Operation Badr

Adler17

Prussian Feldmarschall
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A. Prelude
The loss of the 6 Day war in 1967 hit the national proud of Egypt deeply. Not only the huge losses but also the loss of the Sinai peninsula lead to a wave of nationalism. So despite the defeat the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser wanted to reconquer the lost areas. But his attempts all failed: No strike on the Israeli forces lead to a retreat but to bombings of Egypt by the Israeli Defence Forces. In August 1970 however the Egyptians accept peace. A month later Nasser was dead. His successor was Anwar as Sadat.
Sadat also wanted the Sinai peninsula back. But he tried the diplomatic way at first. He offered Israel to be recognized by Egypt for the price of the Sinai peninsula. But the diplomatic offensive failed. Israel was not willing to accept. Israel thought the Egyptians and other Arab nations were beaten so heavily that in no way they were able to go for a war this time. So they rejected that offer.
So Sadat had to go another way: Instead of a large scale war he wanted a conflict only on the Sinai peninsula. He hoped the conquest of a part and the following defence would force Israel to accept the new situation.
But for that plan the Egyptian army had to be improved massively. With Soviet help new equipment is introduced as well as reorganized. Instead of being behind the front to retreat when the difficulties became more, the officer now should be at the front and stay. There they should be victorious. So the name of the planned attack was chosen after the first victory of Mohamed, peace be with him: Badr!
However Sadat knew very well his forces were in no way strong enough to beat the Israelis in open battle. Despite the numerical advantage and the greater firepower the Israeli weapons were better and the troops much better trained, despite the improvements already introduced. So General Shazli introduced an old and well known plan, made in Germany: He wanted to do the same as Falkenhayn tried in Verdun: To bleed the enemy to death. He knew it was a failure that time but he in contrast to Falkenhayn believes in the plan as Egypt had an ally: Syria. They should attack from the North and bind half of the Israeli forces.
In this moment two Egyptian armies with 1100 tanks and five reinforced Infantry divisions should cross the 180 m wide Sues Canal and conquer two 15 km deep bridge heads. There they should fortify their positions and wait for the Israeli counter strike. After that phase two should start: 2 tank divisions and 3 motorized divisions with 600 tanks should attack and take the mountain passes, which are strategically important. But this phase is not very well planned and what happened next not thought. And here lied one of the reasons why the plan did not work totally.
Israel on the other side had no idea about the attack. As I already said, they thought Egypt was not able to lead a war for a generation and so they neglected any signs of what would come. Even the defence budget was made smaller, although the tank force was increased. The Sinai would be a good puffer, but to stop any Egyptian attempt at the beginning a line of 33 fortresses was built at the Suez Canal, the so called Bar- Lev line. But the Israeli commander is in no way keen about that line and thought it was not suitable. So he closed 19 of the fortresses. The name of the Israeli general: Ariel Sharon!
Sharon wanted to build up an elastic defence with the last tank division he had available. A plan similar to Manstein after Stalingrad. So he also let build a net of roads between the swamps and the desert. There the tanks should be fast in the combat area. Among these roads are three parallel to the Suez Canal. And Sharon relied on the supremacy of the Israeli Air Force.
But the Egyptians now had new Russian SAM system. At the western shore of the Canal 150 batteries of SAMs and 2500 Flak guns were deployed. 10 km of range on the other side of the Canal was now in range of the Egyptian SAMs.
In 1972 Sadat sent the Soviet instructors home. And everyone believed the danger of war is even less since it seemed doubtful, the Egyptians could handle such a modern equipment. Israel erred again.
Even the Egyptian troop movements were not recognized as war preparations since in every year large scale fall manoeuvres took place. So the infantry and tank divisions could take positions without any problems. Even most of the officers were not knowing until the day of the attack that war was imminent. And the Israeli Mossad director said the danger of a war was “less than low” on October 5th 1973. Instead he promised to warn 48 hours before an attack So all in Israel were not knowing that on the Yom Kippur a day later such a “prophecy” showed her unsuitableness.
So the Israeli government got the news of the attack on the morning of October 6th. Only a few hours remained. And Golda Meir is loosing time by not willing to attack by Herself as she feared of diplomatic trouble. At 10 AM before the attack she ordered the armed forced to be partly mobilized.

