas that would usually have been classed as "dangerous" (dangerous for their bearer's life in contemporary France, for instance) thrived and gained wide circullation; in fact this soon horrified Franz and the other Imperial rulers when it transformed into radical republicanism in some cases (as manifests in favour of a "German Republic" were circullated), and in a few particularily horrible ones, into nihilism (which manifested itself not as much on pieces of paper as in arson and political assassination). That resulted in repressions and censorship late in the 1810s, but the process was quite far-gone by then.
Belgium, as already mentioned, went Ultramontane. Although the Belgian Catholic Church was badly-hit by the Josefian Secularisation, it rapidly got back on its feet with popular and French support. The Protestants in the north and the east rebelled as early as in 1809, but were defeated with French help. After Louis XVII came to power in France, French efforts - and pressure - had redoubled, and Louis I, though himself a scandalous libertine, had no choice but to go along and support the Ultramontane faction, that in any case gained heavy support in the Belgian Parlement after the Protestant defeat. In exchange for Belgium retaining the confiscated church lands, the clerics were granted considerable privileges and powers, especially in the government and in education. This "clericalisation" coincided with a Gallification and cultural repression against the pro-Dutch north and the pro-Imperial east. The re-christened Ostende Compagnie revived its colonial efforts in close cooperation with France, despite a few defection attempts in the face of the anti-Protestant policies invoked.
In the wake of the final abolition of the Oranje Monarchy, the United Republics of Holland were left in a troubled state, even if, unlike many other countries, not socially. Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, the first president of Holland, succesfully reconciled most domestic factions by introducing reforms that decentralised and democratised the country in general and granted the radicals an opportunity to peacefully force through any social reforms they may have in mind, and via some other measures as well; meanwhile, the conservatives were relieved from their fear of a radical revolution, and the liberals were appeased by the general course of the government's policies. The only ones that were definitely discontent were the noblemen and the monarchists, who were often the same thing, but they weren't very strong. The main dilemma had more to do with diplomacy and trade. The Patriotten party that was in near-total control of the Staten-Generaal early in the URH history was initially very pro-French, but the balance changed over time with the British entreaties, the defeat of the 1809 rebellion in Belgium and the actions of Louis XVII. At the same time, by a sort of an inertia, Dutch colonial and commercial efforts in West Africa continued despite the British opposition and competition. These ventures ate up much money for little profit. Even after the Patriotten had split into several squabbling factions, both issues remained. It was in 1816, at the initiative of President Isaac Jan Alexander Gogel, that Holland changed its historical course in a dramatic manner, pledging perpetual neutrality - and securing guarantees thereof from Britain and France. Holland also sold its West African colonies to Britain as the highest bidder. After that, the Dutch concentrated on recovering their economy via an European trade network, and particularily - banking, essentially taking over the niche of the extinct Swiss Confederacy.
The map of Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea was utterly redrawn in the period of 1806-1813. No country was quite as frustrated by the Paris Congress' results as Sweden, whose's Gustav III had been denied any gains whatsoever for Sweden's valorous efforts - the Russians merely agreed to leave Swedish Finland, and even then allowed, despite their promises to do the opposite, various dangerous Finnish revolutionaries to take refuge in Vyborg (admittedly, the Russian government wasn't really able to do much about it by this point even if it was willing...). As the Swedes had went to great lenghts economically and militarily, and placed great emphasis on military reform above anything else in the pre-war period, their frustration was understandable. Gustav III incessantly demanded Estonia and Karelia during the negotiations, or at least some other compensation for his efforts, like Bornholm, or some of the Spanish or Portuguese colonies; he desperately needed something to show for the efforts, as resentment grew in Sweden itself. But all he had gained was the reputation of a land-hungry, opportunistic expansionist, and had to accept a territorial status quo ante bellum. Although the feared revolution in Sweden itself didn't come, royal authority was considerably undermined, and in Finland, continued insurgency proved very difficult to deal with. At the same time, the Kamensky Affair with Russia remained unsettled, an issue for much debate. When the Tsar was overthrown in early 1807 (after a coup attempt of his own) and the first Russian senatorial government finally collapsed in late 1807, Gustav III realised just how ramshackle Russia was, and decided to launch a "quick and victorious war", especially as the hated Nikolai Kamensky was an important member of the northern Russian "stavka" (junta, basically). The Swedish troops did everything right this time; they occupied Estonia, defeated a Russo-Finnish army in a pivotal battle at Petrozavodsk and laid overland and oversea siege to Sankt-Peterburg. Kamensky perished in one of the 1808 battles, at Vsevolozhsk to the east from the former empire's capital. The head of the Peterburg stavka, Aleksandr Ivanovich Ostermann-Tolstoy, capitulated on the 7th of August 1808 after a bitter resistance. Sweden "won"... but no peace was signed, for the lack of a legitimate government to negotiate with. Meanwhile, the Swedish landgrab, and the announced intention to annex it all, had alarmed many. The Swedes had particularily been getting on the nerves of the Holy Roman Empire' leaders, who wanted to take over Swedish Pommerania, which Gustav III stubbornly refused to sell. The British were not amused by the Swedish militarism neither, though they left it at that. The Danish sentiments on the issue were also quite clear.
In the wake of the capture of Sankt-Peterburg, Sweden entered a self-declared "golden age", consolidating its gains and taking over Karelia, Arkhangelsk, Pskov, Livonia and some other areas. It wasn't really a golden age apart from territorial gains and perhaps the industrialisation though - the rebels continued rebelling, the war efforts drained the coffers, and the growth of taxes meant that Gustav III's ploy had backfired as far as the domestic situation went. Yet the increasingly-detached monarch did not relent in his course. That caused his doom when in 1811 the Second Russian Empire arose from the First one's ashes, and formally declared war on Sweden, pushing a smaller Swedish force back from Novgorod. The Prussians, who had been helping Victor I (more on him in Russia, naturally), immediately hopped in and captured Stralsund. Assisted by Russian, Finnish and Ostzean German rebels, Emperor Victor and his army had proceeded to recapture Pskov and Petrozavodsk, soon converging on Sankt-Peterburg itself. The Swedish attempt to lift the siege had failed, and amidst fires and rebellion the Russians had succesfully recaptured the city. Although miracilously the Dano-Norwegians refused to intervene, this was clearly the end for Gustav III as rebellions spread into Sweden itself, and most troops were tied down in counter-insurgency operations. A Holy Roman Imperial army had landed in Skane in a very risky operation; though it took major casualties, it had succesfully occupied Malmo, and as reinforcements arrived it captured Goteborg and Kalmar as well. The Russians had meanwhile proceeded to tie down a Swedish army in Estonia, and launch a main thrust into southern Finland. There they were engaged by Sweden's last best hope, an army commanded by Carl Johan Adlercreutz, in the Battle of Hyvinge. The Russians took many casualties, but the Swedes were eventually overwhelmed. That was the end of the end.
A revolution soon toppled Gustav III; his namesake, the infamous Gustav Adolf Reuterholm, formed a provisional government, and quickly signed peace, ceding all Swedish gains and Finland itself to Russia and Swedish Pommerania to the Holy Roman Empire, along with the island of Gotland. This "cowardly peace" was met with outrage, and Sweden soon collapsed into civil war; it was at this point that the wisdom of the Danish king Frederik VI's policy towards Sweden became apparent. Having stayed out of the "Third Northern War", the Dane had gradually forged diplomatic ties within the Swedish corridors of power, especially amongst the liberal bourgoise but also in the liberal and even nationalist intellectual circles. The collapse of the Gustavian system threw Sweden not just into a civil war, but also in an ideological crisis, as a new path of development had to be found. And Frederik offered such a path; though it seemed unlikely at first, gradually it turned out to be quite acceptable and beneficient. Thus on 11th of March 1813, Frederik was crowned as king of Sweden - by then, ofcourse, Stockholm was secured by his supporters and troops, as were various other key cities all over Sweden, although the military nationalist faction still held out in the north (as for Reuterholm, the political adventurist was losing anyway and was thankful for any opportunity to back out of this alive and unharmed). The Kingdom of Denmark-Norway-Sweden was a very loose one, with Sweden in particular retaining considerable internal autonomy... but nonetheless, it was for all purposes an unified state. Its aforementioned advantages were clear - a common front against any further Imperial or Russian aggression, and in addition to that a combination of Danish and Swedish commercial and colonial efforts world-wide, to better compete against Britain and France (nevertheless, the former remained an ally, for now anyway) - and lastly, as the internal tariffs were mostly removed, it meant that Scandinavia's economy was now generally revitalised.
Things did not go all that well in the regards of the Imperials, who had refused to recognise Frederik king of Sweden until he agreed to conceded Schleswig-Holstein. Well, he never did agree to that, but with British and Dutch assistance a compromise was worked out, with only Holstein being conceded (to Brunswick, at that). Yet after that and the defeat of the last Swedish oppositionaries, the new state's existance was recognised de jure and de facto. Having resolved both Sweden's and Denmark-Norway's border issues with the HRE and Russia, how ever unsatisfactorily (but then again, those Germans were nothing but trouble, while the new borders in Jutland were more defensible), Frederik VI (and II) was now free to concentrate on domestic reform and colonial ventures.
Specifically, the domestic side of affairs involved industrialisation, social reform (including the final abolition of serfdom, but not of slavery) and ofcourse greater administrative and economic integration of Sweden. In 1817, a major reform saw the movement of the capital to the commercial center of Goteborg (located near Sweden's borders with both Denmark (after the restoration of Skane) and Norway), the renaming of the state into the Empire of Scandinavia and the formation of a central Senat. In truth the changes weren't as radical as they might seem, as regional authorities still retained their powers, but now also sent representatives to Goteborg to better coordinate their actions with each other and with the imperial government that gradually and quietly established a greater degree of control over issues in all the three kingdoms. Meanwhile, in colonial issues, the considerably-neglected and damaged Swedish trading empire was revived, and the trade outposts near Zhoushan in China and Bantam in Java were recovered. Scandinavian presence in West Africa and India was revived as well, and several new trade outposts and forts were set up, while the Sultan of Gujarat was essentially forced to become a Scandinavian client after a little war. The Scandinavians had also built a noteworthy fleet... All this would have disturbed Britain if not for the continued alliance and the fact that Scandinavia clashed with France at least as much, due to colonial affairs.
The Holy Roman Empire was greatly altered by the Third World War, and practically all the changes spoke in favour of a greater degree of unity, making the transformation of the Empire into a REAL, unified state a distinct possibility. During the war, a greater united national consciousness had evolved, and afterwards it had transformed into German nationalism that served as an example of sorts for nationalist movements elsewhere in Europe. During the war, especially in its alter stages, the armies of the various Imperial state had acted in greater coordination than ever before; this was especially obvious with the Reichskriegsrat. Furthermore, the war had left Prussia devastated in all regards: its morale was dampened by Blucher's late-war defeat, its army was left a shadow of its former self over the course of the war (having trully taken the brunt of both the Russian and the French offensives), and its lands were in ruin after Russian plundering and Cossack raids and even more so after the far more organised and methodical French guerre totale. Brunswick wasn't much better off, and was a minor power in the first place; the same went for Saxony and for Wurttemburg, while Belgium was now an independent (well, more like French puppet, but we are talking de jure here) country. This left Austria - which actually came out stronger out of the war, losing its tenacious Italian holdings in exchange for vast expansion in the east and the south (Austria gained Galicia, Bukovina, Moldavia, Wallachia, northern Bulgaria and Dalmatia), taking over the entirety of the Danube (and thus all the riverine trade associated with it), soon recovering and prospering economically and reforming its military into the second best in Europe thanks to Erzherzog Karl - in a hegemonic position within the Holy Roman Empire, and we should also remember that Franz II still was in the increasingly-meaningful, decreasingly-hollow position of Heiliger Römischer Kaiser. It was only natural now that Austria would reunite the Holy Roman Empire around it, as was planned long ago. The roots of the German unification - and specifically, German-led unification - were indeed platned back in the rule of Josef II, and though he did not live to see the fruits of his labour, it is doubtless that noone had done as much for this process. With the Reichskongress, a greater degree of Imperial coordination was established; the secularisation meant both a somewhat increased degree of regional centralisation (as the various Church lands were annexed by their neighbours) and the minimisation of the influence of religious differences on the Imperial relations (as well as, along with Josef's other social reforms that were largely imitated elsewhere in the HRE, bringing the Empire closer together by the means of introduction of very similar domestic policies); the alliance with Prussia was a visionary move in and of itself, though it was perhaps a dangerous one until the aforementioned crippling of Prussia by the invaders; the near-removal of customs within the Habsburg realms created a good example for a later, international, Imperial customs union. What Franz did was carry on those policies and sometimes add new ones in the same spirit. That was the Reichskriegsrat, for instance, and indeed the 1808's Reichszollverein that allowed the far stronger Austrian economy to dominate the HRE economically. In the same year it was formally decided to revive the Reichskongress (which did not convene during the French occupation of Frankfurt am Main), moving it to Erfurt.
