The 10 most notable modern military strategists

vogtmurr

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When I was working on 10 greatest military leaders, I realized it was really impossible to rate modern high level strategists on the same scale as older historical periods. But I found 10 stories worth telling, and I've rated them here. This history is more current, and therefore can be more controversial. I do certainly try to be consistent and give credit where it is due. Of course I express my own value judgement, but it is mostly for interests sake, not to make a point. Anyway, together they kind of make a disjointed story of their own. Hope you enjoy them.
:)
 
Modern Strategists. The top 10 most notable modern military leaders at the strategic level. This is an arbitrary distinction – I actually consider von Manstein to be more of an operational commander, but his career was a hybrid, like Zhukov and Yamamoto.

1. Helmuth von Moltke the Elder – was chief of the general staff for Prussia, and afterwards united Germany, for 30 years. He effectively transitioned the command structure to modern methods of directing large armies in the field.

Moltke was admired as a brilliant young officer and instructor, and as an artist, historian, traveler, author, and scholar who knew 7 languages. He was also a dyed in the wool nationalist. His first post in the field was as a military advisor to the Ottoman Empire, during which he explored and mapped vast areas of Asia Minor and the Middle East on horseback. The Turks were at a nadir, and their general refused his advice leading to a trouncing by the Egyptians of Mehemet Ali at Nizib. Moltke escaped to Constantinople with difficulty, and returned to Berlin. He held other high-profile appointments, and conceived a plan for the strategic use of railroads.

As chief of staff, he had to take a personal interest in the Schleswig War with Denmark to bring it to a successful close. Moltke was a disciple of von Clausewitz, and studied Napoleon and Waterloo in developing his theory of several army corps operating independently and exercising a range of options within a broad plan and common objectives. He is credited with the phrase “No battle plan survives contact with the enemy”, meaning that the general staff had plans to meet any combination of variables. Prussia faced two armies in the war against Austria-Hungary, Saxony, and other German states, and his theories paid off. A successful holding action against one of the armies, allowed him to then concentrate forces 100 miles apart against the larger Austrian army at Sadowa (Konniggratz), one of the biggest and bloodiest battles fought in Europe to date. It was a decisive victory, partly won by faster breech loading rifles, but Moltke was unsatisfied, planning to cut off the retreat before the attack on one flank was too successful. It didn’t matter, Prussia had achieved German unification without further interference from Austria-Hungary. Moltke actually bolstered Bismarck’s confidence in his diplomatic stance, that he could handle the intervention of France as well, which would be next.

Napoleon III had a solid reputation from the Wars of Italian Independence and was aspiring to the legendary status of his famous uncle, but Moltke had been planning this for years. The timing and flexibility of his 3 army strategy was tested in unexpected battles at Spicheren and Worth, which were won, but he was forced by royal command to carry a bloody victory at Gravelotte with disproportionately high losses. The French Chassepot rifle was an impressive advance, and they had mitrailleuses, early machineguns, but the German Krupp artillery was superior in numbers and performance. At any rate, with Bazaine’s army shut up in Metz, Moltke was able to concentrate on MacMahon at Sedan. After several costly attempts to break the German ring closing in, the entire French army surrendered, including Napoleon III. The last French army was in Paris, where the provisional government made every effort to turn the fortunes for France. Moltke took his time reducing both Paris and Metz, applying a “judicious economy of force”, and resisted pressure to bombard the city mercilessly, though Bismarck eventually overruled him. The raising of piecemeal armies in the French Departments could not affect the outcome, as first Bazaine, then Paris surrendered, despite the brutal Communard revolt. (Later, Bazaine was to be executed as a scapegoat, but he made a daring escape down a cliff, served in Spain, and his shrine is still kept by the French Foreign Legion – no lack of bravery here).

It was a humiliating defeat for France they would remember on the road to WWI, when they faced Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. Germany had become an empire, led by Bismarck hand in hand with von Moltke in the dramatic rise of the new superpower in Europe. He spent the last 20 of his 91 years as a member of the new German Reichstag.
Successful Campaigns: 4 Innovation: 5 Direct Leadership: 4 Casualty Ratio: 4 Legacy: 4

2. Erich von Manstein – born Fritz Erich von Lewinski, came from a Prussian military background, with generals past and current in both his natural and adopted (uncle’s) families. He was wounded early in WWI and served as a staff officer on nearly all European fronts.

He was in the formation of the small Reichswehr allowed by Versailles, and rose up the ranks to the general staff. Their goal was to create a highly trained cadre of officers, loyal only to national interest. With the end of the Weimar Republic, that loyalty was subverted to the ambition of the Nazi regime. By 1935 he was head of the Operations Branch and proposed the development of self-propelled assault guns, which would prove to be one of the most successful and cost-effective German weapons. Although he initially supported Beck’s resistance to Nazi influence, he would not sacrifice his own career or a chance for Germany’s rise from the ashes. Privately, Manstein preferred Poland as a buffer state and potential ally. But in the invasion, theater commander von Rundstedt accepted Manstein’s plans and his adjustments as the campaign unfolded, leading to a rapid victory.

Rundstedt and Manstein together assembled the plan for the invasion of France the following year, relieved when the threat of a two front war receded. Manstein, with Guderian, proposed an alternative to the expected repeat of the Schlieffen Plan, by attacking through the Ardennes, with a second thrust to outflank the Maginot Line. Ober-commander Halder had Manstein removed from the HQ staff and sent to the front as a corps commander. But the plan, with modifications, was an outstanding success, trapping the Allied armies in Flanders and Belgium. Manstein’s corps achieved the first breakthrough across the Seine, and he was promoted to full general for suggesting the plan. It was one example where stubborn belief in his own abilities, and disregard for that of his peers, resulted in success and brought him to the attention of Hitler.

He commanded a Panzer corps in Barbarossa, advancing 100 miles in 2 days and capturing vital bridges. Taking command of a full army after the death of its commander, Manstein was tasked with the reduction of Russian fortresses in the Crimea and Sevastopol. But the Russians counterattacked with two landings in the winter offensive. It was not until May 1942 that Manstein cleared the Kerch Peninsula, destroying three Russian armies, and resumed the siege. He employed the largest guns ever used in war and by July his troops stormed the inner defenses. Field Marshal Manstein next went to Leningrad to repeat the success but another Russian spoiling attack forced him to divert his forces to avoid catastrophe. In bitter fighting he managed to outmaneuver larger Soviet armies, inflicting 60,000 casualties, but the siege of Leningrad would drag on.

By November, Paulus’ 6th Army had been encircled at Stalingrad, and Hitler’s troubleshooter went south again. With Hoth’s Panzer army and auxillary elements, Manstein fought to within 30 miles of the German pocket, but encountered heavy resistance and was driven back. He recommended a simultaneous breakout by Paulus, but dared not give the order directly. Although he sustained the attempt for 3 weeks putting great pressure on the Russian ring, both Hitler and Paulus refused to breakout, making his relief attempt pointless. It was desperate, but had this been coordinated, some of these doomed men may have escaped. It was an irrevocable break with Hitler, and Manstein would now question his judgement openly. However, Manstein was already busy preventing his own disaster as the Russians again struck at a weak point in Little Saturn, and Army Group A was nearly trapped in the Caucasus. "Manstein sent the 6th Panzer Division to the Italians' aid — of the 130,000 encircled troops, 45,000 survived to join the Panzers at Chertkovo on 17 January....With the relief column under threat of encirclement, Manstein had no choice but to retreat back to Kotelnikovo on 29 December, leaving the encircled Germans at Stalingrad to their fate (of the 300,000 soldiers encircled 90,000 survived to be taken prisoner. Only 5,000 lived to return to Germany.). The limited scope of the Soviet offensive also gave General Ewald von Kleist time to withdraw his Army Group A out of the Caucasus and back over the Don at Rostov." German units fought desperately to hold a line on the Don while this took place, and a general retreat was executed.

