timerover51
Deity
Snarkhunter said:Gudmondson's take on things is certainly interesting; I'm not quite sure how much of it (overall) I believe, especially his predictions of the future, but things do seem to be moving more or less in the direction he thought.I have all of the books that you mentioned, and worked with Bruce Gudmondson during the First Gulf War in 1991, when I was working for the Marine Corps as a consultant on various combat-related projects. Despite my disability, the Marines nearly put me back on active duty with them.The latest project I've tackled has been to try to figure out how many PzIII/IV the Germans could have had online in '41 had they not produced StuGs & gotten really serious about ramping up production, then figuring out a better ToE for the panzer divisions instead of splitting them in two, changing the GMT Barbarossa wargames to use 2 kampfgruppen instead of the pz/inf regiments, & seeing how much more/less effective the assault would have gone over the whole front. Entertaining, but I've gone as far as I can go without really detailed production stats which I can't seem to find online. Some, but not all.
kk
I have the data you need on production in my library. Let me see if I can did it out for you and let you have it. However, remember that the Pzkw III had about reached the end of its useful life given the limitations on upgunning, and I might have to look at ball bearing production too for the turret runners. Given the simpler hull with the fixed gun mounting, you could produce more assault guns with a given amount of materials and time than straight tanks. Something is jogging around in my memory that the trade off is 3 assault guns for 2 tanks, but I cannot remember where I read that. It might be in Guderian's Panzer Leader.
I had discovered an old book when I was at IU that had extremely complete production stats, including production of raw materials & even things like locomotives, etc. It had to have been compiled shortly after WWII. It was in German but at the time I could read German pretty well. I know I photocopied a lot of pages out of it; unaccountably they are missing all these years later. Just knowing the names of reference works would be a great help; I can always snoop the Library of Congress (assuming some rascal hasn't stolen what I want!) if I get motivated enough. Any info you can provide, I would appreciate.
The mark III still had one trick up its sleeve, the L60/50. Both mark III and IV had been designed from the get-go to allow for up-gunning & this seems to have been accomplished with little difficulty; e.g., the decision to upgun the IV came in August 41 & the first prototypes rolled out in March 42, IIRC. One of my assumptions is that the Germans could have reflected on the French tanks they encountered in 40 & made the same decision a year earlier, allowing for a couple of battalions worth of L42/75 armed IVs to arrive for Barbarossa. Hardly significant, but some extra punch for a couple of divisions that summer. The mark IIIs would still have a problem w/ T34s, even with the long gun, but they'd have a chance at close range & certainly from the side or rear. But considering how the Germans rolled through Russia in 41, they probably could have used cardboard cutouts & gone just as far
And I see that this has wandered pretty far afield from CivIII! Perhaps we should continue via private mail.
kk
The 50mm/L60 gun would have improved the Mark III verses the Russians to some extent, especially at close range with the tungsten-carbide cored arrowhead ammunition. The problem the Mark III would have had is surviving long enough to get within effective range. While the Mark IV had enough of a weight margin to allow both for upgunning and up-armoring, the Mark III did not. It could be up-gunned, but armor increases were pretty limited. The 50mm/L60 gun had penetration comparable to that of the US 75mm M3 gun on the Sherman, and the Russian 76mm gun on the T-34, but armor was not comparable.
One of the biggest reasons for the failure of Barbarossa was in the breakdown of the German logistic system, which no amount of tinkering with Panzer division TO&E would change. The Germans simply could not support logistically the campaign in Russia. You might want to track down a copy of the DA Pam put out by the Army covering the planning and operations of Barbarossa. I will edit this with the exact cite once I locate my copy.