wildWolverine
L'Etat, c'est moi
Neville Chamberlain: Naive, appeasing fool, or ruthless, calculating strategist?
Introduction:
For the last sixty-five years, Neville Chamberlain has been viewed as a spineless, deluded leader; one who would not stand up to Hitler and call him out for the depredations of Nazi Germany in the latter half of the 1930's. One of the more famous examples of Chamberlain's "appeasement" was the Munich Conference on September 29, 1938. In the agreement reached, Chamberlain, along with Edouard Daladier representing France, ceded the Czechoslovak Sudetenland to Hitler's Germany. Chamberlain returned triumphantly to London, claiming to have won "peace in our time." History quickly proved Chamberlain wrong, as Germany soon annexed the rest of Czechoslovakia, and escalated the crisis to a full-fledged war with the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. The ensuing conflict wreathed the entire continent in the smoke and destruction of war.
The outcome of the Munich Conference was initially popular with the British public, despite the outcry raised by fellow politicians, including Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and Winston Churchill. It was not until several months later, when it became evident that Hitler's insatiable appetite for land and power had merely been whetted by the "gift" of the Sudetenland that common opinion turned against Chamberlain. He was soon indelibly labeled an appeaser and facilitator for war. This essay will re-examine Chamberlain's role and evaluate a possible alternative motive for his actions at the Munich Conference in 1938.
Situational Statistics and Facts
In 1938, Britain's state of war preparedness was deplorable. In March of that year, "the British Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously and categorically urged ... Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to avoid war until Britain was better prepared" (Baldwin, p. 33) In their report,
Leslie Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War, was more explicit. He wrote in his diary,
In September 1938, "Stuffy" Dowding, Air Marshall of the Royal Air Force, Commander in Chief of Fighter Command, had 406 aircraft at his disposal, organized into 29 squadrons. In addition, he had 160 aircraft in reserve. The national output of the fighter-factories stood at 45 planes per month. The majority of the fighters in his command were obsolete, with only a few Hurricanes and no Spitfires (Baldwin, p. 34).
In contrast, Goering's vaunted Luftwaffe was composed of 1,466 bombers and 920 fighters (Braakhuis). Additionally, Germany's factories were producing 92 aircraft per month -- more than double the output of Britain's production facitilities (Braakhuis).
By September 1939, the RAF (including Dowding's command) had increased its strength to 1,476 planes and 118,000 men. For comparison, the Luftwaffe had grown to include roughly 4,300 operational aircraft (including 540 transports) and 500,000 men. More importantly, British production had increased to almost 800 planes a month -- more than the 690 per month produced in Germany (Baldwin, p. 34). The one year delay of Britain's entry into war with Germany caused by the Munich Conference had allowed the RAF to increase both the number and quality of aircraft at it's disposal, but most importantly, gave Britain enough time to mobilize its factories for wartime production. The main radar coverage on the Channel coast was also improved and extended to 15,000 feet.
Analysis and Conclusions
The buildup of aircraft in the year between Munich and the beginning of the Battle of Britain proved to be less important than it initially appears. In early months of 1940, Dowding lost 463 planes and 284 pilots in battles over the Low Countries and France. After the evacuation at Dunkirk, he had 466 operational aircraft -- roughly equivalent in number to the forces available in the fall of 1938 (Baldwin, p. 35). Note, the difference in production remains; it is impossible to overestimate the impact the vastly increased production capability had on both the British strategy and ultimate outcome of the Battle of Britain. "British factories under the spur of Lord Beaverbrook had built 1,665 planes during July 1940, almost 500 of them fighters" (Baldwin, p. 39) This brought Dowding's total up to 704 operational aircraft, 620 of them Hurricanes and Spitfires, and 289 planes in reserve (Baldwin, p. 39). Opposing the defenders were about 900 Me-109's, 1,000 He-111's, Dornier 17's, and Junkers 88's, and 300 Ju-87 Stukas, dispersed amongst Luftflotten 2, 3, and 5 (Baldwin, p. 39).
It is difficult to decipher the motives of Neville Chamberlain on that fateful autumn day in 1938. It is entirely possible that his business background (give a tough customer what he wants) and strong desire to avert war blinded him to Hitler's unbridled ambition, and led Chamberlain to believe Hitler's promises. However, a plausible alternative is that Chamberlain had been advised by his military "experts" that preventing the German takeover of the Sudetenland was impossible, and that it would be wiser not to provoke a conflict that Britain could very easily lose in her present state. As history stands, Great Britain very nearly lost the Battle of Britain. The extra months of preparation and production could have been the difference between victory and defeat. For political reasons, it would have been imprudent for Chamberlain to publicly admit the ruthless reasoning behind his decision to abandon Czechoslovakia to the Germans, both for the loss of honor and face inherent in such an action and because it would have been unwise to advertise/confirm German suspicions of British weakness.
In summary, was Chamberlain a gullible appeaser or a calculating strategist willing to become a public scapegoat, castigated by the world, to give his country a fighting chance in a war with mighty Germany? We will never know the answer, but it might not be as obvious a question as it appears at first glance.
Sources:
Baldwin, Hanson. Battles Lost and Won. United States of America: Konecky & Konecky: 1966. 33-39.
Braakhuis, Wilfried. Germans Victory in Europe 1940. The World at War. 1997 <http://www.euronet.nl/users/wilfried/ww2/1940.htm>
Kemp, Lieutenant Commander P.K., RN (Ret.). Key to Victory. Boston: Little Brown, 1958. 26.