The actual unification of the Holy Roman Empire was a gradual process, not quite finished by 1820; yet major steps were taken towards it. Already, under the Austrian domination, the economy became greatly integrated; soon after, in a series of agreements, an unified Imperial army was created as well, although local armies, considerably-decreased, remained as well. After the regionalist outcry that had followed this had died down, the next measure was taken: the reform of the Imperial Diet (into a more powerful and slightly more democratic (though the age and property census greatly limited the electorate, naturally) body of government; the reformed Imperial Circles now submitted their elected and state-approved representatives) and the creation of a central Imperial government in Erfurt. It was presided over by the Holy Roman Emperor himself (though he delegated that position to an empowered representative for most of the time, except when some really important issue came up), but consulted various representatives of the Imperial states (some had proposed limiting that to just Prussia, Brunswick, Wurttemburg and Saxony). That government's powers were ill-defined, but clearly very minor on the state-level (still, as long as Austria and Prussia were allied they were able to exercise coercion at any time, and in fact Austria was probably strong enough by now to do that by itself); yet on the Imperial level, well, it was the government and so was able to ensure coordination between the various Imperial-level institutes already in place. So in short it could be said that by 1820, a loose confederation existed where once there was but an alliance and some nominal ties. A confederation is already a state, and this already was progress. Some of the Austrian Prussophobes had proposed that Prussia be broken up into separate Imperial states of Westphalia, Brandenburg and Poland, but Friedrich Wilhelm III was absurdly loyal to Franz II and the Erfurt cause, and even had he wanted to provoke Prussia in such a manner it gave no cause for complaint.
Apart from the various Imperial reforms, most the Empire's states continued aping Austrian policies: that meant secularisation, mild liberalisation, and a great emphasis on education and patronage. This was why it was impossible to trully declare the Enlightenment over; while it mostly withered away or evolved elsewhere, its spirit was at its strongest in the Holy Roman Empire, where the concepts of constitutional monarchy and enlightened despotism thrived simultaneously, and the comparative educational and intellectual liberty - a result of the continued feud with the Pope, mostly - meant that various ideas that would usually have been classed as "dangerous" (dangerous for their bearer's life in contemporary France, for instance) thrived and gained wide circullation; in fact this soon horrified Franz and the other Imperial rulers when it transformed into radical republicanism in some cases (as manifests in favour of a "German Republic" were circullated), and in a few particularily horrible ones, into nihilism (which manifested itself not as much on pieces of paper as in arson and political assassination). That resulted in repressions and censorship late in the 1810s, but the process was quite far-gone by then.
das
Regeneration In Process
Speaking of dangerous ideas, Polish and Hungarian nationalists were, as already mentioned, quite strong. 1812-1813 saw major uprisings in both of the eastern provinces, but they were defeated, demonstrating both the strenghts and the weaknesses of the combined Imperial army. Obviously the non-German parts of the Holy Roman Empire (with an exception for Germanised Bohemia) were not included in the Holy Roman Empire as such (i.e. noone there participated in the elections), but rather were ruled by the usual state governments; there, none of the enlightened and liberal policies exercised in the HRE, apart from some basics like the abolition of serfdom, had functioned, and in fact repressions increased there greatly after the rebellions. In fact, the situation in both Hungary and Poland was similar to the situation in Swedish Finland, only it was at the same time more easy and more difficult because of the higher population levels both in the German states and in the provinces being colonised. The progress here was slow.
Nevertheless, economically the Holy Roman Empire had more-or-less recovered by the 1810s, and thrived, and the eastern provinces thrived with it. Soon it became a very potent challenge for both Britain and France, both economically and otherwise...
In the regards of the greater world, the Holy Roman Empire had conducted a lazy, yet fairly eventful policy. The alliance with Britain had mostly died away with time, though ties were maintained; the various governments that rose and fell around Europe were respectively supported and abandoned. Prussia was quite active diplomatically at this time, however, much unlike both Austria and the rest of the HRE; it persuaded Bremen to unite its colonial empire of a few West African trade outposts with Prussia's, and generally increased its presence in West Africa, fighting actually some minor wars against the more aggressive of native tribes. In Europe Prussia was basically in charge of the anti-Scandinavian direction of the Imperial policy; it supported the Second Russian Empire, pressed claims towards the Swedish Pommerania and ultimately fought the already-described war in which it gained both Swedish Pommerania and Gotland, quickly getting a sizeable share of the Baltic Sea trade. Holstein remained out of Prussia's own reach, but it was annexed by Brunswick. The aforementioned Prussophobes had feared that Prussia may try to break free of Erfurt as soon as a more independent monarch comes to power (and cited its active, independent, sometimes not sufficiently coordinated, foreign policy as a precursor), but for now it did not make any clear efforts in that direction.
The Kingdom of Piedmont underwent dramatic change under Vittorio Amadeo IV, who came to power in 1805. In truth he had very little to do with it. The war and its aftermath were basically a complete revolution for the state: the country's pride and the unpopular monarchy's best defense, the obsolete, yet prestigious Savoyard Army was destroyed; the militaristic, Austrophile establishment was discredited; Savoy, Nice and Sardinia were lost, but Lombardy was gained (this signified a shift from a Mediterranean general orientation to an Alpine one); a possibly-ominous popular insurrection had occured in 1806 (but it was promptly stifled by the French); oh, and the king had changed as well. Vittorio Amadeo IV was forced to deal with a very complex situation that he didn't understand at all, and naturally he had to rely on advisors; the most powerful of these was Luigi di Magenta, a scion of a powerful Milanese family. He saw the need for reform quite clearly, and persuaded the king to accept a very moderate and monarchist constitution, quite similar to the Spanish one. Some minor land reform was undertaken, and a general loosening of state intervention in the economy and in culture had occured; nevertheless, the "pocket nationalism" was quite encouraged, becoming something of an official ideology. Steps were taken towards an army reform, but the new army wasn't very efficient, being a result of an attempt to blindly copy the French variant and at the same time avoid upsetting the aristocrats too much. Still, it was an army...
Between the highly-nationalist countries of France, Piedmont and - inasmuch it could be considered a country now - the Holy Roman Empire was trapped the Swiss Confederation, which was in crisis for much of the 1800s. The cantons increasingly turned away from each other, confessional differences were heating up and often exploding into battles, riots and massacres, and the assertive, authoritarian rich families transformed many cantons into effective oligarchies - coming into conflict with the liberals and the radicals in the popular assemblies. The Confederation was disintegrating, and at the same time every canton was being individually shaken by social, political and confessional strife. The addition of the nationalist factor was also disconcerting. Many leaders of populist and oligarchic factions alike begun turning towards foreign governments for support, and when the Piedmontis invaded Ticino in 1810 as per the invitation of several Bellinzona notables, the Confederation begun to be carved up in spite of some petty British protests. Several German cantons swore allegience to the HRE; the French, after an initial hesitation, invaded Geneve to help the local Catholics. Soon more and more interventions begun, some Cantons resisted, sometimes scoring minor victories but eventually being overwhelmed by superior manpower, and clashes between the invading powers too had occured... Long story cut short, in 1815 the Convention of Zurich had partitioned the former Confederation between France (which got Neuchatel, Vaud and Geneve), Piedmont (which got Valais and Ticino) and Austria (which got Thurgau, Toggenburg, Appenzell and Graubunden), with the rest of the Cantons entering the Holy Roman Empire as equal Imperial states. Naturally there were some rebellions against this, but they were all defeated with varying degrees of brutality; Geneve was particularily decimated, its prominent Protestant community scattered in a diaspora (many ending up in Britain and Russia, the latter being even more interested than usual in drawing in European specialists to help it catch up). Thus with a whimper - if we ignore the bloody massacres, political maneuvers and the other exciting drama that constitutes a real lot of very loud booms over the years - Switzerland died.
Piedmont, preoccupied with the Swiss affair - and the subsequent integration of the new gains - mostly stayed out of the rest of Italian life. Admittedly, not all that much of importance had happened there yet. The Italian nationalists still tried to launch some uprisings; their more peaceful counterparts became increasingly influential in the Neapolitan court. Naples had made some feeble attempts to annex Genoa, but was warned off by France, which had by then deployed troops to keep the unpopular Genoese oligarchs safe both from their own people and from any foreign threats. At home, the Neapolitans imitated the Spanish policy of parliamentary monarchism, justas they had followed the Spanish line abroad. With the annexation of Tuscany, Naples entered an era of prosperity assisted by the revival of the Mediterranean trade thanks to the Suez Canal, basically taking over the role that had once belonged to Venice thanks to the excellent strategic position the kingdom held. During this time, Carthage was rebuilt as an Italian colony/port, and it too had reaped the harvest of Neapolitan middleman commerce. Francesco Savorgnan, drawing on Austrian assistance, reformed Venice into the Venetian Kingdom (note that his official title was King of the Venetians, as opposed to King of Venice). It combined hardline absolutism and a powerful secret police system with egalitarian and highly-progressive social reforms. Savorgnan had to defeat numerous conspiracies and revolts, ofcourse, but his populist policies had eventually won him the support of the masses, while the oligarchic upper class was crippled by the wartime revolution and everyone else was cowed by the aforementioned Austrians and the aforementioned secret police. Tiny Lucca - which, learning from the Dutch, Swiss and Venetian lessons, had peacefully reformed itself back into a mostly-egalitarian republic, with the old elite still retaining considerable power and influence - had actually begun to prosper as well, supplanting the decadent Genoa in the Tyrrhenian Sea trade, though ofcourse the French competition was very powerful. Lastly, Pope Benedict XV - previously Cardinal Ercole Consalvi, the master diplomat of Pius VI (both as nuncio and as cardinal, for with the latter position he also received the status of a secretary of state) - presided over social and administrative reforms in the Papal States, integrating the gains from the Paris Congress and generally centralising the territorial Papal States. Curbing the power of the various local rulers, the Pope made sure to enhance his own with a special territorial religious bureaucracy. At the same time, education was somewhat modernised and improved quantitively as many new schools and higher educational facilities were opened. The city of Rome underwent renovation. Still, Benedict did not tolerate any radicalism, and dealt with it quite harshly. In foreign politics he cooperated most fruitfully with Louis XVII, but at the same time maintained some ties with Spain. He involved himself heavily in the missionary activities, overseeing the surprisingly-fruitful evangelising efforts in Africa, Russia, India, Indochina, China and Japan (Vietnam and Japan, now under European rule, were particularily succesful, Catholicism finding much support amongst the disillusioned Japanese masses - although there, serious competition was created by the Protestants - and amongst many ambitious Vietnamese (especially from amongst the urban middle class) who had divined that being Christian generally helps while working with the French).
In Montenegro, life too begun to change, if slowly. Vladika (Prince-Bishop) Petar I developed ambitions for a Serbian Empire based in Montenegro, and indeed the small, yet expanding country had become the apex of Serbian nationalism that was reviving in spite of all the Austrian efforts. Still, Petar was very careful at present, aware that Montenegro was, at present, without allies, especially as Russia was uninterested in any further foreign adventures for the moment, wihle the Byzantines still had some designs of their own towards both Serbia and Montenegro. In the meantime, various domestic reforms were undertaken to integrate gains, create a more efficient bureaucracy, reform the taxation system, spread the education - all this was quite similar to Benedict XV's policies, but with some Orthodox specifics - and create a new military/militia system to defend Montenegro by using its eponymous mountainous terrain and the difficult conditions of life that had hardened its people. It was a combination of an antiquated military tradition and modern concepts of levee en masse and partisan warfare. The Montenegrins were somewhat short on modern weapons, but managed to secretly acquire a few specialists from France, setting up various military manufactories. As Montenegro still was quite small and isolated, nobody paid much attention to its preparations...
Konstantinos X ruled on in the Byzantine Empire. It was not a happy reign. Although the war was not a total loss - though the Danubean Principalities and northern Bulgaria were lost, Albania, Cyprus, Crete, Corfu and the Ionic Islands were gained, neatly rounding up the Byzantine European borders - it was very frustrating and demoralising. The attempted intervention in Russia resulted in a humiliating defeat near Kiev at the hands of Grigoriy Potemkin, and the subsequent withdrawal from all of the gains apart from Crimea and Taman (this was partially caused by the Imperial threats as well; Vienna did NOT want the Byzantines to gain a good foothold in Russia, especially so close to the Austrian border), although at a later point Georgia had gained its independence with Byzantine help, the restored Bagratids, as represented by King Solomon I of Georgia (as opposed to Imeretia, of which he would have been II), repaid by aligning their country with Byzantium and allowing Constantinople a considerable degree of control and influence over all of Georgia's policies. At roughly the same time, the Byzantines had invaded Egyptian Levant; they were thwarted in their attempt to grab Jerusalem (see above), but they did annex Syria this time. A more-or-less firm alliance was signed with Spain, and indeed the foreign side of Konstantinos' later rule could be considered more or less succesful. But nonetheless, things still weren't all that good, especially domestically as liberal and separatist uprisings and conspiracies continued to plague the country. Although Hellenisation bore fruit in Macedonia and Armenia, the Bulgarians remained quite separatist, to say nothing of the Turks (admittedly, the main "Turkish" areas were now central and southern Anatolia; the north and the west were mostly Greek/Hellenised) and the Arabs of the newly-conquered lands. Byzantine attempts to reconcile with the Maronites of Lebanon mostly failed as well, though the Druzes turned out to be surprisingly reliable allies as long as Konstantinos didn't push them too much. Meanwhile, as shown by the poor Byzantine military performance during the first two decades of the 19th century, the army remained comparatively inefficient and backwards despite all the attempts to reform it, while the state apparatus grew overstretched and corrupt. Konstantinos' constant efforts to reform his increasingly-unwieldy empire somewhat bore little fruit, whilst wearing him out considerably, and by 1816 he gave up on reform, instead concentrating on diplomacy and patronage.
