Banastre Bloody Tarleton
Of all the British generals who fought in the War of the American Revolution none were more infamous in their day than Banastre Tarleton. By all accounts, British and American, he the most enduring, the most dashing, the most relentless, and on the whole the most aggressive of British leaders, and for all these reasons he was the one most feared and hated by rebels. The notorious Tarleton, who had already proved himself to be an aggressive, ruthless, and decisive cavalry leader, was known for his eagerness for battle, his quick decision in action, and his skill and energy. However, it was his viciousness and fierceness that earned him the name of Bloody Banny .
Tarleton was one of the first men, if not the first, to grasp the doctrines of mobile warfare that became prevalent in the 20th century. He combined light and agile infantry with fast-striking cavalry in order to mass his forces rapidly, introducing an approach to warfare more modern that that of his contemporaries, embracing H. Lloyds offensive doctrine: No army conquers merely by resisting: you may repel an enemy; but victory is the result of action. In the difficult country of the Carolinas, with poor roads, frequent swamps or pine-barrens, and scant forage, he could move far more rapidly than the regular army, and his blows were delivered with sudden and crushing effect. The ability obtain information ahead of his army, the speed his army could march, and the rapidity and determination in which he pursued his opponents, reflects his ability as an reliable leader. His self-reliance and low material strength, led him to resort to night marches, ruses, surprises, and stratagems of all types to dumbfound his opponents. His hard-hitting and relentless tactics were so effective that Cornwallis wrote: "I wish you would get three legions, and divide yourself into three parts: We can do no good without you."
His British Legion, popularly known as the "Green Horse" or "Tarletons Legion," was an extremely mobile military formation. It was a complete striking force of combined arms units built around cavalry. By merging the mobility of the cavalry with the more concentrated firepower of light infantry, Tarleton created a mobile rapid deployment. Their value tended to be far beyond their small size. They were light, elite, agile men, organized and equipped to maintain constant contact with the enemy, and track him down. Tarleton took his responsibilities seriously, drilling the Legion until it was one of the most effective mounted units in the army. Their prominence came in superior training and discipline, which presented combined rapid marching, as well as ferocity in battle. Tarleton's Legion promptly saw action all across the southern colonies, and was in fact the mobile extension of the British army, serving as spearhead in every attack, the rearguard in every retreat, and throughout the campaign the eyes and ears of Cornwallis himself.
Given the task of chasing down rebel bands, Tarleton quickly harried and demoralized patriot resistance; relentlessly chasing after and cutting down the fleeing militia units. In order to subdue the Patriot resistance, he rightly decided that his only hope lay in keeping his small force mobile and compact moving fast and hard-hitting. When battling the elusive partisans of Thomas Sumter and Francis Marion, Tarleton adapted to the American terrain and tactics, and modified his force to move faster than its opponents could run, marching up to 70 miles a day, often catching the guerillas in their camps. His effective lighting fast tactics, which the American defenders soon learned to recognize, was quick movement, relentless pacing, and hard-hitting.
The rebel forces were always superior in number, yet almost without exception they were defeated whenever Tarleton managed to catch up with them. Indeed his fierce fighting reputation was such that only Continental regulars would face him in the open field, and whole regiments of militia often fled at the mere mention of his name. His mobility of force (he deployed his men as mounted infantry) and superior tactics won him a number of battles.There were brilliant little affairs like Tarleton's victory over Sumter at Catawba Ford, when a charge by less than 200 Legion dragoons, (outnumbered again, this time four to one) routed Sumter's whole force so effectively it was thought they would never assemble again; and the smart action at Waxhaw on the border of the two Carolinas, where Tarleton's Legion after a march of 105 miles in 54 hours fell upon and destroyed a Virginian force under Buford which considerably out-numbered themselves.