B. The War
4 hours later the Egyptian artillery fired on the Israeli lines. Massively. At the front are only an infantry battalion and three tanks to beat that large scale offensive. 15 minutes later 8.000 Egyptian soldiers crossed the Canal supported by Artillery. 11 waves followed. Ferries carried tanks and other equipment to the other side. Egyptian pioneers make 20 pontoon bridges of Soviet origin. It works like a Swiss clockwork. No big problems occur. The Israelis estimated 48 hours to build that bridges. The Egyptians did that in 9. Also 26.000 dead were estimated by the Israelis to cross the Canal. Indeed only 300 were the price to do so. The Israeli tanks appear too late and in too few numbers to be a problem for the Egyptians. Next morning of 290 tanks only 114 would be operational.
Then the Israeli Air Force tried to destroy bridges and SAM sites. With no effect. Although the bombing runs were more suicide missions, the Israeli planes managed to hit 7 of the bridges. But the damage is soon repaired and dozens of Israeli planes shot down. The Bar Lev line was in the consequence given up only a little later. Also the whole air force had to be brought into the North were the Syrians attacked. 1.600 Syrian tanks, among them 600 T 54, T 55, T 64, were threatening to break through the lines to Galilaea.
Here the tides turned. After reinforcements arrived the Syrians could be pushed out of Israel. Here the Arabic strategist made an error in calculating the army mobilisation speed as the reserve divisions were not hindered by civilian traffic at the holidays and so the first reserve divisions arrived at the front in less than 24 hours.
Also on the Sinai: One division with 183 tanks made a counter strike coming from south of the swamps of Baluza. The Israelis think to be victorious. Only the sighting or the rumors of an Israeli tank let whole divisions retreat seven years before. But that was history. Now they did not retreat but fought. The Israeli forces were failing and had to retreat with the loss of many men and nearly all tanks. Additionally also the Air Force lost 44 planes there. High losses that the defence abilities of the Israelis could cripple if they continued. So at the evening of the “black day of the Israeli army”, 8th October, 100.000 Egyptian soldiers and over 1.000 had crossed the canal.
The Israeli command decided to go into defence in the South and to throw everything available to the North. There indeed the tide turned on October 10th. Due to the fear of a new Holocaust the Israelis lost the apocalyptic mood in favour of a willing to resist. So the Israeli forces reconquered the Golan heights and were soon in artillery range of Damascus. Only Jordan and Iraqi units could prevent worse.
But that difficult situation the Egyptians are now in the situation to act. So the not consequently planned phase 2 started. But instead of attacking with full planned strength only 500 tanks and two motorized brigades attacked and wanted to take the Gidi and Mitla passes. But now they left the shield of the SAMs. So they were confronted with intensive bombing runs by the Israeli Air Force. Soon half of the tanks were destroyed.
Although still in minority despite armament help from the US by C 5 Galaxy planes, the Israeli had now taken the initiative.
On October 15th the Israelis started an attack on the reserve of the 2nd Egyptian army. But this was a trap. Indeed they circumvent the Egyptian posts to invade Egypt. Soon they crossed the Canal. Sadat got the news finally from the radio when Golda Meir said, that Israeli troops were now fighting in Africa. Sadat wanted to get a confirmation but is given the wrong notice that only 7 Israeli tanks crossed the Canal, which are under control. So although Shazli proposed to crush the Israeli bridge head with the tank units east of the Canal, Sadat declined as he feared this would lead to a morale breakdown of the infantry. Instead the strategic reserve should deal with the problem.
But the Israelis could spot these units from a distance of 40 km and so were able to attack them in the flank. The tank battle lead to an Egyptian defeat. In the following time a number of SAM batteries is destroyed by the Israelis and the city of Sues in danger. The last reserve, the elite Republican Guard, is now confronting the enemy to prevent the fall of Sues. But due to the loss of the SAMs the Egyptians are no longer capable to prevent bombing runs.
Although the Soviets tried to convince Sadat to make a cease fire, as long as he is in still good positions, he overestimated his situation. It is not before October 21st, when the whole 3rd army is in danger to be enclosed when he offered a cease fire. Golda Meir however rejects at first but had to accept due to US pressures. The cease fire was in force since October 22nd at 6.52 PM.
Although the international observer troops did not arrive yet the Egyptians believed the Israelis would keep their word. However they were surprised when the Israelis advanced and finished the enclosing by capturing the harbour of Adabiya. The 3rd army is now without any supplies like a mouse in the trap. Also Israeli planes attacked them killing many soldiers. In this situation the Soviets threatened to move units in the region and the US are now on alert level 3, for the first time since 1962.
On October 25th the UN passed another cease fire resolution, but also this was broken several times until February 1974, when the Israeli forces retreated from the African side of the Canal.

