Alternate History Thread IV: The Sequel

Which as I said, is interesting, but horribly mundane compared to the idea of something actually Roman, not simply vaguely influenced by Roman military thinking. History can go an infinite number of ways from a given PoD, but it seems the most interesting direction to try and take it from this one would be a Britain which does not fall to Anglo-Saxon influences. Somehow.
 
What's so unsatisfactory or mundane about a predominant Romano-Celtic culture in the British Isles with a marginalised, probably eventually assimilated Anglo-Saxons?
 
Do you take tofu when you can have steak? Celtic Britain has already been done and explored by yourself at least, and is already in operation as a functioning game. Roman Britain has not, to my knowledge, ever been done. To water it down to a mix of the two cultures (more so than what actually existed) is something of a disservice to the concept if it can be avoided.

I also invoke the Rule of Cool, in that a pure strain of Roman militancy (powered by fending off constant invasions) will likely lead to Legionaries fighting Viking Berserkers hopping off longboats, and that is an awesome that no woad-painted Celtic-Roman mix can live up to.
 
(more so than what actually existed)

Emphasis on this, since it still would be Romano-Celtic; the question is that of percentage.

I suppose that Perfectionist is right and the Britannic Empire is key here. Relatedly/alternatively, you need to break up the Roman Empire earlier, so that a distinct Roman Britannic identity could emerge and survive.

On a very, very distantly related topic, what about Gregory the Patrician? Did the Exarchate of Carthage/African Empire stand a chance against the Arabs? Mayhaps it could've survived had Gregory not actually declared himself Emperor - then he could've worked together with the Eastern Romans to keep the Arabs at bay, whilst still probably retaining de facto independence. North Africa would've broken away eventually in any case, but it could've remained under Christian control, which would seriously alter the balance of power in the Mediterranean, not to mention completely change the religious history of Africa and lead to an entirely different trade dynamic.
 
PoD: For some reason, the legions of Britannia are not recalled back to the Continent. Britain thus remains standing while the Western Roman Empire falls, and becomes one of the two chief cultural inheritors, along with the Eastern Empire.

Unlikily: The reason Britain had two legions was because it was troublesome and bordered threats, plus it was a crummy wet mining colony. It would be very hard to gave a politicial situation where the Roman governer who wouldn't try and use the power the legions offered to invade somewhere nicer/go for the imperial crown. The legions would also support this as its hard for Britannia alone to provide their pay, and will be itching to march south for some real money.

With the legions and imperial overstructure gone in search of european glory you have Romano-Britain statelets forming around the towns - tiny polities that are divided and easy targets for invasion.
 
I was referring in part to the exploits of Basil II the Aptly-Named.
Boulgaroktonos is such a fantastic epithet indeed. Remember my first timeline? *reminisces*
Relatedly/alternatively, you need to break up the Roman Empire earlier, so that a distinct Roman Britannic identity could emerge and survive.
The closest plausible thing I could think of would be a fragmentation of the Gallic Empire of the Crisis of the Third Century. Take away Gallienus with an assassination sometime during the early 260s, possibly right after Valerianus was captured at Edessa, and Rome will in all likelihood fragment entirely; it merely remains for the Gallic Empire's Britain to rebel, which was likely enough in any case. Perhaps a failure of Constantinus I would also work; if Maxentius' generals won in the north Italian campaign of 312 and then pushed back into Gallia, Constantinus would be confined to Britannia but with sufficient military force to establish himself securely there.
das said:
On a very, very distantly related topic, what about Gregory the Patrician? Did the Exarchate of Carthage/African Empire stand a chance against the Arabs? Mayhaps it could've survived had Gregory not actually declared himself Emperor - then he could've worked together with the Eastern Romans to keep the Arabs at bay, whilst still probably retaining de facto independence.
Haha, that's excellent. Monoenergism and monothelitism were, in retrospect, silly things to risk Africa over anyway. I agree, however, that Gregorios is probably the Exarchate's best bet.
 
Unlikily: The reason Britain had two legions was because it was troublesome and bordered threats, plus it was a crummy wet mining colony. It would be very hard to gave a politicial situation where the Roman governer who wouldn't try and use the power the legions offered to invade somewhere nicer/go for the imperial crown. The legions would also support this as its hard for Britannia alone to provide their pay, and will be itching to march south for some real money.

With the legions and imperial overstructure gone in search of european glory you have Romano-Britain statelets forming around the towns - tiny polities that are divided and easy targets for invasion.

Which is why we should break the Empire up so that Britannia would have time to mature into something more viable after the initial short-sighted continental shenanigans.
 
Excellent TL, Strategos, though I, with my horrendously inadequate knowledge of east Asian history at this juncture, am unsure as to the ultimate goal of the TL. Unless it has something to do with the Manchu.

For the convenience of the readers, I will make a list of how this timeline is different from OTL. The reader can then interpret the significance of these differences and what will arise from them as they wish.

Ming
-Slightly earlier isolation of the Wanli Emperor brought about by conflict over naming of crown prince and over handling of Korean War
-Expended greater effort in Korean War
-de facto control over much of Korea
-Continued military presence in Korea

Manchu
-Control over the rightful Crown Prince of Korea

Korea
-A conservative faction in control
-Slightly more upheaval
-Rightful Emperor in Japanese custody, rightful crown prince hiding with Manchu

Japan
-Better quality and quantity of navy
-Increased power of liberal and Christian elements in society
-Increased tensions between competing factions
-Increased foreign trade which, along with other economic reformations, mean slightly better economy
-Increased Europeanization of certain elements of population
-Has rightful Emperor of Korea in custody
-Retains control over southern coast of Korea
 
Thank you for that Strategos! :D It's very helpful.
 
Whoops. xcl
 
real quick what was the german company that became dominant during the 19th century. it was something with Z like Zor something something
 
Installment I
Installment II
Installment III
Installment IV

Tempur Heroica, 1876-1883.

The peace proceedings at Brussels were imbued with a certain urgency for some parties, none more so than the Emperor of the French. Napoleon III retained the loyalty of much of his army (what was left of it) but at home things were rapidly degenerating. Reports were spotty, but in Paris things appeared black, with mobs running wild and a ‘Garde nationale’ seizing control of some of the fortresses. Much of the government had evacuated the city, including the empress and Adolphe Thiers, one of Napoleon’s chief remaining statesmen. What was even more troubling were the messages indicating that many of the troops stationed in the city to protect it from the Germans were joining the rebels and opening up the forts around Paris to the mob…in any event, the Emperor’s presence was absolutely necessary, preferably at the head of a large military force. Napoleon excused himself from the Brussels negotiations early, after putting in a pro forma appearance, and immediately joined Justin Clinchant and the army at Verdun. While the duc de Gramont was left at Brussels to carry on the proceedings, Napoleon began to move on rebellious Paris.

Public dissatisfaction with the war had turned ugly in the early months of 1876, and after the disaster of Alfeld and the collapse of France’s allies things got worse. The military governor of Paris, Claude Lecomte, had been instated after the collapse of MacMahon’s army, when the government was terrified at the thought of a German army besieging Paris. Lecomte had ordered the arming of civilians in order to make up the manpower losses by MacMahon and to ‘hold the line’ until Ducrot’s army returned from Italy. While the danger seemed imminent, there were few problems with the new Garde nationale, but with the armistice at Warstein things got much worse. The disaffected working classes of the city now had guns, and they were not afraid to use them. The failure of the Imperial government to win the war, despite the slight gain in territory, along with the previous social injustices perpetuated by even the Liberal Empire of the last few years, served as a rallying point for the communards. Several personalities began to gather adherents as they preached against the failures of the government; Louis Blanqui, Theophile Ferre, and Louis Rossel were present at a somewhat spontaneous gathering at the Champ de Mars on the twelfth of May that exploded into armed revolt after a botched attempt to disperse them by Lecomte’s men. A scuffle between the mob and a few of the soldiers ended with Ferre being shot and a massive retaliation by the crowd. Rossel, taking charge, convinced many of the soldiers to stand down, and with their help the mob seized the Invalides. Within a day other suburbs were revolting as well, especially Montmartre, where a major artillery park and ammunition dump was seized by the communards. That day, the 13th of May, saw the mass government evacuation, and the abandonment by the few troops still loyal to the Emperor of their posts. Blanqui, put in unofficial charge of the commune of Paris, helped direct the establishment of a revolutionary council and the seizure of the Paris forts. Before the week was out, the commune was securely in control of the area and essentially had the run of the place, calling out to other cities to begin their own social revolutions.