The Senate, as already mentioned, did not rule on for long in Russia. From its very start it was plagued by intrigues, coup attempts and peasant uprisings. In January 1807, Tsar Nicholas I and a clique of military officers led by Aleksey Gorchakov had prepared and launched a coup d'etat in Sankt-Peterburg; it was betrayed and defeated, and Nicholas himself was forced to flee to Denmark. The First Russian Republic that was created in the aftermath was extremelly short-lived (in fact, nothing was created - the Senate simply dropped all pretense of monarchy in the country, but itself ruled on as before, promising elections in some distant future). Its collapse sped up as more peasant rebellions, some of them Tsarist, begun. Generalissimus Grigoriy Potemkin had practically deserted the Senate, instead building a warlord empire in central and southern Russia, centered around his military HQ in Kiev (this empire fought off many threats coming from rebels, Byzantines and other warlords, and the French even sent diplomats to his lavish Kiev court, promising to recognise him as Emperor of Russia in 1809... just before he died from overeating and old age, and the diseases associated with such a combination, causing everything to fall apart as his lieutenants fought all over the East European Plain). Kurakin himself was practically expelled by the coalition of Nikita Panin, Platon Zubov and Aleksey Orlov. Zubov made a brief bid for dominance, but was defeated. Then Nikolay Novikov, Grandmaster of the Russian Masons, briefly took power in his own hands (not hard due to the great resources of all kinds that were available to the Russian Freemasonry even in its darkest days), initiating a reign of terror and radical reform, although it mostly remained on paper. That episode gave the Freemasons a bad name, especially in Russia where they were afterwards repressed with particular brutality. In any case, by 1808 Aleksandr Ivanovich Ostermann-Tolstoy overthrew Novikov and with his lieutenants and allies, such as the infamous Nikolai Kamensky, established a military dictatorship in Sankt-Peterburg. It might have asserted power over Russia or at least parts of Russia, if not for the Swedes that as already related had intervenned in the same year. With the death of Potemkin and the defeat of Ostermann-Tolstoy, it seemed that Russia was doomed to anarchy, especially as ethnic rebellions kicked off. Sure enough, many lands were lost in this Second Time of Troubles; the Baltic coast and Karelia were seized by Sweden, the Byzantines had captured Crimea and Taman, Lithuanian Poles were briefly rallied by Venedikt Bulharyn, Georgia and the Circassian tribes reclaimed their independence, Persia consolidated its lands and recaptured Aizerbadjan and much of southern Central Asia, whilst the north fell into disrepair with isolated forts barely fending off the Kalmyks, Kazakhs and Bashkirs that rose up in arms. Yet as in the First Time of Troubles, Russia had sprung back on its feet with surprising speed, though its first steps to recovery were staggering and uncertain.
Viktor Ivanovich Trubetskoy - member of one of the extra-numerous cadet branches of the ancient Trubetskoy family, and thus a descendant of Rurik himself, and a far closer one than any of the Romanovs - was Russia's saviour in this troubled time. Not much is known about his early life. In 1806 he was but a brigadier, deployed in Moscow. The Time of Troubles provided an excellent opportunity for lower-ranks with skill, charisma and luck to climb up the career lattern, and by 1809 he was in command of a large ragtag army based at Moscow. His was not the largest army, but he was more than yet another warlord; through his ancestry, his control of Russia's old capital and his diplomatic skills, he was able to form alliances with many other warlords, promising them nobility and important positions under his reign. Perhaps more importantly he secured the neutrality of the Byzantines and the assistance of the Prussians, who helped him build a small, but modernised and highly-efficient Imperial Guard. With its help he easily defeated the remaining warlords in the Russian heartlands and took for himself the title of Imperator (yet, strangely, not that of "Tsar") in Moscow in 1811. The Second Russian Empire immediately declared war on Sweden; that was a somewhat rash move, but it proved to be well-timed, as Sweden and its army were in a state of decay by then and so were overwhelmed near Novgorod. That was a good start, and it was followed up well. Pskov, Petrozavodsk, Revel, Helsingfors and Torku all eventually fell to Victor I's armies, although the Russian casualties were very high and the battles were sometimes close-ran even as Sweden fell apart. The peace with Sweden didn't mean peace for Russia; and for the rest of 1810s, the fighting continued. By 1813, Cossacks and Poles were reined in, but in 1814 the latest military reforms caused a split between Victor and some of his former allies amongst the warlords; yet in the Battle on the Moskva River, the rebels were utterly routed. A republican conspiracy was defeated in 1815. General Dmitriy Griboyedov led a series of punitive campaigns against the Circassians, recovering the Caucasia by 1816. By 1818, Levin August von Bennigsen had restored order in Siberia, or at least in its more populated, southern parts. The status of the rest remained ambigous, but at least nominally Russian control was restored there as well. Bashkiria and northern Central Asia were also recaptured by 1820, though much progress there had been lost and all attempts to drive the Persians out of the south had failed.
And in the meantime, the civil bureaucracy was slowly rebuilt, at least in the European areas; industrialisation had commenced; foreign specialists were invited in large amounts; geologic expeditions were equipped to unlock the various mineral riches all over Russia, especially east of the Urals; schools were built; efforts were taken to colonise the northern Caucasia and Central Asia with ethnic Russians; Russification was introduced, but cultural - and to a certain degree political - autonomy was retained in Finland and Livonia. Yet though Victor was young, he was yet unmarried, and many feared that even had he had a heir that heir would not be able to hold Russia together as well as the Imperator did.
Nevertheless, economically the Holy Roman Empire had more-or-less recovered by the 1810s, and thrived, and the eastern provinces thrived with it. Soon it became a very potent challenge for both Britain and France, both economically and otherwise...
In the regards of the greater world, the Holy Roman Empire had conducted a lazy, yet fairly eventful policy. The alliance with Britain had mostly died away with time, though ties were maintained; the various governments that rose and fell around Europe were respectively supported and abandoned. Prussia was quite active diplomatically at this time, however, much unlike both Austria and the rest of the HRE; it persuaded Bremen to unite its colonial empire of a few West African trade outposts with Prussia's, and generally increased its presence in West Africa, fighting actually some minor wars against the more aggressive of native tribes. In Europe Prussia was basically in charge of the anti-Scandinavian direction of the Imperial policy; it supported the Second Russian Empire, pressed claims towards the Swedish Pommerania and ultimately fought the already-described war in which it gained both Swedish Pommerania and Gotland, quickly getting a sizeable share of the Baltic Sea trade. Holstein remained out of Prussia's own reach, but it was annexed by Brunswick. The aforementioned Prussophobes had feared that Prussia may try to break free of Erfurt as soon as a more independent monarch comes to power (and cited its active, independent, sometimes not sufficiently coordinated, foreign policy as a precursor), but for now it did not make any clear efforts in that direction.
The Kingdom of Piedmont underwent dramatic change under Vittorio Amadeo IV, who came to power in 1805. In truth he had very little to do with it. The war and its aftermath were basically a complete revolution for the state: the country's pride and the unpopular monarchy's best defense, the obsolete, yet prestigious Savoyard Army was destroyed; the militaristic, Austrophile establishment was discredited; Savoy, Nice and Sardinia were lost, but Lombardy was gained (this signified a shift from a Mediterranean general orientation to an Alpine one); a possibly-ominous popular insurrection had occured in 1806 (but it was promptly stifled by the French); oh, and the king had changed as well. Vittorio Amadeo IV was forced to deal with a very complex situation that he didn't understand at all, and naturally he had to rely on advisors; the most powerful of these was Luigi di Magenta, a scion of a powerful Milanese family. He saw the need for reform quite clearly, and persuaded the king to accept a very moderate and monarchist constitution, quite similar to the Spanish one. Some minor land reform was undertaken, and a general loosening of state intervention in the economy and in culture had occured; nevertheless, the "pocket nationalism" was quite encouraged, becoming something of an official ideology. Steps were taken towards an army reform, but the new army wasn't very efficient, being a result of an attempt to blindly copy the French variant and at the same time avoid upsetting the aristocrats too much. Still, it was an army...
Between the highly-nationalist countries of France, Piedmont and - inasmuch it could be considered a country now - the Holy Roman Empire was trapped the Swiss Confederation, which was in crisis for much of the 1800s. The cantons increasingly turned away from each other, confessional differences were heating up and often exploding into battles, riots and massacres, and the assertive, authoritarian rich families transformed many cantons into effective oligarchies - coming into conflict with the liberals and the radicals in the popular assemblies. The Confederation was disintegrating, and at the same time every canton was being individually shaken by social, political and confessional strife. The addition of the nationalist factor was also disconcerting. Many leaders of populist and oligarchic factions alike begun turning towards foreign governments for support, and when the Piedmontis invaded Ticino in 1810 as per the invitation of several Bellinzona notables, the Confederation begun to be carved up in spite of some petty British protests. Several German cantons swore allegience to the HRE; the French, after an initial hesitation, invaded Geneve to help the local Catholics. Soon more and more interventions begun, some Cantons resisted, sometimes scoring minor victories but eventually being overwhelmed by superior manpower, and clashes between the invading powers too had occured... Long story cut short, in 1815 the Convention of Zurich had partitioned the former Confederation between France (which got Neuchatel, Vaud and Geneve), Piedmont (which got Valais and Ticino) and Austria (which got Thurgau, Toggenburg, Appenzell and Graubunden), with the rest of the Cantons entering the Holy Roman Empire as equal Imperial states. Naturally there were some rebellions against this, but they were all defeated with varying degrees of brutality; Geneve was particularily decimated, its prominent Protestant community scattered in a diaspora (many ending up in Britain and Russia, the latter being even more interested than usual in drawing in European specialists to help it catch up). Thus with a whimper - if we ignore the bloody massacres, political maneuvers and the other exciting drama that constitutes a real lot of very loud booms over the years - Switzerland died.
Piedmont, preoccupied with the Swiss affair - and the subsequent integration of the new gains - mostly stayed out of the rest of Italian life. Admittedly, not all that much of importance had happened there yet. The Italian nationalists still tried to launch some uprisings; their more peaceful counterparts became increasingly influential in the Neapolitan court. Naples had made some feeble attempts to annex Genoa, but was warned off by France, which had by then deployed troops to keep the unpopular Genoese oligarchs safe both from their own people and from any foreign threats. At home, the Neapolitans imitated the Spanish policy of parliamentary monarchism, justas they had followed the Spanish line abroad. With the annexation of Tuscany, Naples entered an era of prosperity assisted by the revival of the Mediterranean trade thanks to the Suez Canal, basically taking over the role that had once belonged to Venice thanks to the excellent strategic position the kingdom held. During this time, Carthage was rebuilt as an Italian colony/port, and it too had reaped the harvest of Neapolitan middleman commerce. Francesco Savorgnan, drawing on Austrian assistance, reformed Venice into the Venetian Kingdom (note that his official title was King of the Venetians, as opposed to King of Venice). It combined hardline absolutism and a powerful secret police system with egalitarian and highly-progressive social reforms. Savorgnan had to defeat numerous conspiracies and revolts, ofcourse, but his populist policies had eventually won him the support of the masses, while the oligarchic upper class was crippled by the wartime revolution and everyone else was cowed by the aforementioned Austrians and the aforementioned secret police. Tiny Lucca - which, learning from the Dutch, Swiss and Venetian lessons, had peacefully reformed itself back into a mostly-egalitarian republic, with the old elite still retaining considerable power and influence - had actually begun to prosper as well, supplanting the decadent Genoa in the Tyrrhenian Sea trade, though ofcourse the French competition was very powerful. Lastly, Pope Benedict XV - previously Cardinal Ercole Consalvi, the master diplomat of Pius VI (both as nuncio and as cardinal, for with the latter position he also received the status of a secretary of state) - presided over social and administrative reforms in the Papal States, integrating the gains from the Paris Congress and generally centralising the territorial Papal States. Curbing the power of the various local rulers, the Pope made sure to enhance his own with a special territorial religious bureaucracy. At the same time, education was somewhat modernised and improved quantitively as many new schools and higher educational facilities were opened. The city of Rome underwent renovation. Still, Benedict did not tolerate any radicalism, and dealt with it quite harshly. In foreign politics he cooperated most fruitfully with Louis XVII, but at the same time maintained some ties with Spain. He involved himself heavily in the missionary activities, overseeing the surprisingly-fruitful evangelising efforts in Africa, Russia, India, Indochina, China and Japan (Vietnam and Japan, now under European rule, were particularily succesful, Catholicism finding much support amongst the disillusioned Japanese masses - although there, serious competition was created by the Protestants - and amongst many ambitious Vietnamese (especially from amongst the urban middle class) who had divined that being Christian generally helps while working with the French).