C. Consequences
The Israelis had won the war on the military level. But they had to pay a high price. 830 tanks were lost. Over hundred planes shot down. And the loss of dead men. On both sides. A Pyrrhic victory. Due to the high losses and the fact the Israeli forces were nearly completely beaten the Israeli government finally agreed to make peace with Egypt by returning the Sinai peninsula. The military victory followed the political defeat with the Treaty of Camp David in 1981. Until today the Egyptians celebrates their success every year. Not too unsubstantial.
Sometimes in times of war the side wins which makes less errors. Here both sides made huge errors. One side underestimated the enemy, the other did not plan it until the last step- to make a long story short. That’s why the Israelis won the war on the military front- but lost it on the political.

Adler
 
The meeting were the declaration about 48 hours was first made was in fact on the 24th of September, not the 5th of October and it was made by the head of military intelligence (Zeira), not the head of Mossad (Zamir). Zeira was also responsible for the quote on the 5th that you attribute to Zamir. It was also part of military intelligence that sat on Siman-Tov's report which accurately predicted the Egyptian attack. At this stage the principle method of intelligence gathering in Israel was Military intelligence, its incorrect to blame Mossad for Zeira's failure to appreciate the situation properly or Meir and Dayan's lack of will to act on the various warnings.

It would have been good to mention something known as "the concept". This basically entailed the idea that Syria would never attack without Egypt and Egypt would not attack until the balance of power (especially air power) had changed significantly in their favour. This permeated all levels of the Israeli intelligence community and wasn't helped by the superority complex many in the military had. It wasn't hard for officers who'd fought in the 6 days and to have a low opinion of Arab military stregnth and therefore believe they would not attack.

I'd also say that although full confirmation of the Arab attack only came in the early morning of the 6th information strongly indicating the attack had been available for days. The Israeli government and military's principle reasons for not preparing and striking first was political and econmic. Sufficient warnings existed but no-one wanted to risk rocking the boat until full confirmation was recieved. Even then Dayan refused to allow full mobilisation and Meir agreed, against the advice of her chief of staff (Elezar). Israel was far from being suprised by the Arab assault, she just had the wrong time for it's start.

I can probably comment on some other parts of what you've written later too
 
I think I'll reserve my judgement for when I get a reply :p

(not that I expect one, I seem to have a knack for killing off threads :sad: )
 
I already have done that. You haven't replied to that either supporting your original claim with a source or accepting the inacuracy.

My information comes from the Sunday Times Insight Team's book on the war by the way.
 
Originally published as:
Insight on the Middle East War
by The Insight Team of the London Sunday Times
Paperback: 256 pages
Publisher: A. Deutsch (1974)
Language: English
ISBN: 0233965661

Reissued in a slightly revised edition as:
The Yom Kippur War
by Insight Team of the London Sunday Times
Paperback: 528 pages
Publisher: I Books; Reprint edition (October 1, 2002)
Language: English
ISBN: 0743452577

The Insight book suffers somewhat from having been rather hastily put together just after the end of the war. The statements of many of the participants were self serving and had yet to be filtered through the lens of historical analysis. Read this book but read later ones as well. The reader reviews at Amazon.com are instructive.
 
Indeed it does have to be taken with a pinch of salt however I've not seen anything elsewhere which contradicts what I said about it being Zeira rather than Zamir and I can't imagine them getting that wrong since it's not an analysis or similar but a direct quote.

Although the following source doesn't clarify things either way it does say that Zeira was more dismissive than Zamir:

http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/intel73.html

Military Intelligence (Aman) Chief Eli Zeira was most confident in expressing the view that the probability of war was low. Mossad Chief Zvi Zamir was less dismissive of Arab intentions, as were Chief of Staff David Elazar and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan.

A few days later, after the September 13 air battle, Aman Chief Eli Zeira argued that the Arabs would not contemplate even a war of attrition before the end of 1975.

I'd say that from the above its therefore more likely to have been Zeira and that your source is wrong.

