Did the Partido Comunista Española sign its own death warrant by cooperating in the transition to democracy?
At the time of the transition from Francoist dictatorship to democracy and what can be termed, with a few caveats, normal Western European politics(1), the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) occupied a significant position within the politics as one of the major forces that emerged after the legalisation of political parties. It took a moderate and cooperative approach to the process and committed itself to electoral politics in the same way that other Western European Communist parties had done. The party went to the elections of 1977 and 1979 with this approach, polling 9.3% and 10.9% of the vote.(2) This was considered a disappointing outcome by many, given the PCEs role in the clandestine opposition to the Franco regime. Subsequently, the party went into a period of decline and crisis, with schisms, leadership strife and the departure of prominent members, increasing electoral irrelevance, and the risk of complete dissolution. Ultimately the result was the PCE's submergence within a broader coalition-type structure known as the United Left (Izquierda Unida - IU).
In analysing the role of the PCE and the merit of its moderate approach during this period, and in its subsequent performance within the politics of Spain, three questions must be answered. First, what were the goals of the PCE in the aftermath of Francos death? Second, were there any alternative paths available throughout the transition? Third, why did the PCE go into decline and crisis after the transition to normal electoral politics?
What happened
From the beginning of the democratisation process, the PCE took a moderate line and was fully integrated into the regime from the beginning.(3) The leader, Santiago Carrillo, was an important presence and his attitudes are credited with contributing significantly to the relatively smooth transition.(4) In the aftermath of the decades-long underground struggle against the Franco regime, the PCEs goals, as articulated by Carrillo were to, in the short term, restore Spain to pluralism and political liberty and to stake out a claim to a legitimate position within the political system(5) which meant participating legally in elections and the drafting of the constitution.
The PCE had, however, to sacrifice a good deal of its policy proposals in committing to moderationnationalisation of industry, tax reform, workers demands, secularisation of education, even commitment to a republic, were lost in the pursuit of legitimacy and respectability within the post-Franco order.(6) In Carrillos words, the great thing today is to smash the forced integration constituted by fascismthe PCEs main ideological goal of the institution of socialism was to be considered a long term goal, subservient to the short term tactical goal of establishing a permanent presence in the post-Franco system(7). Furthermore, in keeping with the eurocommunist philosophy of the majority of western European communist parties at the time, the institution of socialism was to take place within the framework of pluralist democracy as distinct from the model of the Russian Revolution.(8)
Throughout the transition, the PCE imposed rigid discipline on its members in its pursuit of a responsible and moderate image, as illustrated by its orders not to stage mass demonstrations in celebration of their legalisation, and the refusal to endorse a general strike in the Basque country. The PCE electoral platforms in 1977 and 1979 emphasised democracy rather than social reform.(9) Even before this, the PCE had demonstrated this moderation by lending support to the Moncloa Pact between the parties, which consisted of an offer of social reforms and more parliamentary control over economic matters, in exchange for wage restraint. There were also a series of agreements on other issues such as pensions and language education, as well as agreements on some legislative measures necessary for democracy.(10) This was a top-down compromise over worker conditions, meant sacrificing any push for direct action or direct confrontation with the existing establishment. It was not popular with some of the Communist rank-and-file. As a result, the Communist-dominated Comisiones Obreeras (CC.OO.), as well as the Socialist-dominated UGT, lost some ground to more radical labour groups in the period after the Moncloa Pact.(11)
There were, of course, obstacles to the PCE which contributed to its approach and goals, and constituted limiting factors on its behaviour. Fear of the army or a fascist backlash acting as a veto against the PCE or democracy was primary among these. The PCEs relationship with the civil war and the antipathy of the former regime towards it was both a potential strength and a problem. Its clandestine activity in opposition to Franco, and posture as heirs to the Republic(12) gave credibility and prestige which was expected to translate into electoral support as it had for the French and Italian parties after WW2. However, this same image of opposition and continuity was also a liability, for it made the communists a primary enemy of the former regime and its support base. The military, in particular, was seen as extremely hostile and its opposition to the PCEs legalisation may even have jeopardised the entire transition process.(13) Indeed, many simply assumed as automatic that the military would react against the communists if the latter acted to bring about change from the bottom up.(14) The party felt the need to repair its image after these decades of anticommunist propaganda in order to gain legitimacy and obviously, a clearly moderate tone made their legalisation more palatable to sceptical military and right-wing elements.