In Montenegro, life too begun to change, if slowly. Vladika (Prince-Bishop) Petar I developed ambitions for a Serbian Empire based in Montenegro, and indeed the small, yet expanding country had become the apex of Serbian nationalism that was reviving in spite of all the Austrian efforts. Still, Petar was very careful at present, aware that Montenegro was, at present, without allies, especially as Russia was uninterested in any further foreign adventures for the moment, wihle the Byzantines still had some designs of their own towards both Serbia and Montenegro. In the meantime, various domestic reforms were undertaken to integrate gains, create a more efficient bureaucracy, reform the taxation system, spread the education - all this was quite similar to Benedict XV's policies, but with some Orthodox specifics - and create a new military/militia system to defend Montenegro by using its eponymous mountainous terrain and the difficult conditions of life that had hardened its people. It was a combination of an antiquated military tradition and modern concepts of levee en masse and partisan warfare. The Montenegrins were somewhat short on modern weapons, but managed to secretly acquire a few specialists from France, setting up various military manufactories. As Montenegro still was quite small and isolated, nobody paid much attention to its preparations...
Konstantinos X ruled on in the Byzantine Empire. It was not a happy reign. Although the war was not a total loss - though the Danubean Principalities and northern Bulgaria were lost, Albania, Cyprus, Crete, Corfu and the Ionic Islands were gained, neatly rounding up the Byzantine European borders - it was very frustrating and demoralising. The attempted intervention in Russia resulted in a humiliating defeat near Kiev at the hands of Grigoriy Potemkin, and the subsequent withdrawal from all of the gains apart from Crimea and Taman (this was partially caused by the Imperial threats as well; Vienna did NOT want the Byzantines to gain a good foothold in Russia, especially so close to the Austrian border), although at a later point Georgia had gained its independence with Byzantine help, the restored Bagratids, as represented by King Solomon I of Georgia (as opposed to Imeretia, of which he would have been II), repaid by aligning their country with Byzantium and allowing Constantinople a considerable degree of control and influence over all of Georgia's policies. At roughly the same time, the Byzantines had invaded Egyptian Levant; they were thwarted in their attempt to grab Jerusalem (see above), but they did annex Syria this time. A more-or-less firm alliance was signed with Spain, and indeed the foreign side of Konstantinos' later rule could be considered more or less succesful. But nonetheless, things still weren't all that good, especially domestically as liberal and separatist uprisings and conspiracies continued to plague the country. Although Hellenisation bore fruit in Macedonia and Armenia, the Bulgarians remained quite separatist, to say nothing of the Turks (admittedly, the main "Turkish" areas were now central and southern Anatolia; the north and the west were mostly Greek/Hellenised) and the Arabs of the newly-conquered lands. Byzantine attempts to reconcile with the Maronites of Lebanon mostly failed as well, though the Druzes turned out to be surprisingly reliable allies as long as Konstantinos didn't push them too much. Meanwhile, as shown by the poor Byzantine military performance during the first two decades of the 19th century, the army remained comparatively inefficient and backwards despite all the attempts to reform it, while the state apparatus grew overstretched and corrupt. Konstantinos' constant efforts to reform his increasingly-unwieldy empire somewhat bore little fruit, whilst wearing him out considerably, and by 1816 he gave up on reform, instead concentrating on diplomacy and patronage.
The Senate, as already mentioned, did not rule on for long in Russia. From its very start it was plagued by intrigues, coup attempts and peasant uprisings. In January 1807, Tsar Nicholas I and a clique of military officers led by Aleksey Gorchakov had prepared and launched a coup d'etat in Sankt-Peterburg; it was betrayed and defeated, and Nicholas himself was forced to flee to Denmark. The First Russian Republic that was created in the aftermath was extremelly short-lived (in fact, nothing was created - the Senate simply dropped all pretense of monarchy in the country, but itself ruled on as before, promising elections in some distant future). Its collapse sped up as more peasant rebellions, some of them Tsarist, begun. Generalissimus Grigoriy Potemkin had practically deserted the Senate, instead building a warlord empire in central and southern Russia, centered around his military HQ in Kiev (this empire fought off many threats coming from rebels, Byzantines and other warlords, and the French even sent diplomats to his lavish Kiev court, promising to recognise him as Emperor of Russia in 1809... just before he died from overeating and old age, and the diseases associated with such a combination, causing everything to fall apart as his lieutenants fought all over the East European Plain). Kurakin himself was practically expelled by the coalition of Nikita Panin, Platon Zubov and Aleksey Orlov. Zubov made a brief bid for dominance, but was defeated. Then Nikolay Novikov, Grandmaster of the Russian Masons, briefly took power in his own hands (not hard due to the great resources of all kinds that were available to the Russian Freemasonry even in its darkest days), initiating a reign of terror and radical reform, although it mostly remained on paper. That episode gave the Freemasons a bad name, especially in Russia where they were afterwards repressed with particular brutality. In any case, by 1808 Aleksandr Ivanovich Ostermann-Tolstoy overthrew Novikov and with his lieutenants and allies, such as the infamous Nikolai Kamensky, established a military dictatorship in Sankt-Peterburg. It might have asserted power over Russia or at least parts of Russia, if not for the Swedes that as already related had intervenned in the same year. With the death of Potemkin and the defeat of Ostermann-Tolstoy, it seemed that Russia was doomed to anarchy, especially as ethnic rebellions kicked off. Sure enough, many lands were lost in this Second Time of Troubles; the Baltic coast and Karelia were seized by Sweden, the Byzantines had captured Crimea and Taman, Lithuanian Poles were briefly rallied by Venedikt Bulharyn, Georgia and the Circassian tribes reclaimed their independence, Persia consolidated its lands and recaptured Aizerbadjan and much of southern Central Asia, whilst the north fell into disrepair with isolated forts barely fending off the Kalmyks, Kazakhs and Bashkirs that rose up in arms. Yet as in the First Time of Troubles, Russia had sprung back on its feet with surprising speed, though its first steps to recovery were staggering and uncertain.
Viktor Ivanovich Trubetskoy - member of one of the extra-numerous cadet branches of the ancient Trubetskoy family, and thus a descendant of Rurik himself, and a far closer one than any of the Romanovs - was Russia's saviour in this troubled time. Not much is known about his early life. In 1806 he was but a brigadier, deployed in Moscow. The Time of Troubles provided an excellent opportunity for lower-ranks with skill, charisma and luck to climb up the career lattern, and by 1809 he was in command of a large ragtag army based at Moscow. His was not the largest army, but he was more than yet another warlord; through his ancestry, his control of Russia's old capital and his diplomatic skills, he was able to form alliances with many other warlords, promising them nobility and important positions under his reign. Perhaps more importantly he secured the neutrality of the Byzantines and the assistance of the Prussians, who helped him build a small, but modernised and highly-efficient Imperial Guard. With its help he easily defeated the remaining warlords in the Russian heartlands and took for himself the title of Imperator (yet, strangely, not that of "Tsar") in Moscow in 1811. The Second Russian Empire immediately declared war on Sweden; that was a somewhat rash move, but it proved to be well-timed, as Sweden and its army were in a state of decay by then and so were overwhelmed near Novgorod. That was a good start, and it was followed up well. Pskov, Petrozavodsk, Revel, Helsingfors and Torku all eventually fell to Victor I's armies, although the Russian casualties were very high and the battles were sometimes close-ran even as Sweden fell apart. The peace with Sweden didn't mean peace for Russia; and for the rest of 1810s, the fighting continued. By 1813, Cossacks and Poles were reined in, but in 1814 the latest military reforms caused a split between Victor and some of his former allies amongst the warlords; yet in the Battle on the Moskva River, the rebels were utterly routed. A republican conspiracy was defeated in 1815. General Dmitriy Griboyedov led a series of punitive campaigns against the Circassians, recovering the Caucasia by 1816. By 1818, Levin August von Bennigsen had restored order in Siberia, or at least in its more populated, southern parts. The status of the rest remained ambigous, but at least nominally Russian control was restored there as well. Bashkiria and northern Central Asia were also recaptured by 1820, though much progress there had been lost and all attempts to drive the Persians out of the south had failed.
And in the meantime, the civil bureaucracy was slowly rebuilt, at least in the European areas; industrialisation had commenced; foreign specialists were invited in large amounts; geologic expeditions were equipped to unlock the various mineral riches all over Russia, especially east of the Urals; schools were built; efforts were taken to colonise the northern Caucasia and Central Asia with ethnic Russians; Russification was introduced, but cultural - and to a certain degree political - autonomy was retained in Finland and Livonia. Yet though Victor was young, he was yet unmarried, and many feared that even had he had a heir that heir would not be able to hold Russia together as well as the Imperator did.
das
Regeneration In Process
Outside of Europe, things occured somewhat differently. The world is obviously a less crowded and cramped place than Europe, and so great achievements did not necessarily result in explosions of violence, although there was plenty of it as well. Things were somewhat calmed outside of Europe, generally speaking, and not as many revolutions - in the broader meaning of the world - had occured. The colonial empires grew steadily.
North America was dominated by Britain and Spain, especially in the west where Russia, a would-be challenger, was completely elimianted as an American power. The situation there was quite complicated until the Treaty of Seville in 1818, which divided Oregon along the Snake River (everything north was British, everything south was Spanish); the entirety of the Mississippi Basin was recognised as Spanish as well, but the Red River and the surrounding territories that weren't part of the aforementioned Basin were granted to Britain as well. Britain merged its Russian and other North American gains west of Nouvelle France into Rupertsland, "Britain's Siberia" as it was sometimes called with many meanings implied, as indeed it became a prime penal colony for the British Commonwealth, as well as a source of timber and furs, and dividends associated with fur trade, and ofcourse a vast, if not always hospitable, area to colonise, relieving the population pressure at home. The colony generally prospered., especially its rapidly-developing Pacific parts. At the same time, agitation begun for Rupertsland to receive home rule. Meanwhile, the Spaniards developed Louisiana with renewed vigour, founding many forts and missions. Fortunately it was a very large area, while the Spanish people generally weren't as eager in colonialism as the British, so the Spanish authorities in Nueva Orleans managed to forge fruitful and generally amiable relations with the various natives. Still, over time major Spanish concentrations arose. A similar colonial effort was ongoing in (Greater) California, sped up in late 1810s by the discovery of gold by state-comissioned prospectors. It is noteworthy that Nueva Espana, Louisiana and California had separate vice-regal governments and corteses, while Florida had its own Captaincy-General and Presidencia, as part of the colonial decentralisation reform. Quite naturally, Fernando VII's various reforms went down much better in the colonies than they did back at home, and indeed the colonies grew increasingly prosperous during this time. The king was not unaware of it, and during the Desamortisation rebellion had even expressed the desire to move the capital to Ciudad de Mexico. At the same time, he had quite reasonable fears that the colonies might grow a bit too strong, too prosperous and too autonomous, and that then they will no longer need Spain at all... But for now, the colonies were loyal.
In the eastern North America, things were settlingdown. Nouvelle France's autonomy and free trade had already been mentioned. Further south along the Atlantic seaboard there lie the American boroughs of the British Commonwealth; with the very troublesome Philadelphia, along with the moderately-troublesome Marlyand, Delaware and New Jersey, out, the rest of the British lands here (specifically, Newfoundland, Acadia, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island and New York) prospered in peace and quiet, though it also "coincided" with a general cultural stagnation and complacency. Greater ties with the Metropoly were forged, and American politicians such as Aaron Burr rose to prominence in Birmingham. Further south, the Washington Republic stumbled through its difficult formative years. Thomas Jefferson did much to bring the country together, while at the same time setting up a confederal democratic system not unlike the Swiss one (but slightly more centralised and very egalitarian, and generally less hindered by various archaic laws and customs, though that was more of a natural situation than a result of Jefferson's efforts). The office of President was somewhat more powerful than in Britain, but the Washington Republic was definitely a parliamentary one. The capital was moved to Philadelphia after some bickering. On a different note, the Washington Republic saw something of a religious revival, and at the same time partook in the Physiocracy craze of Europe (although for Europe itself it had mostly passed), somewhat neglecting industrial development outside of Pennsylvania. Lastly, Greater Georgia had settled down as well. George II had only retained the Carolinas and Georgia itself, but he had retained them well. As the French basically abandoned Greater Georgia to its fate after the Third World War, George II had managed to gain de facto independence for himself, and already in this endeared himself to his subjects. Fairly liberal reforms helped as well, especially as George II knew where to stop (namely, he stopped short of abolishing slavery). Despite ideological difficulties and historical enemity (as well as religious disputes - the Commonwealth and the Republic were secular with independent and decentralised Churches (although still primarily Anglican), while George II claimed, and in Georgia possessed, control over the Anglican Church), a certain degree of reconciliation with Washington and especially with the British Commonwealth had been achieved; a loose mutual protection pact was signed with the former after both Georgia and the Republic had several synchronous military border clashes with Spain. Still, Georgia remained quite backwater and isolated.