Blanqui saw Paris as a beacon and a sign to all those on the fence in the rest of the country, nay – the world – to begin the mass proletarian uprising against their oppressors, but outside of a few cities (Limoges and Lyons chief among these) in the Empire not much actually happened. Paris had always been distrusted by the rest of the country for its more radical stance, and by and large the revolution was confined to that single city, much as it had been in the earlier stages of the 1789 Revolution. Still, even the slightest hint of revolt set Napoleon off, and rebellious outlying cities were soon crushed. Uneasy about his ability to destroy the commune, the Emperor made his way first to Meaux and then sent to his ally Maximiliano for reinforcements. The Spanish king was somewhat embittered over Spain’s lackluster performance in the war and already had inklings that he would receive very little for his pains. Still, he was aware that a rebellious Paris spelled disaster for his northern neighbor, and a stable France was better than one exporting revolution as it had in the 18th century. So Maximiliano dispatched a corps under Blanco y Erenas – which was in northern Italy with Ducrot, making its way back home after the armistice – to go to Paris and assist Napoleon in crushing the dissidents. Such dithering on the part of the Emperor did allow him time to build up his position, true, but it also allowed the revolutionaries to strengthen their own hand. Already the weapons from the captured Paris forts were being spread throughout the city, with makeshift barricades bristling with artillery and mitrailleuses being placed all over Paris. (The barricades were harder to make than they had been in years past due to the wider Parisian boulevards that had been built due to the Haussmann reforms, but the revolutionaries had time now that Napoleon refused to march on Paris quickly.) Paris was a fortress. Louis Rossel strengthened its defenses by clearing Versailles during the week of 16-23 May, using the captured mitrailleuses to deadly effect.

Within Paris itself, the communards also used their breathing room to make good on their pledges and enact reforms. Using the red flag of 1848 as their banner to replace the imperial tricolor, an attempt was made to organize elections allowing all in the arrondissements to vote for members of the revolutionary council, including women. Blanqui led the effort to secure the ending of night work, especially in Paris bakeries, and the cancellation of debts; all enterprises abandoned by their owners in the mass exodus of the thirteenth were to be taken over by their workers. In addition, Church property was seized. Services were only to be allowed providing that the church turn itself over to the revolutionaries for public meetings every evening. Obviously the old concordat with the Pope was abrogated. To help strengthen ties with the old Revolutions and erase those with the discarded Imperial and Royal governments, Blanqui and his cohorts reestablished the Revolutionary Calendar of the First Republic. Schools were run somewhat efficiently – considering how many of the educational authorities in the city were now either dead or scattered around the countryside – and increasingly decatholicized education. Much of this required money, but many of the communards were timid about robbing the Paris banks, which contained billions of francs; eventually, Blanqui pushed it through and forced the banks to give up their reserve to the Commune. With the vast influx of cash, the council immediately began to disagree about what to spend it on; several parties were in favor of dividing it among the entire commune while others, worried about the Emperor’s reaction, wanted to spend money on defense. Still others believed that the money was necessary to enforce the social reforms…the debate lasted for two days before it was shelved, because by then a full month had passed since the initial seizure of power, and the Emperor was finally approaching Paris at speed. Already on the eighth of June the fort of Romainville was being attacked by Loyalist troops using what heavy artillery they had (for the mitrailleuse was largely useless in that situation). Methodically, Clinchant’s army plus the troops that Ducrot had finally managed to bring up from Italy began hammering away at the communard-controlled forts. Resistance was sharp, though, and after five days of constant siege the Loyalists had only secured the fort of Aubervilliers.

The Loyalist concentration on the region north of the Seine allowed impromptu minister of war Rossel to move his own troops that way en masse, which did a terrific job of halting Napoleon’s advance. While the communards failed to retake Aubervilliers, the critical fort of Romainville was still holding out and the main defensive wall of Paris had not yet been attacked significantly. Thus the communards enjoyed about a week of relative success, beating back the renewed Loyalist assault, until the sixteenth, when Spanish troops finally reached Versailles and began attacking from the rear. Versailles itself was overwhelmed as the few communard troops that were there fled to the southern forts. With most of the mobile communard ‘army’ – made up of the defectors from Lecomte’s army – defending the northern forts, the south was forced to rely on the Garde nationale, which was decidedly inadequate for defense. It only took until the eighteenth of June for the Spanish to break through the great Parisian wall, and as soon as they were inside the city it was every arrondissement for itself. The neighborhood loyalty that had thus far helped the communards gain control of Paris and work well together now backfired. Blanqui attempted to maintain central control but was largely ignored after the controversy over the bank robberies, while Rossel was killed while overseeing the defense of the fort of Nogent on the twentieth. The Spanish were held up for some time while attempting to secure the Bois de Boulogne, attempting to clear their flank so as to enter the city; that objective took two weeks to root out, as the communards there proved surprisingly resilient. Nevertheless, by the twenty-eighth of June the communards had lost all control of the forts and were now plunged into disorganized fighting in the city itself. Individually, each arrondissement fought remarkably, refusing to surrender and cutting down many Loyalist and Spanish troops in the process, but due to the wider streets it was impossible to make individual neighborhoods into fortresses a la 1789 and 1848. Even so, the communards did amazingly well, and it was only after a week or so that the Loyalist troops hit upon the idea of blowing apart the houses with artillery fire to loop around and outflank a given barricade position. And so, over the course of three weeks of heavy fighting, the communards were cleaned out, house by house and street by street, fighting on long after the death of Blanqui. The hill of Montmartre was the last position to fall, on the nineteenth of July, and on the very next day the Emperor himself issued a proclamation declaring the destruction of the commune and the safety of the city.

It was then that the reprisals came. Witnesses were found, photographs were obtained, and newspapers were scoured for mention of any who had raised arms against the Emperor. A series of kangaroo court trials were widely publicized, and everyone, male and even some females, was sentenced to death if found guilty. Which happened a good ninety percent of the time. The global backlash was tremendous; initially a Red Terror had swept the globe but now revulsion arose at what the tyrant Napoleon was doing to maintain his hold on power. But nothing concrete was done; the communards were shot and dumped in mass graves. A scant few escaped to Germany, Britain, and the United States, but they were few in number indeed. The new white terror lasted for months and ended up in the deaths of nearly a hundred thousand people and the exile of a good ten thousand to the French colonies. Napoleon III retook his throne at the partially vandalized Tuileries, establishing himself there as opposed to Versailles so as to keep a closer watch on the city. In any event, it was explicitly clear that the Liberal Empire was, if not on life support, dead.

