Nathaniel Greene Was George Washington's most trusted general and the most dreaded foe the British would face in the war. His Southern campaign is considered one of the best examples of strategy. Greene was an overlooked, but absolutely key leader, who was given the difficult task of preventing the British from winning the South, and emerged as a first-rate strategist. The Southern Campaign began with British defeat at Saratoga, foreign intervention, and over-all failure to bring the rebels to heel persuaded British military strategists to turn their attention to the South. By the summer of 1780, British control of South Carolina seemed assured, especially after Cornwallis' crushing defeat of American forces at Camden in August, 1780.
Cornwallis
The army had already had three commanders, whose failures had left the South in a weak and uncertain state. Greene and his men would face the most able of the British generals, General Charles Earl Cornwallis. His large and well-trained army was a daunting challenge to Greene's small, inexperienced, and poorly supplied Continental forces. At that time, 1780-82, when there was no hope for the rebels- Greene had only his wits, and humility (he had to accept that he would win no Great Victories) to guide him. As it turned out, he was the man for the job.
When Greene arrived, he controlled an army that was outnumbered, ill equipped and demoralized. Morale was low, supply lines poor and discipline almost nonexistent. He was to take this army in a region that was to be a logistical nightmare. His first objective was to attend to the dire logistical imperatives that overshadowed his operational plans. Greene knew that he could count on these men and several others to make the right the decisions, but the task of swift reorganization and replenishment of supplies still needed to be done. He thus began building up his forces and endeavoring to have a workable army. Commanding an army ragged with lack of supplies, Greene had first-hand knowledge of problems inherited in swift reorganization and replenishment of supplies. He reorganized the department, found supplies for the army, and rendered fine service in this capacity. Once he pulled together the scattered and demoralized troops, he began putting his plans into place.
Greene's southern campaign, foreshadowed the guerrilla wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, creating the possibility of a strategic interplay of forces. He recognized that partisan-guerillas, if supported by regulars, could inflict considerable damage. He began coordinating his efforts with local patriots such as Francis Marion, Andrew Pickens, Thomas Sumter, and Elijah Clarke in petite guerre (partisan operations) against the British. These small guerilla bands would harass the enemy supply lines, gather supplies, and keep Greene well informed of Cornwallis' whereabouts, and with his main contingent of regulars, he would attack the larger garrisons throughout the Carolinas and Georgia. Without the irregulars, Greenes main army would have been overwhelmed. The guerrillas themselves, without the main army, would have been hunted down and eliminated one by one. Knowing that as long as his main body remained intact, the British could never disperse to deal with the irregulars.
Instead of directly confronting Cornwallis, Greene decided to play Fabius to Cornwallis' Hannibal. He would play cat and mouse with Cornwallis and avoid major battles. Greenes overall objective was making the main army had to remain intact, and from the start he knew that it was better to lose the battle then to not rise and fight again. So instead of directly confronting the British, he would avoid a major engagement with the British and harass them until he had the advantage and could go on the offensive. It was because of this, he was able to snatch the strategic initiative from Cornwallis and caused him to defer his real objective --the elimination of Greene's army. In doing so, he would defy conventional wisdom.
Taking on a bold strategy, he divided his own troops against Cornwallis' superior forces. He departed his trustful subordinate, Daniel Morgan, to the western part of South Carolina to harass the British outposts and bolster local support, while Greene himself headed to the north-central section of South Carolina to aid any guerrilla activity and give him time to restore his armys strength. Green's strategy was to divide his forces and hope that Cornwallis would to do the same. Greene knew that such a move would have grave consequences for the British, forcing the British to divide as well, greatly reducing their strength and placing them at a severe risk.
Morgan
Cornwallis, who was just preparing to march into North Carolina again, now found himself in a position of danger, for he was between two hostile forces. The British reacted to Greenes strategy as he anticipated, by dividing their own forces as well, putting them within narrower bounds. Cornwallis decided to divide his army, and dispatched his cavalry commander, Colonel Tarleton, with about 1100 men to take care of Morgan, after which the reunited British army could go after Greene. Events did not fall out as Cornwallis expected, for Tarleton was so soundly defeated at the Battle of Cowpens (January 17, 1781) that he lost almost all of His Majesty's light troops.
Frantic to get his regiments back, Cornwallis burned his army's baggage, in effect turning all his remaining men into light troops, and made ready for a sprint after Morgan. The news that Cornwallis had burned his stores and was setting off in hot pursuit intrigued Greene, and he saw how to take advantage of the situation. For Nathaniel Greene, three months of preparation were over; now it was time for action. Thus began one of the most remarkable military movements on record, the "race to the Dan."
The "Race to the Dan" exemplified the superior mobility of the American Army. In a months time, the Americans marched two hundred miles to North Carolina eluding the pursuing British in harsh weather. He then led his men in a retreat that forced Cornwallis to follow the Continental army far away from the British supply base in Charleston. It also exemplified Greenes superior use of local geography and contingency planning. In this feat, Greene succeeded in escaping the British Army and forced them to overextend their supply lines in one move.
Praise came from both sides. "Bloody" Tarleton later recounted: "Every measure of the Americans during the march from Catawba to Virginia was judiciously designed and vigorously executed." (Aaron) Otho Williams 10 years later corresponded with Light-Horse Harry Lee: "The retreat of the southern army to the Dan River, though now forgotten, was, in my estimation, one of the most masterly and fortunate maneuvers of our beloved Greene." Cornwallis chase was futile and logistically and tactically lacking, but it taught Cornwallis a lesson which he recounted himself: "Greene is more dangerous than Washington. I never feel secure when encamped in his neighborhood."