The Carribean, slave rebellions aside, was quite quiet. In general it was neglected as the great powers turned to the east in pursuit of colonies; the abolition of slavery also hurt the regional economy. However, an exception was made for Cuba and the other Spanish holdings, which grew in importance and population size as part of the Spanish colonial development efforts. In particular, many ports were expanded, and military industrialisation occured around Habana, which now became the base for operations against any rebels or foreign enemies in the Carribean area; the Spanish Carribean Fleet was transformed into an impressive fighting force, perhaps even capable of challenging the British if that were to become necessary.
In South America, Spain, via its liberalisation and decentralisation, had assured the maintenance of peace and order despite clear tendencies towards the opposite during the prewar and war periods. Portugal, meanwhile, was forced to deal with the already-mentioned Brazilian separatist rebellion in 1815-1819, and even then had to request Spanish assistance. Even after the rebel defeat, some resistance continued, and Portuguese power in southern Brazil largely rested on Spanish bayonets. This was clearly reflected by the way most territorial disputes between Spanish and Portuguese colonies (chiefly they occured in the western Amazon and in the Regiao Sul) were solved in Spanish favour. Meanwhile, the British had claimed the Malvines and Patagonia, upsetting the Spanish somewhat; still, they agreed to recognise this in 1818 in exchange for Britain abandoning claims to parts of Oregon south of the Snake River (as was already said). The actual British presence in the area was minor, although its (not all that great due to the climate, but still existant) strategic importance was clearly recognised.
Spain in Morocco, France in Algiers and Naples in Tunis all continued their policies in the usual mold - putting down rebellions, colonising, fortifying, proselytising and expanding southwards a bit. The Berber rebellions had gradually died down after the failed 1812 outburst provoked by the new French religious policies. Gradually France and Naples became more established in their colonies, with several thriving colonial communities established (most famously, Carthage). In the more developed and thickly-populated Morocco, Spanish efforts had less success. Nevertheless, Casablanca, which from the start had a major Spanish population (as evidenced by its Spanish name), had emerged as a very important Atlantic port thanks to their efforts.
By this point, pretty much the entirety of the West African coast (in this case meaning the section from Arguin to Niger Delta) was partitioned between the various trade outposts, ports, forts and other installations belonging to the various European colonial powers, namely (as of 1820) Britain, France, Prussia/HRE, Portugal and Scandinavia. Out of these, Portugal was the weakest, with but a minor trade outpost at Bissau, over which it had limited control anyway. Britain's positions in the area had generally weakened as well, but it still was one of the key players, with a serious presence in Guinea, Windward Coast, Gold Coast and Dahomey. France created a serious challenge, with its well-developed colony in Senegal, and numerous outposts all over the southern coast (especially in Ivory Coast). Prussia and Scandinavia were both surprisingly strong here; the Scandinavians had concentrated their efforts on Ivory and Windward Coasts, while the Prussians were particularily strong in Gold Coast, but also present in Guinea and Benin (which in fact became quite important for them after 1817, when their intervention after a civil war that disrupted trade resulted in it becoming a Prussian protectorate). Still, the Europeans, with the exception of a costly yet successful French expedition to secure the entirety of the Senegal River, avoided penetrating far into the interior of West Africa, perhaps rightly so as this was a time of great chaos in that interior. To be brief: the Oyo Empire crumbled, Segu, reinvigorated by Mansong Diarra, went on a new expansionist spree and captured Timbuktu (amongst other places), and the Fulani people, rallied by Shaihu Usman dan Fodio, went on a great Jihad, conquering both the Hausa states and the decaying Bornu Empire (further weakened by the intensified Berber raids from the north, due to greater population pressure caused by the exoduses triggered by French repressions and punitive expeditions on the other side of the Sahara), and creating the extensive and powerful, though shaky, Fulani Caliphate. Its shakiness was somewhat remidied by dan Fodio's later reforms to establish an efficient Islamic theocracy (yet backed up by pragmatic policy in the regards of the less pious, but still helpful of the Fulani warlords and nobles). It must also be noted however that trade soon begun to recover.
The tale of French annexation of Tripolitania and conquest of Egypt has already been told; to it we can only add that d'Etang had succesfully defeated all rebellions in Egypt Proper, but eventually had to abandon Funj. That allowed the sudden ascendancy of the Sultanate of Darfur, which exploited the power vacuum to its east by capturing Sennar and several other key cities in a daring invasion. The Darfuri Empire was, needless to say, a very unstable one, and its control over Nubia was limited, but nonetheless this was perhaps the zenith for the Fur people, as Darfur became a serious regional power.
Ethiopia's Age of the Princes (an era of intermittent feudal civil warfare) went into its culminative phase as the powerful lords of Tigray, Begemder and Shewa clashed for power. The Shewa, with some French assistance (mostly in the form of advisors), had done surprising well early on; but the intensified Oromo incursions, ironically enough caused in part by the French expansion in East Africa, had distracted Wossen Seged's armies and damaged his heartlands. Gugsa, the Ras of Begemder, was himself an Oromo; he allied with his very distant southern relatives, and with their help subjugated Shewa and later conquered Tigray as well, affirming his position of Regent of Ethiopia (the Emperor being a powerless puppet as per tradition). In the aftermath of his victory, Ethiopia entered an even more thorough isolation than before, while the Oromo were granted many lands and privileges. That made this victory a somewhat dubious and incomplete one - for on one hand, it threatened to drown Ethiopia in Oromo warlordism, and on the other hand it provoked constant Ethiopian rebellions. Still, Gugsa hung on to power for the rest of the 1810s...
Central Africa (Cameroon and the like) was chiefly contested by Spain and Britain. The Portuguese asserted themselves in Angola, and launched military expeditions along the Congo, conquering some local states but failing to advance too far. In Mozambique, defenses were improved, both against the natives and against the French who through carrot and stick methods (in other words, through diplomacy, blatant intimidation and even more blatant invasion with overwhelming force) had secured control over the Swahili city-states of East Africa. Sudafrika entered a state of stagnation due to its corrupt and mostly inefficient rulers; still, survival was ensured by treaties with Britain, France and Portugal, while the frontiersmen ("voortrekkers") fought a bitter border war with the Mtethwa, failing to expand far but succesfully crippling the empire in a series of battles. Still, even as it collapsed, various new threats emerged from its remains and from the north. The war on the frontier was quickly becoming a normal state of affairs, and a special, militant and independent mentality developed there. Clashes between the "voortrekkers" and the "kaapers" - the central authority and the northern militarised farmer communities - grew, with the latter growing increasingly independent and defiant. By 1820 the threat of seccession - possibly accompanied by civil war - had become very real, especially with the rise of Colesberg as a potential northern capital and of a new generation of voortrekker leaders such as Andries Retief or Arnoldus Cilliers, who saw the need for cooperation and coordination between all the voortrekker communities from ocean to ocean.
The French had also consolidated their hold on Muscat and Soccotra, to further safeguard their Indian Ocean empire. The rest of Oman was allowed to go free though; it soon collapsed into tribal warfare, until the ascendant Wahhabite Saudi Empire picked it up. Under Saud I (not really the first of the Saudis, but he was the first man named Saud who actually ruled that empire), the Wahhabites launched ambitious raids into the Holy Land, Iraq and Hejjaz; ultimately they failed to make any permanent gains there, but they did sack Karbala and grind a small French army into sand during a would-be punitive expedition against Ad-Dir'iyah, the Saudi capital. Also, as already mentioned, Oman was secured, although it was perhaps too far from the Wahhabite heartland to be a tenable gain.
Vakilol Ro'aya Esmail I's efforts to restore a Zand state had gone very well indeed. He combined the use of "independent" British advisors (who were clearly sent by their government in many cases; the British wanted allies in the Indian Ocean, to use against Russia and/or France should a need to do so appear), fairly efficient and well-trained bureaucrats and local-level popular councils to build up both a working state apparatus and to create a wide support base for himself, especially amongst the ethnic Persians (it is not unreasonable to speak of Persian nationalism here). The traditional egalitarian and populist social policies of the Zands were revived and led further, whilst at the same time the aforementioned foreign specialists were used to build up a good, modern army and to start up the Persian industrialisation, though it didn't go far yet. The process of reform and consolidation went quickly and peacefully enough in Persia Proper, if only because the potential opposition was too weak and tired now. In the non-Persian periphereal regions of Iraq, Aizerbadjan and Central Asia, things were more difficult, but eventually strategic alliances with certain local factions (such as the Iraqi Shiites) and application of brutal force against some others had allowed the Persians to consolidate control there as well. Central Asia (in this case including Afghanistan and Baluchistan) was probably the hardest; it became something of a training ground for the reformed Persian army after 1810. The Persians had ultimately triumphed, securing such great cities as Merv, Samarkand, Bukkhara, Herat and Kabul; a treaty of non-aggression and "mutual respect" was signed with the Sikhs in 1814; the Persians promised not to intervenne in India, and the Sikhs promised not to intervenne in Central Asia. The treaty evolved in 1816 into a fully-fledged alliance, ironically enough resulting in Persia having to intervenne in India after all, on the Sikh behalf. In the meantime, naval matters were mostly neglected, although the Persian Gulf trade revived.
The crystalisation of the new order of things in India continued, in the wake of the downfall of the Mughal Empire and the Maratha Confederacy and the abortion of a would-be British Empire. No single power emerged predominant, but several European and native states rose to prominence on the Indian arena. In the northwest, Khalistan briefly fell into civil war between the various misls (Sikh warrior clans). In the end, the Dhillon misl emerged triumphant, and Kirat Singh I asserted supreme central power in Khalistan, dealing harshly with his opponents. He proceeded to build up the unified Sikh army considerably, and waged never-ending wars with his Muslim neighbours. Eventually the western border was secured by the aforementioned treaties with Persia, and the Persian assistance helped the Sikhs beat back the Mughals. The Mughals, led by Akbar Shah II, consolidated their hold on the Gangetic Plain, campaigning vigorously against the Rajputs as well as against the Sikhs. At the same time, the ties with France were improved and efforts towards modernisation were undertaken. The Rajputs indeed were doing very badly in this era, coming under Sikh, Mughal, Scandinavian and Mysorean attacks; eventually they rallied in an united kingdom based at Ujjain, beating back some attacks and driving the Mysoreans back beyond the Narmada. Meanwhile, the Scandinavians had mostly displaced the Portuguese in Gujarat, converting the weakened, unstable Sultanate into a protectorate of theirs. The British clung on to Bengal, although their control there was threatened both by the foreign (chiefly French and Scandinavian) presence and by the oft-discontent natives only partially appeased by the lackluster efforts at social reform. Portuguese, British, Belgian, Scandinavian and French forts and outposts littered the western coast. There were some important French bases on the eastern coast as well (especially in the Northern Circars that the French had conquered with time), but most of it was actually in Mysorean hands. Mysore, now ruled by Tippu's son Yasin Sultan, was an increasingly bloated and overstretched empire; still, it held on to most of its gains, dominating Deccan. Not much was done in the way of reform, but the gains were consolidated and lots of impressive fortified settlements were built in the north, where the Marathas still did rise up very often. Speaking of the Marathas, some of them fled to the northeast, creating a weaker, but more stable successor state to the Confederacy - the Bhosnle Empire, which filled the political vacuum that eventually arose between Mysore and British Bengal. Lastly, the Scandinavians held on to Ceylon, while the French captured various small island chains in the Indian Ocean.
Qing China under the Jiaqing Emperor was increasingly forced to reasses its situation, amidst corruption, rebellion and the emptying of the treasury. The latter was especially true after the 1800s campaigns against the various rebels (most importantly the Uighurs, the White Lotus and the Koreans - more specifically it was a rebellion against the Chinese vassal ruler in Korea); though the Banners had emerged triumphant, the treasury was virtually empty. To refill it, Jiaqing Emperor introduced higher taxes and purges against corrupt officials, but as it proved insufficient he eventually agreed to open up China some more to western trade, especially Scandinavian, French and British. Missionary activity was explicitly forbidden, however. The trade did help China recover, and also reawakened interest in everything Western - particularily the various gadgets and inventions the merchants had brought along, but also on certain social and political ideas, especially those that bore resemblance to traditional Chinese populist thought. That was, in fact, most alarming...
In Indochina, it was a time of rearming and preparations. The British consolidated and developed their gains in Malaya; the French battled rebels in Vietnam. Meanwhile, both were propping up their respective allies in Amarapura and Siam (which never did sign peace, although eventually ceasing to fight). Whilst Amarapura concentrated on rebuilding its war-ravaged lands and training its military, the Siamese modernised their realm in general with British assistance, centralising authority, consolidating those gains that they did keep and experimenting with industrialisation as well.
