WW2: Why did the Allies attack Italy?

Knight-Dragon

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Since we've many WW2 buffs here (going by the quiz thread) and a lack of new topics...

Why did the Allies decide on attacking/occupying Italy? I mean; wasn't it like a waste of time and effort, for little purpose. The Allies weren't even like tying down large amounts of German personnel and equipment.

If it's to knock Italy out of the war, I would think that Italy was pretty much a non-contender by then in the war, and letting them stay might actually 'distract' the Germans.
 
I suppose though Italy wasn't much of a contender, in the hands of the German army, especially Von Manstein (please correct me if that isn't the commander of German forces) the Germans could hold solid. I think the FallschrimJager(paratroopers) and especially the GerbigsJager(mountain troops) were very tough. Also, Italy had helped Germany during the Africa campaign.
As well as that, I suppose it was morale purposes; Italy was an Axis; if the Allies couldn't knock out Italy, what would happen to Germany?
 
Italy was mainly a British conceived idea, the Americans were dead against the notion. The British felt that it would draw German troops into being spread out and in many conflicts, drawing them away from what eventually became the Normandy Invasion. The Americans disagreed and felt it was a waste of time and men suggesting that a stronger, earlier landing in Normandy to create the real second front was better. I'm not sure precisely how the British won that debate, but I suspect it has much to do with Russian pressure on the western allies to establish a foothold in Europe and draw troops away from the East as early as possible. I do know however that the disagreement between the allies on this point was considerable.

Knocking Italy out of the war though was in some degree worth it, it reduced the Axis naval strength in the Med, thereby allowing the allies to secure more their convoys and bases. Also the invasion and subsequent defection of Italy provided a moral victory for the allies, the first of the Axis powers to fall. If you like you could say that it was a propaganda coup for the allies, 1943 became the year in which the war turned in their favour, and Italy was part of the proof for that.
 
Hmm, I'm no expert on WW2, but I think it was becuase Stalin wanted the Allies to open a second front to take the heat off the Ruskies, and Churchill was very keen on invading the "soft underbelly" of Europe. It also diverted resources away from Normandy.

BTW noncon, Kesselring was the German commander in Italy.

Edit: Yeah, what hudson said.
 
I think the impetus arose finally arose out of circumstances. The fall of
Mussolini in July, the willingness of Sicily to surrender and Marshal Badoglio's
hints at the possibility of an armistice all offered the chance of Italy's
speedy elimination from the war and the drawing of German forces from
other theatres ;) .
 
I think that one of the main reasons for the the Americans was that air bases in northern Italy would put more strategic bombing targets within range, especially the Romainian oil fields. Being able to safely re-open the med to the allies would also free up a lot of shipping.
 
Indeed, it released pressure on both Malta and Gibraltar and the lifeline throught the Suez canal probably had an effect on the war in the Far East to some extent.
 
The way I've heard it, first the Allied landing in North Africa (Operation Torch) and later the invasion of Sicily and Italy came about because of British persuasion. The American idea would have been to hit the Axis/Germans were they were at their stronget, break them, and then roll over the remains, i.e. land in France/Western Europe and head straight for Berlin. The British, who had actually fought a long not always entirely successful war already, weren't too keen on something like that, since it would invariably produce a lot of new casualties.
Apart from that there were the Mediterranean interests of Britain other have pointed out. Going back into Greece after getting kicked out by the Germans must have felt nice for instance, and as a way of not letting down the Greek.:)
 
I don't think it was to secure the Med, as the victory inNorth Africa had already done that. Maybe they thought an invasion would steele the Italian population against the Germans and lead to a quick victory up the boot. Giving them good airbases and access to the Balkans. Churchill was wary of Stalin and probably knew what he had in mind for eastern Europe.
Maybe they were still practicing for D-Day and Sicily,Salerno and Anzio would be good test runs.
 
