A Powerful Paragraph

Vrylakas

The Verbose Lord
Joined
Apr 12, 2001
Messages
1,940
Location
Bostonia
It was an innocent-enough lecture, certainly not one designed to revolutionize concepts of linguistics, national identity, religion and history, changing world demographics and politics forever. Sir William Jones, an associate barrister with the British High Court in Calcutta whose hobby and personal passion was linguistics, was giving an overview of the accomplishments of the Asiatik [sic] Society to that group in Bengal, entitled simply “Third Anniversary Discourse”. The year was 1786, and Sir Jones had been in India for nearly three years already, studying Sanskrit in his spare time. In the middle of his “Discourse”, he made a brief observation in an “oh-by-the-way” fashion that went like this:

The Sanskrit language, whatever may be its antiquity, is of a wonderful structure; more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either, yet bearing to both of them a stronger affinity, both in the roots of verbs and in the forms of grammar, than could possibly have been produced by accident [bold added]; so strong indeed that no philologer could examine them all three, without believing them to have sprung from some common source, which, perhaps no longer exists; there is a similar reason, though not quite so forcible, for supposing that the Gothic and the Celtic, though blended with a very different idiom, had the same origin with the Sanskrit; and the old Persian might be added to the same family, if this were the place for discussing any question concerning the antiquities of Persia.
(C. Renfrew, 1989: pg. 9)

In that single paragraph, Sir William made some powerful connections that blew the collective minds of Europe. Actually, others had already made this observation going back as far as the 16th century (English Jesuit Thomas Stevens and Italian merchant Fillipo Sasseti) but, they lacked the mass media of Sir William’s day and his scholarly gravitas. Still, Sir William had arrived at his conclusions by himself quite honestly, and as the words came from his mouth they made their way around the world. Sir William had connected intellectual dots for Europe (and later the world) that claimed Europe’s most treasured Classical languages, Greek and Latin, were not unique and had a family relationship with at least two ancient languages spoken very far indeed from Europe itself, and worse yet some or even most of Europe’s other languages may be thrown into the mix as well. Vulgaris!

Let’s explore where some of the shock waves from Sir William’s statement led:

1. Linguistics: Sir William revolutionized what was at the time just a gentleman’s hobby into a professional scholarly discipline, as droves tried to uncover and understand these linguistic relationships Sir William had alluded to, connections that others had vaguely noticed but it never occurred to anyone until then that languages could develop and change. Any moron could see the relationship between Italian and Spanish or German and Danish, but Jones forced academians to look at the reality that Russian, Albanian and French were also linguistic relatives. Then even languages like Persian and Urdu, languages spoken by [shudder] non-white peoples were apparently also in the mix! The modern study of linguistics owes its existence to Sir William’s shocking revelation.

2. Nationalism: Sir William’s claim that Greek, Latin, Sanskrit and Persian were related implied to scholars of the 18th century that there must have been a common ancestral language they all derived from, an “Indo-European” mother-language. Somebody then made the next step and said that since languages are spoken by people (and ethnicity can be defined by language), then a language group must represent a people, a nation [“volk”]. Europeans at the time were just beginning to understand Indian history, and they paid especial attention to the destruction of the ancient Dravidian civilization in India (c. 1500 B.C.) by the northern Indo-European-speaking invaders called Aryans, and well… You know much of the rest. They did some fuzzy math and claimed that it all added up to a vastly superior people with an innately powerful culture that would overwhelm all others (Hey! That sounds like us!) – but of course some problems arose when they looked around Europe and realized that clearly not all “Aryans” were fairing equally.

Germans trying to organize resistance to Napoleon latched in particular onto these ideas, and they added the belief that some Aryans had since the Good Old Days bred with inferior “races” and thus diluted their innate superiority – i.e., the Slavs, the post-Roman Greeks, the Latins, etc. The German theorists also added a new idea to the process by launching a search for the area where the first Aryans must have lived and formed their “Über-Kultur”; the quest for the Indo-European ancestral homeland (“Urheimat”) was on! Naturally, it turned out to be in Northern Europe and so it turned out that Germans were the purest of the Aryans… The German connection of Indo-Europeanness (called in German “Indogermanische”) with early Germanic origins was magical for other nations, and everyone in Europe began looking for their own imagined ethnic group’s ancestral origins; they began to search for their own Urheimats, and the concept of ethnogenesis was born. French argued over Germanic and Celtic origins; Poles argued over Slavic and supposed Iranian “Sarmatian” origins; Romanians and Italians claimed Roman origins; English began to invent notions of native “Anglo-Saxon” culture versus foreign, imported Norman cultural concepts. Languages became standardized (while dialects were suppressed), native pure folk cultures were “discovered” (i.e., invented), and a major centuries-long love-affair with the Classical world turned instead towards a focus on modern Europeans’ Medieval ethnic origins. Notions of blonde-haired and blue-eyed sophisticated conquerors overrunning Eurasia in ancient times filled history books for a century and a half after the 18th century, only meeting the cold steel gaze of modern objective science after World War II.