The effect on communist thought was immense. During the two months of the Commune itself Marx had written glowingly about it as had Engels, referring to the transitory ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ and indicating that the Commune was the perfect archetype thereof. Such feelings took a sharp turn when the Commune was destroyed though. Already since the 1872 Hague congress, the First International had been breaking up somewhat along anarchist lines vs. Marxist lines, but after the Commune went the way of the dodo so too did united communist thought. Marx and Engels pointed to the Commune as an excellent prototype of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, that intermediate stage before communism, but that it had had the failure of not entrusting itself to a true dictator, i.e. Blanqui, who could control the revolutionary impulse and give it true direction. The fallout over the bank robbing issue, they thought, helped divide the communards at the worst possible time, which the Loyalists and Spanish were able to exploit. Mikhail Bakunin and the anarchists, however, took a different line. The Commune had not even been necessary, and its mere existence had led to its fall; true success would have been gained by not even bothering with the quasidemocratic, partly authoritarian government that the Commune instituted but rather by immediately proceeding to decentralized workers’ councils, preferably by arrondissement, and so resisting attack. Bakunin and his followers pointed to how much longer it took to clean out Paris one neighborhood at a time to how rapidly the forts and the unified army had collapsed. Then Marx countered by saying that the unified army at least had had a chance, whereas the arrondissements had never been able to do more than mount a stalwart, failed defense…and the argument raged on. The First International was completely broken up by the end of 1876, the Marxists and Bakuninists going their separate ways, and the overall strength of the communist movement took a big hit. Those elements of society that tend towards the revolutionary had been practically destroyed, and it would take some decades before they were strong enough to rise again. Bakunin’s death in 1877 helped speed up reconciliation a bit, but some of his supporters like knyaz Pyotr Kropotkin carried on his message as the Jura federation.

But socialist thought was not the only developing area of philosophy. A philologist named Friedrich Nietzsche had, despite renouncing his Prussian citizenship, served in the Great European War as a medical orderly in the Rhineland and seen the elephant at Alfeld; his reaction to the horror of war was not one of military glorification but instead of revulsion. He had earlier spent time with Richard Wagner (whose Bayreuth opera house had remained largely free of the ruin of war) and had even wrote a book examining Wagner’s and other works in a philological and philosophical context, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music. But now, after the war, his thoughts turned more rapidly towards his antistatist beginnings. It was he who, in 1879, published Human, All Too Human, which in a series of a few hundred aphorisms (since he was somewhat unwilling to construct his own philosophical doctrine) ridiculed the nationalistic ethos that drove the European states to war and is taken as the foundation of the pan-European movement. Nietzsche gained a large following, especially in the Scandinavian countries, for his work. At the height of this popularity, though, he suffered a romantic reverse and fled his post as professor of classical philology at Basel for southern France, where he shut himself up and began work on a magnum opus, which he had not yet finished by 1884. But hints could be found in his other writings, released periodically; the rise of the Paris Commune had led him to write, “Where are the Vandals of the twentieth century? Evidently they will appear and establish themselves only after violent Socialist revolutions.” He railed against the sheeple, saying that “regimentation has grown very strong in this democratic Europe; people who learn easily submit easily…those who can command will find those who will obey.” With great enthusiasm across Europe and with some trepidation many eagerly awaited his next work.

In the aftermath of the turmoil of the Great European War and the crushing of the Paris Commune, by and large Europe began to return to normal. The British subsidies and the French reparations (which in turn were aided by British subsidies of their own, lessening the economic impact on France) helped restore the Belgian and German economies in particular. Much of the damage done to the Rhineland was fixed, and Belgium’s industrial strength began to go back up. For much of this time the countries of Europe were fixed on integrating their new gains; Hungary in particular had quite the interesting time trying to get Bohemia and Slavania to work together with the magnates in Budapest. But a few things prevented Europe from recovering quickly. The first and foremost of these was a new form of influenza, spread during the war; during 1876 and 1877 it swept over Europe and caused millions more deaths than the Great European War itself had. One of the victims of the flu was Emperor Wilhelm I, who left his throne to his son Friedrich (crowned ‘Kaiser Friedrich III’, strangely enough, because that was his title as Prussian King but as Emperor he was the first of the Friedrichs); other prominent Europeans carried off were the Empress Eugenie of France and Benjamin Disraeli. In any event, this equine influenza carried off millions, seriously impeding European growth, but in the end significant developments were made in the field of epidemiology and medical science in general. Reconstruction following the war was given another jolt with a series of bank crises in 1880, which spread even to the United States (affecting the election there, as we will later see). The period before 1884 was full of economic ‘bumps’, but at least there had been no major panic yet. As of that year, the European economy as a whole was extremely fragile, leading to several important decisions by some of the Great Powers…to which we will turn in a moment.

But instead, let us look at the United States, which as we left it in 1865 (outside of a brief interlude in 1874) was, if only briefly, the strongest nation on the planet. The postwar partial demobilization reduced that significantly, of course, but the Americans still had great industrial and manpower potential. And in the aftermath of the Civil War, the Republican coalition of free workers and northern capitalists held strong and reelected Abraham Lincoln on a platform of Southern reconciliation and reconstruction and a quashing of the insurgency. Also, winning the war itself kind of helped. Lincoln’s second term saw some successes against the Ku Klux Klan partisans, especially on the Eastern Seaboard. Their operations were largely confined to the Great Smoky Mountains, the Tennessee River valley, and the Deep South by 1868, when Lincoln refused to run for a third term. It may have been impossible for him anyway. His more lenient plan was shoved aside by the Radical Republicans in Congress as the Ku Klux Klan insurgency ramped up; by 1866 they were able to force the President to go along with many of the old provisos of the Wade-Davis Bill, which he had earlier pocket-vetoed. The Ironclad Oath, which forced the taker to affirm that he had never served the Confederacy in its government or military, was especially seen as necessary due to the large numbers of former Confederate Army personnel serving in the Ku Klux Klan. Members of that particular vile organization (or heroic group of freedom fighters, take your pick) were of course given the death penalty with scant exception. Of more importance – and success – were the programs surrounding black literacy and black suffrage, which the Ku Klux Klan frequently attempted to interrupt with mixed results. In order to give the emancipated blacks more voting power, many former Confederates had been disenfranchised, and many others refused to vote on either a matter of principle, illiteracy, or because they felt violence was a better answer.

So since Lincoln refused to run in 1868, the Republican nomination was essentially up for grabs. His vice president, Andrew Johnson, had been chosen because, as a Democrat, he would be able to hopefully help smooth the introduction of Reconstruction in the southern states. This obviously failed, and along with a general line taken against the Radical Republicans that by now controlled the party Johnson was a dead letter who wouldn’t have been able to run on that ticket anyway. Hannibal Hamlin, Lincoln’s original vice president, similarly declined the honor; just as well, because he too had lost a good deal of prestige after not being nominated as the vice president in 1864. Some support went to George Meade, victor of Gettysburg and capturer of Richmond, but Meade declined the offer, claiming ill health and a lack of interest in politics; so too did Ulysses Grant, commander in the West at that time. (Grant was, after all, spending much of his time commanding the anti-insurgency forces in the Deep South.) So the Republicans finally decided to nominate William Seward for president and boost his ticket with vice president Gouverneur Warren, a wartime general and hero at Gettysburg. Opposing Seward was Horatio Seymour of New York, a favorite son candidate who did surprisingly well at the polls but who was in the end defeated by the Republican candidate by well over half a million votes. The Army’s work to secure black suffrage in the South undoubtedly helped the Republican cause. Seward, whose presidency was greatly affected by the Radical Republicans that were in power in Congress, spent much of his time attempting to keep anti-Confederate measures from being passed, but at the same time to strengthen the cause of Reconstruction; one of his pet projects was the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1869, which cost the United States a grand total of two cents an acre but at the time was roundly mocked by the public. After Congress lost its Radical Republican majority in 1870’s elections, many of the older, harsher anti-Confederate laws were repealed. But at the very least, new federal programs were set up to aid the blacks and continue ‘rehabilitating’ the southern states. The Freedmen’s Bureau, which was organized to help blacks find jobs, get homes, and build schools, was expanded. Due to initial failures in the Freedmen’s Bureau’s implementation, a federal Bureau of Internal Security was founded under the aegis of the Department of Justice to better fight the paramilitary groups both in court and in the field, assisting the overloaded US Marshals Service (which was eventually shifted west to deal with the influx of settlers and the similar influx of lawlessness in those territories). The successes of the BIS led to a marked decrease in Southern resistance in the areas of the Deep South.