Two other constraints for the PCE related to its potential base and to popular opinion. One of these constraints was simple realism--there was popular sentiment towards moderation and consensus. Whereas in the Portuguese transition to democracy, there was an attempt at installing a radical socialist regime(15) and popular mobilisation to the extent that it was said at the time that everyone was a socialist(16), in Spain the process was much more top-directed by the King and by Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, the centre-right was stronger, and there was no real energy towards any social revolution.(17) Rather, the mood was, according to a large-scale survey sociological study about the political climate in 1975, one of reform-mindedness rather than desperation or radicalism.(18)
Secondly, the demographics of Spain compelled the PCE to employ tactical and rhetorical moderation to gain broader-based support than was possible through simply representing workers. Thanks to economic change the country was essentially one dominated by the modern middle classes(19) and despite PCE control of the strongest labour movement, the CC.OO., unions represented only a small section of the labour force. This is attributable to the illegality of unions under Franco, as well as the fact that most Spaniards worked in small firms.(20)
In an environment where consensus, moderation and Europeanised democracy held such attraction(21), where traditional unionised workers were no longer a dominant demographic, the PCEs leadership (if not its rank and file) recognised the need for a conciliatory and pragmatic approach in order to attain broader electoral support. Contrasted with the Portuguese example, it is clear that it would have been far more difficult to take a radical line with any success, even assuming a lack of military or Falangist backlash.
What could have been done? Continuismo, reforma and ruptura.
With these constraints on tactics and rhetoric in mind, the question of what other options were open to the PCE leadership during the transition can now be addressed. The main point of potential divergence is in the attitude of the party towards the transition of the regime itself. Could a greater degree of ruptura could have been demanded successfully? At the time of transition there was a spectrum of views ranging from regime maintenance and no democracy; through to democratic change be bought about from reform within the regime; to a complete break with the regime, with the transitions form left open to a popularly elected constituent assembly or some similar process.(22) The three shorthand words for these positions are continuismo, reforma or ruptura.
The PCE clearly agitated for a clean break, ruptura, involving the chance for a vote on a republic as well as likely confrontation with the Franco regimes beneficiaries in the Church, the army, business, and so forth.(23) As events unfolded, however, the Prime Minister Suárez together with Juan Carlos proved to be the main engine of democratic change, essentially working within the Franquist system as its two main wielders of power and reforming it into a pluralist democracy with their power in an entirely legalistic manner. Essentially, the rupturistas were outmanoeuvred by these reformistasthey lost all agency and there was a simple choice of playing ball or refusing to. Refusal and rejection meant either denying themselves the opportunity to shape events (as the PCE was able to do by winning some concessions during the Moncloa Pact in exchange for accepting austerity measures) or perhaps jeopardising the process by strengthening the hand of those who favoured continuismo.(24)
Given the situation within Spain at the time of these events, with the PCE still an illegal party bearing the antipathy of a still dominant army and government, given the lack of popular support for radical change and given its own lack of a strong power-base, it seems highly doubtful that the PCE was in a position to achieve much more of a break with the previous regime than occurred. It sacrificed many of its policy demandsrepublicanism, nationalisations, and so forth, in order to ensure its long-term survival within the system that eventuated, a tactic which was prudent given its own situation and especially given the skill and popularity of the reformist Suárez and Juan Carlos.
As a means of comparison we can return to the contrast with the Portuguese case, in which one of the central differences which provided the Portuguese Communist Party (among others) with an opening to take charge of events to create a genuine ruptura was the regimes lack of ability to manage a reform process itself. Suárez and Juan Carlos, however, had the power to reform, and they used it sufficiently well that the rupturistas never held the upper hand.
After the transition
One final issue that must now be mentioned is the long term electoral direction the PCE took after the transitiondownwards. Once it was clear that top-directed reform towards normal western politics, with no ruptura, was the path Spain would take, the question for the PCE became how to approach pluralist electoral politics. The primary goal was to capture as much of the left vote as possible, and this meant competition with the PSOE. This was, however, made more difficult by internecine struggles within the party over tactics and leadership. Broadly speaking there were 3 factionson one side was a pro-Soviet faction who opposed Eurocommunism and moderation, another was a pro-Eurocommunist group who nonetheless opposed Carrillos autocratic style regarding internal party matters and his lack of movement away from democratic centralism(26), and the third was Carrillos supporters. By 1985 Carrillo had left the PCE and there were three national Communist Parties in Spain with each representing one of these factions(27).