Such victories gave Tarleton confidence they would soon control the entire South, which Loyalists would flock to their cause. However, his achievements, gave the British a false sense of victory. He didn't count on so much opposition in the backcountry. While conducting long raids to right and left against guerilla, he set about trying to tame the rebellious backcountry through punitive, often brutal, action. He put farms and villages to the torch, ordered crops to be destroyed and livestock slaughtered, destroying supplies that might be useful to the rebel forces and discourage rebels from fighting. One can compare this destruction to Sherman's March. Tarleton succeeded in large measure because, better than any other British general, he fully grasped the essence of psychological warfare and could enact his own deep-rooted rage with ruthless clarity. It is true he practiced total war -- burning houses, destroying crops, the end justifying the means -- when the European ideal was limited war confined to a field of battle. But what Tarleton failed to recognize was that terror does not necessarily crush rebellion.
His seemingly effective tactics worked against him when, on more than one occasion, his Legion attacked and slaughtered natives who turned out to be Loyalist supporters. This was no way to keep friends, but neither Tarleton nor Cornwallis seemed to grasp that some diplomacy was necessary to make the best use of the many Loyalists scattered throughout the Carolinas. The raids were generally considered a success, although they did nothing but galvanize more men to the patriot cause. Soon afterwards, Tarleton's Quarter became a rallying cry for patriots throughout the south, who would use it more than once to justify some of their own butchery in the chaos.
In the end however, it was his eagerness for battle, and his impulsiveness that led him to be defeated at Cowpens. Tarletons weakness lay in his arrogance The reckless Tarleton attacked too boldly, and therefore, was cut to pieces by Morgan, who anticipated Tarletons tactics, and cleverly laid a trap for him. In less than an hour, Tarleton's 1,076 men suffered 110 killed, and 712 captured, nearly 90% of the British force killed or captured. With a slight numerical superiority, a 100% superiority in artillery, a leavening of good experienced troops, a set piece engagement on open terrain should have resulted in at least a tactical victory for "Butcher" Tarleton. Properly handled, his troops should have won. But the cavalryman was too impetuous to wait and prepare a victory. Cornwallis had lost not only Tarleton's legion and his light troops, but also the eyes and ears of his army, limiting the speed of reaction for the rest of his campaign.
Of all the British generals who fought in the War of the American Revolution none were more infamous in their day than Banastre Tarleton. By all accounts, British and American, he the most enduring, the most dashing, the most relentless, and on the whole the most aggressive of British leaders, and for all these reasons he was the one most feared and hated by rebels. The notorious Tarleton, who had already proved himself to be an aggressive, ruthless, and decisive cavalry leader, was known for his eagerness for battle, his quick decision in action, and his skill and energy. However, it was his viciousness and fierceness that earned him the name of Bloody Banny .
Tarleton was one of the first men, if not the first, to grasp the doctrines of mobile warfare that became prevalent in the 20th century. He combined light and agile infantry with fast-striking cavalry in order to mass his forces rapidly, introducing an approach to warfare more modern that that of his contemporaries, embracing H. Lloyds offensive doctrine: No army conquers merely by resisting: you may repel an enemy; but victory is the result of action. In the difficult country of the Carolinas, with poor roads, frequent swamps or pine-barrens, and scant forage, he could move far more rapidly than the regular army, and his blows were delivered with sudden and crushing effect. The ability obtain information ahead of his army, the speed his army could march, and the rapidity and determination in which he pursued his opponents, reflects his ability as an reliable leader. His self-reliance and low material strength, led him to resort to night marches, ruses, surprises, and stratagems of all types to dumbfound his opponents. His hard-hitting and relentless tactics were so effective that Cornwallis wrote: "I wish you would get three legions, and divide yourself into three parts: We can do no good without you."
His British Legion, popularly known as the "Green Horse" or "Tarletons Legion," was an extremely mobile military formation. It was a complete striking force of combined arms units built around cavalry. By merging the mobility of the cavalry with the more concentrated firepower of light infantry, Tarleton created a mobile rapid deployment. Their value tended to be far beyond their small size. They were light, elite, agile men, organized and equipped to maintain constant contact with the enemy, and track him down. Tarleton took his responsibilities seriously, drilling the Legion until it was one of the most effective mounted units in the army. Their prominence came in superior training and discipline, which presented combined rapid marching, as well as ferocity in battle. Tarleton's Legion promptly saw action all across the southern colonies, and was in fact the mobile extension of the British army, serving as spearhead in every attack, the rearguard in every retreat, and throughout the campaign the eyes and ears of Cornwallis himself.
