To what extent was the American use of the Atomic Bombs a result of the wish to bring a quick and favourable end to the war in the Pacific?
The dropping of the atomic bombs in August of 1945 has been at the centre of a lot of controversy for some time.
Whether the goal of the American government was to secure a peace, as rapidly as possible, to save the lives of American and Allied servicemen, while retaining a favourable situation in terms of territory, and the treatment of those responsible for the war, or whether there was an ulterior motive, such as a demonstration of force over the Soviet Union, or to justify the expenditure on the project has been the subject off much scrutiny.
The primary argument that attempts to justify the use of the Atomic bombs, put forwards more often than not by those who had decided to use the bomb (such as Harry S. Truman, and Winston Churchill, as a historian strongly supported this view) lies in the casualties the Japanese could inflict during an amphibious invasion.
General George C. Marshall, in a post-war interview, said:
We had just gone through the bitter experience at Okinawa
And elaborated that the Japanese
“Would not surrender and would fight to the death.
We had to end the war; we had to save American lives.” 1
Indeed, the Japanese had shown their fanaticism on many occasions, that of Okinawa costing 82 days, and 100,000 Japanese giving their lives for a lost cause a typical example.
Truman, in his diary, had described them as
“Savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic”2
Strong words, especially in a private document, so there is little doubt of what Truman’s opinion was.
The Japanese were indeed viewed around the world as “savages”, as much
because of the terrible crimes which they committed, from the earliest invasion in Manchuria to the torture of enemy soldiers, as the racism that was not uncommon at the time (such as the opinion, prior to Pearl Harbor, that the Japanese were unable to skilfully fly aircraft on account of their eyes).
The fanaticism of the Japanese was not something to doubt; after Saipan had been captured by Americans, over a thousand civilians leaped off cliffs in suicide; the soldiers were well known for preferring an all-out Banzai charge, armed with whatever implements they could garner, and even Seppuku.
An amphibious assault of the Japanese Home Islands would undoubtedly incur massive casualties.
As Henry Stimson, the US Secretary of War explained:
“The Japanese are highly patriotic, and certainly susceptible to calls for fanatical resistance to repel an invasion”3
Not only does a Japanese communiqué to Stalin emphasizing their willingness to fight to the death corroborate this, but Rhodes describes what may very well epitomise the Allied opinion of the Japanese mentality, and the justification for the bombs.
During a meeting of Japan’s Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Staff spoke of his:
“’Plan for certain victory……Sacrifice 20,000,000 in a Special [Kamikaze] attack’
Whether or not he meant the 20 million to attack the Allies with rocks and bamboo spears, the record does not show. “
It is not subject of debate whether or not the Japanese would have done so, as the Japanese had practically invented suicide raids, and Kamikaze was an integral part of the Japanese war-machine.
However, that such a plan was never fully mobilized speaks volumes of the high-command.
Of course, the “Poor Bloody Infantry” would be the ones with the most to lose if such a campaign were to take place.
A soldier4 wrote of his elation when he learned of the bombs being dropped:
“We were going to live! We were going to grow up to adulthood after all!”
There is little doubt of the infantryman’s perceptions of his chances in a land invasion of Japan.
This is mirrored in the words of an officer, quoted by Rhodes, who attended the briefing of the mission by Colonel Paul Tibbets, the pilot of the Enola Gay, who gave the impression:
“[This] would shorten the war by at least six months. And you got the feeling he really thought this bomb would end the war, period”
However, a Colonel would not be privy to more sensitive information about the political climate, or the war effort, so Tibbets might not be qualified to comment on such issues. In any case, it is likely that saying this was intended to raise morale of the troops.
If we do accept that the bombs were used to save Allied lives, the Allied POWs must certainly have been on the minds of the American High Command. The Japanese, since their invasion of Manchuria in 1937, had been notorious for their brutal and inhumane treatment of prisoners, shown by their Death Marches, such as that in Bataan, and even the Rape of Nanking.
Every day the war continued could have meant the death of more prisoners.
The military importance of Hiroshima would also have been key to the decision of dropping the bombs.
Hiroshima was the headquarters of the Second Army, responsible for the defence of Kyushu and south Japan.
An American study published in autumn 1945 elaborated:
“Hiroshima was a city of considerable military importance…..The city was a communication centre, a storage point, and an assembly area for troops.
To quote a Japanese report: “Probably more than a thousand times since the beginning f the war did Hiroshima citizens see off with cries of ‘Banzai’ the troops leaving from the harbor”5
While the last line is undoubtedly Japanese propaganda, it just reinforces the morale blow that a successfully devastating raid on Hiroshima would give, as well as more strategic victories.
An American study is unlikely to be subjective, as one produced for the high-command would have to be as objective as possible, as a slight omission or error could have great ramifications, and even waste lives and effort.
Churchill may have condensed the general consensus of the High Command into a perfect rationalisation:
“To avoid a vast, indefinite butchery, to bring the war to an end, to give peace to the world, to lay healing hands upon its tortured peoples by a manifestation of overwhelming power, at the cost of a few explosions, seemed, after our toils and perils, a miracle of deliverance”6
This passage, written in his history of WWII, though it comes with the benefit of (minimal) hindsight, may very well be Churchill’s attempt to exonerate himself for the civilian deaths, though this was before it became commonplace for the decision to be scorned.
While Hiroshima undoubtedly held considerable military value, acting as a headquarters and depot, whether dropping “the” bomb on it had any effect on the duration of the war is questionable.