The fractious nature of the Communist left was an inhibiting factor on its electoral success during this period, but equally so was the success of the Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE) in capturing the left vote. Initially the PSOE had sought to articulate a radical line, labelling itself Marxist in the belief that it needed to challenge the PCE on its own territory.(28) Almost in spite of this attempt to move to the left of the PCE, however, the left vote still went to the PSOE (24.9% against the PCEs 9%). With the PCEs status as the anti-Franquist heroes,this seems surprising, but in reality despite its Marxist posturing the PSOE was still seen as more moderate than the PCE(29) and as has been discussed, the electorate was not in the mood for radical politics.
Following this, the PSOE moved clearly towards social democratic pragmatism and even neoliberal economic policies, and continued to command significantly more votes than the PCE. Perhaps the clearest explanation for the lack of greater electoral success of the PCE against the PSOE lies in a simple comparison with the situation of other communist parties in Western Europe. Eurocommunism and the deradicalisation that came with it was a concept that existed in Communist parties beyond Spain, and the PCE were quite closely identified with the Italian and French Communist parties of the time.(30) These parties were attempting, collectively, a response to the increasing untenability of old-style Soviet-directed communist politics and Marxist-Leninist theory and their failure to have any sort of success in the western European democracies.
Carl Boggs argues that Eurocommunism was not so much a new strategy as a transitional phase towards new oppositional forms(31), or perhaps in other words, between an old and a new left. Essentially, then, the PCE attempted to transform from a Marxist party to one with a very social democratic practise, out of a combination of genuine ideological commitment to pluralist democracy, situational necessity, and perceived electoral advantage. However, many factors, not least of which were its internal fractures, and the success of the PSOE in capturing this ground, consigned PCE to minor-party status and decline as politics normalised. The crisis, and the contradiction between new left practice and old left theory, eventually culminated in the creation of IU. This was an ambiguous and complex coalition in which the aim was to both perpetuate the PCE and maximise the electoral success of the left as a whole. The PCE still exists, but its activity is drastically reduced in favour of the activity of the IU and its new left red-green discourse(32). In short, the fate of the PCE in normal western electoral politics has followed that of parties of the left in other western nations, despite the unique circumstances surrounding the transition to democracy.
Conclusiony bit.
The PCEs decisions seem to have had only a limited effect on its long term fate after the death of Franco when compared to circumstances beyond their control. The Communist's decision to play ball with the reformistas, to a greater extent than did the PSOE, bought legitimacy and some degree of influence in the consensus politics of the Moncloa Pact and the writing of the constitution. Although it clearly would have desired clean break with the regime it was in no position to achieve this even if it had demanded and fought for it.
There were too many constraints on its behaviour for it to successfully do thisthese included regime hostility towards it, the lack of a sufficiently strong power base (due to low numbers of unionised workers), the moderation of the electorate, and above all the skill with which Suárez and Juan Carlos acted to bring top-down reform through compromise and consensus.
Carrillos Eurocommunist approach served to both smooth the path to democracy for Spain, and guarantee the PCEs survival in a way that a commitment to ruptura and louder demands for social change would not have done. The PCE did not write its own death warrant by supporting reforma and consensus. Survival and legitimacy were preferable to the potential consequences of the available alternatives. The later cost of normal politics has been high for the PCEthe fracturing of the party, submergence within the IU, de-emphasis on Marxism, and its seeming permanent consignment to minor party status, but this is part of a broader international trend within communism in Europe, the same fate that befell communist parties elsewhere, and it cannot be blamed on the direction Carrillo and the PCE took during democratisation.