Given the task of chasing down rebel bands, Tarleton quickly harried and demoralized patriot resistance; relentlessly chasing after and cutting down the fleeing militia units. In order to subdue the Patriot resistance, he rightly decided that his only hope lay in keeping his small force mobile and compact moving fast and hard-hitting. When battling the elusive partisans of Thomas Sumter and Francis Marion, Tarleton adapted to the American terrain and tactics, and modified his force to move faster than its opponents could run, marching up to 70 miles a day, often catching the guerillas in their camps. His effective lighting fast tactics, which the American defenders soon learned to recognize, was quick movement, relentless pacing, and hard-hitting.
The rebel forces were always superior in number, yet almost without exception they were defeated whenever Tarleton managed to catch up with them. Indeed his fierce fighting reputation was such that only Continental regulars would face him in the open field, and whole regiments of militia often fled at the mere mention of his name. His mobility of force (he deployed his men as mounted infantry) and superior tactics won him a number of battles.There were brilliant little affairs like Tarleton's victory over Sumter at Catawba Ford, when a charge by less than 200 Legion dragoons, (outnumbered again, this time four to one) routed Sumter's whole force so effectively it was thought they would never assemble again; and the smart action at Waxhaw on the border of the two Carolinas, where Tarleton's Legion after a march of 105 miles in 54 hours fell upon and destroyed a Virginian force under Buford which considerably out-numbered themselves.
Such victories gave Tarleton confidence they would soon control the entire South, which Loyalists would flock to their cause. However, his achievements, gave the British a false sense of victory. He didn't count on so much opposition in the backcountry. While conducting long raids to right and left against guerilla, he set about trying to tame the rebellious backcountry through punitive, often brutal, action. He put farms and villages to the torch, ordered crops to be destroyed and livestock slaughtered, destroying supplies that might be useful to the rebel forces and discourage rebels from fighting. One can compare this destruction to Sherman's March. Tarleton succeeded in large measure because, better than any other British general, he fully grasped the essence of psychological warfare and could enact his own deep-rooted rage with ruthless clarity. It is true he practiced total war -- burning houses, destroying crops, the end justifying the means -- when the European ideal was limited war confined to a field of battle. But what Tarleton failed to recognize was that terror does not necessarily crush rebellion.
His seemingly effective tactics worked against him when, on more than one occasion, his Legion attacked and slaughtered natives who turned out to be Loyalist supporters. This was no way to keep friends, but neither Tarleton nor Cornwallis seemed to grasp that some diplomacy was necessary to make the best use of the many Loyalists scattered throughout the Carolinas. The raids were generally considered a success, although they did nothing but galvanize more men to the patriot cause. Soon afterwards, Tarleton's Quarter became a rallying cry for patriots throughout the south, who would use it more than once to justify some of their own butchery in the chaos.
In the end however, it was his eagerness for battle, and his impulsiveness that led him to be defeated at Cowpens. Tarletons weakness lay in his arrogance The reckless Tarleton attacked too boldly, and therefore, was cut to pieces by Morgan, who anticipated Tarletons tactics, and cleverly laid a trap for him. In less than an hour, Tarleton's 1,076 men suffered 110 killed, and 712 captured, nearly 90% of the British force killed or captured. With a slight numerical superiority, a 100% superiority in artillery, a leavening of good experienced troops, a set piece engagement on open terrain should have resulted in at least a tactical victory for "Butcher" Tarleton. Properly handled, his troops should have won. But the cavalryman was too impetuous to wait and prepare a victory. Cornwallis had lost not only Tarleton's legion and his light troops, but also the eyes and ears of his army, limiting the speed of reaction for the rest of his campaign.
