Relationship between crime and ethics

Souron

The Dark Lord
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This question came up in the Smullyan's Paradox thread, and I thought it deserved it's own thread.

What is the relationship between crime and ethics?

My own opinion succinctly stated is that
Criminal law is society's method of enforcing it's agreed upon system of ethical obligation. This is a lower ethical standard than what a person should do or should be praised for doing.
 
From that thread:
I only believe negligence should be a crime if there is a contract (Which can be implicit) requiring action. As I said, this can be implicit. If you are a parent who hasn't given up his child for adoption, this is an implicit acceptance of the duty to feed, clothe, and shelter that child, even if you didn't physically sign a contract. You are not, however, guilty of (At least not legal, the moral question is much more difficult and probably damns us all) negligence if a child starves in Africa, because you have no (Again, I'm restricting this to legal, not moral) responsibility for that child.

Yes, this even applies to the "Able to throw a lifeboat and don't" situation, unless you have a contractual obligation to do so (Such as being employed as a lifeguard, or some other similar situation) you shouldn't be able to legally prosecute someone for not throwing the lifeboat. I admit that this really sucks, and I don't really like it either, but a legal system has to be consistent.

That said, an ethical system does not necessarily need to be consistent like a legal system does, and in the kind of free society I would like to see, you don't have to associate with people that you don't want to. While sometimes this usage of freedom of association will be ethically wrong, and likely killed by the market (Such as a storeowner who doesn't sell to black people, gay people, exc.) I would consider a refusal to associate with the guy who refuses to throw the life preserver an ethical GOOD. And some people likely won't associate with such a despicable person.

I wouldn't.

So there is likely a pretty harsh backlash against the guy who refuses to provide this very minimal kind of aid, even if he doesn't go to jail for it. It would also be completely legal to print such a person's name in the newspapers and advise people not to associate with him/sell him anything/whatever.
With this I agree. But negligence is not aggression.

I've been definitely dabbling in theory here, trying to refine my consistency, exc. but when it comes to the real world, this is 95% of my problem with the legal status quo. That is, if "Victim" is correctly defined. I've seen people oppose the principle of victimless crime, and then go by a line of reasoning that makes something that definitely does not have a victim actually having a victim.

One poster (I'm attacking an idea here, not the poster, which is why I'm not naming him) even compared a refusal to give someone service on religious grounds to be comparable to swinging your fist and hitting someone in the face... Sorry but no.

One could also argue that drugs have "Negative social affects" but there's still no (Intrinsic) victim, so it shouldn't be a crime.
From what I've been taught of legal theory, criminal law is founded on the idea that certain acts harm society and are therefore criminal. Acts which are wrong, harm others, but do not harm society are called torts and are handled by the civil legal system. These tend to be disputes where wrongful harm was not intended, but nonetheless achieved, although criminal damages are handled by the system too. (Note that my claim that crime should coincide with ethics was not part of that teaching)

But we're not really in disagreement on the broad statements you make here. The devil is in the details.

I wouldn't volunteer to be on that jury (To prosecute such a person) and I think you are basically a jerk if you are anywhere near well to do and won't give a starving person that's right in front of you a bit of food. This probably goes back to my whole freedom to associate comments I made above. Still, the starving person did steal, and if someone wants to press charges for that, they have a (Legal, not moral) right to do so.
It is difficult to write law that would address this particular situation properly, while applying a fair prosecution of theft in general, but I think it is an ideal that a justice system should strive for, either by more detailed law, or by giving the judge and jury to the authority to apply their own sense of equity to the situation. If someone is starving and stealing food, I think ideally the state should ensure that person obtains the means to get food, and take no further punitive action. That's what should be done if there is no state, and that what should be done if there is a state that act in the name of it's people. So to reiterate the state's authority should coincide with the ethics of the situation.