---
1 H Wiarda, Spain 2000: A Normal Country? Mediterranean Quarterly, 11, 3, 2000, p30-61
2 E R Arango, Spain: Democracy Regained, (Westview Press, USA, 1995) p202
3 L Morlino, Consolidation and Party Government in Southern Europe, International Political Science Review, 16, 2, 1995, p147
4 Arango, Democracy Regained, p201
5 C Boggs, the Socialist tradition, (Routledge, NY, 1995) p104-5
6 E Mortimer, J Story and P F D Torre, Whatever happened to Eurocommunism? International Affairs, 55, 4, 1979, p579-80
7 Ibid, p580
8 C Boggs, Socialist Tradition, p103-105
9 J Coverdale, The political transformation of Spain after Franco (Praeger, NY, 1979) p65
10 Coverdale, Spain after Franco, p92
11 Mortimer, Story and Torre, Eurocommunism? p580-81
12 Arango, Democracy Regained, p201
13 K Medhurst, Spains evolutionary pathway from dictatorship to democracy in G Pridham (ed) The New Mediterranean Democracies, (Frank Cass and Company, London, 1984), p37-38
14 Arango, Democracy Regained, p106
15 Morlino, Consolidation and Party Government, p158
16 N Bermeo, Redemocratization and Transition Elections: A comparison of Spain and Portugal Comparative Politics, 19, 2, Jan 1987, p216
17 Bermeo, A comparison of Spain and Portugal, p219
18 Arango, Democracy Regained, p112 (summarising the sociological survey Informe sociológico sobre el cambio politico en España, 1975-1981 published by Fundación Foessa)
19 Ibid, p222
20 Mortimer, Story and Torre, Eurocommunism? p580, 582
21 Bemeo, A comparison of Spain and Portugal, p218
22 Medhurst, Dictatorship to democracy, p33-34
23 Ibid. p34
24 Arango, Democracy Regained, p108-9
25 Bemeo, A comparison of Spain and Portugal, p214
26 L Ramiro-Fernández, Electoral competition, organizational constraints and party change: the Comunist Party of Spain (PCE) and United Left (IU), 1986-2000 Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 20, 2, June 2004, p2
27 Arango, Democracy Regained, p202-203
28 Ibid, p193
29 Ibid, p196
30 Mortimer, Story and Torre, Eurocommunism?
31 Boggs, The Socialist tradition, p129
32 L Ramiro-Fernández, the PCE and IU, 1986-2000 p23-24
At the time of the transition from Francoist dictatorship to democracy and what can be termed, with a few caveats, normal Western European politics(1), the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) occupied a significant position within the politics as one of the major forces that emerged after the legalisation of political parties. It took a moderate and cooperative approach to the process and committed itself to electoral politics in the same way that other Western European Communist parties had done. The party went to the elections of 1977 and 1979 with this approach, polling 9.3% and 10.9% of the vote.(2) This was considered a disappointing outcome by many, given the PCEs role in the clandestine opposition to the Franco regime. Subsequently, the party went into a period of decline and crisis, with schisms, leadership strife and the departure of prominent members, increasing electoral irrelevance, and the risk of complete dissolution. Ultimately the result was the PCE's submergence within a broader coalition-type structure known as the United Left (Izquierda Unida - IU).
In analysing the role of the PCE and the merit of its moderate approach during this period, and in its subsequent performance within the politics of Spain, three questions must be answered. First, what were the goals of the PCE in the aftermath of Francos death? Second, were there any alternative paths available throughout the transition? Third, why did the PCE go into decline and crisis after the transition to normal electoral politics?
What happened
From the beginning of the democratisation process, the PCE took a moderate line and was fully integrated into the regime from the beginning.(3) The leader, Santiago Carrillo, was an important presence and his attitudes are credited with contributing significantly to the relatively smooth transition.(4) In the aftermath of the decades-long underground struggle against the Franco regime, the PCEs goals, as articulated by Carrillo were to, in the short term, restore Spain to pluralism and political liberty and to stake out a claim to a legitimate position within the political system(5) which meant participating legally in elections and the drafting of the constitution.
