and thx Sidhe, I read the other thread but dont see an answer to my question.
I only meant to answer the first bit, sorry should of edited it better. It should answer that part at least.
and thx Sidhe, I read the other thread but dont see an answer to my question.
Thank you for your answer. I would now like to open it up even more (but not completely). What do you think is the most likely reason that Christianity exists today as a religion and Jesus is claimed to be divine? (allowing every explanation and possibility other than any kind of affirmation of Jesus' divinity... i.e. suppose he is not divine, then what is the most likely reason?)
Thank you for your answer. I would now like to open it up even more (but not completely). What do you think is the most likely reason that Christianity exists today as a religion and Jesus is claimed to be divine? (allowing every explanation and possibility other than any kind of affirmation of Jesus' divinity... i.e. suppose he is not divine, then what is the most likely reason?)
Well, my point was basically this: assuming predestination, any sin I commit will turn out to be what God wanted. But any good that I do will also turn out to be what God wanted. So any rationalisation that I may come up for sinning, on the basis of predestination, can also be applied mutatis mutandis to not sinning. That is, I may say that my sin was predestined and desired by God, but I may also say that my not-sinning was predestined and desired by God. The parallel justifications cancel each other out, and I'm left with the same reasons for or against that I would have had if there were no predestination at all: namely, that one ought not to sin, other things being equal.
Hi! I'm posting in a great thread! I'll try not to mess it up.
What do you think of moral knowledge? For example, I know a lot of Christians like to believe that without morals as dictated by God then life is essentially amoral. Do you buy that? I'm not sure if this is theology or more of a philosophy sort of thing so I'll just vaguely say "Moral Knowledge" and exit.
Hi Plotinus. Forgive me if this was asked before but is teaching Theology your profession? How did you first get into it? Do you feel this study has enriched your life? What made you so curious about Christianity seeing as you're not religious?
A couple more - do you think overall Christianity is good or bad for people? How about if they actually studied it and knew more about it (assuming they'd still take it seriously as religion)?
And finally - does it bother you that Theology is a dead end "science" in Civilization 2 (I always wondered if that was a secret dig at religion )?
Plotinus: What have been the major theological responses to the Euthyphro dilemma? Has the church ever had an "official" position on it?
Which is more likely to have happened (out of these two possibilities), based on your studies?
A) Jesus was an excellent trickster. He fooled everyone into believing he is divine. He knew what he was doing.
B) Jesus didn't actually do much or intend to do much. The story was exaggerated by being passed down through multiple rewrites and interpretations, either through intentional or unintentional means (or both).
Sorry for the concise and imprecise descriptions. Thanks for your input!
Don't know if they are wanted or required, but (as I did from time to time before), thought I'd offer my services on the side to compliment Plotinus.
I know there are a couple types of Satanism these days, but is there evidence of it being a cyclical historical fad? I guess there's no real 'anti-Christian' faith these days (i.e., a faith with the same metaphysical makeup as Christianity, but an opposite conclusion), but there're hints about it in fiction (and the like). Any history of groups with very similar metaphysical views, but radically different (and antithetical) conclusions?
Thank you for your answer. I would now like to open it up even more (but not completely). What do you think is the most likely reason that Christianity exists today as a religion and Jesus is claimed to be divine? (allowing every explanation and possibility other than any kind of affirmation of Jesus' divinity... i.e. suppose he is not divine, then what is the most likely reason?)
So Plot, what do you think of memes and the description of relgion as memes or collections of memes?
Meaning the names used may not be of the people serving as sources?
How do we know who was or was not a witness or what they saw? If Mark was not a witness yet served as a source for Matthew, then where'd Mark get his stuff? From someone who was a witness? And if Mark's source saw something Matthew didn't, then why not use Mark's source? But that does indeed suggest Mark's source was a witness and known to Matthew as reliable.
As you said, early Christians were expecting the end...and the Messiah, etc... No need to write stuff down, but the end didn't come and neither did the Messiah. So they got older, neared death, and recorded their memories. Are actual witnesses precluded from authoring the gospels?
Paulianity, linky link link.