Von Manstein regrouped the southern front and counterattacked an overextended Soviet flank near Kharkov. By March 1943, he had scored a major success, recapturing the city after heavy street fighting, and capturing much Russian heavy equipment. He was ready to follow up with another tactical opportunity, but Hitler was so encouraged he authorized Citadel, the elimination of a Russian salient at Kursk-Orel in a strategic operation closer to the center of the front. The northern pincer movement was a disaster from the outset, achieving little ground, but the southern pincer under Manstein penetrated deeper and broke a Russian armored counterattack. He had achieved local superiority and refused Hitler's orders to withdraw, but could not have sustained it alone anyway. The Russian counterattack was immediate and Manstein’s Army Group South inflicted heavy casualties in a fighting withdrawal to the Dnieper, then launched another German counterattack around the flank of the Russians threatening Zhitomir. Many notable victories were won by Hermann Balck’s 4th Panzer Army but by January 1944 Manstein was forced to retreat against the last massive Russian winter offensive. Along the way he disobeyed orders and extracted the Korsun (Cherkassy) pocket with 56,000 men, which Hitler approved after it already succeeded.

Manstein’s mobile flexible defense was contrary to Hitler’s static ‘stand or die’ orders. It was too late anyway, but Manstein’s resolve to do the job properly made him “publicly advocate that Hitler relinquish control and leave the management of the war to professionals”. Hitler actually had to defend his control against his most prestigious general, but it wasn’t long before Himmler and Goering had Manstein removed for ‘defeatism’ ! He knew about the attempt on Hitler’s life but “Prussian Field Marshals do not mutiny,” though he did not betray the plot.

He escaped to the west with his family at the end of the war, and was called as a witness at Nuremberg. However, to placate the Russians he was placed on trial for war crimes. Montgomery, and Churchill (no longer in office) donated money for his defense. There was one piece of damning evidence that in 1941 he authorized harsh anti-partisan activities, specifically targeting Jewish collaborators. “The Jewish Bolshevik system must be wiped out once and for all…The German soldier has therefore not only the task of crushing the military potential of this system. He comes also as the bearer of a racial concept and as the avenger of all the cruelties which have been perpetrated on him and on the German people.” The order recognized that foodstocks would be diverted to the Reich, and occupied cities would have to go hungry. Yet also, “severe steps will be taken against arbitrary action and self-interest, against savagery and indiscipline, against any violation of the honor of the soldier.” He disclaimed knowledge of some of the content. We can’t pretend he would have gone out of his way to save Jews from the camps – but there is no evidence he voluntarily or knowingly sent any to their death either. It is ironic though that the Soviets prosecuted the charge of scorched earth against Manstein.

It was enough to get him an 18 year sentence in 1949, commuted to 12, but after 4 years he was released for health reasons. In the demilitarized state of post-war Germany, Manstein was recalled by Konrad Adenauer to advise on the creation of the Bundeswehr. It was the Cold War, and his remarkable string of victories and near successes in a losing cause was not forgotten. Manstein theorized that without Hitler’s deranged interference, the Wehrmacht would have won on the eastern front.
Successful Campaigns: 5 Innovation: 4 Direct Leadership: 4 Casualty Ratio: 4 Legacy: 3

3. Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill – Some might wonder why a somewhat (by today’s standards) controversial head of state is included on a list of great military leaders. The simple fact is he had direct responsibility for many armaments and strategic war decisions in WWI, and as head of state in WWII, almost every strategic, armament and major tactical decision did not get passed without his personal attention and input. He was also an energetic and persuasive wartime politician whose diplomatic efforts are largely responsible for keeping Britain in the war, forming the tripartite alliance with US and Russia, determining the fate of Europe post-war, and the United Nations.

Like many ambitious aristocrats he took to soldiering with a passion, in a variety of posts worldwide, including narrow escapes at Malakand, Afghanistan, and from a POW camp in the Boer War. As First Sea Lord in WWI he partnered with ‘Jackie’ Fisher in planning naval construction and operations. He also helped father the development of tanks in Britain. In his eagerness for military action he was in the line at the defense of Antwerp, but this drew probing questions as to his priorities. With the bloody stalemate on the western front, Churchill conceived of a naval operation in the Dardanelles to knock Turkey out of the war and open a supply line to Russia.

I have read some accounts of the decision making process and prosecution of this campaign; and the fact is it was so watered down by compromises and delays, that any opportunity for quick success was missed. Once committed, the allies felt they had to follow up with landings on Gallipoli. He had no control over the outcome, but it was bungled and Churchill was betrayed by the actions of some of his peers. The best part of it was the brilliant execution of the evacuation of British, French, and ANZAC forces without casualties. Regardless, he had quarreled with many influential people to get his way, and along with others, had to pay the price of partial responsibility for this debacle. He resigned after a valedictory speech and was given a non-entity role he soon quit, and went to the front lines commanding a battalion. He criticized the wasteful attrition on the western front, but in humorous recollection, preferred it there because HQ was ‘dry’.

Churchill survived his political setback stoically through various changes in parliament by his basic common sense, and was at the forefront of many diplomatic decisions, but his outspokenness continued. He supported the intervention against the Bolsheviks, aided the Polish independence movement, signed the articles recognizing the Irish Free State, and opposed Indian nationalism. He called the Indian Congress leaders “Brahmins who mouth and patter principles of Western Liberalism.” Churchill took criticism for not relieving the later Bengal famine in WWII, but the reason it happened was the loss of imports from Burma by the Japanese occupation. His biggest mistake in inter-war years was his unqualified support of the Gold Standard which depressed the English economy and led to a general strike. Churchill commented that Mussolini had “a way to combat subversive forces”.

However he was one of the first voices raised in warning against the rise of Nazism. His support of King Edward VIII during the abdication crisis left him politically isolated (really, Wallis Simpson would have been completely inappropriate as a queen); and he left parliament, but remained connected to the machinations of defense. After the Munich Agreement he chastised Chamberlain: “You were given the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour, and you will have war.” When war came the RN signaled “Winston is back" as 1st Lord of the Admiralty, and by 1940 Chamberlain resigned. The first real attempt at checking Hitler's power was the closely fought campaign in Norway.

Despite the accumulated disasters and the bleak outlook of a Soviet-Nazi rapprochement, Churchill rejected any armistice with Germany. Buoyed by the 'miracle' of Dunkirk, his speeches were a great inspiration: “...we shall fight in France,…on the seas and oceans,…with growing confidence and strength in the air, we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be…we shall never surrender.” But retreat is not a victory, “Let us therefore…bear ourselves, that if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, ‘This was their finest hour’.” He authorized the strike against Vichy French naval assets, and later British interventions on the continent at great risk wherever the desire to resist was real.

Churchill authorized the RAF attacks on Berlin that changed the Luftwaffe’s focus to reprisal in terror raids on London, giving the RAF time to recover, as it was on the verge of collapse. As success in the Battle of Britain became certain, he proclaimed “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few”. But many dark months lay ahead with the threat of strategic shortages and starvation in the U-boat war. Nonetheless, when Hitler launched Barbarossa in June 1941 he unhesitatingly pledged aid to Communist Russia, which he distrusted, under Stalin, whom he could never conceal his dislike for. “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would at least make a favourable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.”

Churchill developed a genuine friendship with Franklin D. Roosevelt that would lead to the Lend-Lease agreement and eventually “in God's good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the Old.” Overstretched, Britain, India, and its ANZAC allies, would have been under enormous pressure in a war against Japan, without the US. Churchill never made an attempt to paint a picture of false optimism. When the Commonwealth finally savoured the taste of a decisive victory at El Alamein he stated “This is not…even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning”.

Churchill initiated the Strategic Operations Executive which conducted covert and partisan operations in occupied territories with great success, and also the Commandos; which would evolve with the SAS into other intelligence branches (the origin of ‘MI-6’ ?). Despite mild heart attacks and pneumonia he traveled over 100,000 miles meeting various allied leaders.