Introduction:
For the last sixty-five years, Neville Chamberlain has been viewed as a spineless, deluded leader; one who would not stand up to Hitler and call him out for the depredations of Nazi Germany in the latter half of the 1930's. One of the more famous examples of Chamberlain's "appeasement" was the Munich Conference on September 29, 1938. In the agreement reached, Chamberlain, along with Edouard Daladier representing France, ceded the Czechoslovak Sudetenland to Hitler's Germany. Chamberlain returned triumphantly to London, claiming to have won "peace in our time." History quickly proved Chamberlain wrong, as Germany soon annexed the rest of Czechoslovakia, and escalated the crisis to a full-fledged war with the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. The ensuing conflict wreathed the entire continent in the smoke and destruction of war.
The outcome of the Munich Conference was initially popular with the British public, despite the outcry raised by fellow politicians, including Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and Winston Churchill. It was not until several months later, when it became evident that Hitler's insatiable appetite for land and power had merely been whetted by the "gift" of the Sudetenland that common opinion turned against Chamberlain. He was soon indelibly labeled an appeaser and facilitator for war. This essay will re-examine Chamberlain's role and evaluate a possible alternative motive for his actions at the Munich Conference in 1938.
Situational Statistics and Facts
In 1938, Britain's state of war preparedness was deplorable. In March of that year, "the British Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously and categorically urged ... Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to avoid war until Britain was better prepared" (Baldwin, p. 33) In their report,
they stated, without making any qualifications, that the country was not ready for war, that no measures of force, whether alone or in alliance with other European countries, could now stop Germany from inflicting a crusing defeat on Czechoslovakia, and that any involvement in war with Germany at this stage could well lead to an ultimate defeat... no matter what the cost, war must be averted until the rearmament program began to bear substantial fruit. (Kemp, p. 26)
Leslie Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War, was more explicit. He wrote in his diary,
The P.M. yesterday spoke to us of the horrors of war, of German bombers over London and of his horror in allowing our people to suffer all the miseries of war in our present state. No one is more conscious than I am of our present deficiencies. Chiefs of Staff view -- to take offensive against Germany now would be like "a man attacking a tiger before he has loaded his gun.(author's italics)
In September 1938, "Stuffy" Dowding, Air Marshall of the Royal Air Force, Commander in Chief of Fighter Command, had 406 aircraft at his disposal, organized into 29 squadrons. In addition, he had 160 aircraft in reserve. The national output of the fighter-factories stood at 45 planes per month. The majority of the fighters in his command were obsolete, with only a few Hurricanes and no Spitfires (Baldwin, p. 34).
In contrast, Goering's vaunted Luftwaffe was composed of 1,466 bombers and 920 fighters (Braakhuis). Additionally, Germany's factories were producing 92 aircraft per month -- more than double the output of Britain's production facitilities (Braakhuis).
By September 1939, the RAF (including Dowding's command) had increased its strength to 1,476 planes and 118,000 men. For comparison, the Luftwaffe had grown to include roughly 4,300 operational aircraft (including 540 transports) and 500,000 men. More importantly, British production had increased to almost 800 planes a month -- more than the 690 per month produced in Germany (Baldwin, p. 34). The one year delay of Britain's entry into war with Germany caused by the Munich Conference had allowed the RAF to increase both the number and quality of aircraft at it's disposal, but most importantly, gave Britain enough time to mobilize its factories for wartime production. The main radar coverage on the Channel coast was also improved and extended to 15,000 feet.
Analysis and Conclusions
The buildup of aircraft in the year between Munich and the beginning of the Battle of Britain proved to be less important than it initially appears. In early months of 1940, Dowding lost 463 planes and 284 pilots in battles over the Low Countries and France. After the evacuation at Dunkirk, he had 466 operational aircraft -- roughly equivalent in number to the forces available in the fall of 1938 (Baldwin, p. 35). Note, the difference in production remains; it is impossible to overestimate the impact the vastly increased production capability had on both the British strategy and ultimate outcome of the Battle of Britain. "British factories under the spur of Lord Beaverbrook had built 1,665 planes during July 1940, almost 500 of them fighters" (Baldwin, p. 39) This brought Dowding's total up to 704 operational aircraft, 620 of them Hurricanes and Spitfires, and 289 planes in reserve (Baldwin, p. 39). Opposing the defenders were about 900 Me-109's, 1,000 He-111's, Dornier 17's, and Junkers 88's, and 300 Ju-87 Stukas, dispersed amongst Luftflotten 2, 3, and 5 (Baldwin, p. 39).
It is difficult to decipher the motives of Neville Chamberlain on that fateful autumn day in 1938. It is entirely possible that his business background (give a tough customer what he wants) and strong desire to avert war blinded him to Hitler's unbridled ambition, and led Chamberlain to believe Hitler's promises. However, a plausible alternative is that Chamberlain had been advised by his military "experts" that preventing the German takeover of the Sudetenland was impossible, and that it would be wiser not to provoke a conflict that Britain could very easily lose in her present state. As history stands, Great Britain very nearly lost the Battle of Britain. The extra months of preparation and production could have been the difference between victory and defeat. For political reasons, it would have been imprudent for Chamberlain to publicly admit the ruthless reasoning behind his decision to abandon Czechoslovakia to the Germans, both for the loss of honor and face inherent in such an action and because it would have been unwise to advertise/confirm German suspicions of British weakness.
In summary, was Chamberlain a gullible appeaser or a calculating strategist willing to become a public scapegoat, castigated by the world, to give his country a fighting chance in a war with mighty Germany? We will never know the answer, but it might not be as obvious a question as it appears at first glance.
Sources:
Baldwin, Hanson. Battles Lost and Won. United States of America: Konecky & Konecky: 1966. 33-39.
Braakhuis, Wilfried. Germans Victory in Europe 1940. The World at War. 1997 <http://www.euronet.nl/users/wilfried/ww2/1940.htm>
Kemp, Lieutenant Commander P.K., RN (Ret.). Key to Victory. Boston: Little Brown, 1958. 26.