Berzerker said:I read that link and it makes a decent case for the gospels (3 anyway) already in written form before Paul's influence would have made it harder for them to enter the religion, the 50s ce...
What do you think of moral knowledge? For example, I know a lot of Christians like to believe that without morals as dictated by God then life is essentially amoral. Do you buy that? I'm not sure if this is theology or more of a philosophy sort of thing so I'll just vaguely say "Moral Knowledge" and exit.
Can a rationalization go in this way: God DO NOT want committing sins by default, but if someone already did, He might turn it into something good. So basically, the system works similar to the IF-THEN orders, IF A) man does not commit a sin, THEN God continues with His plan (whatever it is)
and IF B) man commit a sin, THEN God is adjusting the plan to move the current situation up to good.
I don't think the church has ever officially addressed this in much detail. One reason for this is that the Catholic Church adopted a form of virtue ethics, which rather avoids the whole problem. In virtue ethics, as least the kind set out by Aquinas, the "right" action is the one that leads to human flourishing. So it is "right" because it is expedient. Now why does this particular action lead to flourishing and this other one not? Because God has created us in such a way. So on this view, the fact that love is good for us and murder is bad for us is down to God in the end, but it's not like he's arbitrarily decreed that the former is "right" and the latter is "wrong". Rather, he has made us in such a way that it is natural that the former is "right" and the latter is "wrong". Now that may then lead to the question why he has made us in this way rather than that way, but that's not a moral question. If you look through that amazingly cheap edition of Aquinas you got you'll see that not only does he not address the Euthypthro problem, there isn't really a part of the work where you might naturally expect it.
Cool, thanks! Is the "human flourishing" as defined by Aquinas the same as Aristotle's eudaimonia, or does Aquinas see human flourishing in a more "god-related" way?
The function of a human being
The idea that a human being can have a “function”, like a machine, sounds odd. But in fact this basic conviction was at the heart of most ancient ethical theories, which typically sought to identify what the function was. The idea was that the best kind of life for human beings would involve functioning properly. That does not presuppose that there is any kind of “intended” function for human beings: it is not as if God “designed” them for some purpose. But it still makes sense to talk of function, in the sense of the activity that people are suited to.
The most famous theory of this sort was that of Aristotle, which he presented forcefully in his Nicomachean Ethics. In that book, Aristotle suggested that happiness is rather like health: it is a matter of correct functioning. The person who fully realises his or her potential, who lives the kind of life for which human beings are most suited, will be the happiest. Since the ability to reason is what sets human beings apart from other animals, Aristotle argued that a life devoted to reason would therefore represent the pinnacle of human flourishing, and be the happiest; nevertheless, since not everyone has the opportunity to spend their lives in philosophical contemplation, it is also possible find happiness through a practical life, lived out in society – for human beings are also intrinsically social animals. There are thus two kinds of happiness – a rather mundane one, for most people, and a better one, for a select few. Much of Aristotle’s book is devoted to an analysis of “virtue”, for virtues are character traits which tend to produce happiness. So being virtuous is rather like being healthy. Just as we should cultivate (say) lower blood pressure, because it will tend to make us fitter and less prone to certain diseases, so too we should cultivate (say) generosity because it will make us the sort of person who flourishes and is happy.
Aristotle’s theory is often called a “eudaimonistic” theory, from the Greek word for “happiness”. It is also often categorised as “virtue ethics”, since it is concerned with cultivating a certain kind of character. His theory had an enormous influence on medieval ethical thought. In particular, Thomas Aquinas modified it in the thirteenth century to produce a Christian theory of happiness and the virtues. Just like Aristotle, Aquinas believes there are two kinds of happiness, but he argues that these two kinds of happiness are nurtured by completely different sets of virtues. On his view, there are actually three kinds of virtue. The first are the intellectual virtues, wisdom, science, and understanding, which help one to learn the truth. The second are the moral or cardinal virtues, justice, temperance, fortitude, and prudence, which help one to live rightly. Fostering these virtues will produce a lower kind of happiness – what one might call a satisfying life on earth. However, there is also the third kind of virtue, the theological virtues – faith, hope, and love (or charity) – which help one to reach one’s true destiny and happiness. The list of theological virtues comes from 1 Corinthians 13:13, where Paul also comments that love is the greatest of the three – but he does not specify what their roles are or even call them “virtues” at all.