The PCE had, however, to sacrifice a good deal of its policy proposals in committing to moderationnationalisation of industry, tax reform, workers demands, secularisation of education, even commitment to a republic, were lost in the pursuit of legitimacy and respectability within the post-Franco order.(6) In Carrillos words, the great thing today is to smash the forced integration constituted by fascismthe PCEs main ideological goal of the institution of socialism was to be considered a long term goal, subservient to the short term tactical goal of establishing a permanent presence in the post-Franco system(7). Furthermore, in keeping with the eurocommunist philosophy of the majority of western European communist parties at the time, the institution of socialism was to take place within the framework of pluralist democracy as distinct from the model of the Russian Revolution.(8)
Throughout the transition, the PCE imposed rigid discipline on its members in its pursuit of a responsible and moderate image, as illustrated by its orders not to stage mass demonstrations in celebration of their legalisation, and the refusal to endorse a general strike in the Basque country. The PCE electoral platforms in 1977 and 1979 emphasised democracy rather than social reform.(9) Even before this, the PCE had demonstrated this moderation by lending support to the Moncloa Pact between the parties, which consisted of an offer of social reforms and more parliamentary control over economic matters, in exchange for wage restraint. There were also a series of agreements on other issues such as pensions and language education, as well as agreements on some legislative measures necessary for democracy.(10) This was a top-down compromise over worker conditions, meant sacrificing any push for direct action or direct confrontation with the existing establishment. It was not popular with some of the Communist rank-and-file. As a result, the Communist-dominated Comisiones Obreeras (CC.OO.), as well as the Socialist-dominated UGT, lost some ground to more radical labour groups in the period after the Moncloa Pact.(11)
There were, of course, obstacles to the PCE which contributed to its approach and goals, and constituted limiting factors on its behaviour. Fear of the army or a fascist backlash acting as a veto against the PCE or democracy was primary among these. The PCEs relationship with the civil war and the antipathy of the former regime towards it was both a potential strength and a problem. Its clandestine activity in opposition to Franco, and posture as heirs to the Republic(12) gave credibility and prestige which was expected to translate into electoral support as it had for the French and Italian parties after WW2. However, this same image of opposition and continuity was also a liability, for it made the communists a primary enemy of the former regime and its support base. The military, in particular, was seen as extremely hostile and its opposition to the PCEs legalisation may even have jeopardised the entire transition process.(13) Indeed, many simply assumed as automatic that the military would react against the communists if the latter acted to bring about change from the bottom up.(14) The party felt the need to repair its image after these decades of anticommunist propaganda in order to gain legitimacy and obviously, a clearly moderate tone made their legalisation more palatable to sceptical military and right-wing elements.
Two other constraints for the PCE related to its potential base and to popular opinion. One of these constraints was simple realism--there was popular sentiment towards moderation and consensus. Whereas in the Portuguese transition to democracy, there was an attempt at installing a radical socialist regime(15) and popular mobilisation to the extent that it was said at the time that everyone was a socialist(16), in Spain the process was much more top-directed by the King and by Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, the centre-right was stronger, and there was no real energy towards any social revolution.(17) Rather, the mood was, according to a large-scale survey sociological study about the political climate in 1975, one of reform-mindedness rather than desperation or radicalism.(18)
Secondly, the demographics of Spain compelled the PCE to employ tactical and rhetorical moderation to gain broader-based support than was possible through simply representing workers. Thanks to economic change the country was essentially one dominated by the modern middle classes(19) and despite PCE control of the strongest labour movement, the CC.OO., unions represented only a small section of the labour force. This is attributable to the illegality of unions under Franco, as well as the fact that most Spaniards worked in small firms.(20)
In an environment where consensus, moderation and Europeanised democracy held such attraction(21), where traditional unionised workers were no longer a dominant demographic, the PCEs leadership (if not its rank and file) recognised the need for a conciliatory and pragmatic approach in order to attain broader electoral support. Contrasted with the Portuguese example, it is clear that it would have been far more difficult to take a radical line with any success, even assuming a lack of military or Falangist backlash.
What could have been done? Continuismo, reforma and ruptura.
With these constraints on tactics and rhetoric in mind, the question of what other options were open to the PCE leadership during the transition can now be addressed. The main point of potential divergence is in the attitude of the party towards the transition of the regime itself. Could a greater degree of ruptura could have been demanded successfully? At the time of transition there was a spectrum of views ranging from regime maintenance and no democracy; through to democratic change be bought about from reform within the regime; to a complete break with the regime, with the transitions form left open to a popularly elected constituent assembly or some similar process.(22) The three shorthand words for these positions are continuismo, reforma or ruptura.
