Thanks a lot! Your "not very much" is more than I expected, and much more than people usually bother at internet discussion pages.
It still wasn't quite ideal though... I've just been reading some stuff which is relevant to this problem. As I said before, most of the discussion about Christ's human perfections - modern and medieval - revolves around his knowledge rather than other qualities such as his running ability. But it's still the same basic question - is his (human) quality perfect (for a human)? As I think I said, the traditional Catholic answer is "yes" but modern theologians would be more inclined to say "no". I've just been reading what Richard Swinburne has to say on this. He's one of the most prominent philosophers of religion today, and has an interesting take on such things because he's a rationalist analytic philosopher who converted to the Greek Orthodox Church.
In his book The Christian God, Swinburne argues that Christ could have had two sets of knowledge - divine knowledge and human knowledge. That matches the scholastic distinction between his "infused knowledge" and his "acquired knowledge". But Swinburne's account differs in two main ways. The first is that he offers an argument to the effect that it is possible to have two sets of knowledge in this way:
Richard Swinburne said:It was Freud above all who helped us to see how an agent can have two systems of belief to some extent independent of each other. In performing some actions, the agent is acting on one system of belief and not guided by beliefs of the other system; and conversely. Although all his beliefs are accessible--they would not be his beliefs unless he had privileged access to them--he refuses to admit to his consciousness beliefs relevant to his action, on which he is not acting. Thus, to take a well-worn example, a mother may refuse to acknowledge to herself a belief that her son is dead or to allow some of her actions to be guided by it. When asked if she believes that he is dead, she says 'No', and this is an honest reply, for it is guided by those beliefs of which she is conscious. Yet other actions of hers may be guided by the belief that he is dead--for instance, she may throw away some of his possessions--even though she does not admit that belief to consciousness. The refusal to admit a belief to consciousness is of course itself also something that the agent in this example refuses to admit to herself to be happening.
The Freudian account of the divided mind was of course derived from analysis of cases of human self-deception, when the beliefs of one belief system and the belief that the systems have been separated are not consciously acknowledged, and where the self-deception is a pathetic state from which the individual needs to be rescued. But such cases and the Freudian account of them helps us to see the logical possibility of an individual for good reason with conscious intention keeping a lesser belief system separate from his main belief system, and simultaneously doing different actions guided by different sets of beliefs of which he is consciously aware.
Indeed even those of us who do not suffer from bad cases of a Freudian divided mind can sometimes perform at once two quite separate tasks--for example, having a conversation with someone and writing a letter to someone else--in directing which quite distinct beliefs are involved, which we can recognize as 'on the way to' a divided mind in which the beliefs of both parts are consciously acknowledged.
Now a divine individual could not give up his knowledge, and so his beliefs; but he could, in becoming incarnate in Christ and acquiring a human belief-acquisition system, through his choice, keep the inclinations to belief resulting therefrom to some extent separate from his divine knowledge system. Different actions would be done in the light of different systems. The actions done through the human body, the thoughts consciously entertained connected with the human brain, the interpretation of perceptual data acquired through the human eyes, would all be done in the light of the human belief-system. So, too, would any public statement made through his human mouth. However, his divine knowledge-system will inevitably include the knowledge that his human system contains the beliefs that it does; and it will include those among the latter which are true. The separation of the belief-systems would be a voluntary act, knowledge of which was part of the divine knowledge-system but not of the human knowledge-system. We thus get a picture of a divine consciousness and a human consciousness of God Incarnate, the former including the latter, but not conversely.
The second major difference is that Swinburne thinks that Christ's "human knowledge" needn't be perfect, even perfect in a human way: Christ could have been ignorant about lots of things or even mistaken.
So Swinburne can say:
Richard Swinburne said:What in effect the 'divided mind' view is claiming is that the divine and human natures are to some extent separated, and that allows the human nature of Christ to be not a nature as perfect as a human nature could be (e.g. in Heaven), but a nature more like our human nature on Earth, subject to ignorance and disordered desire, yet one connected enough with the divine nature so that Christ does no wrong. In particular the two wills are kept to some extent separate, so that when Christ wills under human conditions, he wills under the conditions, not of perfect humanity, but under conditions more like those of our humanity, i.e. conditions of ignorance of some of the remote consequences of his actions, limited awareness of power, and open to the influence of desire. The 'subjection' of the human will to the divine must then be read only as a subjection which ensured no wrongdoing, but not in the more full-blooded way that always Christ had to will as he would will if he knew all the possibilities open to him and was not subject to influence by desire.
So on this view, Christ's perfection does not entail that he was the best runner in the world. When the Son chooses to become incarnate, he chooses to take on the effective limitations of normal human existence.
I don't know if that helps address the problem, but it at least shows the range of opinions that exist. I would certainly recommend reading Swinburne or other modern philosophical theologians if you're interested in this sort of thing, because even if you don't agree with their conclusions they will help you to see how people tackle these sorts of problems, and also point you towards others who have done so.
Personally I'm inclined to think that it is virtually impossible to articulate a doctrine of the incarnation which is orthodox, coherent, and plausible, but that's one of the things that makes it an interesting challenge. In fact I'm just starting a job which will involve trying to do precisely that for the next year, so perhaps in a year's time I'll have a more authoritative answer...