Aquinas shares with Aristotle the belief that the intellectual and cardinal virtues can be acquired through practice. If you behave justly, you will eventually become a just person. But the theological virtues are not like this. They can come only directly from God, and, furthermore, they perfect the other kinds of virtues. It is possible, for example, to have wisdom and justice without also having faith and love; but if you do have faith and love, then your wisdom and justice will be of a higher order, and will contribute to a higher kind of happiness.
The theological virtues, of course, are directed towards God: it is God in whom one has faith and hope, and God whom one loves. In other words, Aquinas is suggesting that a truly virtuous life is one that takes account of God... That is partly because God, who lays down the eternal law, is in effect the creator of morality: things are right or wrong because he says so. From a purely pragmatic point of view, too, God is the creator of human beings: he designed them to function in a certain way. It is therefore wise to pay attention to his operating instructions, as it were.
So on Aquinas’ view, it is not simply the case that one must focus on God if one is to act morally... one must also focus on God if one is to be happy. Here he was taking his cue from Augustine of Hippo. Augustine’s Confessions, probably the most famous and influential autobiography ever written, testified to his belief that happiness can be found only in God: it described his spiritual wanderings before he finally returned to the church and found happiness. In the first chapter, in undoubtedly the most hackneyed quotation from his entire works, Augustine summarised the relationship between God and humanity:
You move us to delight in praising you; for you have formed us for yourself, and our hearts are restless until they find rest in you. Confessions I 1
C.S. Lewis expressed the same idea in more modern terms:
God made us: invented us as a man invents an engine. A car is made to run on petrol, and it would not run properly on anything else. Now God designed the human machine to run on Himself. He Himself is the fuel our spirits were designed to burn, or the food our spirits were designed to feed on. There is no other. That is why it is just no good asking God to make us happy in our own way without bothering about religion. God cannot give us a happiness and peace apart from Himself, because it is not there. There is no such thing. Mere Christianity p. 50
Aquinas agrees with this. On his view, however, real happiness can never be found in this life. The reason is that we can know God only imperfectly in this life. On earth, the best we can hope for is a satisfying life, the life of morality which comes through exercising the cardinal virtues. If God gives us the theological virtues too, we can begin to glimpse the greater kind of happiness, but we cannot know it fully yet.
Now man’s happiness is twofold... One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, that is, which human beings can obtain by using their natural abilities. The other is a happiness beyond human nature, and which humans can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, which is why it is written that by Christ we are made “partakers of the divine nature”. And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, human beings’ natural abilities which enable them to act well according to their capacity are not enough to direct them to this same happiness. So it is necessary for humans to receive from God some additional abilities, so that they can be directed to supernatural happiness... Such principles are called “theological virtues”: first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us reliably to God; second, because they are infused in us by God alone; third, because these virtues are not made known to us except by divine revelation, contained in Holy Scripture. Summa Theologiae I i lxii 1
For Aquinas, achieving true happiness is the true function of human beings. What, then, is the nature of this happiness?
The vision of God
In the west, Christians’ understanding of the purpose of human beings – and the nature of their happiness – was enormously influenced, like so much else, by Augustine of Hippo. Four centuries earlier, Paul had written:
...we know only in part, and we prophecy only in part; but when the complete comes, the partial will come to an end. When I was a child, I spoke like a child, I thought like a child, I reasoned like a child; when I became an adult, I put an end to childish ways. For now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then we will see face to face. Now I know only in part; then I will know fully, even as I have been fully known. 1 Corinthians 13:9-12
But it was Augustine who elaborated on this to produce western Christianity’s understanding of the “now, but not yet” idea that we have just seen in Aquinas: the belief that we can have some dim grasp of future happiness now, but no more than that. Augustine argued that the passage from 1 Corinthians referred to the time following the general resurrection of the dead, after Christ had judged all human beings – that is, the time of eternal life.
