The American Cannae
Daniel Morgan was a frontiersman, a teamster by trade, known for his brawling, experienced at fighting Indians, and something of a genius at leading men in battle. He led one of the finest band of sharp-shooters ever to grace this earth. The British called them the widowmakers. His riflemen could strike massed troops moving across open ground with deadly accuracy. At Saratoga, Morgan made his reputation in employing troops armed with rifles to defeat the British on the battlefield using firepower exclusively. While the use of rifles was certainly known to the British and their German allies, they restricted their rifle units to the skirmishing role. Morgan cleverly combined the mass employment of rifles with obstructed terrain to eliminate the use of the bayonet and put the smoothbore musket at a disadvantage. His notorious men shot and killed British officers even though it was an 18th Century breech of etiquette. As such, he demonstrated great ability in guerilla warfare, and showed himself to be a devoted and able officer.
Morgan not only led soldiers into battle, he drew up battle tactics. In the bitterly contested war in the Southern States, Greene gave Morgan's command of about 700 men the job of foraging and enemy harassment in the backcountry of South Carolina, with instructions to "give protection ... and spirit up the people and avoiding any direct battle. From a vantage point well inland from the Southern Department's main body, Morgan could slip behind Cornwallis, rally militiamen, and begin offensive operations against British supply trains and bases. When this strategy became apparent, the British General Cornwallis sent Colonel Banastre Tarleton's British Legion to track him down. Morgan talked with many of the militia who had fought Tarleton before, and decided to disobey his orders, and pulled off a battle of annihilation at Cowpens, a tactical masterpiece of the Revolution.
The Cowpens may be one of the most important battles ever fought on American soil from the standpoint of the tactical lessons one can learn from it. In addition, it served as the turning point of the entire war. Moreover, it contained the tactical masterpiece of the entire warMorgan's unique and ingenious deployment of troops. He had an uncanny understanding of the psychology of soldiers and a firm grasp of tactical principles. Morgan's battlefield plan and his sub commander's (particularly William Washington and John Howard's) performances are correctly studies in leadership and execution. Morgan knew his men and his opponent, knew how they would react in certain situations, and used this knowledge and the terrain to his advantage. Using a unique deployment of troops, Morgan planned a tactical masterpiece that made use of all his troops' strengths and used some of their weaknesses (in the case of the militia, whom George Washington considered a broken reed) to his advantage. Morgans unorthodox strategy, as well as his clear perception of the capabilities of militia and regulars, were the defining factors ensuring his clear victory. His strategy was simple, but effective.
To begin with, the location of his forces were contrary to any existing military doctrine, for he placed his army between the Broad and Pacolet River, thus making escape impossible if the army were routed. His reason for cutting off escape were obvious; to ensure that the untrained militiamen would not, as they had been accustomed to do, turn in flight at the first hint of battle and abandon the regulars. Selecting a hill as the center of his position, he placed his Continental infantry on it, deliberately leaving his flanks exposed to his opponent.. Morgan reasoned that Tarleton would attack him head on and he made his tactical preparations accordingly.
Well out in front of the main line he posted militiamen in two lines, instructing the first line to fire two volleys and then fall back on the second, the combined line to fire until the British pressed them, then to fall back to the rear of the Continentals and re-form as a reserve. He would use these lines as a series of buffers that would slow down and then finally stop and throw back the British. The movement of the militia in the second line would unmask the third line to the British. Howards men would not be unnerved by the militias expected move, and unlike the militia they would be able to stand and hold, especially since the first and second lines, Morgan felt, would have inflicted both physical and psychological attrition on the advancing British before the third line came into action.
Behind the hill he placed Lt. Col. William Washington's cavalry detachment, hidden and ready to charge the attacking enemy at the critical moment. He also informed them in precise detail what he expected of them. Every man in the ranks was informed of the plan of battle and the part he was expected to play in it. The unique quality of Morgans leadership was much in evidence during those dark morning hours.
On finding Morgan, Tarleton ordered an immediate attack, without rest nor breakfast for his men. Tarletons plan was simple and direct. Most of his infantry (including that of the Legion) would be assembled in linear formation and move directly upon Morgan. The right and left flanks of this line would be protected by dragoon units. In reserve he would hold his 250-man battalion of Scottish Highlanders (71st Regiment of Foot), commanded by Major Arthur MacArthur, a professional soldier of long experience who had served in the Dutch Scotch Brigade. They would be used, if needed, to provide the "coup de grace." Finally, Tarleton kept the 250-man cavalry contingent of his Legion ready to be unleashed when the Americans broke and ran.