But still, Seward was seen as too conciliatory for the Presidency; while the insurgency continued in the South, many of the Republicans believed that the complete and utter destruction of the former Confederates was necessary, by the harshest means if possible. A president with a military background was required for the 1872 elections, one that would take a more active approach to the problem of the Ku Klux Klan; given the unwillingness of the General of the Army Ulysses Grant to serve, Republican Party chiefs had to scour the ranks of the military to find a suitable candidate. They thought they did in William Tecumseh Sherman, who had fought under Grant in the West and proved an admirable logistic strategician as commander of the Army troops in Mississippi and Alabama. Back in 1868 he had refused to run, reiterating it to a reporter from the New York Tribune: “If drafted, I will not run; if nominated, I will not accept; if elected, I will not serve.” By 1872, though, with the Ku Klux Klan expanding its operations in the West (although declining under the blows of his troops and the BIS in the South), Sherman was ready to recant his statement; though he was strongly opposed to the plan, he feared that he would have to, there being no other choice. With James G. Blaine of Maine as his running mate, Sherman – having, in essence, been rubber-stamped by the party convention – went on to crushingly defeat Samuel Tilden’s Democratic ticket in the general election. Tilden’s campaign as a reform candidate from New York had given Sherman the support of many of the Northeastern bosses, a key aid. And Sherman applied to the Presidency the same spirit that he had to the Ku Klux Klan. While he personally did not favor most Radical Republican policies, Sherman felt that he had to destroy every basis for Klan power, and thus with the assistance of Elihu Washburne, a Radical Republican in the House of Representatives, pushed through a measure that would arm the Southern blacks and divide the plantations of former slave owners between them. Finally approved in 1874, the measure seriously split the Republican Party. The northern capitalists and party bosses it had relied on were aghast at the Radicals and at Sherman, and it showed in the 1874 midterm election, in which the Republicans lost several strongholds in the Northern states (though the allegiance of free workers aided their cause tremendously). Sherman didn’t really care, though; the Klan was virtually annihilated in the Southern states by the end of his term and was in partial remission in the West. As for the West itself, that problem was lessened by a somewhat similar plan; where Sherman had attacked the enemy’s support base in the South, he created one in the West, by improving relations with the Native Americans and generally acting to split them from the Klansmen by giving concessions, including larger and better reservations and working with the Supreme Court to improve their legal status. With their support base destroyed, the Klansmen began to wither, suffering tremendous blows at the hands of the Army and the BIS, until eventually Nathan Bedford Forrest, the ‘Grand Wizard’ of the group, was caught and killed at Bozeman in 1875 with two thousand other cavalry. The back of the insurgency was broken, and although after 1875 sporadic attacks continued by splinter groups, by and large resistance to the federal government ceased. It is for this reason that many count 1875 as the final year of the American Civil War, not 1864 as others do.

Sherman was most definitely not going to run for the Presidency again, and he made this abundantly clear. This was the final straw for the Republican Party and Lincoln’s old coalition. Already it had been seriously riven by the Radical Republicans’ policies in the Deep South, and granting the Native Americans larger and better reservations had angered the northern capitalists who had served as a major antagonist of the slave-owning South. Now that slavery and the Confederacy had been finally, decisively defeated, and now that the businessmen of the North were getting more and more interested in trade both transcontinental and intercontinental, the coalition lost all meaning. Already the free white workers were beginning to clash with their managers over labor issues of pay and work hours. The split was already visible by the 1874 election, but in 1876 it became formal. Many Republican party bosses in the North as well as many of the merchants and industrialists simply walked out of the convention and held their own. Calling for a platform that entailed stronger central government (so that it could subsidize business and crush the Native Americans, of course), these men formed the Neo-Federalist Party, which merged with large segments of the already-ruined Democratic Party – especially the classical-liberal Bourbon Democrats – and nominated Horace Greeley, a media magnate and head of the New York Tribune. The Radical Republicans dominated their convention, as to be expected. Roscoe Conkling, a New York City boss who stayed loyal to the Republicans, had one of his cronies, Chester A. Arthur, Port Collector for New York City, nominated for the Presidency. A few splinters of the Democratic Party held their own convention but were largely ignored and got next to no votes in the general election of 1876, while a few more coalesced in the Greenback Party, which commanded significant labor support due to its opposition to the return of the United States currency to specie-based methods.
 
In the end, Arthur squeaked through with not an insignificant amount of grease (Conkling leaned on many of his railroad friends) and in large part due to the votes of former slaves in the South, which was now becoming a significant Republican stronghold; the Democrats and Greenbacks were just enough to play spoiler, stealing a few voters from the Neo-Federalists to allow Arthur to come in ahead of Greeley by a margin of five percentage points in the popular vote. Greeley’s lackluster campaign also helped the Republican cause. But it was increasingly clear that the Republicans were not the same party that had won the Civil War. They were now more than ever the party of free labor, allied with freed slaves. Conkling, who managed to get himself made Speaker of the House, pushed through a few labor laws (which made his hold on New York politics incredibly solid, endearing him to the immigrants that were beginning to pour in), alienating a few of his railroad compadres; with Arthur in the White House, the measures were easily passed. But the 1878 midterm elections brought woe; the Neo-Federalists gained the House and Senate both, having had the ability to solidify their party over the intervening few years (especially with the outrage among many business leaders at Conkling’s new laws), blocking much Republican legislative activity. The remainder of Arthur’s term was not particularly successful. True, a few Native American uprisings among recalcitrant tribes who had not benefited as much from Sherman’s policy were squelched. But Arthur spent a good deal of time fighting the growing clamor for civil service reform, a charge led by the Neo-Federalists, whose bills he repeatedly vetoed in order to keep Conkling’s cronies in charge. A railroad scandal and ensuing minor financial crisis marred 1879 – briefly alleviated to an extent by the enaction of the Bland-Allison Act, which did a good deal to help the federal government cash in on the Nevada Comstock Lode – and ensured that Arthur would not be reelected. He formally announced his unwillingness to run for a second term early in the next year, and the Republicans had to scramble to find somebody else to oppose him. They were aided in this by the Neo-Federalists, who, thinking the election virtually won due to Arthur’s unpopularity, nominated the former Bourbon Democrat Thomas Bayard. Choosing James A. Garfield, who had served in the Army during the first years of the Civil War, to run for the Presidency, the Republicans managed, against all odds, to beat the Neo-Federalists again in the 1880 general election, but by an even closer margin than before. Amidst allegations of fraud, Garfield was sworn in in early 1881 and immediately pursued civil service reform in order to help soothe tensions. (Many believe that this is a result of a backroom deal with the Neo-Federalists, who agreed to not bring court proceedings against Garfield’s campaign in return for the passage of civil service reform bills.) Sponsored by George Pendleton, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1881 passed the Neo-Federalist Senate and House easily and was signed by Garfield a few days later, helping to put an end to the patronage system that was currently in existence and implementing a form of meritocratic examination for most federal posts.