And so, when I am asked what the saints will do in that spiritual body, I do not say what I see, but I say what I believe, according to what I read in the psalm, “I believed, therefore have I spoken.” I say, then, that in the body they will see God – but whether they shall see him by means of the body, as now we see the sun, moon, stars, sea, earth, and all that is in it, that is a difficult question... City of God XXII 29
Augustine believed that, in the future life, people would “see” God in the same way that the “see” each other now. Modern philosophers often talk of “the problem of other minds”, namely – how can you be certain that the people you see around you are really people like you, with minds and thoughts of their own? After all, you can only see their bodies. Augustine points out that although we cannot literally see other people’s minds, we know that they have them from the way that they behave. There is a sense in which we can “see” other people’s minds, although we do not do so literally. And this, he suggests, is what the vision of God will be like in the resurrection life. In this life, we can “see” God in the world around us only faintly, and we need faith to do so; but in the future life, we will “see” God in the world around us directly.
Aquinas repeated this notion of the “beatific vision”, but he believed it was even more dramatic than Augustine had suggested. Rather than “seeing” God in the world around them, Aquinas argued that the saints would “see” God directly – that is, God’s essence, the very divinity of God.
Final and perfect happiness can consist of nothing else than the vision of the divine essence. To make this clear, two points must be observed. First, that human beings are not perfectly happy as long as there is still something for them to desire and seek. Second, the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now the object of the intellect is “what a thing is”, i.e. the essence of a thing... So the intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing... So, for perfect happiness, the intellect needs to reach the very essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in which alone human happiness consists. Summa Theologiae I 2 iii 8
In the late Middle Ages, there was some controversy over when, precisely, people could expect to enjoy this beatific vision... the orthodox Christian belief in the Middle Ages was that, at death, the soul goes to heaven (or hell), where it waits until the general resurrection from the dead: at this point it is reunited with its body and judged. Augustine had spoken of the beatific vision as a reward that comes after this judgement. But what about the souls waiting in heaven right now? Many people in the Middle Ages thought that they might be allowed to enjoy the beatific vision too. In the early fourteenth century, Pope John XXII denied that they could. His successor, Benedict XII, overruled John’s views and issued the following decree in 1336:
We define that the souls of all the saints in heaven have seen and do see the divine essence by direct intuition and face to face, in such a way that nothing created intervenes as an object of vision, but the divine essence presents itself to their immediate gaze, unveiled, clearly and openly; moreover, that in this vision they enjoy the divine essence, and that, in virtue of this vision and this enjoyment, they are truly blessed and possess eternal life and eternal rest. Benedictus Deus
This has been the orthodox Catholic view ever since.
Union with God
The belief of the eastern Orthodox churches has, historically, been rather different. Where Catholicism has held that the faithful will see God, the Orthodox have insisted that the faithful will be united to God... immortality, for some Orthodox theologians, is a matter of the human soul becoming so close to God that it is impossible to tell the difference. For many Christians, indeed, this is what salvation is, a notion that can be derived from the New Testament. In 1 Corinthians 15:54, Paul writes that, at the resurrection, the bodies of believers will become incorruptible and immortal. But, according to 1 Timothy 6:16, these qualities belong to God alone: the future life, then, will be one of sharing in God’s qualities. 2 Peter 1:4 tells its readers that they will “become participants in the divine nature”. As the fourth-century theologian Athanasius famously put it, “[God] became man so that man could become God” (On the incarnation 54).