His men moved forward in regular formation, were momentarily checked by the militia rifles, but, continued to advance sensing victory. The British drove in successive lines, anticipating victory only to encounter another, stronger line after exerting themselves and suffering casualties. The dept of the American lines soaked up the shock of the British advance. Taking the withdrawal of the first two lines as a full blown retreat, and sensing victory, they broke ranks, rushing headlong into the awaiting final line of disciplined regulars, who wavered, then held on the hill. When the British advanced was finally halted by the Continentals, the American cavalry struck them on the right flank and rear, while the militia, having re-formed, charged out from behind the hill to hit the British left.
The shock of the sudden charge, coupled with the reappearance of the American militiamen on the flanks where Tarleton's exhausted men expected to see their own cavalry, proved too much. Tarleton, realizing the desperate seriousness of what was occurring, rode back to his one remaining unit, the Legion cavalry. What he needed was a headlong charge from them in order to break open the American envelopment. He was unable to rally them, and most of the Legion horsemen turned and disappeared back down the Mill River Road in retreat. Tarleton with a few remaining horsemen rode back into the fight, but after clashing with Washingtons men, he too retreated from the field. Trapped in the pocket, the British began to surrender. Caught in a clever double envelopment, the British surrendered after suffering heavy losses. Morgan had carried the day with his astute military tactics and bold leadership.
During the war, American arms had never exceeded this level of tactical performance. Cowpens, in its part in the Revolution, was a surprising victory and a turning point that changed the psychology of the entire war "spiriting up the people", not just those of the backcountry Carolinas, but those in all the colonies. Tarleton barely managed to escape with only a small force of cavalry he had held in reserve. It was on a small scale, and with certain significant differences, a repeat of the classic double envelopment of the Romans by a Carthaginian army under Hannibal at Cannae, an event of which Morgan probably had not the foggiest notion. This defeat was so total because of the Masterful plan and seamless execution by General Morgan. Its resultsthe destruction of an important part of the British army in the southwere incalculable toward ending the war. This battle set in motion a series of events leading to eventual Patriot victory at Yorktown.
Daniel Morgan was a frontiersman, a teamster by trade, known for his brawling, experienced at fighting Indians, and something of a genius at leading men in battle. He led one of the finest band of sharp-shooters ever to grace this earth. The British called them the widowmakers. His riflemen could strike massed troops moving across open ground with deadly accuracy. At Saratoga, Morgan made his reputation in employing troops armed with rifles to defeat the British on the battlefield using firepower exclusively. While the use of rifles was certainly known to the British and their German allies, they restricted their rifle units to the skirmishing role. Morgan cleverly combined the mass employment of rifles with obstructed terrain to eliminate the use of the bayonet and put the smoothbore musket at a disadvantage. His notorious men shot and killed British officers even though it was an 18th Century breech of etiquette. As such, he demonstrated great ability in guerilla warfare, and showed himself to be a devoted and able officer.
Morgan not only led soldiers into battle, he drew up battle tactics. In the bitterly contested war in the Southern States, Greene gave Morgan's command of about 700 men the job of foraging and enemy harassment in the backcountry of South Carolina, with instructions to "give protection ... and spirit up the people and avoiding any direct battle. From a vantage point well inland from the Southern Department's main body, Morgan could slip behind Cornwallis, rally militiamen, and begin offensive operations against British supply trains and bases. When this strategy became apparent, the British General Cornwallis sent Colonel Banastre Tarleton's British Legion to track him down. Morgan talked with many of the militia who had fought Tarleton before, and decided to disobey his orders, and pulled off a battle of annihilation at Cowpens, a tactical masterpiece of the Revolution.
The Cowpens may be one of the most important battles ever fought on American soil from the standpoint of the tactical lessons one can learn from it. In addition, it served as the turning point of the entire war. Moreover, it contained the tactical masterpiece of the entire warMorgan's unique and ingenious deployment of troops. He had an uncanny understanding of the psychology of soldiers and a firm grasp of tactical principles. Morgan's battlefield plan and his sub commander's (particularly William Washington and John Howard's) performances are correctly studies in leadership and execution. Morgan knew his men and his opponent, knew how they would react in certain situations, and used this knowledge and the terrain to his advantage. Using a unique deployment of troops, Morgan planned a tactical masterpiece that made use of all his troops' strengths and used some of their weaknesses (in the case of the militia, whom George Washington considered a broken reed) to his advantage. Morgans unorthodox strategy, as well as his clear perception of the capabilities of militia and regulars, were the defining factors ensuring his clear victory. His strategy was simple, but effective.