It’s difficult to emphasize how much “creative” scholarly work went into this sudden discovery of the past involved, because in order for this romantic past to be discovered it first needed to be invented. If I can quote Patrick Geary:

Before the [historical] sources could be edited, one had to establish a canon of those records of the past that were indeed sources of German history. This meant defining Germany in the past and laying claim to this past as inherently German. The scholars who undertook this task were not radical political nationalists. Nevertheless, their work fueled nationalist claims of extraordinary breadth. These editors claimed as these monuments all texts written in or about regions in which Germanic-speaking peoples had settled or ruled.
(P. Geary, 2002: Pg. 28)

In other words, these early scholars created our modern sense of identity; the idea of country, of ethnicity, of race, and the belief that one can look at a modern country and trace back an unbroken, uninterrupted historical line 1000 or more years, connecting ancient peoples with a radically different idea of human groupings to our modern political and social organizations.

BTW, all of the notions I’ve described in the past two paragraphs have since been challenged or outright dispelled, from the idea of a single mother Indo-European language all the way to the early linkage of languages with ethnic groups. Ethnicity itself is a very modern concept.

3. Religion: the implication of Sir William’s statement was that languages develop. Even in modern linguistics there is hot debate about how long it takes for languages to evolve, but it was immediately clear to everyone in the 1780s that whatever the exact length, it certainly took a long time. A real long time – long enough to throw some doubt on a few Biblical passages. The Anglican Archbishop James Ussher had claimed in the 17th century that one could use the Bible to count back the generations to the beginning of Earth, and he concluded that Earth’s birth took place on Sunday, 23. October, 4004 B.C. 18th century historians were aware of history stretching as far back as 1000 B.C., and some were finding things that suggested history uncomfortably close to the 4004 date – or perhaps worse. Now Sir William’s theories were implying that it took longer for languages to develop than the Bible itself allowed for – and it was still 23 years before Charles Darwin would be born! The insolence!

Sir William was a dedicated barrister and part-time scholar, and had no political or nationalistic ambitions. He publically spoke against slavery and Europeans’ treatment of their colonial peoples, especially chastising the British for their belittlement of the Indians whose history he had come to respect. He died in 1794, completely unaware of the firestorms his little paragraph would ignite in the 19th century. Oops…
 
Goodness me Vrylakas, where did all these articles come from?

Interesting articles by the way. :goodjob:

I wish you would write bibliographies though. :(

Just one problem:

Originally posted by Vrylakas

In other words, these early scholars created our modern sense of identity; the idea of country, of ethnicity, of race, and the belief that one can look at a modern country and trace back an unbroken, uninterrupted historical line 1000 or more years, connecting ancient peoples with a radically different idea of human groupings to our modern political and social organizations.

Ethnicity is an idea nearly as old a civilization itself. The phenomenon that you are speaking of was not so much the introduction of concepts like race, country and ethnicity, which have always existed; but rather, it would be much more accurate to see these scholars as establishing a modern basis for these concepts.

Originally posted by Vrylakas


Ethnicity itself is a very modern concept.


That is not true. Well, it is a modern concept, but not in particular. Even the Pentateuch is incomprehensible without the familiarity with the concept of Hebrew ethnicity. The Old Testament itself is essentially a set of books on Hebrew ethnic history.

The concept of ethnicity was also extremely important to the Romano-German kindoms of the Late Roman West, who issued histories (like the Origo Gothica) and genealogies describing the origins of their race (gens), and who issued law codes applicable only to certain ethnic groups. It was one of the most important features of pre-Norman kingship in western Europe that a kingdom had a legitimate ethnic basis.

The idea that ethnicity is purely modern will not make sense to a ancient historian or a medievalist without significant qualification. The misconception seems to arise because modern historians tend to be trained in the modern era only. They will see the importance of ethnicity rise sharply from almost nothing in the 16th and 17th century to become the dominant political force of the 19th amd early 20th century and will unconsciously state that it is therefore purely modern. Well, that's the theory I've always used to explain the commoness of this misconception. :)
 
Calgacus wrote:

Goodness me Vrylakas, where did all these articles come from?