The British Pacific Empire grew by leaps and bounds. In the furthest west, Singapore and Macao were built up into formidable trade centers. Although west Sumatra was now French, the rest of the island came under one or another degree of British authority by 1820. The Phillipines, Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas and Timor constituted the prosperous colony of British East Indies, while far to the north lie Port Peterpaul, which was of somewhat limited use due to the weather conditions but still evolved into a valuable asset, especially as semilegal trade with the nearby Chukchas and Ainu was set up. Between Kamchatka and the Phillipines was Japan... After several more incidents, the Japanese, still refusing to open up to British trade as per the insistance of the dogmatic isolationist Matsudaira Sadanobu. Emboldened by the purchase of the Dutch trade settlement at Dejima and outraged by the increasingly violent Japanese responses to all the British intrusions (culminating with the storming of the said Dejima settlement and its eventual destruction), the British outfitted a major military expedition to Nagasaki in 1812. The city was captured, yet the Japanese still refused to negotiate, thinking that the British will just burn it and withdraw. Instead, the British pressed on with their attacks, sending in more and more ships and troops and landing elsewhere in Japan. The outdated, ill-coordinated Japanese armies were decimated one by one, with very uneven losses, although at a later point the fanatical Japanese resistance, combined with despair and the occasional cunning caused by it did take its toll on the British invaders. Ultimately, the British managed to capture Edo and the Emperor, and by using his prestige along with promises of social reforms received the support of many of the Japanese peasants, at least temporarily. The middle class, how ever weak, supported the British almost from the start, eager to free itself from the restrictive policies of the Shogunate (and also somewhat naive as to the British purpose). Shogun Tokugawa Ienari commited suicide in 1817. By this point, Japan had become a de facto British fief. The Emperor became a figurehead for the invaders, just as he was a figurehead for the previous rulers. Some rebellions happened when the British turned out to be a) not so benevolent towards the peasantry after all and b) very proactive in their missionary efforts (not a fault of the British government or military; the missionaries just came along and they didn't stop them). Still, British control was maintained, and stricter control was established via collaborators (mostly but not solely the aforementioned middle class and the Protestant converts; the Japanese Catholics, who had become quite numerous as well, actually became one of the most troublesome opposition groups). This conquest had alarmed even Beijing, although to a limited extent only (still, it might be one of the reasons for the somewhat more West-friendly policies of Jiaqing in the 1810s). Further to the east, various small Pacific island chains were claimed, chiefly in the central and western parts of the Ocean. And lastly, a loose British protectorate was established in the Hawaii after a series of amiable agreements with the local chieftains; the Pearl Harbour was the only serious concentration of British citizens, however.
Scandinavia did create something of competition for the British with its control over Bantam and some other outposts in the East Indies, as well as trade with China and the trade outposts near Wushan and on Taiwan. But this ofcourse wasn't anything serious as far as the British were concerned. Meanwhile, Hamengkubuwono III of Java had signed an alliance and trade agreemenet with Scandinavia; he used this to modernise his realm, introducing administrative and educational reforms and standardising laws and language.
The colonisation of Australia begun in the earnest; with French outposts in the west, Scandinavian ones in the north and British ones in the east; thus far, the British were far ahead in this colonial race, having already secured much of the eastern coast and established several small, yet burgeoning port settlements. Some outposts were established in New Ireland (OTL North Island of New Zealand).
Thus towards 1820, tensions gathered up, waiting to explode in the coming Interesting Times during which, some had already prophesized, the world as we know it will cease to be.
OOC: Will work on the map later today.
North America was dominated by Britain and Spain, especially in the west where Russia, a would-be challenger, was completely elimianted as an American power. The situation there was quite complicated until the Treaty of Seville in 1818, which divided Oregon along the Snake River (everything north was British, everything south was Spanish); the entirety of the Mississippi Basin was recognised as Spanish as well, but the Red River and the surrounding territories that weren't part of the aforementioned Basin were granted to Britain as well. Britain merged its Russian and other North American gains west of Nouvelle France into Rupertsland, "Britain's Siberia" as it was sometimes called with many meanings implied, as indeed it became a prime penal colony for the British Commonwealth, as well as a source of timber and furs, and dividends associated with fur trade, and ofcourse a vast, if not always hospitable, area to colonise, relieving the population pressure at home. The colony generally prospered., especially its rapidly-developing Pacific parts. At the same time, agitation begun for Rupertsland to receive home rule. Meanwhile, the Spaniards developed Louisiana with renewed vigour, founding many forts and missions. Fortunately it was a very large area, while the Spanish people generally weren't as eager in colonialism as the British, so the Spanish authorities in Nueva Orleans managed to forge fruitful and generally amiable relations with the various natives. Still, over time major Spanish concentrations arose. A similar colonial effort was ongoing in (Greater) California, sped up in late 1810s by the discovery of gold by state-comissioned prospectors. It is noteworthy that Nueva Espana, Louisiana and California had separate vice-regal governments and corteses, while Florida had its own Captaincy-General and Presidencia, as part of the colonial decentralisation reform. Quite naturally, Fernando VII's various reforms went down much better in the colonies than they did back at home, and indeed the colonies grew increasingly prosperous during this time. The king was not unaware of it, and during the Desamortisation rebellion had even expressed the desire to move the capital to Ciudad de Mexico. At the same time, he had quite reasonable fears that the colonies might grow a bit too strong, too prosperous and too autonomous, and that then they will no longer need Spain at all... But for now, the colonies were loyal.
In the eastern North America, things were settlingdown. Nouvelle France's autonomy and free trade had already been mentioned. Further south along the Atlantic seaboard there lie the American boroughs of the British Commonwealth; with the very troublesome Philadelphia, along with the moderately-troublesome Marlyand, Delaware and New Jersey, out, the rest of the British lands here (specifically, Newfoundland, Acadia, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island and New York) prospered in peace and quiet, though it also "coincided" with a general cultural stagnation and complacency. Greater ties with the Metropoly were forged, and American politicians such as Aaron Burr rose to prominence in Birmingham. Further south, the Washington Republic stumbled through its difficult formative years. Thomas Jefferson did much to bring the country together, while at the same time setting up a confederal democratic system not unlike the Swiss one (but slightly more centralised and very egalitarian, and generally less hindered by various archaic laws and customs, though that was more of a natural situation than a result of Jefferson's efforts). The office of President was somewhat more powerful than in Britain, but the Washington Republic was definitely a parliamentary one. The capital was moved to Philadelphia after some bickering. On a different note, the Washington Republic saw something of a religious revival, and at the same time partook in the Physiocracy craze of Europe (although for Europe itself it had mostly passed), somewhat neglecting industrial development outside of Pennsylvania. Lastly, Greater Georgia had settled down as well. George II had only retained the Carolinas and Georgia itself, but he had retained them well. As the French basically abandoned Greater Georgia to its fate after the Third World War, George II had managed to gain de facto independence for himself, and already in this endeared himself to his subjects. Fairly liberal reforms helped as well, especially as George II knew where to stop (namely, he stopped short of abolishing slavery). Despite ideological difficulties and historical enemity (as well as religious disputes - the Commonwealth and the Republic were secular with independent and decentralised Churches (although still primarily Anglican), while George II claimed, and in Georgia possessed, control over the Anglican Church), a certain degree of reconciliation with Washington and especially with the British Commonwealth had been achieved; a loose mutual protection pact was signed with the former after both Georgia and the Republic had several synchronous military border clashes with Spain. Still, Georgia remained quite backwater and isolated.
The Carribean, slave rebellions aside, was quite quiet. In general it was neglected as the great powers turned to the east in pursuit of colonies; the abolition of slavery also hurt the regional economy. However, an exception was made for Cuba and the other Spanish holdings, which grew in importance and population size as part of the Spanish colonial development efforts. In particular, many ports were expanded, and military industrialisation occured around Habana, which now became the base for operations against any rebels or foreign enemies in the Carribean area; the Spanish Carribean Fleet was transformed into an impressive fighting force, perhaps even capable of challenging the British if that were to become necessary.
In South America, Spain, via its liberalisation and decentralisation, had assured the maintenance of peace and order despite clear tendencies towards the opposite during the prewar and war periods. Portugal, meanwhile, was forced to deal with the already-mentioned Brazilian separatist rebellion in 1815-1819, and even then had to request Spanish assistance. Even after the rebel defeat, some resistance continued, and Portuguese power in southern Brazil largely rested on Spanish bayonets. This was clearly reflected by the way most territorial disputes between Spanish and Portuguese colonies (chiefly they occured in the western Amazon and in the Regiao Sul) were solved in Spanish favour. Meanwhile, the British had claimed the Malvines and Patagonia, upsetting the Spanish somewhat; still, they agreed to recognise this in 1818 in exchange for Britain abandoning claims to parts of Oregon south of the Snake River (as was already said). The actual British presence in the area was minor, although its (not all that great due to the climate, but still existant) strategic importance was clearly recognised.
Spain in Morocco, France in Algiers and Naples in Tunis all continued their policies in the usual mold - putting down rebellions, colonising, fortifying, proselytising and expanding southwards a bit. The Berber rebellions had gradually died down after the failed 1812 outburst provoked by the new French religious policies. Gradually France and Naples became more established in their colonies, with several thriving colonial communities established (most famously, Carthage). In the more developed and thickly-populated Morocco, Spanish efforts had less success. Nevertheless, Casablanca, which from the start had a major Spanish population (as evidenced by its Spanish name), had emerged as a very important Atlantic port thanks to their efforts.
By this point, pretty much the entirety of the West African coast (in this case meaning the section from Arguin to Niger Delta) was partitioned between the various trade outposts, ports, forts and other installations belonging to the various European colonial powers, namely (as of 1820) Britain, France, Prussia/HRE, Portugal and Scandinavia. Out of these, Portugal was the weakest, with but a minor trade outpost at Bissau, over which it had limited control anyway. Britain's positions in the area had generally weakened as well, but it still was one of the key players, with a serious presence in Guinea, Windward Coast, Gold Coast and Dahomey. France created a serious challenge, with its well-developed colony in Senegal, and numerous outposts all over the southern coast (especially in Ivory Coast). Prussia and Scandinavia were both surprisingly strong here; the Scandinavians had concentrated their efforts on Ivory and Windward Coasts, while the Prussians were particularily strong in Gold Coast, but also present in Guinea and Benin (which in fact became quite important for them after 1817, when their intervention after a civil war that disrupted trade resulted in it becoming a Prussian protectorate). Still, the Europeans, with the exception of a costly yet successful French expedition to secure the entirety of the Senegal River, avoided penetrating far into the interior of West Africa, perhaps rightly so as this was a time of great chaos in that interior. To be brief: the Oyo Empire crumbled, Segu, reinvigorated by Mansong Diarra, went on a new expansionist spree and captured Timbuktu (amongst other places), and the Fulani people, rallied by Shaihu Usman dan Fodio, went on a great Jihad, conquering both the Hausa states and the decaying Bornu Empire (further weakened by the intensified Berber raids from the north, due to greater population pressure caused by the exoduses triggered by French repressions and punitive expeditions on the other side of the Sahara), and creating the extensive and powerful, though shaky, Fulani Caliphate. Its shakiness was somewhat remidied by dan Fodio's later reforms to establish an efficient Islamic theocracy (yet backed up by pragmatic policy in the regards of the less pious, but still helpful of the Fulani warlords and nobles). It must also be noted however that trade soon begun to recover.
The tale of French annexation of Tripolitania and conquest of Egypt has already been told; to it we can only add that d'Etang had succesfully defeated all rebellions in Egypt Proper, but eventually had to abandon Funj. That allowed the sudden ascendancy of the Sultanate of Darfur, which exploited the power vacuum to its east by capturing Sennar and several other key cities in a daring invasion. The Darfuri Empire was, needless to say, a very unstable one, and its control over Nubia was limited, but nonetheless this was perhaps the zenith for the Fur people, as Darfur became a serious regional power.
Ethiopia's Age of the Princes (an era of intermittent feudal civil warfare) went into its culminative phase as the powerful lords of Tigray, Begemder and Shewa clashed for power. The Shewa, with some French assistance (mostly in the form of advisors), had done surprising well early on; but the intensified Oromo incursions, ironically enough caused in part by the French expansion in East Africa, had distracted Wossen Seged's armies and damaged his heartlands. Gugsa, the Ras of Begemder, was himself an Oromo; he allied with his very distant southern relatives, and with their help subjugated Shewa and later conquered Tigray as well, affirming his position of Regent of Ethiopia (the Emperor being a powerless puppet as per tradition). In the aftermath of his victory, Ethiopia entered an even more thorough isolation than before, while the Oromo were granted many lands and privileges. That made this victory a somewhat dubious and incomplete one - for on one hand, it threatened to drown Ethiopia in Oromo warlordism, and on the other hand it provoked constant Ethiopian rebellions. Still, Gugsa hung on to power for the rest of the 1810s...