Info on Simon-Tov:

In the post-war research assessment of Israel's Intelligence failure, it emerged that only one of Aman's researchers refused to be swayed by "the concept." His name was Lieutenant Binyamin Siman-Tov, a junior Military Intelligence officer. He argued that the huge Egyptian deployments and exercises along the Suez Canal "seemed to be camouflage for a real canal-crossing assault." When his first assessment was ignored on October 1, he sent a more comprehensive one on October 3. Both were ignored by his superior, and Siman-Tov, low as he was in the rank of the IDF hierarchy, was to have no influence on the upper-level Intelligence assessments of Egyptian intentions.

And on the concept:

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a concept (or "conceptzia", as the Israelis called it) took hold that the Arabs were unwilling to go to war against Israel. The concept was based on the idea that the 1967 War was such an overwhelming victory that the Arabs would not be able to overcome Israel for the time being. Thus even when it appeared clear that the Arabs had aggressive intentions, Israeli analysts refused to believe that the Arabs would actually follow through with them.

Your source was?
 
I have no problem with saying that it was Ziera and not Zamir. Perhaps the "Concept" should have been mentioned but these are minor quibbles in what should be looked at as very brief introduction to the Yom Kippur War. The simple fact is that serious mistakes were made which Adler17 pointed out (perhaps not to the satisfaction of all readers).
 
I was under the impression he contested the point, hence the word seem and asking for the source.
 
Adler17 said:
After that phase two should start: 2 tank divisions and 3 motorized divisions with 600 tanks should attack and take the mountain passes, which are strategically important. But this phase is not very well planned and what happened next not thought.

Many experts think that the Egyptians didn't want to advance beyond the Suez Canal and only did so in a desperate attempt to take some of the pressure off the Syrian forces in the Golan. The fact that the Egyptians made little effort to exploit their victory after crossing the Canal does support this theory (eg, given the extent of their success in the first couple of days of war and Egypt's generally adequete level of military competance, if the Egyptians really wanted the Sinai passes they would have pushed out of their bridgehead well before they did historicaly, and not put all their effort into digging in).

The Sinai would be a good puffer, but to stop any Egyptian attempt at the beginning a line of 33 fortresses was built at the Suez Canal, the so called Bar- Lev line.

Seeing as the Bar Lev line strong points ('fortresses' is a bit excessive) were always small and not garrisoned by more than a company of infantry with a few tanks attached, it's hard to sustain an argument that they were ever intended to stop a full-scale attack. While Israeli strategic thinking in regards to the Bar Lev line was confused (to put it mildly) it seems that the Israelis didn't ever regard the line as being anything but string of outpost and observation positions. Given the length of the Canal it's hard to see how 33 small outposts could stop an attack of any size. The role of the Bar Lev line was to provide basic border security during what passed for peacetime.

And the loss of dead men. On both sides. A Pyrrhic victory.

I'd disagree with that. Ironically, both Israel and Egypt achieved their primary war aim. Israel survived as a nation at a relatively low (though still high) cost and was able to trade some land she didn't really want for what's proved to be a lasting peace (which was anything but a "political defeat"). Egypt regained its lost territory at an acceptable price while also being able to opt out of the more hare-brained aspects of Middle Eastern politics using the honour she gained from almost beating the Israelis. Syria was the only real loser.
 
Case, at first the Egyptians attacked together with the Syrians. Also they planned that for about 6 years (more or less). They wanted to do what they did. However they believed Israel would be crushed by the Syrians and so their further advance would be only a question of time and with little losses.
The Bar Lev line was considered at first as a kind of building up a Maginot line (bad example). They should be fortified points to deny any Egyptian advance. However Sharon closed most of them as they were indeed useless. And infact the Egyptian advance was not stopped by them.
At last we should see the objectives of both sides:
I. Egypt: Taking so much territory Israel is finally agreeing to regive the Sinai peninsula. That failed on the military level. But on the political one that succeeded.
II. Israel: Surviving (although it is to debate if the Arab nations indeed threatened the existence) and keeping al of the Holy Land. The first point was successful. However the second wasn't. In right wing Israeli politics, which dominated in that time, Israel should be all the lands they owned 2.000+ years ago. Therefore they also demanded the Sinai peninsula (and some still demand that and the area of Babylon even!). They refused to give it back and so the war began. In the end they lost it and tried to rescue the rest.
III: Conclusion:
Israel won the war on the military point of view, but lost it political.