Churchill, so supportive of Truman’s decision, in his history of the Second World War put it bluntly:
“It would be a mistake to suppose that the fate of Japan was settled by the atomic bomb. Her defeat was certain before the first bomb fell, and was brought around by overwhelming maritime power”7
Indeed, Japan had suffered almost total losses at Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
Henry Stimson, Truman’s Secretary of War, concurs:
“Japan has no allies.
Her navy is nearly destroyed, and she is vulnerable to a surface and underwater blockade, which can deprive her of sufficient food and supplies for her population.
She is terribly vulnerable to our concentrated air attack upon her crowded cities, industrial and food resources.
She has against her not only the Anglo-American forces, but the rising forces of China and te ominous threat of Russia.
We have inexhaustible and untouched industrial resources to bring to bear against her diminished potential.
We have great moral superiority through being the victim of her first sneak attack”
These are not the words of an accused man defending his actions, but the words of a man carefully analysing the position.
If we take these sources as truthful (which they most likely are, seeing as Churchill and Stimson should be the last men to admit to Japan’s defeat, as well as having the right expertise to come to a conclusion), it must be wondered why the bombs were dropped. Under the conditions, Japan would have almost certainly collapsed under the strain.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe, had, post-war, said:
“The Japanese were ready to surrender, and it wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing. I hated that our country be the first to use such a weapon”8
Eisenhower would know what he was talking about; a career officer and later President who led America at war, his credentials are unblemished.
Even if Japan had been able to continue the war, the evidence points to the idea that she did not wish to.
From June 1945, she had made a number of attempts to surrender, which Liddell Hart called “peace feelers”
Richard Rhodes explained:
“US Intelligence had intercepted and decode messages passing between Tokyo and Moscow instructing the ambassador to attempt to interest the Soviets in mediating a Japanese surrender”
If US intelligence had intercepted such a message, which evidence points to, then the US should have used their position to negotiate a peace .
However, James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, attempted to explain the lack of negotiation in 1947:
“We could not rely on Japan’s inquiries to the Soviet Union about a negotiated peace as proof that Japan wanted to surrender”9
However, primary evidence from the Japanese government contradicts Byrnes’s opinion.
The next day, Togo re-emphasised:
“It is in His Majesty’s Heart’s desire to see the swift termination of the war.
However, as long as America and England insist on Unconditional surrender, our country has no alternative but to see it through in an all out effort for the sake and survival of the Honour of the Homeland”10
One must, remember, however that while many more moderate members of the Japanese government wished to surrender, the hardliners were adamantly opposed.
Not only would surrendering breach their perverse Bushido code, but they had nothing to gain from surrender, as they knew they’d be tried, and hanged, for their warcrimes.
In the last sentence lay the crux of the matter.
The major religion of Japan was Shinto. The Emperor was believed to have been descended from the Sun Goddess, and as such, was the father of all the Japanese, a position perhaps comparable to Jesus Christ.
To press for unconditional surrender, including the abdication and trial of Hirohito, which the Allies were doing, would be a de facto desecration of Shinto.
As such, the reluctance of the Japanese to unconditionally surrender is understandable.
Had the intention of the US been only to secure an end to the war, the opportunity was there for the US to take it.
Unconditional Surrender was never an issue, in the sense that the Japanese would never have accepted such an offer.
Moralist G.E.M Anscombe, in a 1947 pamphlet opposing Truman’s award of an honorary Oxford Degree wrote:
“It was the insistence of an unconditional surrender that was the root of all evil. And in itself, the proposal of an unlimited objective in war is stupid, and barbarous”10
While she obviously has an axe to grind, one must ponder his words, while keeping in mid that she was not a historian, but a philosopher, and that she
had opposed Britain’s entry into WWII, and as such, her conclusion is largely subjective.
The Japanese were willing to surrender, but were being stopped by this technicality, considering that the eventual surrender did not compromise the Emperor.
Even Stimson understood this:
“Japan is not a nation com prised wholly of mad fanatics of an entirely different mentality from ours…..It is therefore my conclusion that a carefully timed warning be given to Japan….I personally think that if in [giving such a warning] we should add that we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty, it would substantially add to the chances of acceptance”11
If this was known by the upper echelon of the high command, the Secretary of War, and the President, the question begs:
If the atomic bombs were not used to secure a speedy and favourably end to the war, then why were they used?
This is where historians’ opinion differ.
Liddell Hart, for example, strongly asserts his opinion that the atomic bombs’ use was directly related to the Soviet Union.
Firstly, he says that the Soviets’ looming invasion of Japan would be “Very Embarrassing” to the Americans.
Leonard Mosley Marshall-Organiser of Victory, 1982
2 Quoted by Robert Ferrell, Truman at Potsdam 1980
3 Quoted by Richard Rhodes The Making of the Atomic Bomb 1986
4 Paul Fussel, 2nd Lt. In a Rifle Platoon, later a historian and author
5 Anthony Cave Brown & Charles B. MacDonald, The Secret History of the Atomic bomb, 1977
6 Winston Spencer Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI, Triumph and Tragedy, 1953
7 Winston Spencer Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI, Triumph and Tragedy, 1953
8 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Ike on Ike”, Newsweek article, 11th November, 1963
9 James F Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 1947
10 G.E.M Anscombe, Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. III, 1981, quoted by Rhodes
11 Henry Stimson, from “Proposed Programme for Japan” prepared for Truman, quoted in Stimson & McGeorge Bundy’s On Active Service in Peace and War, 1948