Central Africa (Cameroon and the like) was chiefly contested by Spain and Britain. The Portuguese asserted themselves in Angola, and launched military expeditions along the Congo, conquering some local states but failing to advance too far. In Mozambique, defenses were improved, both against the natives and against the French who through carrot and stick methods (in other words, through diplomacy, blatant intimidation and even more blatant invasion with overwhelming force) had secured control over the Swahili city-states of East Africa. Sudafrika entered a state of stagnation due to its corrupt and mostly inefficient rulers; still, survival was ensured by treaties with Britain, France and Portugal, while the frontiersmen ("voortrekkers") fought a bitter border war with the Mtethwa, failing to expand far but succesfully crippling the empire in a series of battles. Still, even as it collapsed, various new threats emerged from its remains and from the north. The war on the frontier was quickly becoming a normal state of affairs, and a special, militant and independent mentality developed there. Clashes between the "voortrekkers" and the "kaapers" - the central authority and the northern militarised farmer communities - grew, with the latter growing increasingly independent and defiant. By 1820 the threat of seccession - possibly accompanied by civil war - had become very real, especially with the rise of Colesberg as a potential northern capital and of a new generation of voortrekker leaders such as Andries Retief or Arnoldus Cilliers, who saw the need for cooperation and coordination between all the voortrekker communities from ocean to ocean.
The French had also consolidated their hold on Muscat and Soccotra, to further safeguard their Indian Ocean empire. The rest of Oman was allowed to go free though; it soon collapsed into tribal warfare, until the ascendant Wahhabite Saudi Empire picked it up. Under Saud I (not really the first of the Saudis, but he was the first man named Saud who actually ruled that empire), the Wahhabites launched ambitious raids into the Holy Land, Iraq and Hejjaz; ultimately they failed to make any permanent gains there, but they did sack Karbala and grind a small French army into sand during a would-be punitive expedition against Ad-Dir'iyah, the Saudi capital. Also, as already mentioned, Oman was secured, although it was perhaps too far from the Wahhabite heartland to be a tenable gain.
Vakilol Ro'aya Esmail I's efforts to restore a Zand state had gone very well indeed. He combined the use of "independent" British advisors (who were clearly sent by their government in many cases; the British wanted allies in the Indian Ocean, to use against Russia and/or France should a need to do so appear), fairly efficient and well-trained bureaucrats and local-level popular councils to build up both a working state apparatus and to create a wide support base for himself, especially amongst the ethnic Persians (it is not unreasonable to speak of Persian nationalism here). The traditional egalitarian and populist social policies of the Zands were revived and led further, whilst at the same time the aforementioned foreign specialists were used to build up a good, modern army and to start up the Persian industrialisation, though it didn't go far yet. The process of reform and consolidation went quickly and peacefully enough in Persia Proper, if only because the potential opposition was too weak and tired now. In the non-Persian periphereal regions of Iraq, Aizerbadjan and Central Asia, things were more difficult, but eventually strategic alliances with certain local factions (such as the Iraqi Shiites) and application of brutal force against some others had allowed the Persians to consolidate control there as well. Central Asia (in this case including Afghanistan and Baluchistan) was probably the hardest; it became something of a training ground for the reformed Persian army after 1810. The Persians had ultimately triumphed, securing such great cities as Merv, Samarkand, Bukkhara, Herat and Kabul; a treaty of non-aggression and "mutual respect" was signed with the Sikhs in 1814; the Persians promised not to intervenne in India, and the Sikhs promised not to intervenne in Central Asia. The treaty evolved in 1816 into a fully-fledged alliance, ironically enough resulting in Persia having to intervenne in India after all, on the Sikh behalf. In the meantime, naval matters were mostly neglected, although the Persian Gulf trade revived.
The crystalisation of the new order of things in India continued, in the wake of the downfall of the Mughal Empire and the Maratha Confederacy and the abortion of a would-be British Empire. No single power emerged predominant, but several European and native states rose to prominence on the Indian arena. In the northwest, Khalistan briefly fell into civil war between the various misls (Sikh warrior clans). In the end, the Dhillon misl emerged triumphant, and Kirat Singh I asserted supreme central power in Khalistan, dealing harshly with his opponents. He proceeded to build up the unified Sikh army considerably, and waged never-ending wars with his Muslim neighbours. Eventually the western border was secured by the aforementioned treaties with Persia, and the Persian assistance helped the Sikhs beat back the Mughals. The Mughals, led by Akbar Shah II, consolidated their hold on the Gangetic Plain, campaigning vigorously against the Rajputs as well as against the Sikhs. At the same time, the ties with France were improved and efforts towards modernisation were undertaken. The Rajputs indeed were doing very badly in this era, coming under Sikh, Mughal, Scandinavian and Mysorean attacks; eventually they rallied in an united kingdom based at Ujjain, beating back some attacks and driving the Mysoreans back beyond the Narmada. Meanwhile, the Scandinavians had mostly displaced the Portuguese in Gujarat, converting the weakened, unstable Sultanate into a protectorate of theirs. The British clung on to Bengal, although their control there was threatened both by the foreign (chiefly French and Scandinavian) presence and by the oft-discontent natives only partially appeased by the lackluster efforts at social reform. Portuguese, British, Belgian, Scandinavian and French forts and outposts littered the western coast. There were some important French bases on the eastern coast as well (especially in the Northern Circars that the French had conquered with time), but most of it was actually in Mysorean hands. Mysore, now ruled by Tippu's son Yasin Sultan, was an increasingly bloated and overstretched empire; still, it held on to most of its gains, dominating Deccan. Not much was done in the way of reform, but the gains were consolidated and lots of impressive fortified settlements were built in the north, where the Marathas still did rise up very often. Speaking of the Marathas, some of them fled to the northeast, creating a weaker, but more stable successor state to the Confederacy - the Bhosnle Empire, which filled the political vacuum that eventually arose between Mysore and British Bengal. Lastly, the Scandinavians held on to Ceylon, while the French captured various small island chains in the Indian Ocean.
Qing China under the Jiaqing Emperor was increasingly forced to reasses its situation, amidst corruption, rebellion and the emptying of the treasury. The latter was especially true after the 1800s campaigns against the various rebels (most importantly the Uighurs, the White Lotus and the Koreans - more specifically it was a rebellion against the Chinese vassal ruler in Korea); though the Banners had emerged triumphant, the treasury was virtually empty. To refill it, Jiaqing Emperor introduced higher taxes and purges against corrupt officials, but as it proved insufficient he eventually agreed to open up China some more to western trade, especially Scandinavian, French and British. Missionary activity was explicitly forbidden, however. The trade did help China recover, and also reawakened interest in everything Western - particularily the various gadgets and inventions the merchants had brought along, but also on certain social and political ideas, especially those that bore resemblance to traditional Chinese populist thought. That was, in fact, most alarming...
In Indochina, it was a time of rearming and preparations. The British consolidated and developed their gains in Malaya; the French battled rebels in Vietnam. Meanwhile, both were propping up their respective allies in Amarapura and Siam (which never did sign peace, although eventually ceasing to fight). Whilst Amarapura concentrated on rebuilding its war-ravaged lands and training its military, the Siamese modernised their realm in general with British assistance, centralising authority, consolidating those gains that they did keep and experimenting with industrialisation as well.
The British Pacific Empire grew by leaps and bounds. In the furthest west, Singapore and Macao were built up into formidable trade centers. Although west Sumatra was now French, the rest of the island came under one or another degree of British authority by 1820. The Phillipines, Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas and Timor constituted the prosperous colony of British East Indies, while far to the north lie Port Peterpaul, which was of somewhat limited use due to the weather conditions but still evolved into a valuable asset, especially as semilegal trade with the nearby Chukchas and Ainu was set up. Between Kamchatka and the Phillipines was Japan... After several more incidents, the Japanese, still refusing to open up to British trade as per the insistance of the dogmatic isolationist Matsudaira Sadanobu. Emboldened by the purchase of the Dutch trade settlement at Dejima and outraged by the increasingly violent Japanese responses to all the British intrusions (culminating with the storming of the said Dejima settlement and its eventual destruction), the British outfitted a major military expedition to Nagasaki in 1812. The city was captured, yet the Japanese still refused to negotiate, thinking that the British will just burn it and withdraw. Instead, the British pressed on with their attacks, sending in more and more ships and troops and landing elsewhere in Japan. The outdated, ill-coordinated Japanese armies were decimated one by one, with very uneven losses, although at a later point the fanatical Japanese resistance, combined with despair and the occasional cunning caused by it did take its toll on the British invaders. Ultimately, the British managed to capture Edo and the Emperor, and by using his prestige along with promises of social reforms received the support of many of the Japanese peasants, at least temporarily. The middle class, how ever weak, supported the British almost from the start, eager to free itself from the restrictive policies of the Shogunate (and also somewhat naive as to the British purpose). Shogun Tokugawa Ienari commited suicide in 1817. By this point, Japan had become a de facto British fief. The Emperor became a figurehead for the invaders, just as he was a figurehead for the previous rulers. Some rebellions happened when the British turned out to be a) not so benevolent towards the peasantry after all and b) very proactive in their missionary efforts (not a fault of the British government or military; the missionaries just came along and they didn't stop them). Still, British control was maintained, and stricter control was established via collaborators (mostly but not solely the aforementioned middle class and the Protestant converts; the Japanese Catholics, who had become quite numerous as well, actually became one of the most troublesome opposition groups). This conquest had alarmed even Beijing, although to a limited extent only (still, it might be one of the reasons for the somewhat more West-friendly policies of Jiaqing in the 1810s). Further to the east, various small Pacific island chains were claimed, chiefly in the central and western parts of the Ocean. And lastly, a loose British protectorate was established in the Hawaii after a series of amiable agreements with the local chieftains; the Pearl Harbour was the only serious concentration of British citizens, however.
Scandinavia did create something of competition for the British with its control over Bantam and some other outposts in the East Indies, as well as trade with China and the trade outposts near Wushan and on Taiwan. But this ofcourse wasn't anything serious as far as the British were concerned. Meanwhile, Hamengkubuwono III of Java had signed an alliance and trade agreemenet with Scandinavia; he used this to modernise his realm, introducing administrative and educational reforms and standardising laws and language.
The colonisation of Australia begun in the earnest; with French outposts in the west, Scandinavian ones in the north and British ones in the east; thus far, the British were far ahead in this colonial race, having already secured much of the eastern coast and established several small, yet burgeoning port settlements. Some outposts were established in New Ireland (OTL North Island of New Zealand).
Thus towards 1820, tensions gathered up, waiting to explode in the coming Interesting Times during which, some had already prophesized, the world as we know it will cease to be.
OOC: Will work on the map later today.
das
Regeneration In Process
Thlayli
Le Pétit Prince
Great timeline so far, das. Though the development of the North American political situation the way it did seems slightly unlikely.
As for the Atlantic Seaboard, the addition of the Hudson River to the standard map is sort of essential.
Also, is the capital of Greater Georgia supposed to be Charleston or Savannah? And did the Washington Republic annex all of New Jersey, or only the southern half?
I can probably revise the Eastern Seaboard map if you answer those questions.
As for the Atlantic Seaboard, the addition of the Hudson River to the standard map is sort of essential.
Also, is the capital of Greater Georgia supposed to be Charleston or Savannah? And did the Washington Republic annex all of New Jersey, or only the southern half?
I can probably revise the Eastern Seaboard map if you answer those questions.
das
Regeneration In Process
Particular grievances? Although you probably mean the independent states. The Kingdom of Greater Georgia is indeed "slightly unlikely", but not all that impossible given an eventual switch to a more sensible policy. And even then, its long-term survival is very much in doubt. The Washington Republic too was to a certain extent a product of several coincidences; it still is plagued by disunity, though, and the decentralisation may not be a viable long-term solution.
As are many other things! Had the map been right in the first place the borders too would've been right.
Charleston.
All of it.
Symphony D.
Deity
Would it be possible for all the installments of this alt-hist to be linked to in a single post? A common problem with reading these things is they tend to be strung out over pages and pages--makes it difficult and time-consuming to determine where they begin and where the pieces are. Tables of content are a good thing.
That aside, what I've seen so far is rather quite excellent.
That aside, what I've seen so far is rather quite excellent.
das
Regeneration In Process
I already did do a table of contents for this in the past... Time to make an updated version:
Links:
Introduction and Beginning of the British Revolution.
The Fourth English Civil War, its spread and evolution.
The Five Years War.
Snapshot-1780.
The "Quiet" Eighties.
The "Noisy" Nineties.
1790s Continued and the End of Peace.
Tsar War: Opening Moves and the Stalemate.
Tsar War: Climax and Anticlimax. Fall of the Tsar.
World War: Darkest Hour, or Triumph and Tragedy.
World War: The Central Powers Strike Back.
World War: Endgame. The Paris Congress
Aftermath: Generalities and Western Europe.
Aftermath: Central Europe Redrawn.
Aftermath: Whither Switzerland, Italy and Russia?
Aftermath: The Greater World. Ominous Days.
Maailmankartta 1820 Anno Domini:
Links:
Introduction and Beginning of the British Revolution.
The Fourth English Civil War, its spread and evolution.
The Five Years War.
Snapshot-1780.
The "Quiet" Eighties.
The "Noisy" Nineties.
1790s Continued and the End of Peace.
Tsar War: Opening Moves and the Stalemate.
Tsar War: Climax and Anticlimax. Fall of the Tsar.
World War: Darkest Hour, or Triumph and Tragedy.