The Italian campaign was not very successful for the allies. Although superiror in many aspects they were not able to free Italy. Even in the last days of the war they were several hundred km away from the Alps. Genua for example was still German and Venice. German troops in Italy were not able to be used in other campaigns but this was only a minor effect in contrast to the allied troops unable to fight in France. So although retreating and the morale and propaganda victory for the allies the Italian campaign was a military defeat: Gaining ground for nearly nothing, unable to defeat the small German force defending (with some Italians), while loosing many men and the unability of using them in other more important places. The Allied goal was to crush the German forces, the German to stop or at least to slow the allied advance. The Germans achieved their objective, the allies not. The only real reason for that campaign was indeed Stalin.

Adler
 
Maybe they were still practicing for D-Day and Sicily,Salerno and Anzio would be good test runs.

Excellent point, if we remove the italian invasions the allies would have entered the Normandy assault with just the experience of the debacle at Dieppe under their belts and the virtually unopposed landings of Torch, in that respect they needed all the opportunities that the Italian invasion gave them. Also as has been said it permitted the allied air forces to strike at Balkan targets easier, another good point. Of course it's going to have been hard, defending a narrow country with natural defensive lines in it isn't exactly rocket science after all :p

Further the fact that it tied down smaller numbers of Germans is irrelevant in and of itself. The allies already had sufficient numerical superiority in Normandy to, what Italy did was draw valuable German troops away from the main landing areas. Often these troops would come from some of the best German formations such as Parachute troops and the HG panzer division in Scilly. Reducing the number of allied formations in Normandy didn't make (IMO) that much difference, reducing the number of elite German formations able to counter them quite clearly did. Costal units in Normandy took over the role of these formations and failed to perform as well. I see Italy as the linchpin in the British movement to draw vetran and normal divisions away from Normandy/France and into other areas such as the Balkans (where the germans diverted a number of divisions prior to d-day) through a mixture of brilliant deception and Invasion such as Italy.

Besides, Italy was a side show to the main event (don't wish to insult the bravery of the men there, hell my grandad was, but...) whatever the "failures" of the campaign stretching the already strained German resources further was also an important aim, not just to liberate Italy. If you want to make the objective purely military then fine, but even had the allies broken the Germans in Italy earlier, the result would not have mattered anywhere near as much as that of the Normandy landings. The allies had a bigger picture to concern themselves with, and whilst on one hand it was a defeat of sorts, on the other it did much of what they wanted it to do :)
 
Good point privatehudson, but in the Nromandy the allies could have suffered a big defeat- if Hitler was not the leader. The tank divisions could have got their marching orders much earlier to attack the allies even at the beach. This would have a dramatically shift of the power: While most allied tanks were still loaded on the ships the German counterstrike might have been successful to destroy the landing forces. But that´s another question for another thread. Nevertheless the Italian campaign was not successful for the allies.

Adler
 
Could of should have, bah :p I always wondered just what difference it might have made, for example much of the armour was east of the beaches and would have had to either take a big diversion or overwhelm the British Airborne troops at Pegasus for example.

Italy was a tactical defeat, but in the scale of grand strategy it was a sucess, it drew German forces away from the vital fronts, knocked Italy for six (propaganda and morale is important after all), gave valuble experience and opened new bombing routes whilst securing beyond a doubt the Med routes.

Further I would offer the point that even had the allies somehow taken Italy mostly in 1943 or 1944 then their ability to further persue the Germans would have been weaker anyway, to some degree, suceeding in the invasion of Italy might have been self defeating.
 
dgfred said:
I think the impetus arose finally arose out of circumstances. The fall of
Mussolini in July, the willingness of Sicily to surrender...

I am confused by this statement. The island of Sicily surrendered after Patton and Monty were done with it...

As has been mentioned previously, the Italian campaigns were definitely not a ringing military success. However, with slightly better planning and much better command in the early phases (Mark Clark was definitely NOT one of the better American commanders), the campaign could have gone much differently, leading to more German forces tied up in the area or even a third avenue for assault into Germany.
 
Klesselring, not von Manstein, was in command in Italy. The British did push hard for the Med stradegy, but the real reason for the invasion of Italy in 1943 was the simple fact that the allies were not strong enough in England to have a reasonable chance of a successful cross-channel invasion and they wanted to "appease" Stalin with a "second front" in 1943.
 
Why not Southern France? The Germans couldn't have turned too many units against them as they still had to keep Italy and Northern France strongly garrisoned. I'm not too sure of the topography of that part of Europe though.
 
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