The Christian writer most associated with this idea in its early centuries was Gregory of Nazianzus, who was briefly patriarch of Constantinople until he was deposed in AD 381. Gregory – known as the Theologian for his work in seeking to understand the Trinity – coined the Greek term theosis to express his hope for the future of humanity. Theosis literally means “deification”, and Gregory believed that this is something that will happen to the whole person, not just the soul. For Gregory, this would happen above all at the end of time, at the final resurrection:
God will be all in all in the time of restitution... when we shall be no longer divided (as we now are by movements and passions) and containing nothing at all of God, or very little, but shall be entirely like. Oration 30.6
But it is something that comes only through Christ. Like Athanasius before him, Gregory was convinced that salvation comes through the fact that, in Christ, humanity and divinity meet. And Christians can hope to share in this meeting themselves. Gregory speaks almost as though human nature and divine nature are tangible “things” that can literally touch. Since the divine nature has “touched” human nature in Christ, it is now accessible to everyone, meaning that, through Christ, everyone can hope to become divine:
...in the character of the form of a servant, [Christ] comes down to his fellow servants – no, to his servants, and he takes on a strange form, bearing all of me and mine in himself, so that in himself he may bring evil to an end, as fire does wax, or as the sun does the mists of earth; and so that I may share in his nature by the blending. Oration 30.6
Although Gregory of Nazianzus would always be closely associated with the doctrine of deification, another name frequently invoked by later theologians was that of Maximus the Confessor. This seventh-century monk was most famous for his strident opposition to the official doctrine, endorsed by the Byzantine emperor, that Christ had one will (a divine one). Maximus believed that this doctrine denied Christ’s true humanity, and for his views, he was arrested and had his right hand cut off and his tongue torn out. Later, however, Maximus’ views were vindicated at the Third Council of Constantinople, and he became revered as a confessor (one step down from a martyr). Why was this issue so important? Maximus believed that any denial of the true union of God and humanity in Christ was, in effect, a denial of the possibility that anyone else might be united to God. Like earlier theologians, Maximus was convinced that it is through the incarnation that God touches humanity: through faith, human beings can become united to Christ, and this means they are united to God.
In the same way in which the soul and the body are united, God should become accessible for participation by the soul and, through the soul’s intermediary, by the body, in order that the soul might receive an unchanging character, and the body, immortality; and finally that the whole man should become God, deified by the grace of God-become-man, becoming whole man, soul and body, by nature, and becoming whole God, soul and body, by grace. Ambigua
So for Maximus, deification does not mean ceasing to be human. On the contrary, it means becoming perfectly human. Christ was not just fully God – he was also fully human. Becoming united to him means becoming fully human just as it means becoming God. Moreover, union with God means being able to realise one’s full potential as a human being. But Maximus does distinguish between being fully human “by nature” and being fully God “by grace”. Even union with God does not mean undifferentiated union: one does not literally “become” God. One participates in what God is, “by grace”.
Maximus was enormously influential on later Orthodox theologians. One of the most important of these was the fourteenth-century monk Gregory Palamas. Palamas prefers to use the metaphor of light to describe both what the mystical experience is like and how it can involve union with God:
This hypostatic light, seen spiritually by the saints, they know by experience to exist, as they tell us, and to exist not just symbolically, like manifestations produced by fortuitous events; but it is an illumination immaterial and divine, a grace invisibly seen and ignorantly known. What it is, they do not pretend to know. Triads II iii 8
For Palamas, the fact that this divine light can be (and has been) experienced by mystics means that the future goal of union with God is not some pie-in-the-sky hope that has no direct connection to our current lives; on the contrary, it is simply the logical conclusion of what begins in this life. He points out that with literal light, we can see it only because of its own presence: light is seen in light. Similarly, with the divine light, we can see it only because we begin to take on its characteristics. This means that the vision of God necessarily involves becoming united to God:
For it is in light that the light is seen, and that which sees operates in a similar light, since this faculty has no other way in which to work. Having separated itself from all other beings, it becomes itself all light and is assimilated to what it sees, or rather, it is united to it without mingling, being itself light and seeing light through light. If it sees itself, it sees light; if it beholds the object of its vision, that too is light; and if it looks at the means by which it sees, again it is light. For such is the character of the union, that all is one, so that he who sees can distinguish neither the means nor the object nor its nature, but simply has the awareness of being light and of seeing a light distinct from every creature. Triads II iii 36