Religious faith makes me a bit more confident of my ethics, although this doesn't really help me when trying to translate ethics to politics, such as with the NAP and defining terms like "Victim", so I have a similar skepticism of my own logic. That said, even if my ethical system could be demonstrated beyond an absolute doubt, I still believe it would be immoral to impose it at the point of a gun. Morality through immoral means is still immoral. Also known as "Part truth and part lie is all lie" or "A little bit of yeast spreads to the whole loaf" or whatever other analogy you find appropriate.
I've struggled with the question: When is it ethical to get people to do the right thing for the wrong reason? Maybe in cases like this it can be.

I did mention this before. I find it unlikely that ALL of the public would agree even that murder is wrong, let alone lesser evils like we're discussing in this thread. That said, the MAJORITY of people would find certain forms of "Criminal" neglect, such as refusing to throw a lifeboat, reprehensible. As far as I'm concerned, they have every right to "Discriminate" against such a person and refuse to associate or do business with him. (I also think you have a right to discriminate for less noble reasons, but I also think the market would be more likely to naturally weed these out in the long run.)
In other words you would not use the mechanism of the state to pursue this particular form of punishment. No argument, just making the observation.

I don't usually like prison as a punishment for anything, although I do make exceptions for a few things in the name of public safety. Even still, during your stay you should be made to do labor (I'm not talking about brutality or torture, but you should have to work) to pay back your victim for the wrong you did to him.
Wow, we actually disagree more than I thought on this. I agree that jail has it's problems, but the principal of having an institution responsible for deterrence of crime and rehabilitation is to me a sound one. But restoration is not part of that institution. Instead there is a separate civil justice system for determining reparations owed to the victim, and if the criminal is unable to pay, his future wages are garnished. This does mean that it may be impossible for the criminal to pay reparations, in which case the victim is on his own (though perhaps the state could provide insurance, if the idea was popular.) I think this is a sound system.

But basically you're saying that the state should not punish people based on the moral severity of their crime. Only the severity of public danger, as measured by damage caused by the crime to the immediate victims. Under this logic, and given the separateness of civil and criminal law in our society, no theft should be criminally prosecuted; theft amount to a tort against the victim, nothing more.

I heartly disagree. The system of criminal law should discourage all morally reprehensible acts. The severity of a crime is proportional to the harm to society and to the morally delinquency of the act. These two things coincide to a degree that makes the distinction moot in most cases, because moral delinquency coincides with doing harm. The punishment is not necessarily proportional to severity however, since retribution is really an important part of punishment. For other motivations of punishment, severity is not as strong an influence.

A note on terminology: I'm including rehabilitation in punishment, because it is forced on the individual. However it in part for the victims sake. There are cases where the only punishment should be rehabilitation.
 
My own opinion succinctly stated is that
Criminal law is society's method of enforcing it's agreed upon system of ethical obligation. This is a lower ethical standard than what a person should do or should be praised for doing.

You need to get rid of 'what a person should do'. An ethical obligation, after all, determines what one ought to do. What one ought to do is what one should do. So a system of such obligations constitutes what a person should do. As put, you succinct opinion goes like this; 'Criminal Law is society's method of enforcing what it has agreed a person should do. This is a lower standard than what a person should do...'

There's ways of interpreting that where it is not a contradiction, but I don't think that's what you mean to be getting at.
 
You need to get rid of 'what a person should do'. An ethical obligation, after all, determines what one ought to do. What one ought to do is what one should do. So a system of such obligations constitutes what a person should do. As put, you succinct opinion goes like this; 'Criminal Law is society's method of enforcing what it has agreed a person should do. This is a lower standard than what a person should do...'

There's ways of interpreting that where it is not a contradiction, but I don't think that's what you mean to be getting at.
No, that line was intentional. The distinction I'm trying to make is between things like "you should be polite to strangers", and "you should not kill people". It's a moral obligation not to kill people. It is still true that you should be polite to strangers, but being polite to strangers is not a moral obligation of the same degree. Similarly things you should be praised for is a distinct standard from things it could be said you "should do."

EDIT: changed example.
 
Trying to be nice is a moral obligation which includes not killing people, isn't it?

As for punishment being a deterrence and rehabilitation, I don't see it myself. It really doesn't seem to work all that well, imo. Apart, perhaps from truly professional criminals, who are surely rather a minor part of the crowd; they do seem to be deterred by harsh sentences for things like bank robbery, and move on to more lucrative less penalized or less easily policed areas.
 
