Perfection
The Great Head.
Were there ever any high-profile sexy female theologians?
Why did God make this thing?
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Why did God make this thing?
I didn't say that there existed valid proofs or disproofs of God's existence. Even if no valid proof exists, that does not, in itself, prove that no such proof can exist. You seem to be claiming not simply that there exists no such proof but that such proofs are impossible. But I don't see any reason to suppose that. You haven't given one; all you've done is insist that God has some kind of feature that makes it impossible to prove or disprove him, but you haven't specified what that feature is other than claim that God is the object of faith, not science, whereas other things are the object of science, not faith.
The "proof" of God that you give may be valid or invalid. (It can certainly be made valid by adding the premise "Whatever I experience, exists.") But I don't see why this derives from the fact that it's about God. For example, "I have experienced dark matter. Ergo, dark matter exists" would be just as valid or invalid. In fact, "I have experienced X. Ergo, X exists" would be equally valid or invalid for any X. Whether X stands for God or not seems to me to be neither here nor there.
I don't think that proofs of god's nonexistence are that hopeless, since it is lot easier to show than nonexistence.
I believe I already mentioned we have no knowledge about any properties pertaining to God. It seems to me that, given this, all that remains is speculation. (Actually, what this means is that we do not have any knowledge of God period.)
Actually, I'd like to leave out the ergo for a moment. Turning to "x number of people have experienced God", I'd say that's beyond doubt - except for one caveat: people who do not believe in God.
Now, the point is, any God-proof will always about belief, rather than knowledge - although people tend to confuse the two, there is a difference, obviously. So why is any God-proof absurd? Because God is in the area called "belief", and proof is in the area called "knowledge". (And I must admit I'm inclined to add and ne'er the twain shall meet...)
I wonder, then, what you take the word "God" to mean. If by "God" you mean "the ultimate source of being in the universe" or something like that, then perhaps it is true that we don't know what properties it has. If by "God" one means "a being which is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good" then it's clear that we do know precisely what properties it has. One can define anything one likes, with whatever properties one likes. The only question then is whether anything answering to that description exists.
Normally, when people argue about the existence of God, they begin with such a definition and then consider whether it exists or not. It seems to me that you're going the other way, assuming that there is some existing thing which you call "God", and then wondering what it's like. Which is all very well, except that (1) it's not clear if the word "God", on such a procedure, has any meaningful content - if not then you're not saying anything at all when you use the word; and (2) if it does have content, how do you know that it exists in the first place?
Surely it's perfectly in doubt whether anyone has experienced God. What's not in doubt is that many people have had experiences which they have interpreted as being of God. The question, of course, is whether those experiences (or some of them) really were of God, or at least, whether it would be rational to think that they were.
But surely, although knowledge and belief are different, the difference is that knowledge is a kind of belief. If I know that the sky is blue, I must believe that the sky is blue; it does not make sense to suppose that I can know something without believing it. So if knowledge is simply a sub-category of belief, the two can certainly meet. I suppose you would say to that that God can be the object only of the kind of belief that isn't knowledge. I don't really see why. To return to the notion of religious experience, I'd say that if God were to choose to reveal himself to me in such a way that it would be impossible to doubt that the object of this theophany really was God, then I would as a result know that God exists - just as I can know that the sky is blue by looking at it. Whether God ever actually does this or not is not really to the point - the point is that, if he exists, he could do this if he so chose (being omnipotent), which means that conditions could exist under which we could know that God exists.
You will say that we don't know that God is omnipotent so we don't know if he could do that at all. But I say that if we define "God" to include the property of omnipotence, as most theists do, that means we know perfectly well that if God exists then he is omnipotent - because anything that isn't omnipotent isn't God, by definition, even if it exists. Moreover, even if you don't accept that, then if you still insist that we can't know what properties God has, you must agree that you don't know that he can't cause a person to have an undoubtedly veridical experience of him. In which case you must admit that it could be the case that conditions exist under which someone could know that God exists.
I'll agree that science and religion are both phenomena, but still, I can't see any meaningful way in which either of them can be called knowledge.
Slavery was certainly an issue well before the nineteenth century - Christians developed the idea that it was wrong in the early Middle Ages, which is why it had virtually disappeared from Europe by around 1000 CE. Of course it made a comeback later on, but that's another matter.
First, its completely crazy to say that beliefs are a form of knowledge. Knowledge is, among other things, a factive mental state. Beliefs are not factive mental states (if they were this would imply all manner of contradictions). So knowledge is not a form of belief.
Second, even if beliefs were a form of knowledge, science and religion are not beliefs, they are practices or phenomena, the practicers of which often have certain beliefs.
Ridiculous! Tim believes the Moon is made of green cheese. Does Tim have knowledge that the moon is made of green cheese? No, because the Moon is not made of green cheese. We do not say, "Tim knows the moon is made of green cheese"; we say, "Tim thinks the moon is made of green cheese." Knowledge might require belief, but beliefs themselves are not knowledge.Actually, beliefs are a form of knowledge;
That's not correct, all cultures have oral systems of passing around and debating knowledge. These systems while they may have spiritual/supernatural/religious components can not be adequately be described as a religion alone.there even was a time when religion was virtually the only form of knowledge available to man - apart from instinct, which isn't specifically human.
I'd describe science and religion as human institutions, organized systems of belief and practices.Coming back on an earlier comment, I'd agree that both religion and science can be activities, for the practitioners of these; it's just that that isn't the only possible definition of both.)
Ridiculous! Tim believes the Moon is made of green cheese. Does Tim have knowledge that the moon is made of green cheese? No, because the Moon is not made of green cheese. We do not say, "Tim knows the moon is made of green cheese"; we say, "Tim thinks the moon is made of green cheese." Knowledge might require belief, but beliefs themselves are not knowledge.
That's not correct, all cultures have oral systems of passing around and debating knowledge. These systems while they may have spiritual/supernatural/religious components can not be adequately be described as a religion alone.