The route across North Carolina was threaded with rivers and creeks, mostly running southeast and all flooded after weeks of steady rain. General Cornwallis immediately began a pursuit in hopes of catching Greene and bringing about the major engagement that he desired and for which Greene was as yet ill-prepared. In his attempt to catch up with Greene, General Cornwallis burned his baggage train and overextended his supply lines. His army was strung out for miles as Cornwallis did not wait for the slower elements to keep up. The effort was in vain, however, because Greene had prepared for crossing the swollen Dan River by having boats ready to move his army across.
Greene's generalship and judgment were again conspicuously illustrated in the next few weeks, goaded Cornwallis, eager to bring about another major engagement, to march north to Virginia luring him into a false position. Greene's reasons for this move were given to Washington in a letter on 29 March, as follows : "I am determined to carry the war immediately into South Carolina. The enemy will be obliged to follow us, or give up the posts in that state." Greene's plan was based on practical West Point doctrine- when faced with overwhelming odds, withdraw into your interior lines and consolidate your forces; make your enemy extend his supply lines; then fight him on ground of your own choosing.
He began a retreat, drawing the British farther into enemy territory and stretching their supply lines to the limit. He knew the routes, the fords, already had the boats lined up--when the time was right, Greene might even be able to turn and fight Cornwallis on favorable ground. Colonel Carrington, his quartermaster, was dispatched to survey the terrain with a particular eye to mapping out possible routes of retreat. Another aide, the Polish volunteer Thaddaus Kosuisko, took on the task of locating fords and building boats. While making careful points to concentrate his army, he maneuvered on favorable terrain, using local geography and contingency planning, placing his emphasis on lines of maneuver, awareness of terrain and possession of strategic strongpoint. Greene planned the campaign well, for the march filled the need to gain the local militias along the way, and it combined nicely with his previous order to the new Quartermaster to explore and map the Dan River and gather boats for transport.
Because the many broad, deep and swift rivers in the area often determined the movements of troops on both sides. Greene strategy also included keeping rivers and streams between his army and the enemy. It was the season to the year when the rivers and streams could rise rapidly and these conditions Greene watched with unusual care. Greene's foresight in providing for the construction and transport in wagons of flatboats from one river to another, proved to be of the utmost importance in his campaign. There were no bridges and many of the fords were unfordable, but here Greene's foresight in arranging for boats paid off; Americans were often treading the high ground while their enemies were still floundering in the swells. By practicing every expedient his fertile mind could devise, he succeeded in getting across the River, without loss of a single man
The two forces finally met at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina on March 15, 1781. Greene deployed his men into smaller groups to take advantage of the terrain. After the battle (which was a strategic success for the Americans), Greene ordered the Continental Army to retreat. Although Cornwallis claimed victory, he had sustained heavy losses...a fourth of his army and nearly a third of his officers. Greene, his army still intact, immediately turned his face southward, leaving Cornwallis to limp his way to Yorktown.
His strategy of rapid movement and constant pressure wore out Cornwalliss army. Cornwallis, who had been close upon his heels for more than 200 miles, finding his troops fatigued and dispirited by their fruitless march, and just having fought a costly battle, began limping to Virginia and Yorktown, leaving Greene to pick off one by one his isolated posts in South Carolina, and generally captured or broke them up. The British found themselves unable with their diminishing force to man these garrisons beyond Charleston; and began a embarrassing retreat, leaving the countryside in American hands. Greene was hailed as the deliverer of that section.
Though rather indecisive, Greene slightly loss this battle, yet still won his strategic objective. The Battle of Guilford Courthouse was an extremely significant battle, for not only did it force Cornwallis to abandon the south with no real hope of ever reestablishing any real chain of British posts, it also effected the circumstances to the north. It is doubtful that if Greene had lost, Washington would have risked victory or defeat at Yorktown, and John Adams even wrote that this battle was just as important as the British surrender at Yorktown.
After this battle, Greene resumed his campaign. His ingenious tactics continued to sap the British of their strength and resolve even as they "won" nearly every battle. For the rest of the duration, he nibbled away at the British army; avoided destruction of his own force while dividing, eluding and tiring his opponent by long marches and constant harassment. He kept the enemy off balance in a two-year campaign of hit-and-run attacks and a few pitched battles, which drained the British of irreplaceable manpower; yet he always managed to withdraw in time to fight another day. His lack of success in winning a battle is best summed up in his own words, "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." There has never been a general in history, not even Washington, which never won a battle in his entire career, and yet inflicted so much damage to his opponents. Historians often point to Greene's long-term strategy of as crucial to final victory of the Revolution.
By the time Cornwallis finally gave up and headed into Yorktown, Greene had reclaimed Georgia, South and North Carolinaeffectively negating all the earlier British conquestswithout winning a single battle. A major factor in his success was an outstanding group of subordinates including: He was greatly assisted by able subordinates, including the Polish engineer, Tadeusz Kosciusko, the brilliant cavalry captains, Henry "Light-Horse Harry" Lee and William Washington, the ingenious field commander Daniel Morgan, and the partisan leaders, Andrew Pickens and Francis Marion.
Greene's Southern campaign showed remarkable strategic features that remind one of those of Turenne, the commander whom he had taken as his model in his studies before the war. His strategic skill is considered ingenious by many, and thereafter brought the war in the South to a successful end. Freeing the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia from the major forces of the British army, he was able to accomplish this with an inefficient and poorly equipped army, reveals that a moral as well as a military victory was on his side. This, combined with his strategic wisdom, and logistic and organizational accuracy, may perhaps be considered the salient points of Greene's genius for war.