After the overkill in bombing raids against Dresden Churchill issued a memo: “…the moment has come when the question of bombing German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror,…should be reviewed...I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives…rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction…” It was reworded for issue. As the war drew to a close, he maneuvered for the autonomy of Poland and other eastern European states, but failed. He authorized the transfer of nationals from occupied areas to the new borders, but it resulted in another wave of terror in reprisals against Germans, and imprisonment or death of prisoners and refugees returning to eastern bloc countries. Churchill was prepared “to impose upon Russia the will of the United States and the British Empire.”

As a judge of character Churchill was usually dead on. He early recognized the value of Charles de Gaulle as leader of the Free French, despite the latter’s anti-Anglo stance, and supported his appointment in opposition to the hapless puppet Eisenhower proposed. He epitomized the tenacity of a ‘British Bulldog’ (a term the Russians gave him) and acted with unimpeachable integrity. As a political leader in wartime there could be no better choice, but in 1945 his party stepped down. Still, the ice forming in the Cold War and Korea led to his election for another term in 1951. He did not take well to the gradual dismemberment of the British Empire.

Churchill was a prolific historian who produced numerous volumes of well-written works on almost every subject he was privileged to be an expert on, which garnered him a Nobel Prize, and also the primary source of his income. He was also a quite credible impressionist painter, a hobby he cultivated to dispel the ‘black dog’ of depression as he called it. He died age 90, leaving among many memories, that of his acerbic wit. Life in Parliament must have been interesting with him around. The following outtakes with the first female Members illustrate a lovable, if politically incorrect curmudgeon (thanks Sharwood):
Lady Astor: "Winston, you're drunk!"
Churchill: "Yes my dear, and you are ugly. But I shall be sober in the morning."
Female Labour MP: "Mr Churchill, if you were my husband I'd put poison in your coffee."
Churchill: "And if I were you're husband I'd drink it."
Successful Campaigns: 5 Innovation: 4 Direct Leadership: 2 Casualty Ratio: 4 Legacy: 5

4. Admiral Chester Nimitz – born in Texas the son of a German merchant mariner, graduated from Naval Academy with distinction in 1905. His early career required 2 years at sea to receive a commission. He remained on Asiatic station, and ran aground commanding a destroyer off the Philippines. This got him a court martial and reprimand.

He returned to the US and got in the ground floor of the submarine force, commanding several subs, not exactly an enviable position at the time. He studied diesel engines in Germany and in WWI became chief of staff to the commander, Atlantic submarine fleet. With a Letter of Commendation he moved up to Senior Member, Board of Submarine Design. Between the wars he served as chief officer on major surface ships, and established the first Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps unit, but continued to command submarine flotillas. By the time of Pearl Harbor he had commanded battle forces, and was Chief of Bureau of Navigation.

He became C-in-C, Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral. Within 6 months, the Pacific fleet fought back to back battles at Coral Sea and Midway. Nimitz received the intercept of Japanese naval code, and positioned the US carrier forces for an ambush. Whereas the Japanese made mistakes, the Americans did not. The odds were about even, but with somewhat inferior aircraft (except the Dauntless dive bomber) operational commanders like Fletcher, turned the tide in the Pacific war. Nimitz had control over all Allied units: air, land, and sea, in the Pacific, and conceived the island hopping campaign; to extend US bases and roll up the Japanese Empire. This would strand substantial Japanese island garrisons that were left behind and starved.

C-in-C of the Navy King ordered the opening campaign on Guadalcanal, where tactically, the Japanese achieved a naval victory. At one point there was not a single US carrier in action in the Pacific, and Nimitz replaced Ghormley with Halsey. But land based Marine aircraft kept the US from collapsing, even when their surface ships could only enter the Slot by daytime.

By 1944 he was Admiral of the Fleet, though the credit for the great battles of Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf, and any misjudgments, go to his operational commanders. It was Nimitz, 3000 miles away in Hawaii, who finally reined in Halsey to protect Kincaid’s 7th fleet from Kurita’s center force that suddenly emerged from the San Bernardino Strait. It was too late to help, but a close one anyway. Note that Spruance took heat for refusing to let Mitscher leave the landing at Saipan exposed, against what he presumed was a carrier diversion in the Philippine Sea. After this Nimitz moved his headquarters to Guam.

It is difficult to assess how much Nimitz controlled the actions of US forces in the Pacific, but he had the challenging assignment to plan and manage the overall strategic campaign by land, sea, and air forces, with their associated logistics, over a 15,000 mile string of archipelagos. Nimitz chose where the island battles took place, while the IJN determined where the naval battles took place, except when they encountered surprisingly effective US submarines. The last big island battles were Iwo Jima and Okinawa, where Nimitz was present. After typhoons, thousands of kamikaze attacks, and the last sortie of the IJN, he took the unprecedented step of relieving his naval commanders in that prolonged campaign to rest and recuperate.

With overwhelming firepower, the Allied Pacific Fleet was able to sail directly into Japan’s territorial waters near war’s end, and Nimitz signed for the US aboard the Missouri. Postwar he had the difficult task of gradually scaling back the US navy to peacetime levels, moving many new ships into reserve, and eventually some to the scrap yard.

Nimitz showed respect and magnanimity towards the US’s former enemies, but also a certain Espirit de Corps with former admirals. He furnished an affidavit in support of Donitz at the Nuremberg trial, on the practice of unrestricted submarine warfare, which he himself had employed throughout the Pacific. This reduced a possible death sentence to 10 years imprisonment, after which Nimitz visited Donitz (maybe no surprise he had the Pacific theater). He also raised funds for the restoration of the Mikasa, Togo’s flagship in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. It was a significant gesture in the Cold War era.

In a UN security resolution, he was accepted by India and Pakistan to administer the plebiscite in the dispute over Jammu-Kashmir.
Successful Campaigns: 5 Innovation: 4 Direct Leadership: 3 Casualty Ratio: 4 Legacy: 4
 
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5. Georgy Zhukov – was a decorated soldier in WWI, who joined the Bolshevik Revolution after October 1917. His impoverished background was an asset in the Leninist army. He soon showed his capacity in the ruthless suppression of the Tambov peasant uprising. “He was a keen proponent of the new theory of armoured warfare and was noted for his detailed planning, tough discipline and strictness, and a ‘never give up’ attitude. He survived Joseph Stalin's Great Purge of the Red Army command in 1937-39.”

His first operational command of an all-arms modern army was against the expansion of Japanese Imperialism in the far east. Russia had lost credibility in their previous match ups, and a border incident erupted into full-scale war. The Japanese had achieved local air superiority but were weaker in mechanized firepower when they attacked across the Khalkhin Gol, but were stalled by the Soviet defense and supply problems. Zhukov followed up with an attack as they were regrouping. Soviet infantry and Mongolian cavalry made a conventional frontal assault supported by mass artillery, incurring heavy losses against the understrength but elite Japanese divisions. While they were pinned, Zhukov went around both flanks with armor and motorized units. Other Japanese units counterattacked but were unable to prevent the destruction of their surrounded forces. This had a profound effect on Japanese strategy, which would enable Russia to deal with events in Europe without interference from the east. It also showed Zhukov’s willingness to sacrifice large numbers to achieve a decisive victory, a hallmark of his career.

Zhukov was the only general who was openly critical of Stalin’s culpability when Germany invaded – and his demotion kept him out of the worst debacles as Barbarossa unfolded. Against his advice, large Russian armies were encircled at Kiev, and in desperation Stalin gave him command of the defense of Moscow. Zhukov had to build the front almost from scratch – fighting delaying actions to prevent encirclement while the Red Army and Air Force built up its strength. The citizens of Moscow deserve the most credit for defending their city as winter set in, but Zhukov dealt a surprise blow by the rapid transfer of his veterans from the east, with enough equipment and supplies to launch the first Russian winter offensive. The Germans had to give ground (against Hitler’s orders) and suffered their first taste of massive casualties before stabilizing the front, out of reach of Moscow. Russian casualties in total were much higher. Though not immediately apparent, the Wehrmacht’s failure had doomed them to a long war, and the bitter prospect of future winter campaigns. Stalin’s willingness to listen to the outspoken Zhukov was another key factor.