To begin with, the location of his forces were contrary to any existing military doctrine, for he placed his army between the Broad and Pacolet River, thus making escape impossible if the army were routed. His reason for cutting off escape were obvious; to ensure that the untrained militiamen would not, as they had been accustomed to do, turn in flight at the first hint of battle and abandon the regulars. Selecting a hill as the center of his position, he placed his Continental infantry on it, deliberately leaving his flanks exposed to his opponent.. Morgan reasoned that Tarleton would attack him head on and he made his tactical preparations accordingly.
Well out in front of the main line he posted militiamen in two lines, instructing the first line to fire two volleys and then fall back on the second, the combined line to fire until the British pressed them, then to fall back to the rear of the Continentals and re-form as a reserve. He would use these lines as a series of buffers that would slow down and then finally stop and throw back the British. The movement of the militia in the second line would unmask the third line to the British. Howards men would not be unnerved by the militias expected move, and unlike the militia they would be able to stand and hold, especially since the first and second lines, Morgan felt, would have inflicted both physical and psychological attrition on the advancing British before the third line came into action.
Behind the hill he placed Lt. Col. William Washington's cavalry detachment, hidden and ready to charge the attacking enemy at the critical moment. He also informed them in precise detail what he expected of them. Every man in the ranks was informed of the plan of battle and the part he was expected to play in it. The unique quality of Morgans leadership was much in evidence during those dark morning hours.
On finding Morgan, Tarleton ordered an immediate attack, without rest nor breakfast for his men. Tarletons plan was simple and direct. Most of his infantry (including that of the Legion) would be assembled in linear formation and move directly upon Morgan. The right and left flanks of this line would be protected by dragoon units. In reserve he would hold his 250-man battalion of Scottish Highlanders (71st Regiment of Foot), commanded by Major Arthur MacArthur, a professional soldier of long experience who had served in the Dutch Scotch Brigade. They would be used, if needed, to provide the "coup de grace." Finally, Tarleton kept the 250-man cavalry contingent of his Legion ready to be unleashed when the Americans broke and ran.
His men moved forward in regular formation, were momentarily checked by the militia rifles, but, continued to advance sensing victory. The British drove in successive lines, anticipating victory only to encounter another, stronger line after exerting themselves and suffering casualties. The dept of the American lines soaked up the shock of the British advance. Taking the withdrawal of the first two lines as a full blown retreat, and sensing victory, they broke ranks, rushing headlong into the awaiting final line of disciplined regulars, who wavered, then held on the hill. When the British advanced was finally halted by the Continentals, the American cavalry struck them on the right flank and rear, while the militia, having re-formed, charged out from behind the hill to hit the British left.
The shock of the sudden charge, coupled with the reappearance of the American militiamen on the flanks where Tarleton's exhausted men expected to see their own cavalry, proved too much. Tarleton, realizing the desperate seriousness of what was occurring, rode back to his one remaining unit, the Legion cavalry. What he needed was a headlong charge from them in order to break open the American envelopment. He was unable to rally them, and most of the Legion horsemen turned and disappeared back down the Mill River Road in retreat. Tarleton with a few remaining horsemen rode back into the fight, but after clashing with Washingtons men, he too retreated from the field. Trapped in the pocket, the British began to surrender. Caught in a clever double envelopment, the British surrendered after suffering heavy losses. Morgan had carried the day with his astute military tactics and bold leadership.
During the war, American arms had never exceeded this level of tactical performance. Cowpens, in its part in the Revolution, was a surprising victory and a turning point that changed the psychology of the entire war "spiriting up the people", not just those of the backcountry Carolinas, but those in all the colonies. Tarleton barely managed to escape with only a small force of cavalry he had held in reserve. It was on a small scale, and with certain significant differences, a repeat of the classic double envelopment of the Romans by a Carthaginian army under Hannibal at Cannae, an event of which Morgan probably had not the foggiest notion. This defeat was so total because of the Masterful plan and seamless execution by General Morgan. Its resultsthe destruction of an important part of the British army in the southwere incalculable toward ending the war. This battle set in motion a series of events leading to eventual Patriot victory at Yorktown.