Trying to be nice is a moral obligation which includes not killing people, isn't it?
I should have said being polite to strangers.

As for punishment being a deterrence and rehabilitation, I don't see it myself. It really doesn't seem to work all that well, imo. Apart, perhaps from truly professional criminals, who are surely rather a minor part of the crowd; they do seem to be deterred by harsh sentences for things like bank robbery, and move on to more lucrative less penalized or less easily policed areas.
I agree that harsh punishment tends not to be an effective deterrent for serious crimes. People are afraid of going to jail, but beyond that longer sentences proportional to seriousness may not help much. I've also heard that short jail sentences for minor crimes can be a very effective deterrent because it exposes people to the end of the slippery slope that crime can be in the form of associating with other convicts. Rehabilitation doesn't work because we're bad at it, but I think it's worth trying to improve.
 
With this I agree. But negligence is not aggression.

I would argue that that very much depended on the situation. A person who is routinely negligent, despite knowing that harm to others could result, is indeed acting with aggression.
 
I would argue that that very much depended on the situation. A person who is routinely negligent, despite knowing that harm to others could result, is indeed acting with aggression.
GhostWriter16 said all crime is characterized by aggression. Do you agree with this?
 
It certainly seems to characterized by egocentricity, imo. But otherwise it would appear to depend on what you mean by aggression.

wiki said:
Aggression, in its broadest sense, is behavior, or a disposition, that is forceful, hostile or attacking. It may occur either in retaliation or without provocation. In narrower definitions that are used in social sciences and behavioral sciences, aggression is an intention to cause harm or an act intended to increase relative social dominance. Predatory or defensive behavior between members of different species may not be considered aggression in the same sense. Aggression can take a variety of forms and can be physical or be communicated verbally or non-verbally. Aggression differs from what is commonly called assertiveness, although the terms are often used interchangeably among laypeople, e.g. an aggressive salesperson

So, can self-defence against members of one's own species be considered aggression in certain circumstances? I'm inclined to think it could be.
 
No, that line was intentional. The distinction I'm trying to make is between things like "you should be polite to strangers", and "you should not kill people". It's a moral obligation not to kill people. It is still true that you should be polite to strangers, but being polite to strangers is not a moral obligation of the same degree. Similarly things you should be praised for is a distinct standard from things it could be said you "should do."

EDIT: changed example.

Well, I think you want to say something like this:

"Some moral obligations are more stringent then other moral obligations; they are 'obligations' to a greater degree (metaphorically). The law is society's way of enforcing very stringent moral obligations. But it needn't enforce laxer moral obligations, nor should it enforce behaving in a way that is praiseworthy. That's why the law shouldn't stop us from being rude but should stop us from killing. It's a system for enforcing the stringent obligations.

The problem with this is that, in that case, you don't really disagree with GW at all. Oh, you disagree with him on the substantive issue of what acts the law should discourage and what acts it should leave well enough alone. But both of you agree that the law should enforce some ethical obligations. And both of you agree that it shouldn't enforce all ethical obligations. At this fundamental level you are in agreement.

(this isn't necessarily a problem, in fairness. Not all GW's opinions are wrong. In fact, this one seems more defensible then most - but what you were saying about 'ideal law' doesn't sit very well with it).
 
From that thread:
With this I agree. But negligence is not aggression.

It can be if you have a contractual obligation not to be negligent, like if you're a lifeguard and you don't jump in the water to save the drowning guy. That's your job that you agreed to doing. You should be punished if you don't. If the guy dies, its manslaughter at the very least.

If on the other hand, you're just a random passerby, and you don't jump in when the guy is drowning, that is negligence but not aggression. It shouldn't be a crime. You're a horrible person if you can swim and you don't, but it still shouldn't be criminal.

From what I've been taught of legal theory, criminal law is founded on the idea that certain acts harm society and are therefore criminal. Acts which are wrong, harm others, but do not harm society are called torts and are handled by the civil legal system. These tend to be disputes where wrongful harm was not intended, but nonetheless achieved, although criminal damages are handled by the system too. (Note that my claim that crime should coincide with ethics was not part of that teaching)

Maybe currently but I dislike it. I believe every crime should have a victim, and "Society" doesn't generally count.