He was sent to Stalingrad on the southwest front under overall command of Vasilevsky. Zhukov poured Russian reserves into a bloody defeat at Rzhev, but it was a diversion. After well-hidden preparations, Operation Uranus was launched, encircling the German 6th army in a manner similar to Khalkhin-Gol. Germany lost a million men by the time this brutal campaign ended, vindicating the sacrifices of countless Russian men and women who had been fed into this meat-grinder to keep the enemy occupied. Transferring to the north, Zhukov helped orchestrate the first breakthrough in the blockade of Leningrad, bringing relief to a city Stalin had neglected, and later freed it completely after the most appalling siege in history. Germany’s losses were harder to replace, and after defeat in North Africa and a landing in Sicily, Hitler made one final attempt to regain the initiative on the eastern front.

Operation Citadel had been anticipated by Soviet spies and Zhukov was part of the central planning committee that prepared the defenses around the salient at Kursk, and just as importantly, the follow up counterattack. Other Russian operational commanders were in direct charge of a hard fought victory that confirmed the decline of Axis power. Stalin was increasingly suspicious of Zhukov’s popularity with the Red Army, but allowed him to complete the final Russian offensive, Bagration, the largest in history, and enter Berlin to receive Germany’s surrender.

Afterwards, Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander on the western front, toured the Soviet Union with Zhukov whom he admired. But the breach with Stalin widened; Zhukov was denounced and relegated to inactive duty until the former’s death. He had the satisfaction of joining Konev in the tribunal that put Stalin’s henchman Beria to death, after which he was restored as defense minister. Under Khrushchev, Zhukov advised a moderate approach in the suppression of the Hungarian revolt. He also helped defend Khrushchev in a powerful speech against the complicity of neo-Stalinists, but the two disagreed over defense policy, and Zhukov was sidelined again until the ascent of Brezhnev to the Presidium. His popularity outshone the Supreme Soviet until his death in 1974.

There is a great deal of controversy within Russia around Zhukov’s generalship. Some called him a ‘cannibal marshal’, citing his refusal on one occasion to allow Rokossovsky to retreat to an advantageous position; even countermanding a higher order, as this general’s command was annihilated. At least some of the criticism has been motivated by the envy of political opponents, or the memory of those who suffered personally under his leadership. He could be crude in the extreme, and expressed a disregard for soldier’s lives, as long as it was a means to an end. His own memoirs are considered inaccurate. However, the facts indicate that although he was in command on the most active fronts, his personnel suffered lower casualty rates than the Russian front as a whole at the time. He also invested more time in training and preparation than most generals in his circumstances.

However, the worst charge, posthumously, is evidence that he may have ordered the ‘disappearance’ of returning Russian prisoners of war and their families. This came to light in 1991, the most popular time for criticism of the ousted communist regime. It was one of the great tragedies in the aftermath of the war, but Stalin’s paranoia is well known. To what extent it was carried out and under whose ultimate authority, no-one knows. Regardless, Zhukov deserves a place in history as the commander responsible for the most strategic victories in the 20th Century, the largest single contribution to the downfall of Nazi Germany.
Successful Campaigns: 5 Innovation: 4 Direct Leadership: 4 Casualty Ratio: 2 Legacy: 3

6. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto – the son of a Samurai, graduated from the naval academy in time to lose two fingers aboard a cruiser at Tsushima. He was opposed to war with the US after his studies at Harvard, and as naval attaché in Washington. His first command was the cruiser Isuzu, followed by the carrier Akagi, as he had been a proponent of naval aviation since 1924. He was rear-admiral then vice-admiral as a specialist at both London naval treaties.

Yamamoto personally opposed the invasion of Manchuria, the subsequent invasion of China, and the 1940 Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. As Deputy Navy Minister, he apologized to United States Ambassador for the bombing of the gunboat Panay. These issues made him a target of assassination by pro-war militarists, and the Japanese Army placed him under ‘protection’. “One man's life or death is a matter of no importance. All that matters is the Empire. As Confucius said,…They may destroy my body, yet they will not take away my will.” He resigned from the Navy ministry and his successor, actually concerned for his life, reassigned him to C-in-C, Combined Fleet. That was his position at the start of the war, despite the fact that when Tojo became PM most thought his career was over. The 2 reasons it wasn’t were his immense popularity with the officers and men of the fleet, and because the omnipotent Emperor Hirohito shared his concerns. In a letter to ultranationalists: “Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians...have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices”. However, Yamamoto’s last line was deleted when the quote was made public, leading to a quite different interpretation in the US.

Despite his reservations, Yamamoto accepted his role, and his plan for a bold pre-emptive strike while simultaneously thrusting into the oil and rubber resource rich areas of Southeast Asia, the Dutch East Indies, and Malaya, was accepted by the Army-dominated military review board. Yamamoto opposed the building of the Yamato class super-battleships, which were already white elephants. He also emphasized the speed, range, and maneuverability of aircraft, but this came at a cost of protection that would have ramifications towards the end of his life. Strategically, he authorized the consolidation of 6 large carriers in the 1st Air Fleet.

The attack against Pearl Harbor was a complete success so far as primary objectives, but Yamamoto railed at the failure of Nagumo to search out and destroy the US carriers, and other targets on Oahu. (They would have had no better chance to take Hawaii in its entirety.) When he learned that the note officially breaking diplomatic relations with the United States was delivered late after the attack, he was found sunk in depression while the rest celebrated: “I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.”

Politically, he may have been a dove, but as a commander, he was an eagle. His navy assisted the rapid whirlwind of victories that doomed the allies at Bataan and Singapore, with bonuses for Prince of Wales and Repulse, and the Java Sea along the way. The 1st air fleet launched attacks as far apart as northern Australia and Ceylon. In 1940 he had correctly predicted that “I can run wild for six months…after that, I have no expectation of success.” The ‘doolittle raid’ on Tokyo played into Yamamoto’s plans to follow up with an offensive towards Hawaii to destroy the US navy in the western Pacific. First, he had to ensure their flank on the SW Pacific facing Australia was secure, and sent his two best carriers to support a landing near Port Moresby, New Guinea. He received an unpleasant surprise at Coral Sea. Tactically, it was a Japanese naval victory, but strategically the invasion convoy was turned back, while these carrier air groups were so decimated they could not take part in Midway.

The plan went ahead anyway, further dividing his forces for an ultimately pointless diversion towards the Aleutians. The concept of combining their fighting strength had been violated, and in the accelerated timetable to reach strike positions before the anniversary of Tsushima, Yamamoto made do without confirmed reconnaissance of the American carriers. Afterwards, the Japanese called it ‘victory fever’, that infected their strategic and tactical decisions. Even so, the operation may have succeeded. What hurt Japan’s chances, was their intercepted naval code (which plagued the Germans as well), and the direct cause of their demise was Nagumo’s bungling of the aircraft handling after the threat from Midway had been effectively neutralized, decisions that Yamamoto could have overridden. The still powerful surface fleet could have finished off the island anyway, and would face much tougher odds later, but Yamamoto wisely ordered a withdrawal. The highly trained carrier pilots that had given Japan a strategic advantage, much like Churchill’s ‘the few’ in the Battle of Britain, were now gone. Yamamoto had lost face, and was reduced to the Defensive Battle strategy he had always detested.

He commanded personally with his best remaining carrier forces and surface warships at Guadalcanal, fighting the US to a draw. The IJN was forced in its extremity to high risk operations that would make their early prudence seem overcautious. The night operations of Japanese surface forces, in particular, were so successful in the Solomons well into 1943, that the US Navy avoided them whenever possible. But Japan’s navy could not rebuild itself as fast as the US, and the ‘Tokyo Express’ supply line suffered high losses in order to sustain the illusion of an offensive fighting chance. Afterwards, it made daring runs to evacuate their remaining marines. Yamamoto’s prediction of the fundamental weakness of the Japanese island empire, that it’s bases could be neutralized and bypassed, was becoming apparent.