Here we rejoin the wider world, and briefly return to European affairs. While in general the early 1880s was a time of economic hiccups, a few nations did reasonably well. Spain in particular with its limited liberalization, led by King Maximiliano himself, attracted significant amounts of foreign investment and was able to industrialize somewhat in the years immediately following the Great European War. Juan Prim, during the last years of his ministry (he died in 1878), did his best to build on the lessons from the Balkan and Italian theaters, improving the army yet further, while the King, who had always been interested in naval matters, did his best to modernize the Spanish fleet as he had modernized the Austrian fleet twenty-five years prior. Admiral Patricio de Montojo y Pasaron created a viable Admiralty and had several monitors and other ironclad ships laid down, similarly attempting to use the experience of the Great European War to prepare for the next conflict. Spain itself was largely dissatisfied with the Brussels treaty, though. They only got Sardinia out of the whole deal, despite the contributions of their soldiers in the Balkans, which had essentially been the sole reason for the survival of the Ottoman Empire. The general feeling in the Cortes was that they deserved more than just a single island that was somewhat unprofitable and rather hard to control anyway. So already in 1880 there was a desire to turn the army and navy against a real target to secure cash monies and greater influence and prestige and, most importantly, an outlet for the national frustration.

It was this atmosphere that met the Mexican visitors to the Cortes in the fall of 1880. Refugees from the Liberal movement, they came to Maximiliano with tales of Conservative atrocities in the recent coup. For after the 1864 American intervention in Mexico, the Liberals under Benito Juarez had retained great power. This power lasted for ten years, before Juarez died in office; the ensuing election was widely suspected of having been rigged by the Liberal protégé of Juarez, Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, who narrowly beat Porfirio Diaz, the Conservative candidate, who had rebuilt the Conservative base in the years since the European intervention. Lerdo de Tejada increasingly had to rely on grease to push his policies through, and Diaz – who after a failed coup attempt in 1875 was a refugee in the countryside – continued to gain support in both the legislature and the military. In 1879, Lerdo de Tejada finally tried to push something that could not be countenanced: a bill initiating a fresh centralization process and limiting states’ rights. Amid the hue and outcry, Diaz had his supporters in the army mutiny and march on Mexico City. Within months, the Liberal government had fallen and retreated to the countryside once more as Diaz took control of the country. These Liberals were the ones that approached Maximiliano a few months later. This was the outlet that Spain needed; and doubtless some ‘concessions’ could be secured with the grateful Liberal government once Spain routed the parvenu Conservatives. Montojo was ordered to outfit the fleet for an 1881 campaign.

The United States didn’t know of these events until Montojo’s Spanish fleet was resupplying at Cuba, and President James Garfield insistently protested and threatened war. But in all honesty, the American military was not up to the task of fighting a European Great Power (albeit one of the weaker ones) and Garfield, being a former military man, knew it. After repeated entreaties failed to get the British to reaffirm Castlereagh’s old State Paper (in which he had indicated the desirability of not having Spain reclaim its then-rebelling colonies) or guarantee the Monroe Doctrine, the US military was forced to stand idly by and watch as Montojo, in overall command of the expedition, landed at Veracruz and annihilated the Conservative armies with concentrated mitrailleuse fire. Spanish ships remained at stations not far off the American coast in order to force compliance, but even this humiliation would not push Garfield into war, for he knew all too well how the postwar reductions in force had hurt the army and navy. After a whirlwind campaign of less than a year, Spain had helped the Liberals reclaim Mexico. But major concessions were made, especially in the form of trade, as Veracruz virtually became a Spanish colony unto itself, as did Acapulco. Spain also exerted significant political power inside Mexico, with foreign policy virtually subordinated to the Spanish ambassador.

In the United States, outrage rapidly grew at how the President refused to enter a war to safeguard the Monroe Doctrine. The Republicans, who had briefly reclaimed the House of Representatives, were forced to relinquish it in the 1882 midterm elections. Garfield himself was nearly assassinated and speculation began to arise that he would not run for a second term. In the meantime, the Neo-Federalists finally found a good candidate in Winfield Scott Hancock, the Civil War hero and a man who had resigned his generalship over the failure to aid the Conservatives (never mind that the Neo-Federalists were probably closer to the Liberals in political outlook). Hancock’s popularity began rising, and a successful election in 1884 began to look like a shoo-in. Meanwhile, as had been planned, the United Kingdom was able to collect on the Mexican government's significant debt, which had accrued over the past few decades since the last intervention.

Meanwhile, confronted with a surfeit of manufactured goods in Europe and a lack of sufficient markets for them (part of the problem fueling the European up and down economy), the European Powers began to look towards Africa and Asia as a venue for expansion. Tunisia was a prime target for both the French and the Neapolitans (who were most interested in something prestigious to offset the failure of the last war), and both France and Spain eyed Morocco greedily. Spain already began to act on its interest by seizing the Rio de Oro colonial region south of Morocco, rich in phosphates, and subduing the Berber tribes that lived there. Britain was largely occupied by its own colonies (specifically a problem with a growing theocratic insurgency in southern Sudan as well as with Tripolitania and especially the Boers), but it was most interested in the Asante and Sokoto states as expansion regions. Portugal continued muddling along in Angola and East Africa/Mozambique; with the relatively ineffective Luis I still on the throne some development occurred but not much. It was gradually becoming the aim of Portuguese colonial activity to make a bridge across southern Africa from Maputo to Luanda, and some expansion up the Zambezi began, though progress was somewhat slow. Germany too was beginning to take interest in colonization; while interested in revision of the Brussels settlement in the Rhineland, von Bismarck figured that Germany too needed more prestige and more land, which although useless would make the Volk happy. Germany was already beginning to meddle in Zanzibar and the Namib coast, and an offer to purchase the Cape Colony from Britain was tendered in 1883, although laughed out of the house by the resurgent Conservatives.

British activities in Africa require clarification. Problems for the British arose in Ottoman Tripolitania, which was held as the virtual fief of Urabi Pasha and his band of revanchist formerly Egyptian officers. It quickly became apparent to the pasha that he couldn’t pay his men by himself, having the better part of the old, professionalized Egyptian army with him but in control of a near useless stretch of desert. In 1879, as the British were facing down Zulus in South Africa, Urabi launched his own campaign against British-owned Cyrenaica, sweeping aside the pitiful garrison at the El Agheila bottleneck and then proceeding to Benghazi and Tobruk, and even breaking into Mersa Matruh by the end of the year. Lord Salisbury, who had just captured the premiership from Gladstone, dispatched Lord Garnet Wolseley to the scene with ten thousand men. Wolseley smashed Urabi outside of Alexandria and then followed up the attack to the border. After a brief dispute with the Sultan (which was eventually resolved by the Porte disavowing the disobedient vassal), Wolseley was authorized by London to pursue beyond the border and take Tripolitania, which he did with alacrity and support from the Navy. Urabi withdrew with his vastly decreased army into the Sahara to the cities of Murzuk and Ghat, which were deemed too much of a problem for the British to attack and hold. Meanwhile, in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, a similar problem arose. A holy man from the Sudanese countryside, Mohammed Ahmed, who called himself the Mahdi, gained a following in the wake of the disappearance of Ottoman forces from the region. When Anglo-Egyptian troops attempted to reassert control in 1882, a large body of them were ambushed and killed at Al Ubayyid by the Mahdi’s men. Mohammed Ahmed’s dervishes began overrunning formerly Egyptian Sudan. Tewfik, the khedive of Egypt, plaintively requested British aid, and it was forthcoming; the large commitment under the command of Lord Wolseley was able to reach and hold Khartoum, but advances further south were stymied by the Mahdi’s dervishes fighting an asymmetric campaign. Wolseley consolidated his gains but it was patently obvious that further advances would require a greater force.

Sic transit gloria mundi: Overview of the World in 1883.