It is difficult to write law that would address this particular situation properly, while applying a fair prosecution of theft in general, but I think it is an ideal that a justice system should strive for, either by more detailed law, or by giving the judge and jury to the authority to apply their own sense of equity to the situation. If someone is starving and stealing food, I think ideally the state should ensure that person obtains the means to get food, and take no further punitive action. That's what should be done if there is no state, and that what should be done if there is a state that act in the name of it's people. So to reiterate the state's authority should coincide with the ethics of the situation.

I simply disagree with your role of the state here.

I've struggled with the question: When is it ethical to get people to do the right thing for the wrong reason? Maybe in cases like this it can be.

If you're a utilitarian, sure. But I'm not.

]Wow, we actually disagree more than I thought on this. I agree that jail has it's problems, but the principal of having an institution responsible for deterrence of crime and rehabilitation is to me a sound one. But restoration is not part of that institution. Instead there is a separate civil justice system for determining reparations owed to the victim, and if the criminal is unable to pay, his future wages are garnished. This does mean that it may be impossible for the criminal to pay reparations, in which case the victim is on his own (though perhaps the state could provide insurance, if the idea was popular.) I think this is a sound system.

If the criminal can't pay he should be forced to work to make money for the victim to restitue for what is stolen.

But basically you're saying that the state should not punish people based on the moral severity of their crime. Only the severity of public danger, as measured by damage caused by the crime to the immediate victims. Under this logic, and given the separateness of civil and criminal law in our society, no theft should be criminally prosecuted; theft amount to a tort against the victim, nothing more.

Technically, yes.

Not sure. Much, if not most. But all? I would have to give that some thought.

Something tells me you AREN'T going to agree with me here:mischief:
 
Well, I think you want to say something like this:

"Some moral obligations are more stringent then other moral obligations; they are 'obligations' to a greater degree (metaphorically). The law is society's way of enforcing very stringent moral obligations. But it needn't enforce laxer moral obligations, nor should it enforce behaving in a way that is praiseworthy. That's why the law shouldn't stop us from being rude but should stop us from killing. It's a system for enforcing the stringent obligations.

The problem with this is that, in that case, you don't really disagree with GW at all. Oh, you disagree with him on the substantive issue of what acts the law should discourage and what acts it should leave well enough alone. But both of you agree that the law should enforce some ethical obligations. And both of you agree that it shouldn't enforce all ethical obligations. At this fundamental level you are in agreement.

(this isn't necessarily a problem, in fairness. Not all GW's opinions are wrong. In fact, this one seems more defensible then most - but what you were saying about 'ideal law' doesn't sit very well with it).
It's trivial to say that crime tends to agree with ethics. But is this the point of crime, or tangential? GW seems to be saying that it's largely tangential, and that criminal law should counteract harm and damage, not impose ethics per say.
 
It can be if you have a contractual obligation not to be negligent, like if you're a lifeguard and you don't jump in the water to save the drowning guy. That's your job that you agreed to doing. You should be punished if you don't. If the guy dies, its manslaughter at the very least.

If on the other hand, you're just a random passerby, and you don't jump in when the guy is drowning, that is negligence but not aggression. It shouldn't be a crime. You're a horrible person if you can swim and you don't, but it still shouldn't be criminal.
I agree. Again though I think the right way to characterize what constitutes a crime is a low bar of ethical obligation.

The best exploration and most famous exploration of this kind of ethics is the famous trolley problem, in which the morality of ensuring the death of a group of people is evaluated while the degree of obligation to those people vary. (This isn't initially obvious, but does accurately describe the account). But the trolley problem is an ethics problem. If you're using the same logic to determine criminality, then that suggests that crime and moral delinquency are the same.

If you're a utilitarian, sure. But I'm not.
I'm not utilitarian either. Ideally we should talk to criminals until they honestly repent or convince us that the law was bad in the first place. But that's impractical.