So for Palamas, it is not as if the idea of deification were a sort of alternative to the western ideal of the “vision of God”. Rather, it is its logical consequence. The ultimate goal for human beings is to see God, but to see God is to become God. Indeed, he goes beyond this to suggest that the doctrine of deification is an essential part of the Christian doctrine of God itself. The reason is that, for a Christian, God is what gives human beings direction and purpose. But that means that, despite his intrinsic incomprehensibility, God must be ultimately accessible. This is the role of Christ, in whom God and humanity are perfectly and genuinely united, and who paves the way, as it were, for other human beings to become united to God. Without this possibility, God would not be “God” for us: he would have no meaning and relevance to human life:
Since there are those who participate in God, yet on the other hand the superessential essence of God is absolutely imparticipable, there must be something between the incommunicable essence and those who communicate of it... If you destroy this... you separate us from God, breaking the bond and setting up a great and unbridgeable gulf. We should then have to seek another God... a God who would be somehow accessible, in whom each one sharing in proportion as he might, could be, and live, and become, godly. Triads III xxii 24
How literally should we take this language? Does Palamas think that each Christian is in the process of becoming, quite literally, a God? Some groups within the Orthodox world have seemed to endorse this idea. One such group was the “Isochrists” of the sixth century. These Christians – whose name means “like Christ” – believed that, at the final resurrection of the dead, all Christians would become literally equal to Christ... Paul had taught that Christ was the “first fruits” of the resurrection, that is, the first person to be raised by God, and that everyone would be raised in a similar way. The Isochrists simply took this further, suggesting that if everyone was going to experience what Christ did, then everyone would be exactly the same as Christ – he was just the first. But the Isochrists were condemned for this. So too were the Khlysty, a mystical group in the eighteenth-century Russian church. They believed that God was constantly becoming incarnate in a series of Messiahs, and that through the practice of ecstatic prayer, any Christian could receive the Holy Spirit and become indistinguishable from Christ.
Palamas, however, stresses that Christians should not look forward to becoming equal to God. Just like Maximus before him, he points out that union with God means taking on the “glory” of God, but not his nature:
Thus to our human nature he has given the glory of the Godhead, but not the divine nature; for the nature of God is one thing, his glory another, even though they are inseparable from each other. Triads II iii 15
Also: Just how bad (historically inaccurate and philosophically uncharitable/prejudiced) is Russell's discussion of Catholic Philosophy in his History of Western Philosophy?
Thanks for the answers . So that part in Da Vinci's code (a book by Dan Brown) where they talk about the emperor deciding on Jesus's divinity has some semblance of history.
I think the point Margim was making about Constantine was about his endorsing Christianity and bringing it into the centre of Roman culture, rather than about any notion of Constantine actually tinkering about with what Christians believed.
If we're talking about a context in which predestination is true, or at least is believed to be true, then it wouldn't make much sense to think of God adjusting his plan in accordance with people's decisions, because those decisions are part of his plan to start with. If I believe in predestination then I believe that whatever I do - whether sinful or not - is what God has predetermined me to do.
But if we forget about predestination then the model you suggest would make a lot of sense, and I think it's how a lot of people - at least Protestants - would probably think of things. But still, to say that God adjusts his plan to take account of our sinful actions wouldn't be much of a justification for committing them. On the contrary, even though God might bring good out of our evil, he presumably would not bring as much good as there would have been if we hadn't sinned and if his original plan had been followed. Otherwise, that wouldn't have been his original plan, on the assumption that God always plans for the most amount of good. Any variation upon God's plan will reduce the overall good, so even though God will bring about the best consequences he can from our sin, it would still have been better not to have had it in the first place. That's what I'd think anyway.
Thanks for the answers . So that part in Da Vinci's code (a book by Dan Brown) where they talk about the emperor deciding on Jesus's divinity has some semblance of history.
Uh, a nice one. Let me try to elaborate this "no predestination" part, as well as the "adjust" word. Well, I'm not suggesting that God must "adjust" or "adopt" to the situation when sin is committed. What I'm trying to say is this: categories like "time" don't have much sense when speaking from the God's point of view; He knows what will happen at the "end of the time" in advance. My point is that He don't need to adjust the plan from HIS point of view, the beginning of the whole universe and the end is just "a moment" (again, meaningless word for Him). Only from OUR point of view it seems that He's adjusting the plan.
And another thing... Whatever His plan is, it definitely must be an extremely flexible (again, from OUR point of view) because of free will. And again, from HIS point of view it can be "set in stone", cause He already knows the final result.