The PCE clearly agitated for a clean break, ruptura, involving the chance for a vote on a republic as well as likely confrontation with the Franco regimes beneficiaries in the Church, the army, business, and so forth.(23) As events unfolded, however, the Prime Minister Suárez together with Juan Carlos proved to be the main engine of democratic change, essentially working within the Franquist system as its two main wielders of power and reforming it into a pluralist democracy with their power in an entirely legalistic manner. Essentially, the rupturistas were outmanoeuvred by these reformistasthey lost all agency and there was a simple choice of playing ball or refusing to. Refusal and rejection meant either denying themselves the opportunity to shape events (as the PCE was able to do by winning some concessions during the Moncloa Pact in exchange for accepting austerity measures) or perhaps jeopardising the process by strengthening the hand of those who favoured continuismo.(24)
Given the situation within Spain at the time of these events, with the PCE still an illegal party bearing the antipathy of a still dominant army and government, given the lack of popular support for radical change and given its own lack of a strong power-base, it seems highly doubtful that the PCE was in a position to achieve much more of a break with the previous regime than occurred. It sacrificed many of its policy demandsrepublicanism, nationalisations, and so forth, in order to ensure its long-term survival within the system that eventuated, a tactic which was prudent given its own situation and especially given the skill and popularity of the reformist Suárez and Juan Carlos.
As a means of comparison we can return to the contrast with the Portuguese case, in which one of the central differences which provided the Portuguese Communist Party (among others) with an opening to take charge of events to create a genuine ruptura was the regimes lack of ability to manage a reform process itself. Suárez and Juan Carlos, however, had the power to reform, and they used it sufficiently well that the rupturistas never held the upper hand.
After the transition
One final issue that must now be mentioned is the long term electoral direction the PCE took after the transitiondownwards. Once it was clear that top-directed reform towards normal western politics, with no ruptura, was the path Spain would take, the question for the PCE became how to approach pluralist electoral politics. The primary goal was to capture as much of the left vote as possible, and this meant competition with the PSOE. This was, however, made more difficult by internecine struggles within the party over tactics and leadership. Broadly speaking there were 3 factionson one side was a pro-Soviet faction who opposed Eurocommunism and moderation, another was a pro-Eurocommunist group who nonetheless opposed Carrillos autocratic style regarding internal party matters and his lack of movement away from democratic centralism(26), and the third was Carrillos supporters. By 1985 Carrillo had left the PCE and there were three national Communist Parties in Spain with each representing one of these factions(27).
The fractious nature of the Communist left was an inhibiting factor on its electoral success during this period, but equally so was the success of the Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE) in capturing the left vote. Initially the PSOE had sought to articulate a radical line, labelling itself Marxist in the belief that it needed to challenge the PCE on its own territory.(28) Almost in spite of this attempt to move to the left of the PCE, however, the left vote still went to the PSOE (24.9% against the PCEs 9%). With the PCEs status as the anti-Franquist heroes,this seems surprising, but in reality despite its Marxist posturing the PSOE was still seen as more moderate than the PCE(29) and as has been discussed, the electorate was not in the mood for radical politics.
Following this, the PSOE moved clearly towards social democratic pragmatism and even neoliberal economic policies, and continued to command significantly more votes than the PCE. Perhaps the clearest explanation for the lack of greater electoral success of the PCE against the PSOE lies in a simple comparison with the situation of other communist parties in Western Europe. Eurocommunism and the deradicalisation that came with it was a concept that existed in Communist parties beyond Spain, and the PCE were quite closely identified with the Italian and French Communist parties of the time.(30) These parties were attempting, collectively, a response to the increasing untenability of old-style Soviet-directed communist politics and Marxist-Leninist theory and their failure to have any sort of success in the western European democracies.
Carl Boggs argues that Eurocommunism was not so much a new strategy as a transitional phase towards new oppositional forms(31), or perhaps in other words, between an old and a new left. Essentially, then, the PCE attempted to transform from a Marxist party to one with a very social democratic practise, out of a combination of genuine ideological commitment to pluralist democracy, situational necessity, and perceived electoral advantage. However, many factors, not least of which were its internal fractures, and the success of the PSOE in capturing this ground, consigned PCE to minor-party status and decline as politics normalised. The crisis, and the contradiction between new left practice and old left theory, eventually culminated in the creation of IU. This was an ambiguous and complex coalition in which the aim was to both perpetuate the PCE and maximise the electoral success of the left as a whole. The PCE still exists, but its activity is drastically reduced in favour of the activity of the IU and its new left red-green discourse(32). In short, the fate of the PCE in normal western electoral politics has followed that of parties of the left in other western nations, despite the unique circumstances surrounding the transition to democracy.