1884, being an election year for the United States and also a key year for some of the European monarchies, is a good spot to stop and take stock of the global situation. The age of imperialism was about to dawn, clearly; already in Africa claims were beginning to cross and it was apparent that a formal agreement on the future of European claims in Africa was necessary. Noises were being made about holding a Congress including the major European Powers and possibly the United States as well. After the destruction of the past decade or two, Europe definitely needed to catch its collective breath. Of course, the economic situation didn’t really help, with most things in constant flux, a boom and bust cycle that wasn’t really alleviated by most government measures. The coming years would be interesting even if viewed solely from the economic point of view…but of course, rivalries were already coming to the forefront, and although a Great Power conflict was almost certainly out of the question, proxy wars were likely, especially in South America, which had been reopened to European meddling due to the apparent collapse of the Monroe Doctrine.

The United States prepared for its presidential election year with an attitude of near-certainty about a Neo-Federalist taking the Presidency. Winfield Scott Hancock, the clear front runner among most circles, was almost sure to clinch the nomination at the convention. On the Republican side, an effort was underway to find yet another war hero that could perhaps counter the stain of the Garfield and Arthur Presidencies, but prospects were bleak. Radical Republicanism had virtually run itself dry. The labor movement was also becoming somewhat more unpopular. The Knights of Labor, an organization founded fifteen years prior, was already viewed as a sell-out by many of its members, with the head Terence V. Powderly refusing to take part in strikes, which he viewed as ‘threatening’ to the gains that were being slowly made under Republican presidencies. So gradually labor organizations had grown secret terrorist arms, which were more often than not unnoticed by the Knights of Labor and the unions themselves; these professed Marxists, under the aegis of an American chapter of the International Workingmen’s Association, sparked a riot in Chicago at Haymarket Square on the first of May and then attacked the police cordon with bombs, killing several policemen and initiating a further polarization of the organized labor issue and generating a few Bakuninist splinter groups in American labor as well. (May Day also, as a side note, became widely adopted by many socialist organizations the world over as both a holiday and day of commemoration; Powderly’s Knights of Labor refused to do so though because it would likely antagonize the federal government.) This further discredited the generally pro-labor Republicans and hastened their downfall.

In addition, the BIS was increasingly unable to hold down race relations in the South, now that a decade had passed since the Battle of Bozeman and the Southern whites had largely forgotten that they had lost the war. While the Ku Klux Klan was not resurrected yet, threats were being made by splinter groups to interfere with black voting, and while the blacks as a whole had not an insignificant ability to fight back they were outpopulated by the whites. The despondent Garfield administration made a few lackluster attempts to prevent vote fraud but, like James Buchanan in the days before the Civil War, did relatively little overall to stop the harassment of the black voters. Too, the postwar waves of immigration were creating a social strain in the eastern and western American seaboards that the federal government was somewhat unsuccessful in dealing with. The plight of these immigrants, mostly from Europe but also significant numbers from China, was raising social concerns and broadening national support for a welfare program of some kind. Independent welfare organizations were already active in Chicago and New York City. In the meantime, the United States underwent something of a cultural renaissance with the advent of the largely American philosophy of pragmatism, espoused by William James, Charles Sander Peirce, and John Dewey, while American authors like Mark Twain and Bret Harte continued to publish. The proliferation of pro-labor (or at least anti-big business) authors like Frank Norris and Ida Tarbell, called muckrakers, aided the Republican Party at times as well. In the realm of foreign policy, American isolationism was beginning to be broken up. While relations with the United Kingdom remained good – mostly due to the strong financial ties the two had – Spain was a clear enemy, having intruded upon the American sphere of influence. America would doubtless regard any further incursions into the Western Hemisphere as hostile, and it was on this premise, with a platform of remilitarization, that Winfield Scott Hancock was winning so many supporters.

In South America, the fallout from the War of the Triple Alliance had largely passed and things were returning to normal everywhere except Paraguay which was having a difficult time recovering from the demographic disaster it had suffered. Brazil was attempting to enter a period of economic growth but was faltering somewhat, a condition which was blamed on the emperor, Dom Pedro II. Rising dissent against Pedro proved to be even more paralyzing, and Brazil was either spiraling towards a coup or civil war in the years to come. Meanwhile, Argentina had spent much of the past decade conquering the desert regions to the south; largely under the direction of President (formerly General) Julio Argentino Roca, the Argentineans had seized the remainder of the formerly uncolonized regions and were now improving the infrastructure and integrating the new lands, which promised to take some time. However, exports were already beginning to boom, and economic growth seemed to be on the horizon. To the west, Chile had nearly come out the winner in the War of the Pacific, but the Spanish, wanting both revenge for the Chincha Islands War defeat of the 1860s as well as wanting to throw around their new American muscle (tacitly acknowledged by the British), dispatched a squadron that in conjunction with the Peruvian ironclad Huascar destroyed much of the Chilean navy and briefly blockaded several major Chilean ports before a Royal Navy contingent arrived and threatened their own intervention, forcing a compromise peace that saw Chile seize the Bolivian Litoral but which allowed Peru to keep its segment of the Atacama Desert.
 
The United Kingdom had spent the past few years profitably exploiting colonies and tightening its hold. At home, Gladstone had repeatedly attempted to bring Irish Home Rule about but made no progress, having spent much of his political capital on the war; however, he did successfully push through the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act in 1878 before his government fell to Lord Salisbury and the Conservatives. Salisbury focused even more on the colonies and made it abundantly clear to the Russians especially that the old Treaty of Frankfurt alliance was dead by building up the British forces in India as the Russians began to range across the Central Asian wastes. A Great Game was now afoot between the titan of the land and the ruler of the waves, and while it stayed reasonably quiet for now Central Asia would prove to be a major bone of contention in years to come. At home the Industrial Revolution continued, but Britain was clearly losing its earlier advantage it had once enjoyed. France and Germany were both industrializing rapidly and Spain was also attempting to catch up, to say nothing of the American colossus. Britain was far less secure than it had been a scant two decades ago, despite her successes in the Great European War. Diplomatically, she was retreating into isolation again after the cooperation of the war; while relations stayed cordial with Germany due to the kaiser’s efforts and were normalized with France to an extent, Russia was increasingly hostile and Spain was beginning to encroach on the UK’s normal playground in the Americas. The flow of capital and trade between it and the United States remained strong of course.

The French Empire weathered the storms of the Great European War and the Paris Commune with aplomb, but the last decade was nothing if not a mixed success. Napoleon III continued to survive, though in 1883 he increasingly seemed to be at death’s door; plans were already in place to have the Prince-Imperial succeed him, and the only question remained “when”. The reaction against the Communards had undone part of Napoleon’s Liberal Empire, and forced Napoleon to rely more and more on clerical support for many of his programs. There was hope that his heir would change that, but such would have to wait for the Emperor’s death. Meanwhile, France continued to industrialize. Attempts to integrate Luxembourg, the Sarre, and the Rhineland were somewhat successful but faced resistance from the German population, and Alsace-Lorraine was no picnic either. The coal and iron from the new territories greatly assisted industrialization, and France’s postwar economy, although having a bit of a rocky start, was beginning to pick up by 1883. The Senegal and Algerian colonies were expanded but public pressure began mounting to intervene more in the affairs of China and the rest of Africa. Diplomatically, France was obviously moving away from Spain due to political considerations as well as the aftermath of the Great European War; tensions with Germany did not decrease either as French politicians began to assert that the Germans were sparking resistance in France’s eastern territories amongst the German populace. Such allegations were unproven, of course, but the mistrust was still there. French investments in the Ottoman Empire continued but in a much reduced form as the British began to take hold there; however it was compensated by the strong French position in northern Italy via the puppet Confederacy, in which the French army had to intervene twice to prevent the Pope from being unseated by his own subjects. Good relations were cultivated somewhat with Hungary and Russia, more so the former. A major impediment to French diplomacy was the perfidious invasion of Belgium during the war, which seriously damaged the empire’s credibility and of course forced the Belgians themselves closer to the British. This stigma still clung to France despite the intervening years, and made any offensive war on France’s part a serious political gamble (not to mention a huge financial one as well due to the on again off again state of European finance).