World War: The Central Powers Strike Back.
World War: Endgame. The Paris Congress
Aftermath: Generalities and Western Europe.
Aftermath: Central Europe Redrawn.
Aftermath: Whither Switzerland, Italy and Russia?
Aftermath: The Greater World. Ominous Days.
Maailmankartta 1820 Anno Domini:
Symphony D.
Deity
Below is the outline of the PoD and initial flow of a timeline I'm considering writing for some critique. I've gotten a bit farther in planning it out but I figure getting some (any) opinions on the below would be helpful first. Some details (casualties, quotes, dates) are subject to change.
- Saddam Hussein does not commit the gross strategic error of allowing American forces five months to build up in Saudi Arabia, and does attack Saudi Arabia sometime between and September 13, 1990 and January 1, 1991 as a preemptive strike against the inevitable attack. The earlier the more successful he is likely to be--retrospective estimates having concluded that prior to October the Coalition likely did not have sufficient mass to oppose him. There is also a stylistic aspect in that UNSC Resolution 666 was passed on September 13; 667 followed on the 16th and they continued from there. It would potentially be useful in light of what follows.
- Depending on the launch date of the attack, Iraqi success will vary due to the quantity of American ground forces but will likely not achieve complete success due to American air cover. Precise data on when things arrived (such as the six Aircraft Carrier groups the US had assembled and other supplies) is required for an accurate judgment. It is plausible, however, that they would succeed in capturing the Hama oil fields. Between these, Kuwait, and Iraq itself, Saddam will control between 1/4 to 1/3 of all world crude oil reserves. From here he continues to shore up his defensive position and launch raids on American positions, forcing them to withdraw.
- The "unprovoked" attack confirms President George H.W. Bush's placement of forces in Saudi Arabia as a strategically sound choice--the purported fabrication of an impending attack by Saddam, already ignored in our timeline, is now completely forgotten. Congress overwhelming approves a motion to declare war. International condemnation is immediate and harsh--UNSC Resolutions are redoubled, and a Coalition resembling the one formed OTL rapidly forms--including Syria, Egypt, and, of course, Saudi Arabia. The PLO reaffirms its support for the Iraqi cause, straining ties with both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
- Saddam capitalizes on similar rhetoric as OTL--Iranian propaganda against Saudi decadence combined with appeals to Islamic Jihad against the West. These initially meet with little reception abroad.
- Despite initial gains against the now Coalition, Iraqi forces are not geared for the deep penetration strategy necessary to completely over run a nation such as Saudi Arabia, and fighting winds down into a series of desert skirmishes. American forces begin to regroup within the interior as further Coalition forces arrive and they prepare for a counterattack offensive. Coalition airpower begins to establish air superior despite having been caught off-guard.
- Realizing the desperation of his situation, Saddam resolves to break the Coalition by dragging Israel into the war. Rather than a mere 8 SCUD missiles, he instead deploys well over two dozen against Israeli, utilizing a mix of VX, Sarin, Tabun, and Anthrax. Despite Civil Protection precautions casualties range in the hundreds. Despite American attempts to pressure the Israelis into restraint, within 24 hours Israel declares war on Iraq. Syria backs out of the Coalition almost immediately in response; Egypt initially stays but due to internal public pressure eventually follows suit. Saudi Arabia, for obvious reasons, remains. The PLO and several other Islamic extremist groups, including a little-known group called al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, publicly applaud the attack.
- Saddam is not finished, however. Almost immediately after the Israeli attacks similar attacks occur on Coalition positions in Saudi Arabia. Coalition forces are better prepared following the attacks on Israel, and Patriot Missile systems manage to intercept a not-insignificant number of SCUDs, but casualties are still heavy. President Bush issues a public address stating that the "usage of chemical and biological weapons on American troops will not stand, and will be responded to in kind." American and Western public support for the war swells, as does general world condemnation of the Iraqi regime. However, in the Arab world, public opinion begins to turn the other way.
- In the week following the attacks on Israel, a new and shocking wave of suicide bombings by the PLO, Hamas and other Palestinian factions dramatically increase within Israel proper, as do insurgent activities in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon, where Israeli forces increasingly come under fire. Israeli Security Forces launch a crackdown in both Gaza and the West Bank and begin active bombing campaigns in southern Lebanon in response, to the outrage of the Arab world. Both Syria and Jordan refuse to allow Israeli over flight of their territory by military aircraft, but Saudi Arabia reluctantly allows it in light of the fight against a common enemy. Dissent by conservative elements begins to ferment in Saudi Arabia despite the ongoing war but all public dissent is ruthlessly crushed under the excuse of wartime emergencies.
- 68 hours after the NBC attack on American forces, all Western journalists are issued a command to leave the city of Baghdad effective immediately by their respective governments; it should be noted that it is indeed a command, and not an advisement. 72 hours after the attack a single F-117 stealth fighter is dispatched deep into Iraqi air space on an attack vector to Baghdad. Onboard is a single B61 nuclear bomb, dialed in to a 60 kiloton setting. The plane goes completely undetected as it penetrates the most heavily defended city in the world, and as the parachute-******** bomb descends it exits just as unnoticed. The first and last indication that Baghdad is under attack is as the power of the sun consumes it. Initial casualty estimates are placed at almost 500,000 people due to blast and immediate after-effects with up to 1,000,000 more potentially in danger and at least 5,000,000 affected by the radioactive byproducts. Bush simultaneously delivers an address in which he states "the United States, and the civilized world as a whole, will not be held hostage to the genocidal ambitions of a madman," during which he cites not only the recent NBC attacks but Saddam's repeated use of biological weapons in the Iran-Iraq War and against the Kurdish people. Public reaction in the United States and the Western world is decidedly mixed; American public opinion roughly supports the measure, while European opinion is more divided--many of the nations that sent units immediately following the initial Iraqi strike are more supportive; particularly supportive of the nuclear strike is France. The Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact, PRC, Iran, and most of all Japan remain silent on the issue. The majority of the Arab world expresses outrage. America's clandestine support of the the Iraqi bioweapons program during the Iran-Iraq War is not brought up in the West.
- Saddam is apparently not killed in the strike. Within 6 hours after the blast a voice later identified as his is heard on Iraqi national radio declaring “The great duel, the mother of all battles has begun. The dawn of victory nears as this great showdown begins.” Saddam calls for a Jihad against the United States and Israel by all Muslim peoples. Several extremist groups answer his call and public agitation in the Middle East begins to increase exponentially. Attacks against Israel continue to increase and for the first time suicide bombings begin to occur against Coalition positions in Saudi Arabia. Some press sources begin to speak of World War III.
- Saddam also redoubles his strikes against both the Coalition and Israel, launching waves of SCUD attacks and rapidly depleting his initial arsenal of weapons. Although both Israeli and Coalition ground forces and populations are better prepared, Patriot systems, including those deployed to Israel, are depleted and overstrained by the bombardments, and mass casualties still occur, most especially in Saudi Arabia. Efforts at intercepting the mobile launchers on "SCUD hunts" are mostly ineffective at stemming the tide. Israel publicly joins the Coalition with American, European, and Saudi blessing--dissent in Saudi Arabia continues to simmer.
das
Regeneration In Process
That was probably supposed to be Israeli overflight, no?
Note: conservatives in Saudi Arabia would probably be the monarchists, who are likely to support most of the monarchy's actions. Now, the Islamic radicals on the other hand may well rise up in arms at some point (at least, you know, the really radical ones), or at least protest. I rather doubt that they qualify as conservatives, however.
Interesting timeline all in all; I always hated it the way that conflict failed to expand into a proper conflict. I do hope that we could drag down most of the Middle East into it, one way or another. What will Qaddafi do?
---
On a different topic entirely (and no, this is not the althist that I will start working on in January), an interesting "British naval defeat in Great French War*" scenario would be a one involving the Floating Republic. That one practically paralysed the British navy for most of 1797. Had the Spanish fleet fared better in that year's earlier naval campaign - linking up with the French fleet to crush Jervis' much smaller fleet, and so allowing the Franco-Spanish forces to eventually make use of the British disturbances - or had the mutiny actually managed to inspire some rebellions on the mainland (its ultimate success is doubtable unless the French quickly sign an alliance with the rebels and send in serious assistance) - then Britain may actually have fallen. IMHO that was the only point in the Great French War when there was a real threat to Britain.
With Britain knocked out, a lot of things would've been different. Having signed the Treaty of Campo Formio and secured its interests in Rhineland and Italy, France may well have turned to the west, where it would have been free to both restore/impose order on Haiti, and to properly claim Louisiana. Naturally, in such a situation the French government wouldn't have sold it. Eventually the USA - especially if Hamilton would have used the growing strenght of France to rally the nation around him - may well try and ally with the loyal British remnants and the European powers in a new coalition. The Napoleonic Wars equivalent would have been fought on both sides of the Atlantic. In case of victory, America might've become a great power of the first rank early on, perhaps even building a colonial empire beyond the Atlantic instead of gnawing off Mexico. Or if it had lost, the French Empire - or Republic, or even a Kingdom, but an Empire was more likely at this point - would have had a North American colonial empire (USA being limited to the East Coast), at the expense of diverting resources from Europe and North Africa (the latter would probably have been trusted to Spain, where de Godoy would probably have retained power, especially if we go with the naval victory scenario).
That's just some musings here, though.
*Dividing it into French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars strikes me as rather unreasonable; or, rather, they should've taken it in its entirety and then divided it into coalition wars, as opposed to dividing them into Revolutionary and Napoleonic phases and THEN into the coalition ones.
Symphony D.
Deity
Fixed.das said:
Religious conservatives.das said:
It's somewhat poorly worded throughout, I know.It will go much farther than that, ultimately... toss in the Holy Land for the world's three greatest religions and a whole bunch of coincidental occurences that can be interpreted as religious portents and people start to do some fairly crazy things. And while the cat's away, the mice will play...das said:
I was rather inspired by how apocalyptic the Kuwaiti oil fires looked and how horribly badly Saddam bungled the military campaign, so I figured if he did a few suicidal, desperate things he could prematurely trigger a lot of the things we're seeing today, but in much worse circumstances.
Regarding Qaddafi, well, he's always been... eccentric... so once I work out the start a bit better, I'll get to him. Probably something bizarre. Helpfully his NBC program was always far in advance of Iraq's. Did you know some New York playwright is making a musical about his life? A rap musical. He insists it's not a parody or farce. Only with Qaddafi does that make sense.
I'm thinking it would run forward until maybe 2010 or so, just to give changes enough time to propagate fully--perhaps a bit longer.
The prospect, however vague, of the United Kingdom becoming a peripheral territory of a colonial America, amuses me greatly. Sending sufficient forces to North America to vanquish the Americans (and possibly Mexicans) and also conducting a European War sounds to dangerously overstretch France's resources to me--particularly as even if rebellion takes hold in the United Kingdom, that does very little to stop the British Navy from continuing on from other bases, especially if America is suddenly their ally.das said:
das
Regeneration In Process
That's the idea!
They will overstretch resources in their efforts to build a North American empire, which is why and when the Coalition will strike. But technically, I'd imagine the Rhine and Alpes "natural boundary" to be very defensible, which will ease the strain somewhat. I do think that a French victory will be unlikely if the Americans play their cards right.
The PoD is the Royal Navy being considerably weakened by mutinies and naval defeats. Still, the remnants will probably fight on, harassing French efforts world-wide.
A fun, if very unlikely variant will be the one where the survivors of the British royal family flees to America, along with the remnants of the Royal Navy. Canada seems like a natural target for a French invasion, probably splitting along ethnic lines. If American society and politics become polarised enough (i.e. if a war begins with the French and an alliance is signed with the "Free British", and if the Anglophobes launch a rebellion at French instigation, making things desperate enough and at the same time untying Hamilton's hands (why Hamilton? Because here the French will be seen as a greater threat and in general the Federalist agenda will seem more like a national one to the electorate)), perhaps some sort of an "Empire of the Americans" might be created, an union of the British remnants (Anglo-Canadians, the Royal Navy, the Carribean colonies) and American Federalists, with a Hannoverian king (George IV?) on the throne. After all, Hamilton was a believer in constitutional monarchy... I do however realise that not all that many Americans would've been enthusiastic for monarchy, especially a British monarchy. Still, if things get desperate enough...
Britain might actually remain a republic in this world then, though probably an American client state/lesser ally, along with Ireland (the idea is that if the French invade, a loyal Hibernian Republic and a Batavia-like, more independent and unstable Alban Republic will be created, the latter ruled by the Radical Whigs that might actually betray the French out of patriotism when tables begin to turn, but probably won't restore monarchy if it already was abolished by then). West Africa and the Carribean sound like natural targets for colonial expansion for the American Empire, after Canada is consolidated.
On Mexico, the American government will as said probably leave it alone, having a whole different expansion vector. But I'd imagine that the various defeated "Jeffersonians" might move to Texas. It might make a nice buffer state against Mexico if it goes aggressive...
And again, I realise it is unlikely. In any case, this PoD offers rich opportunities, if only because I don't recall it being tapped before (correct me if I'm wrong).