If the criminal can't pay he should be forced to work to make money for the victim to restitue for what is stolen.
That's basically what garnished wages are. Except that the victim does not get to choose the means of making money that the criminal does, and it's not a kind of slavery.
 
It's trivial to say that crime tends to agree with ethics. But is this the point of crime, or tangential? GW seems to be saying that it's largely tangential, and that criminal law should counteract harm and damage, not impose ethics per say.

I don't think this is really true. GW is saying that criminal law should be aimed at stopping aggression. This is an enforcement of a particular ethical obligation; don't agress. He does not think this is the only ethical obligation. He also thinks that one ought to help those in need and so on and so forth. So he thinks that criminal law should be about enforcing some ethical obligations but not all of them.

You think that criminal law is about enforcing stringent ethical obligations. But you also think lax ethical obligations exist. You don't think criminal law is about enforcing these obligations. So you think that criminal law is about enforcing some ethical obligations, but not all of them.

So your difference resides only in what particular obligations criminal law should enforce, not in the relation between law and ethics as such.
 
It can be if you have a contractual obligation not to be negligent, like if you're a lifeguard and you don't jump in the water to save the drowning guy. That's your job that you agreed to doing. You should be punished if you don't. If the guy dies, its manslaughter at the very least.

If on the other hand, you're just a random passerby, and you don't jump in when the guy is drowning, that is negligence but not aggression. It shouldn't be a crime. You're a horrible person if you can swim and you don't, but it still shouldn't be criminal.
Actually, you're wrong. You're obligated to help in both cases, you just have a higher/lower level of responsability.

If you're a lifeguard, you're required to jump and swim. If you're only a passerby, you're required to call for help, throw a rope if you have one available, etc.
Not doing so is not only ethically wrong, but it's also illegal.
 
I don't think this is really true. GW is saying that criminal law should be aimed at stopping aggression. This is an enforcement of a particular ethical obligation; don't agress. He does not think this is the only ethical obligation. He also thinks that one ought to help those in need and so on and so forth. So he thinks that criminal law should be about enforcing some ethical obligations but not all of them.

You think that criminal law is about enforcing stringent ethical obligations. But you also think lax ethical obligations exist. You don't think criminal law is about enforcing these obligations. So you think that criminal law is about enforcing some ethical obligations, but not all of them.

So your difference resides only in what particular obligations criminal law should enforce, not in the relation between law and ethics as such.

True. I have a specific basis for my line in the sand. Souron's seems arbitrary, but I'd best not assume that it is.

There is only one type of legal right that should exist, negative liberties. Freedom from restraint. Any positive freedom takes away someone else's negative freedom. So it shouldn't exist.

If there is, for instance, a "Right not to starve" there must, therefore, be a right to food. But what if you don't own any? What if other people own the food? To say they have a right to coercively take it is to deny property rights entirely. To only sometimes defend property rights without a clear basis for when you do and when you don't is arbitrary.



Actually, you're wrong. You're obligated to help in both cases, you just have a higher/lower level of responsability.

If you're a lifeguard, you're required to jump and swim. If you're only a passerby, you're required to call for help, throw a rope if you have one available, etc.
Not doing so is not only ethically wrong, but it's also illegal.

It is indeed ethically wrong, but to make it illegal is akin to a form of slavery.
 
It is indeed ethically wrong, but to make it illegal is akin to a form of slavery.
Sorry, for one second I forgot who I was uselessly trying to have a discussion with...
Silly me.
 
That's basically what garnished wages are. Except that the victim does not get to choose the means of making money that the criminal does, and it's not a kind of slavery.

I wasn't saying they should become the person's slave (Although frankly, indentured servitude would be a HECK of a lot more useful for some of this stuff than imprisonment, and actually compensates the victim. I honestly wouldn't have a problem with it, with certain restrictions) but I'm morre than fine with however it gets done. They should, however, have to compensate their victims.

Sorry, for one second I forgot who I was uselessly trying to have a discussion with...
Silly me.

Yeah, I'm sure you'd rather just talk to people that believe in slavery.
 
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