Maximiliano’s Spain was on the rise, as previously mentioned; the interventions in Mexico and Peru only served to increase its prestige. Cuban and Filipino incipient rebellions were crushed and the African colonies were expanded. Diplomatically, though, Spain had few friends. The UK was generally opposed in the Americas, as was the United States itself (although as yet neither had done anything significant to stop the Spanish). France was viewed as having betrayed Spain at the Brussels conference and relations with them became more and more icy, especially as Spanish influence grew in the Two Sicilies and Franco-Spanish interests clashed in Morocco. Germany was perhaps the closest thing Spain had to an amiable partner, but even then it was limited to a vague preference of Spain over France on the part of the Germans. The diplomatic isolation would need to be fixed if Spain were to continue its current rise. Not to mention, an heir would have to be found for the aging king, who was thus far childless.

The Netherlands remained largely as quiet as they had been earlier, focusing on colonial affairs (namely, fighting a series of major wars in the Indonesian archipelago) and building dynastic ties with Germany. The Great European War had affected them relatively little, allowing for peaceful expansion relative to their southern neighbor. Belgium itself had suffered greatly, and reparations only helped so much; a scar on the national psyche made a return to neutrality difficult. King Leopold began to cozy up to Britain somewhat, partly to allow him to pursue colonial shenanigans, partly for security from France, and partly for further economic aid to allow the rebuilding of Belgium. This policy was pursued almost wholly out of a desire to avoid war, and if anything the Belgians themselves became even more firmly entrenched in their wish for neutrality, something no sane politician would attempt to override. Bad feelings with France, of course, persisted. King Leopold was still officially in charge of the nascent Congolese International Association but no real development occurred due to Belgium’s necessary focus on rebuilding at home.

Otto von Bismarck was retained by Kaiser Friedrich III mostly because of his ability to get the disparate German interests to be silenced and because of his diplomatic acumen. The Kaiser himself took a more active role than had his father, pursuing better relations with Britain (to limited success) and attempting to hold Germany’s former Frankfurt partners together to little avail. Russia was lukewarm, with dynastic relations being probably the closest tie between the two; Germany was wary of Russia’s juggernaut size while Russia was threatened by the German massive industrialization. Which was proceeding rapidly, if somewhat slower due to the loss of the Saar and Luxemburg to the French; Silesia and the Ruhr were retained, and Austrian industry was integrated to a large extent, although Bohemia would have of course been ideal. Germany was perhaps affected most by the boom and bust cycle of the postwar world and her citizens began to clamor for rache against the French and possibly the Hungarians. Von Bismarck was so far able to distract them with colonial adventures, mainly the activities in southern Africa and the seizure of the Solomon Islands, but this became an increasingly difficult task as the years went on. He also attempted to co-opt many potential Social Democrats by instituting a series of welfare laws and extending suffrage to all males over 18, while making sure to avoid antagonizing the Catholic Center Party, which had grown relatively strong with the acquisition of large Catholic Germans in the peace of Brussels. (Austrian membership in the CCP was high.)

The Italian Confederation remained somewhat unstable during its early years, often relying on French troops to intervene in favor of the Pope. A framework somewhat similar to that of the old Germanic Confederation of the first half of the century, the Italians’ lack of a general legislative organization somehwat hindered their development and forced stagnation. They were hit especially hard by the fluctuating economic conditions of the late seventies and early eighties, and it remained to be seen if it was a viable state, especially with the princes disregarding what few papal decrees were issued. Industrial development still went on in the north, but it was somewhat inhibited by the internal trade barriers that were reenacted by the princes of the northern states. Meanwhile, to the south, the House of Savoy (ironically unrenamed) and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies served as not only a magnet for Italian nationalists but also somewhat of a puppet state with Britain (though actual British influence was low and of the disinterested nature; Spain actually had more supporters within the government). Primarily agricultural and a raw materials supplier, the south Italians largely were forced to rely on trade to boost their economy and were hit hard with a famine in 1882 from which they were still recovering. The kingdom, in the process of rebuilding, was dragged in two directions: some suggested North Africa as a route for expansion, specifically Tunisia, while others propounded the necessity of reuniting Italy. In both directions, France was the primary antagonist.

Sweden-Norway and Denmark remained largely as quiet as they had been since Denmark lost the last Schleswig-Holstein War; Scandinavism was in something of a remission although it retained significant supporters in all three countries. Norway’s ties with Sweden continued to decrease although of course the two countries remained in personal union. All of the Scandinavian states remained staunchly neutral, although the Swedish and Norwegian trade ties with the wider world remained.

Hungary was off to a bit of a rough start. The conflicting interests of the various constituencies – the Magyars, Czechs, Croats, and Bosnians being the most important of these – made progress difficult on many levels in the Diet. Lajos Kossuth, despite his advanced age, returned to Hungary and served as the country’s first Prime Minister, and drawing on the experience of the 1848 revolution he was able to coax the disparate nationalities into finalizing a constitution and making the republic a sound federal state. While dominated by many of the old rich magnates that had always held sway in Hungary, the Diet was able to establish a federal system based somewhat on the American example (but of course without many of the American centralization measures) in its first years. After Kossuth’s 1880 death, his place was taken by Kalman Tisza, whose great achievement thus far has been in preventing Hungary’s self-dissolution. The death of the great Croat nationalist Gabriel Radic aided this tremendously, of course. In order to distract people from nationalist difficulties, Tisza planned a series of economic reforms with the aid of the French, normalizing the taxation system, but as of 1883 was unable to push this system forward through the opposition of many of the rich magnates who dominated the Diet. This helped prevent the proper exploitation of the highly industrialized Bohemia, which was the closest that the agrarian Hungarian economy came to a more modern system. Hungary was thus making little industrial progress, though bright hopes remained if they could push through the reforms. Diplomatically, Hungary was clearly clashing with Germany over the issues of Germans in the Hungarian Republic, as well as over Slavania and the Croats in general, while the Romanians demanded more of Transylvania. Ties with France were developed but at the same time were significantly impeded by Napoleon III’s antipathy to republicanism and by the remaining ties between Hungary and Germany that persisted even through the border disagreements. Russia was also somewhat hostile due to the increasing influence of the Slavophiles in Russian government (spurred even further by the quasi success of the Slavophilic policy in the Great European War), as well as the clashes between Hungarian and Russian influence in the Balkans.