To boost morale, Yamamoto planned a flying inspection in the South Pacific, but again messages were intercepted. Nimitz instructed Halsey to ambush him, in a plan partly driven by Roosevelt’s desire for revenge after Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto had been warned not to depart Rabaul, but only a picked squadron of long range P-38s maintaining radio silence could reach him. In the first pounce the transports were hit and crashed into the jungle. “Yamamoto had been thrown clear of the plane's wreckage, his white-gloved hand grasping the hilt of his katana, still upright in his seat under a tree…appearing as if deep in thought.” His ashes were returned to Japan aboard his last flagship Musashi, and the funeral procession wound past the home of his favorite Geisha Kawai, whom he was very close to.

In his personal life Yamamoto loved to gamble. It is perhaps merciful that he did not live to witness the wasteful expenditure of the IJN at Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf, or the outcome of the equally effective US submarine campaign against Japanese shipping, which the IJN was inadequately prepared for. In his legacy is a reminder that not all Japanese commanders were fanatics, who would allow the maltreatment and mass deaths of Allied prisoners.
Successful Campaigns: 3 Innovation: 4 Direct Leadership: 4 Casualty Ratio: 3 Legacy: 4

7. Dwight D. Eisenhower – was a man with a strong religious background, but abandoned any affiliation with Jehovah’s Witnesses when he entered West Point. However, his beliefs evolved with him, becoming more or less inter-denominational. Eisenhower was later instrumental in the addition of the words ‘under God’ to the Pledge of Allegiance in 1954, and the 1956 adoption of ‘In God We Trust’ as the motto of the US when he was US president. He had an impressive athlete’s physique, but a knee injury ended his football prospects.

In WWI he was one of the earliest US tank corps commanders, an interest he shared with George Patton. Otherwise his posts were mostly instructional in to the 1920s. As an executive officer he continued his studies under the influence of Fox Conner in the Canal Zone, Pershing in the Battlefield Monuments Commission, and MacArthur in the Philippines. He gained a talent from dealing with these strong personalities that would make him a point of balance in the agendas of allied military leaders in WWII. His lack of active experience meant an operational command eluded him, but he was a natural for the general staff that developed the long range plans for defeat of Germany and Japan. His talent for organization and administration was noticed by George C. Marshall, and he became Commanding General, European Theater of Operations. This would begin a sometimes frustrating, but ultimately productive relationship with Churchill.

As the pressure to open a second front mounted, Eisenhower took over command of the North African Theater, and brought the green US army forces into battle in Operation Torch. This would guarantee that the rebuilding Afrika Korps was not able to take a sustained offensive against the British 8th Army from Tunisia, with the Vichy French guarding their back. It also had his involvement in the high drama of swaying the Vichy resistance over to the Free French cause, despite their grudge with Britain. The ground campaign was won by Patton and Montgomery, who became natural rivals. At first this seemed healthy enough, two competent commanders trying to outperform each other. Eisenhower (now widely known as Ike) moved his command to the Mediterranean Theater, and oversaw the invasion of Sicily and Italy.

Ike early recognized that his role was not to micro-manage field commanders, he gave them the tools to do the job, and did not hinder them. However, he found he had to referee between his two senior commanders who were glory seeking. A lack of solid cooperation between them led to unnecessary allied casualties, and the escape of crack Axis divisions to Italy. He also had Patton removed from active command for awhile for some of his more impulsive actions. Omar Bradley would be his right hand man. The Italian campaign ground on but by 1944 it was clear Ike would be the commander behind the next massive amphibious assault on Fortress Europe.

This time he would take a more direct responsibility for planning and operations in a dual role as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces. He was understandably worried about the possible outcome and blow to Allied prestige if it should fail, and even had a speech prepared: “Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based on the best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt, it is mine alone.” After some tense moments on D-Day, Overlord was a success, due in large part to heavy allied preponderance in the air, and Hitler’s refusal to release the Panzer divisions for a counterattack. Other allied armies landed in southern France and the Free French liberated Paris; Germany was withdrawing to its natural frontiers. Ike gave in to pressure from Montgomery to authorize the ill-fated airborne assault of Arnhem. It was an ambitious attempt to end the war early, born of overconfidence. The Canadian Army was tasked with clearing the Scheldt Estuary, making Antwerp a usable port. An even bigger surprise came with the Battle of the Bulge, when Patton, back in field command, prevented a bigger disaster.

Ike was promoted to General of the Army, in which role he dealt directly with heads of state such as Stalin, as Roosevelt’s designated representative, much to the chagrin of the British high command. Although not as colourful as some of the war’s leaders, Eisenhower balanced the personalities and talents of difficult subordinates, as well as allies such as Zhukov, Churchill and Charles de Gaulle. In the aftermath he was sickened by the full disclosure of the death camps, and backed some pretty radical restrictions on post-war Germany.

He never saw combat but had the respect of front line commanders for his calm reason and sound recommendations; all good attributes for someone in the White House during the Cold War. He was in the running against his former friend Truman, who never forgave him for not silencing Senator Joe McCarthy’s demagoguery. Nonetheless he brought the war in Korea to an end and won back to back terms. His motivation for the Interstate Highway System was based on military experience. Although viewed as a conservative, he did enforce and protect the beginnings of the Civil Rights Movement. He was in charge during the heated start of the nuclear arms race and space race against a “hostile global ideology, atheistic in character”.

However, his farewell address should give us pause for thought, a warning against “the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex...Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together”. At least Ike’s loyalty was to higher ideals than just the Pentagon. With both terms up his hopeful successor was Nixon, but the then oldest serving president would hand off power to the youngest, JFK.
Successful Campaigns: 4 Innovation: 3 Direct Leadership: 2 Casualty Ratio: 4 Legacy: 5

8. Erich Ludendorff – was accepted as a cadet on the basis of his excellence in mathematics, and outstanding work ethic. He got his commission in 1885, serving with a marine battalion, followed by selection for the war academy, and General Staff by 1894. He analyzed the minutiae of the Schlieffen Plan for any weaknesses vis-à-vis the Belgian fortresses, and agitated for more army expenditures in preparation for the war he knew was coming. The social democrats applied political pressure and he was removed from the General Staff and returned to regimental duties. Although a forbidding workaholic in his new role, apparently the younger officers learned to love him. “Lacking a trail of reminiscences or anecdotes as he grew in eminence, Ludendorff was a man without a shadow.”

When the Great War started, the Germans got hung up for the first time by the fortress of Liege. Ludendorff replaced a dead general, and in ten days he had isolated it and bombarded it into submission. It was enough to get him the Pour le Merite from the anxious Kaiser himself. He was working away at Namur when an urgent request sent him to East Prussia with Hindenburg, called out of retirement. The Russians had advanced quicker than they expected, during the upset to the Schlieffen timetable. Ludendorff was a key part of the planning and successful operations at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes that destroyed two invading Russian armies in a month, and gave Germany the advantage on the eastern front until the end of the war.

Hindenburg got most of the credit, but knew how well he worked with Ludendorff, who was rewarded with Lieutenant-General for the Battle of Lodz. After this the eastern front stiffened, with a successful Russian counterattack in Galicia against Austria-Hungary. The deadlock on the western front resulted in Falkenhayn’s resignation, and Hindenburg became chief of staff. Unwilling to play 2nd fiddle, Ludendorff was named Furst Generalquartiermeister, forming the Third Supreme Command, requiring their joint authorization. In actuality, Hindenburg became the front man, with Ludendorff calling most of the shots. In this strategic role, he pursued victory at all costs, at a time when an armistice may have been possible. He advocated unrestricted submarine warfare which was a mistake, the settlement of occupied areas of Poland, and with a bit of foresight, released Lenin and his accomplices to wreak havoc with the Russian war effort in the Bolshevik Revolution. Resuming the offensive, the Germans were largely able to dictate the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In this final knock-out blow at Riga, the Germans tested the theory of Oskar von Hutier’s elite stormtroopers, who it was hoped would break the deadlock and attrition on the western front.