Conclusiony bit.
The PCEs decisions seem to have had only a limited effect on its long term fate after the death of Franco when compared to circumstances beyond their control. The Communist's decision to play ball with the reformistas, to a greater extent than did the PSOE, bought legitimacy and some degree of influence in the consensus politics of the Moncloa Pact and the writing of the constitution. Although it clearly would have desired clean break with the regime it was in no position to achieve this even if it had demanded and fought for it.
There were too many constraints on its behaviour for it to successfully do thisthese included regime hostility towards it, the lack of a sufficiently strong power base (due to low numbers of unionised workers), the moderation of the electorate, and above all the skill with which Suárez and Juan Carlos acted to bring top-down reform through compromise and consensus.
Carrillos Eurocommunist approach served to both smooth the path to democracy for Spain, and guarantee the PCEs survival in a way that a commitment to ruptura and louder demands for social change would not have done. The PCE did not write its own death warrant by supporting reforma and consensus. Survival and legitimacy were preferable to the potential consequences of the available alternatives. The later cost of normal politics has been high for the PCEthe fracturing of the party, submergence within the IU, de-emphasis on Marxism, and its seeming permanent consignment to minor party status, but this is part of a broader international trend within communism in Europe, the same fate that befell communist parties elsewhere, and it cannot be blamed on the direction Carrillo and the PCE took during democratisation.
---
1 H Wiarda, Spain 2000: A Normal Country? Mediterranean Quarterly, 11, 3, 2000, p30-61
2 E R Arango, Spain: Democracy Regained, (Westview Press, USA, 1995) p202
3 L Morlino, Consolidation and Party Government in Southern Europe, International Political Science Review, 16, 2, 1995, p147
4 Arango, Democracy Regained, p201
5 C Boggs, the Socialist tradition, (Routledge, NY, 1995) p104-5
6 E Mortimer, J Story and P F D Torre, Whatever happened to Eurocommunism? International Affairs, 55, 4, 1979, p579-80
7 Ibid, p580
8 C Boggs, Socialist Tradition, p103-105
9 J Coverdale, The political transformation of Spain after Franco (Praeger, NY, 1979) p65
10 Coverdale, Spain after Franco, p92
11 Mortimer, Story and Torre, Eurocommunism? p580-81
12 Arango, Democracy Regained, p201
13 K Medhurst, Spains evolutionary pathway from dictatorship to democracy in G Pridham (ed) The New Mediterranean Democracies, (Frank Cass and Company, London, 1984), p37-38
14 Arango, Democracy Regained, p106
15 Morlino, Consolidation and Party Government, p158
16 N Bermeo, Redemocratization and Transition Elections: A comparison of Spain and Portugal Comparative Politics, 19, 2, Jan 1987, p216
17 Bermeo, A comparison of Spain and Portugal, p219
18 Arango, Democracy Regained, p112 (summarising the sociological survey Informe sociológico sobre el cambio politico en España, 1975-1981 published by Fundación Foessa)
19 Ibid, p222
20 Mortimer, Story and Torre, Eurocommunism? p580, 582
21 Bemeo, A comparison of Spain and Portugal, p218
22 Medhurst, Dictatorship to democracy, p33-34
23 Ibid. p34
24 Arango, Democracy Regained, p108-9
25 Bemeo, A comparison of Spain and Portugal, p214
26 L Ramiro-Fernández, Electoral competition, organizational constraints and party change: the Comunist Party of Spain (PCE) and United Left (IU), 1986-2000 Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 20, 2, June 2004, p2
27 Arango, Democracy Regained, p202-203
28 Ibid, p193
29 Ibid, p196
30 Mortimer, Story and Torre, Eurocommunism?
31 Boggs, The Socialist tradition, p129
32 L Ramiro-Fernández, the PCE and IU, 1986-2000 p23-24