Serbia, following the Great European War, was more tantalized than ever by the establishment of a South Slavic state under their guidance. Under the clear tutelage of Russia, Serbia began supporting the Croat and Bosnian nationalists and agitating for the cession of the Banat by Hungary. Hungary was, however, able to hold the weapon of cutting off Serbian trade over Belgrade’s head, so nothing came to war…yet. (Not that Serbia would be able to do well in a war with Hungary, or that Hungary had the money or motivation to fight one either.) Its policy in the Ottoman Empire was similarly active, concentrating on attempts to acquire Macedonia and on rivalries with Bulgaria. A brief conflict between Serbia and Bulgaria over the Bulgarian intent to annex Eastern Rumelia (which was stymied by the Turkish refusal to back down and the unwillingness of the Russians to support the Bulgarians very far) came to nothing after an indecisive beginning in 1882. Meanwhile, Serbian industrialization was aided by the iron deposits in the former Sanjak of Novi Pazar, but they still relied on Hungary – who had the closest good ports – to get their wares out to the rest of the world. Serbia’s neighbor Bulgaria was having other problems. Bulgaria was in dire economic straits, which it attempted to solve via military means in 1882 by threatening war with the Ottomans and hoping that Russia would support them; when this didn’t happen, they, as previously mentioned, attacked Serbia and were stymied there as well. The acquisition by Bulgaria of a Russo-German prince, Alexander of Battenberg, put them firmly into the Russian bloc, but this relationship was damaged with the Russian refusal to assist in the East Rumelian crisis of 1882, and the Ottoman army that crushed the Eastern Rumelian rebels prevented Bulgaria from making progress on their own. Bulgaria’s national frustration increased discontentment with Alexander himself, and a coup attempt was likely in the offing. And Greece, finally, had its path smoothed by the liberalization that King Giorgios had agreed to prior to the war; although the Greeks definitely didn’t get everything they wanted, their control of Thessalonika made much of Ottoman Macedonia economically dependent on them and brought the Greeks into an era of renewed prosperity aided by foreign investment and limited industrialization and military reforms on the lines that von Bittenfeld had had to try to introduce in a crash course during the Great European War. Already Greek militant organizations were being formed in the unredeemed Aegean islands as well as Albania, western Anatolia, and Thrace.

The Ottoman Empire was decidedly shaky. Sultan Abdulaziz had managed to fend off military coups in the wake of the failure of the Great European War but he couldn’t fend off pneumonia, of which he died in 1880. His successor, his nephew Abdulhamid II, initially introduced a constitution but then took it away within a year after the assembly began to discuss limiting his personal power. A military crackdown followed, as well as an Armenian massacre to pay them back for allying with the Russians during the Great European War. Abdulhamid had to renew the military pressure in 1882 due to having to back down to the British over Tripolitania as well as due to the Eastern Rumelian rebellions. The Ottoman Empire was not a happy state, and was forced to rely on others for financial aid; there was bad blood between them and the Spanish due to the mismanagement of the Great European War, but French investments flowed in, especially to Syria, while the British also began a limited involvement. Meanwhile, to the east, Qajar Persia continued to decline under the benevolently incompetent rule of Nasser al-Din Shah, who formed a close friendship with the British to protect from Russian imperialism and presided over virtually no industrialization or improvement in the economic situation.

Russia itself was undergoing an era of serious socioeconomic stress due to the emancipation of the serfs in 1861; Alexander II’s generally Slavophilic policies were no real boon to Russian industrialization, although the emancipation of the serfs helped urbanization somewhat and created something of a labor pool. Workers began moving into the Donbas, central Ukraine, and the Moscow and St. Petersburg metropolitan areas. A few more factories sprung up in the major cities with or without government assistance. In addition, municipal fairs began to grow in the wake of Alexander II’s urban reforms of 1870; hotels and restaurants sprung up in great number in the larger cities and even western Siberia. With the advent of industrialization, as was the case in Spain as well, militant groups began to pop up. In particular, one large radical group, Land and Freedom, arose during the 1870s and mounted an assassination attempt on the Tsar in 1877. While this failed, the group managed to survive the counterattacks by the secret police and many of the key organizers were still at large by 1883. This did not shake Alexander’s willingness to reform, however. The miscreants were punished as best he could, but the mass of Russian peasantry was innocent in the matter. In 1880 Alexander appointed a new minister of the interior, the Armenian Mikhail Loris-Melikov, who embodied the spirit of the pro-zemstvo activists and who drafted a constitution in 1881 that in essence would create a form of a parliament, a national zemstvo so to speak, that would serve in a somewhat advisory but also not powerless role. Discussion and refinement of the constitution continued to 1883, but Alexander had not quite yet made up his mind on the matter, and was increasingly the target of terrorist bombs. Russian foreign relations were a bit tangled. Antipathy and mistrust of France still remained after the Polish affair of the 1860s as well as the military opposition of the 1870s, but Britain was not a particularly good friend either, as interests clashed in both the Ottoman Empire and Persia as well as Central Asia, where Russia was integrating the protectorates of Khiva and Bukhara as well as engaging in a cold war with China over Mongolia and Manchuria. Hungary was a rival in the Balkans and Germany was beginning to be more distant as well.

Qing China was still attempting to recover from the Taiping rebellion somewhat, but that was by far not the only problem that they had. The Guangxu Emperor had officially come to the throne in the 1870s but was clearly not in charge of his own fate; instead, a court battle was taking place between the conservative supporters of the Dowager Empress Cixi and the apostles of the Self-Strengthening Movement, Prince Gong and Li Hongzhang. Neither faction managed to gain a clear ascendancy, with the result that Westernization went forward although it was rather weak and riddled with corruption. The creation of the Beiyang Army and Beiyang Fleet, two relatively modernized and Europeanized formations, had been a major goal of Li Hongzhang, who achieved a great degree of control over foreign affairs and military policy by 1883. Too, several factories and government-assisted enterprises also came about, although they were hamstrung by serious corruption.

Meanwhile, even further east, Japan was continuing its own industrialization, albeit at a slower rate than China. Having aligned itself more or less with France in the 1870s, Japan ended up getting a bit of fallout from the French quasi-defeat in the Great European War, nearly going to war with Korea in an effort by the French to widen the conflict to East Asia and distract British sea power, but the Japanese lost the staring match with the Royal Navy and decided to abandon the project. The Meiji oligarchy managed to co-opt many liberals through its initial support of the plan to invade Korea, however, and as such was able to promulgate a French Liberal Empire-style constitution with the emperor having great power although having a Diet with a more advisory role than originally planned by many. The ensuing disagreements with Britain slowed foreign investment save for that of the French, which allowed industrialization to go forward but not at an incredibly high rate. Adoption of a French style military system also occurred.

1884 promised to be an eventful year, true enough, but it was clear in many other ways that the world was on the cusp of something greater. European dominance was reaching its apex, a time that the French referred to as la belle époque, but at the same time Europe itself was riven by internal struggles and economic troubles. It was an era of opportunity for the various nations on the world stage, to see who would claim preeminence or if those who already had it would safeguard their dominance. Only time would tell as to how things would turn out and when the last resort of kings would be needed.

Acta est fabula plaudite!

Commentary and questions would be highly appreciated.
 
Excellent job, Dachs, the best (and last?) one yet. How long till it starts?
 
Excellent job, Dachs, the best (and last?) one yet. How long till it starts?
Rules and stats construction. Which will take some time.
 
Finally finished your whole series. Damn that was a hell of a saga dachs. Superb job on the detail, it really made it worth reading the whole thing to get the minute things like where opposing armies were in relation to each other and taking into account terrain. (even cooler that you actually did visit one of the sites! How cool must that have been) As a history buff I am very impressed at the body of work as a whole. Showing that armies are not just one big mass but very intricate cogs that grind together to push forward the giant machine of war is refreshing.

I just really hope that you can maintain and allow for that level of detail in the actual NES mechanics while also keeping a big picture of the conflicts and political situations that get tossed around during updates and diplomacy. I'm not sure how you could indeed keep that kind of detail, stat-wise, without pouring a huge amount of time into said updates.

With that in mind will you be using previously founded stat models and rule sets? Or will you be coming up with your own design, which I think would be neccessary to keep this detail. Also I am extremely glad that you incorporated the effects of artillery and how crucial they were to winning a lot of battles. Are you going to be keeping them in the stats because i have yet to see them put seperately in a lot of NES's. Puting them in would be pretty easy so I hope you do.
 
Good work good sir. You'll be needing my help for the economics I be guessing ;) (be happy to lend a hand... I just happen to have a few academic works on Industrialisation sitting on my table).
 
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