With the release of vast armies and resources to concentrate on a one front war, it became a race to score a major victory before Americans could arrive in force. In spring 1918 he planned and directed the final 5 German offensives, even though he was not formally a C-in-C. Operations Michael, Georgette, and Blucher saw surprise German columnar attacks who used good cover and overwhelming firepower at the point of contact, to penetrate in the farthest advance of the war. The allies were actually in full flight at some points. But Germany was on the point of exhaustion, falling short of a breakthrough to Paris, and Ludendorff knew the war had to be ended as quickly as possible. He implored his men to hold their positions while a cease fire was negotiated, but the advance of the allies including Americans continued on all sectors. Apparently he was beginning to crack under the strain and had a nervous breakdown. First Ludendorff, then the provisional civilian government, appealed to the US for favorable terms. Unable to achieve an honorable peace, he like many, felt they had been betrayed, while they still held a massive salient in France over which so much blood had been spilled. But US president Woodrow Wilson actually moderated the terms of Versailles, from what the French proposed.

The Stab-in-the-Back myth persisted in his memoirs: “By the Revolution [civilian government] the Germans have made themselves pariahs among the nations, incapable of winning allies, helots in the service of foreigners and foreign capital, and deprived of all self-respect. In twenty years' time, the German people will curse the parties who now boast….” It was prophetic, but he was a pioneer in the thinking that set them on that road to disaster, even forcing Hindenburg to repeat these sentiments at an inquiry, by threatening to expose his secondary role in the great victories.

Postwar, Ludendorff was disallowed a mercenary appointment with the Chinese Nationalist Army. He took part in the Beer Hall Putsch with Hitler, and lost badly in the presidential election against Hindenburg, who was well beyond his original retirement years, and became an easy tool of the Nazis. By now it was apparent that the sacred trust of the General Staff with the German people was being betrayed. In 1933 he sent this telegram to the hapless Hindenburg who had done what he could to avoid it; “By appointing Hitler Chancellor of the Reich, you have handed over our sacred German Fatherland to one of the greatest demagogues of all time. I prophesy to you this evil man will plunge our Reich into the abyss and will inflict immeasurable woe on our nation. Future generations will curse you in your grave for this action.” History was much kinder to Hindenburg, though Ludendorff may have been the most successful general in WWI.

When Hitler offered him a position as Field marshal, he thundered back “a field marshal is born, not made.” Against his explicit wishes, der Fuehrer attended his state funeral.
Successful Campaigns: 4 Innovation: 4 Direct Leadership: 3 Casualty Ratio: 3 Legacy: 3
 
Modern Revolutionaries – a special class of political-military leaders of strategic impact. There are other modern strategists who would exceed their ratings on a purely military score, but this is not intended to be an all inclusive list, that would seem incomplete without these two individuals.

9. Ho Chi Minh – His family was associated with patriotic scholars, but Ho kept his nose clean for awhile, attending school in Hue where he met Vo Nguyen Giap. Ho traveled to France, America, and Britain; working a variety of jobs to support his studies of western culture and institutions.

Following WWI he petitioned the western powers at Versailles for recognition of the civil rights of the Vietnamese. He became a founding member of the French Communist Party, and traveled to Moscow, along with several other Asian cells around the same time, and became a theorist on colonial warfare. In the 1920s he educated Nationalists in China on the independence movement in Indo-China, and was arrested in Hong Kong. He later returned to China before WWII as an advisor with the Chinese communist forces at Yenan.

Ho took the leadership of the Viet Minh in 1941 and oversaw many successful operations against the occupying Japanese and their Vichy French collaborators. He was jailed for many months by Chiang Kai-shek’s authorities before his release and treatment for dysentery by the American OSS, which clandestinely supported his resistance in Indo-China. At the war’s end the Japanese allowed the Viet Minh nationalists free reign while westerners were still incarcerated. The August Uprising was followed by a Proclamation of Independence Ho crafted from the US and French Declarations, and the abdication of Emperor Bao Dai. In the early years of his movement Ho had courted the favour of western powers, including Woodrow Wilson at Versailles, and now repeatedly to Harry Truman, citing the Atlantic Charter. He was ignored both times.

In a power struggle the Viet Minh purged many rival groups, and banned opposition parties. Violence with the French was spiraling out of control and after the declaration of martial law, Ho’s response was a general strike. A Chinese Nationalist Army arrived in Hanoi. Ho agreed to dissolve the party and hold a general election that yielded a coalition government, within the confines of a French led Indo-Chinese Federation. But Chiang Kai-shek was busy elsewhere and hostilities resumed. Ho courted Mao and Stalin in Moscow and received training and materiel from the PLA, with which he prosecuted the war vigorously using many of the ambush tactics he advocated. He almost negotiated a truce with France, but refused to hand over Japanese POWs to stand trial for war crimes, as they were training his army.

From this time command passed to his general Giap who won the decisive Battle of Dien Bien Phu. Ho became president of N. Vietnam while about a million, mostly catholic Vietnamese evacuated to the south. Many more fled or were imprisoned after the usual reprisals following Mao’s example. Ho preferred the more moderate Giap as party boss, but this went to Le Duan who began funneling aid to Viet Cong guerillas in the south. NVA regulars occupied Laos, and Chinese labourers began building infrastructure that would link up the various supply lines that became the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Despite his gradual loss of power, Ho was still the political leader who refused to negotiate with the US and remained in Hanoi during Operation Rolling Thunder.

The Politburo recognized the war was not going well, with heavy losses in the blunting of every operation. Ho authorized the Tet Offensive to exploit the weakness of the South Vietnam army, and the resolve of Americans to continue the war. Tactically, this was a huge disaster that decimated the Viet Cong (enabling the north to dominate their leadership), but it was a huge propaganda success as Americans came to believe the war could not be won. Ho Chi Minh died in 1969 aged 79, insisting to the end that the war must continue until his country was reunited.

Compared to Mao, Ho Chi Minh was more subtle in his dealings with the west, often disseminating to hide his true motives. As a nationalist he can be respected in the west; once he became a communist figurehead, the people of Vietnam paid an increasingly heavy price for this dubious ‘liberation’. Left alone, the majority of South Vietnamese would have been happy to enjoy their own independence and prosperous dealings with the west. But the agitation of communist guerillas, corruption, and prosecution of the war itself eroded support and belief there could ever be peace while the country was divided. He prevailed in one of the longest, most grueling independence movements in history. ‘Uncle Ho’ remains the center of a popular personality cult to this day, and Saigon now bears his name.
Successful Campaigns: 3 Innovation: 4 Direct Leadership: 3 Casualty Ratio: 2 Legacy: 3

10. Mao Zedong – Communist party organizer, revolutionary, political writer, and eventual head of the Chinese communist state. Initially this treatment will attempt to focus on Mao’s role as a military leader, and later the legacy of this controversial figure. Mao first saw military action as part of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Chinese Nationalist movement that toppled the Qing dynasty, and protested the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. He early became enamored of communist ideals, and formed cells of the Worker’s Movement as a charter member of the Communist Party of China.

As the chaos of the 1920s came to a close, the communists found themselves opposed by the Kuo-mintang government that was consolidating power. Mao, who had been Propaganda Director for the KMT Nationalists, never relinquished his role in the CPC executive and led the first peasant uprisings. The urban revolts had been crushed, and Mao focused on a rural strategy with the peasant majority. In the mountains of Jiangxi, Mao reorganized the rebels along party lines, winning the allegiance of local insurgents and Zhu De, who would become the tactician of the Red Guard. Other revolutionaries who opposed him were brutally tortured.

The Chinese Soviets were poorly armed but engaged in both mobile offensive maneuvers, and defensive guerilla operations against the KMT forces that were trying to contain them. Under pressure, Zhou Enlai had Mao removed from overall command, and the communists orchestrated a break-out that caught the KMT by surprise. The epic Long March from SE to NW China took 1 year to cover the 9600 km, over rugged mountain ranges and well defended river crossings, with numerous rear guard actions against KMT forces and regional warlords. Only 7,000 of the 100,000 that accompanied Mao reached Yenan, but his reputation and role as Chairman was secured, with Zhou Enlai at his side. From this small start, the Red Guard held its own, and grew to a regional command in the war against Japan. Allied intelligence confirmed the greater dedication and effectiveness of communist forces in the war, but Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalists continued to receive the bulk of US aid. An armed truce existed with the KMT, while the communists expanded into the river valleys and set up cells in the Nationalist army.

