Actually, such is explicitly forbidden by the ECB. For instance, the Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank) occasionally printed money to fill up slight budget deficits in the Dutch treasury until 1999.
No, they can't just print money to hand over to the state, or to buy state debt themselves. But they can still lend to banks, taking from them as collateral state bonds! Someone from Germany may be better informed, because there was some guy making a fuss about this there, but I think this is the way things go. This doesn't count as creating money, but as "guaranteeing liquidity in the financial system" which is an obligation of the central banks. The creation part would have been (technically) done by the bank's action of buying the new debt.
In practice this means that, so long as one bank is willing to cooperate with the state, the state can create unlimited debt ultimately backed by its central bank.
I don't think Greece is going to replicate Iceland once it exits and defaults. These are very different economies and societies. Iceland was wealthy and successful, something Greece in pre-Euro times never was. The Euro enabled Greece to enjoy a boom for some years (low cost of new debt being the primary reason), only to crash even faster over the past few years. Make no mistake. I've been saying for a long time (certainly longer than you) that Greece needs to get out because it has better prospects out of the Eurozone than in it. But there will be a lot of pain. I'm afraid that living standards in Greece will continue to fall for a while before they can rise again, with or without the Euro.
Well, Iceland's default and devaluation has not been any bed of roses either. Iceland, as Greece, was (is) heavily dependent on imports for many kinds of goods. It has little diversity by way of natural resources to export.
An exit by Greece will be hard. It's just that at least it'll allow the freedom for new policies aimed at a recovery, something that now seems totally blocked.
Yeah, but you can also vote for Syriza who want to have the Euro without austerity, by getting other nations to fund them perpetually.
I don't know what aims those people in Syriza have, but what I've been seeing from economists connected to other "left parties" in Europe is not quite that. They recognize that such a deal would be unsustainable, and they aim instead at creating conditions where the countries with "undervalued" currencies (those with current accountants surpluses) would leave the Euro, leaving the remaining countries in the Euro free to devalue it. Their rationale is that the costs of leaving the Euro are very big for countries having to devalue a national currency (bankruptcy of the whole financial sector, bank runs, likely some period of political anarchy with an uncertain outcome), but would be barely noticeable for those countries which left in order to revalue a national currency up (no bank runs, no immediate political fallout, etc).
This "the euro without austerity" is just a strategy to try to get a more "orderly" breakup of the Euro, not any serious attempt at avoiding it. The big unknown for them is in which side of the line will France choose to be in such a scenario. With Sarkozy's defeat they may be hoping that the "weak Euro" outcome can be achieved, with French aid. Or at least a two-way split, a "weak euro" and a "strong euro". But that, imho, is unrealistic.
I have no idea how they came up with these figures or checked their methodology, but if it is to be believed then the Eurozone is f*cked.
I absolutely don't believe it. Let's speak plainly:
the Euro project was a banker's project, for the benefit of the (continental, as the UK refused to get on board) european banks. It may have had also some political inspiration, but it was the big banks, the ones aiming at "internationalization", that quickly got on board and pushed it along. The "architecture" of the Euro as a strong currency was designed to serve their interests, enabling them to go on a buying spree around the world. They have so much as stake in it now (their continued existence, in many cases) that you can only expect such dire predictions - it's scaremongering.
Having said why I don't trust any guesses coming from the major banks, I must admit that - depending on how the Euro ends - there is a possibility for some big economic collapses, and they can last for a
few years if the political aspects get bad enough. But I'm guessing a rather quick recovery after a default, perhaps one-two years of confusion before a reorganization and quick recovery.