Adler
 
I did not do that, but I found it a minor point

My appologies, I misread you, it certainly appeared like you did for the reasons I mentioned.

Egypt: Taking so much territory Israel is finally agreeing to regive the Sinai peninsula. That failed on the military level. But on the political one that succeeded.

Egypt may have taken some territory but the army occupying it was surrounded, its supply lines cut and its troops largely at the mercy of Israel. Israel was also banging on the front door of Damascus (i.e. sitting less than 40k away and shelling its outskirts) at the time. In other words Egypt and Syria finished the war not only in a poor military position but a poor political one since neither had an especially strong hand so to speak. Had Egypt retained her presence on the east bank without 3rd Army being threatened then she'd likely have been able to force even more concessions from Israel in any eventual peace, or at the least pushed for an earlier resolution of the Sinai issue than what occurred. As it was Israel was able to trade the Sinai for gains she needed - recognition, use of the Suez canal and a reduction of Egyptian strength on the Sinai. If Israel lost Yom Kippur politically to any great degree she would probably not have gained these concessions. Egypt lost a great deal of face as a result of these concessions and ticked off a lot of Arab states, so therefore it could be argued that they didn't gain so much out of Yom Kippur either.

Yom Kippur may have been costly but I wouldn't argue that the military consequences of the war alone changed Israeli thinking on the Sinai or its attitude to the Arab states around it. Viewing the loss of the Sinai as purely down to Yom Kippur is therefore oversimplifying the issue in my opinion.
 
I disagree concerning the Egyptian army. It occupied a strip on the east bank and was able to hold it thanks to the SAM batteries. They were able to repell all attacks. Their military mistake was they attacked later, therefore opening the line and allowing the Israeli to cross the channel, destryoing the SAMs and surrounding the army. There they lost it dramatically.
Also Sadat only wanted to get back the Sinai. He tried it peacefully before by offering peace for the Sinai. He was not successful and so he went to war.
Of course there were more reasons why the Israeli gave the Sinai back. One of the main points however is the Yom Kippur war. With a little more luck the Arabs would have been much more successful. So in the end the Israeli had to make peace with at least one of her opponents to make sure another war would not happen so likely. And as Egypt still offered real peace they had to accept it.

Adler
 
I disagree, Israel didn't have to accept peace with Egypt, she was able to bargain for a very realistic and in the end reasonable peace with them. Israel gave up land that only the more hard-line sections intended to keep in return for decent concessions, something I'd count as a sucess. Egypt gave up her pre-eminent status in the Arab world in order to get back the Sinai, something I'd count as only a minor sucess if one at all. If Sadat had done better in Yom Kippur his political status would have been enough to impose the return without loosing face, that would have been a victory. Sadat's assasination can be directly linked to him having to negotiate with Israel, therefore I think its plausible to suggest that the fact that he had to negotiate rather than dictate the return ultimately was a defeat for him personally. Begin retired from politics, Sadat was murdered, a notable difference. I therefore don't think that reducing result of Yom Kippur down to whether Sadat got back the Sinai or not is looking at the whole picture.

And I'm aware of the timeline of the war thank you, my point was that having the third army on the east bank wasn't a huge bargaining chip since a) it wasn't going anywhere and b) it was surrounded and out of supplies. My point concerned not what the Egyptian army had done but its situation at the end of the war. Israel finished the war politically better off than either of its neighbours.
 
Well Israel saw, it could only lead wars if Egypt is still hostile. And if Sadat got the Sinai earlier in negotiations he was still tha "bad guy" of radical islamists. So his situation would be not very much better then.
Also do not forget that not only hardliners wanted to keep the Sinai. Many others, too. Some generals wanted to keep it as puffer, others as settlement areas. So for the Israelis it was a loss.
Also Israel was indeed after the war in a better political situation, but only in contrast to Syria. Egypt was beaten, too, but the catastrophe for the Israeli forces was now just evaded by not very much. Only few was missing. So the Israeli had to choose: To keep the Sinai and lead more wars, or to give it away for peace. They did the latter. Egypt got what it wanted. Also it was much more open to the west and became an ally of the US. That was also a success.
Also why, if the land was so useless, the Israeli did not give it back?
However Israel got peace and Egypt the land. So in the end the Egyptian plan succeeded.
So Egypt might be the only Arab nation to be victorious against the Israelis on the political level.

Adler
 
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