With Japan defeated, many arms captured by the Russians flowed to the communists. The US organized a massive sea-and-air lift of Nationalist forces to fortified points and seaports to offset this development, but the communists held the advantage in Manchuria where the first blows of the Civil War would land. Mao’s commanders deserve the credit for operations in the world’s largest post-WWII conflict, but eventual victory was guaranteed by Mao’s strategic doctrine which won the hearts and minds of Chinese peasants and workers. The Party inspired resistance and won adherents even as Nationalist morale slumped.

Whether it can be attributed to Mao, or was simply the formal presentation of the tactics advocated by his generals, Mao’s 10 principles of guerilla warfare (such as winning control of the countryside first, cities later; “making front out of enemy’s rear”, and engaging only with local superiority) guided their success. Likewise, he defined the operational tasks of the People’s Liberation Army, to include guarding the rice harvest, and conducting a strategic defense where small forces would contain and deceive attackers, while overwhelming strength would be brought to bear on a targeted enemy column, isolating or capturing their base. Against this fluid warfare the Nationalists were on the defensive, while rural men and women were assets that went great distances for the communists.

In 1946 there were 600,000 communist regular forces and a similar number of guerillas against at least 3 million Nationalist forces equipped with the latest in US military technology. By 1949 Mao had command of 4 million men, swelled by defections, and Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan. Within 2 years, Mao felt confident enough to authorize a massive intervention of the PLA in Korea that would ultimately end in a stalemate with the US led United Nations forces. As a military leader in these wars Mao was more of a figurehead, but he enshrined the tactics and authorized many of the operations, with the authority of experience gained on the Long March. Though Mao’s rhetoric of the day sometimes advocated or threatened the ‘human wave’ concept, actual tactics in Korea were usually more subtle, involving infiltration, except in desperate circumstances.

Mao’s empire was complete with the hostile occupation of Tibet, and China entered the nuclear club in a tri-polar balance of power.

As a political leader, where his primary claim to fame rests, he was a ruthless, callous opportunist. On his reputation and the widespread distribution of the ‘Red Book’, something akin to hero worship infected the masses. Once he was in power, re-education programs and the displacement of city populations resulted in ruined lives and millions of deaths, often by suicide. The Hundred Flowers Campaign was supposedly an invitation to reformers, but was used to expose and persecute ‘dangerous thinkers’, and millions more disappeared. This was only a prelude to greater abominations.

The Great Leap Forward tried to create a cottage steel industry along peasant collective lines, but the insidious organization behind it resulted only in the consumption of forests and even household wood to fuel the scrap fires, with all metal belongings melted down to meet quotas. Meanwhile the diversion of labour and ban on private food production resulted in possibly the worst famine in history, conservatively 50 million dead in his time, while exports continued to hide the fact from the west. There are remarkable similarities to the reign of terror of Stalin, the closest thing to a peer Mao had, and on whose death China became more isolated. His infrastructure programs were also useless, because Mao did not believe in Engineers on ideological grounds. There were grumblings even within his own party and select appointees, especially Deng Xiaoping.

Mao countered by appealing to the idealistic brainwashed youth of the paramilitary Red Guard who had grown up reading his literature, to denounce their parents, teachers, businessmen, or anybody suspected of harboring a book from the west, or a bourgeois liberal thought. They circumvented the party hierarchy with their own tribunals, and millions more were violently persecuted or commit suicide, destroying a generation of educated thinkers, and many fine works of Chinese culture were lost as well. Mao officially ended this personally authorized crusade in 1969 but it continued until his death in 1976.

Mao’s favorite general Lin Bao had been named successor, but he in fact was plotting Mao’s assassination before he died in a mysterious plane crash in 1971. China has yet to fully come to terms with the legacy of this monstrous tyranny, the details of which were conveniently downplayed in international relations. Compare this to the 8 rules of attention of the 8th Route Army during WWII, before he took power:
• Speak politely.
• Pay fairly for what you buy.
• Return everything you borrow.
• Pay for anything you damage.
• Do not hit or swear at people.
• Do not damage crops.
• Do not take liberties with women.
• Do not ill-treat captives.

His early motives were fairly pure and justified, but even his personal life at the time has come to light as filled with deviancy and excess. Remarkably, he is still admired today as a poet in the romantic tradition. You don’t have to ‘carry a picture of Chairman Mao’ to acknowledge that he had a role as a military strategist and was undeniably successful.
Successful Campaigns: 4 Innovation: 4 Direct Leadership: 2 Casualty Ratio: 2 Legacy: 1
 
Just on Stalingrad: There was absolutely no way that at the time of Operation Winterstorm that the Sixth Army could of fought the 30 miles to link up with Hoths divisions. The tanks that they did have left had fuel for less then half that distance, coupled with the fact that prior to the encirclement the majority of the horses used by the sixth army had been withdrawn behind the Don so as to save on transportation of supplies.
Also the main reason behind the withdrawl from the river Myshkova was not the threat in the Caucasus but Operation Little Saturn that had completely smashed the Italian Eight Army on the left flank of the LVII PanzerCorps and threatend yet another major encirlement, also with the addition of the 2nd Guards Army to the battle along the River Myshkova.
 
Excellent list vogtmurr
 
Just on Stalingrad: There was absolutely no way that at the time of Operation Winterstorm that the Sixth Army could of fought the 30 miles to link up with Hoths divisions. The tanks that they did have left had fuel for less then half that distance, coupled with the fact that prior to the encirclement the majority of the horses used by the sixth army had been withdrawn behind the Don so as to save on transportation of supplies.
Yeah it was desparate but I think that the outcome is disputable - if the Russians were distracted by a serious breakout attempt, they would not have been able to concentrate on Hoth as effectively - there were still 250,000 men available for a breakout. Even if the 6th Army's tanks and heavy artillery were expended and got left behind, they would have succeeded in denting the lines of circumvallation, where reserves would not have been available, because they were engaged against Hoth. There may only have been 15 miles to cross if it had been coordinated. Some would have escaped - the Russians were still reinforcing their perimeter as fast as they could when the opportunity presented itself. Look at Korsun - that was a pocket too. At any rate it was infinitely better than the fate that awaited them in a cramped pocket, pounded by artillery while the thermometer dropped. I said "many of these doomed men may have escaped", The reason none escaped is because Hitler (and Paulus) would not allow them to - that much is history. And the Luftwaffe began a supply airlift, which while inadequate, could have been used to support a breakout attempt with enough fuel and ammunition for a few days at least.

EDIT: "As resistance and casualties increased, Manstein appealed to Hitler and to the commander of the German Sixth Army, General Friedrich Paulus, to begin the Sixth Army's breakout operation; both refused. Fourth Panzer Army continued to attempt to open a corridor to the Sixth Army between 18–19 December, but was unable to without the aid of forces inside the Stalingrad pocket." That was on Dec. 16, the decision to hold Stalingrad was made on Nov. 24. But the Italians were the weak point in Little Saturn.

Also the main reason behind the withdrawl from the river Myshkova was not the threat in the Caucasus but Operation Little Saturn that had completely smashed the Italian Eight Army on the left flank of the LVII PanzerCorps and threatend yet another major encirlement, also with the addition of the 2nd Guards Army to the battle along the River Myshkova.
Okay - I may have got these confused a little bit and combined them.
 
I would put Võ Nguyên Giáp instead of Hồ Chi Minh. The latter was a revolutionnary, a politician and a party leader but not a military strategist.
 
I would put Võ Nguyên Giáp instead of Hồ Chi Minh. The latter was a revolutionnary, a politician and a party leader but not a military strategist.

acknowledged - but I called this category 'modern revolutionaries of strategic impact' - read the top of post #4. Ho was the founder of the independence movement, a specialist in colonial warfare theory, a commander fighting the Japanese (EDIT: and French), organized the Viet Minh, and authorized some of the important operations in the Vietnam war. His story is what is here - and I did not attribute Giap's notable contributions to Ho. Giap deserves mention, but not on a list of the greatest modern military strategists. I'm not trying to capture every well-known operational military leader - There is a different list for that.
 
Works cited?

Just kidding, I actually learned a lot about military history there.
 
Works cited?

Just kidding, I actually learned a lot about military history there.

A lot of it is a distillation of what can be gleaned from Wiki - in my own words, and there are lots of sources cited there, some of which I've also read, and my own selection of the Ballantine Illustrated History of the Violent Century series. I probably should add a bibliography to the list.
 
Yeah it was desparate but I think that the outcome is disputable - if the Russians were distracted by a serious breakout attempt, they would not have been able to concentrate on Hoth as effectively - there were still 250,000 men available for a breakout. Even if the 6th Army's tanks and heavy artillery were expended and got left behind, they would have succeeded in denting the lines of circumvallation, where reserves would not have been available, because they were engaged against Hoth. There may only have been 15 miles to cross if it had been coordinated. Some would have escaped - the Russians were still reinforcing their perimeter as fast as they could when the opportunity presented itself.

Ofcourse the outcome is disputable. But by the time of Operation Winter Storm the soldiers within the kessel where already suffering from hunger and fatigue (kept under constant harrasment attack my soviet patrols, U2 bombing raids, artillery etc..) not to mention the lack of supplies

To ask half emaciated soldiers to break out through the lines of the 57 Army and elements of the 64th and 21st and then trudge through waist high snow, while under constant aerial attack, plus Soviet Cavalry Divisions and then on reaching the River Myshkova and to smash the 2nd Guards Army (one of the most powerful soviet formations on the OOB). Many would simply of not had the strength.

At any rate it was infinitely better than the fate that awaited them in a cramped pocket, pounded by artillery while the thermometer dropped. I said "many of these doomed men may have escaped", The reason none escaped is because Hitler (and Paulus) would not allow them to - that much is history. And the Luftwaffe began a supply airlift, which while inadequate, could have been used to support a breakout attempt with enough fuel and ammunition for a few days at least.


And it would be better out in the Steppe. Battalion commanders, junior officers and the rank and file were msotly behind staying within the pocket atleast there most of them had shelter on division even had a fully furnished sanatorium within the kessel...

The reason none of them escaped was because Paulus was a bloody staff officer not a field commander and would do nothing without orders. The only one able to possible 'save' the soldiers at stalingrad was Manstein.

The Luftwaffe's air supply was a joke. Sixth Army estimated that they needed 700 tons of supply per day which was ignored by Goering and his transport officers, the max they could deliever was 350 tons a day and for a short period of time (taking into account: flak, enemy interception, breakdowns etc...). In one week before the breakout they recieved just 300 tons in a week.

In no way could the air supply hope to facilitate a breakout attempt it couldn't even sustain the troops.
 
Needs more Ahmad Shah Massoud. But it's a good list, regardless.
 
No love for Mikhail Tukhachevsky? He practically invented Operational Art, and Deep Battle proved to be just as acceptable a strategy as blitzkrieg.

I would also voice for Sir Gerald Templar because of the innovation and precedence he set for combating guerrilla warfare, and Basil Liddell Hart for 1) the brainstorming he and Fuller did in the 20s to create the foundations of armored penetration tactics (blitzkrieg) and the "indirect approach" that he codified in The Classic Book on Military Strategy. Admittedly, he didn't invent indirect approach, he just showed how well it has worked in the past, and why.
 
To ask half emaciated soldiers to break out through the lines of the 57 Army and elements of the 64th and 21st and then trudge through waist high snow, while under constant aerial attack, plus Soviet Cavalry Divisions and then on reaching the River Myshkova and to smash the 2nd Guards Army (one of the most powerful soviet formations on the OOB). Many would simply of not had the strength. .

I've no doubt you have a very good appreciation of the battle and the challenges a breakout would have faced. But I still don't understand the conclusion that a breakout attempt was futile. A lot hinges on what the potential fighting strength of the 6th Army was on Nov. 24. I think it was far from impotent, but I appreciate that many wounded and rear guard troops would have to be sacrificed. At the beginning of December, when preparations should have been underway, there were still stockpiles, albeit dwindling, within the kessel. If they were already emaciated, then by the end of January no one would have been left. And these unfavorable battle conditions were not unique, they were present anywhere on the front at this time and affected both sides. I don't imagine soviet cavalry divisions were very effective in 'waist high snow'.

And it would be better out in the Steppe. Battalion commanders, junior officers and the rank and file were msotly behind staying within the pocket atleast there most of them had shelter on division even had a fully furnished sanatorium within the kessel....
Then they must have had some supplies initially. Hindsight is 20/20, but if the rank and file knew what awaited them, a breakout attempt would have been far preferable. 45,000 Italians escaped from Little Saturn, and 56,000 escaped from Cherkassy. Maybe 90,000 would have escaped from Stalingrad, instead of the 5,000 who eventually came home after the war from the 90,000 who surrendered.

The reason none of them escaped was because Paulus was a bloody staff officer not a field commander and would do nothing without orders. The only one able to possible 'save' the soldiers at stalingrad was Manstein..
Agreed - 100%. As I stated in the list, Manstein needed cooperation from Paulus. He never got it. What puzzles me about this line of thinking, is why did they order Manstein and Hoth to open a corridor to Stalingrad, if they didn't intend to try and exploit it ? Was Hitler expecting Manstein to restore the whole front ? Manstein's relief force reached its greatest penetration on Dec. 19, 4 weeks after the ring closed, and he did not abandon the attempt until Dec. 29. From what I understand, the Russian 2nd Guards Army was under great pressure trying to contain this. If there was any chance of success, surely it existed in the first two weeks of December.

The Luftwaffe's air supply was a joke. Sixth Army estimated that they needed 700 tons of supply per day which was ignored by Goering and his transport officers, the max they could deliever was 350 tons a day and for a short period of time (taking into account: flak, enemy interception, breakdowns etc...). In one week before the breakout they recieved just 300 tons in a week.

In no way could the air supply hope to facilitate a breakout attempt it couldn't even sustain the troops.

Well I didn't make a strong statement around the air supply, but it could have helped in the short term, maybe all they needed. Yes 700 tons a day was required to 'even sustain the troops', and it was beyond the Luftwaffe's capabilities. But in a breakout attempt that isn't the goal, to sustain them indefinitely. 350 tons a day for two weeks might have given them a fighting chance before all remaining stockpiles were depleted. At this time, Russia did not yet 'own' the air.
 
Needs more Ahmad Shah Massoud. But it's a good list, regardless.

Thanks (I will look up Massoud ?)

No love for Mikhail Tukhachevsky? He practically invented Operational Art, and Deep Battle proved to be just as acceptable a strategy as blitzkrieg.

I would also voice for Sir Gerald Templar because of the innovation and precedence he set for combating guerrilla warfare, and Basil Liddell Hart for 1) the brainstorming he and Fuller did in the 20s to create the foundations of armored penetration tactics (blitzkrieg) and the "indirect approach" that he codified in The Classic Book on Military Strategy. Admittedly, he didn't invent indirect approach, he just showed how well it has worked in the past, and why.

Ah yeah. I did peruse some of these guys as I compiled the list, but decided that staff officers who are theorists in peace time, or innovators in war time, still need to have a significant campaign record and examples of successful strategic decisions. I may need a little more study on Tukhachevsky, but this is consistent with the stated aims and ranking criteria of both lists. I was under pressure to add Sun Tzu on the other list (whose book I finally read - not bad), and Schlieffen and von Clausewitz also got consideration for this list.

EDIT: of course its not just about the list - I think there could be almost a family tree of these innovators who influenced eachother - even de Gaulle is on there.
 
Clausewitz is probably the most qualified of those for your list given your criteria, as neither Sun Tzu or Schlieffen ever commanded troops.

If there were a "runners-up" list, it should probably include the ones I mentioned, plus an infamous Russian general who spawned an eponymous maneuver (read: stunt) unseen since Hannibal.
 
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