Had some spare time during lunchtime today... :D

I wish you would write bibliographies though.

Haven't really tried a bio. Suggestions for a first one?

Just one problem:

In other words, these early scholars created our modern sense of identity; the idea of country, of ethnicity, of race, and the belief that one can look at a modern country and trace back an unbroken, uninterrupted historical line 1000 or more years, connecting ancient peoples with a radically different idea of human groupings to our modern political and social organizations.

Ethnicity is an idea nearly as old a civilization itself. The phenomenon that you are speaking of was not so much the introduction of concepts like race, country and ethnicity, which have always existed; but rather, it would be much more accurate to see these scholars as establishing a modern basis for these concepts.

Ethnicity itself is a very modern concept.

That is not true. Well, it is a modern concept, but not in particular. Even the Pentateuch is incomprehensible without the familiarity with the concept of Hebrew ethnicity. The Old Testament itself is essentially a set of books on Hebrew ethnic history.

The concept of ethnicity was also extremely important to the Romano-German kindoms of the Late Roman West, who issued histories (like the Origo Gothica) and genealogies describing the origins of their race (gens), and who issued law codes applicable only to certain ethnic groups. It was one of the most important features of pre-Norman kingship in western Europe that a kingdom had a legitimate ethnic basis.

The idea that ethnicity is purely modern will not make sense to a ancient historian or a medievalist without significant qualification. The misconception seems to arise because modern historians tend to be trained in the modern era only. They will see the importance of ethnicity rise sharply from almost nothing in the 16th and 17th century to become the dominant political force of the 19th amd early 20th century and will unconsciously state that it is therefore purely modern. Well, that's the theory I've always used to explain the commoness of this misconception.


An accurate and correct critique, C.

I should have been more specific and mentioned that our modern definition of ethnicity is quite recent. Ethnicity, race, etc. have indeed been with humanity since its inception, although definitions have changed and been distorted through the ages to the extent that some terms like "race" have become almost meaningless. My intent was to illustrate the disproportionate attention and importance attached to ethnicity in the 19th century, and to a lesser extent I was broaching how much the radical changes shaping modern concepts of statehood were also distorting common concepts like ethnicity.

In the 18th century, many peoples living within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth identified themselves as Polish, though they didn't actually speak Polish as a native language, while in the 19th century many of these same peoples began to call themselves Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Germans, Slovaks, etc. while centuries-long Slavic residents of Silesia and Pomerania began considering themselves Poles. Fundamental differences about how we organized our identities changed all across Europe, and the centralization of the state led to the centralization of ethnic identities as well. No more Transylvanians, Burgundians or Catalans; we all had to be Hungarians/Romanians/Germans, French, Spanish, etc. A millennium of historical ethnic and social development was fed into the meatgrinder of European nationalism, and the result was very different than anything that had gone before - for better or worse.

Thanks for the clarification C. -
 
Thanks for sharing this! I don't have time to ponder it right now, but just wanted to thank you for bringing it before me. These topics are right down my alley.
 
Originally posted by Vrylakas
Calgacus wrote:



Had some spare time during lunchtime today... :D

Yeah, right ;)

Originally posted by Vrylakas


Haven't really tried a bio. Suggestions for a first one?


I just meant suggestions for further reading and, more importantly, the books you used in composing the articles. The importance of this rises with the importance of the topic. I'd suggest the Tannenburg article and this one :goodjob:


Originally posted by Vrylakas


An accurate and correct critique, C.


Thanks :goodjob:

Originally posted by Vrylakas


I should have been more specific and mentioned that our modern definition of ethnicity is quite recent. Ethnicity, race, etc. have indeed been with humanity since its inception, although definitions have changed and been distorted through the ages to the extent that some terms like "race" have become almost meaningless. My intent was to illustrate the disproportionate attention and importance attached to ethnicity in the 19th century, and to a lesser extent I was broaching how much the radical changes shaping modern concepts of statehood were also distorting common concepts like ethnicity.

In the 18th century, many peoples living within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth identified themselves as Polish, though they didn't actually speak Polish as a native language, while in the 19th century many of these same peoples began to call themselves Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Germans, Slovaks, etc. while centuries-long Slavic residents of Silesia and Pomerania began considering themselves Poles. Fundamental differences about how we organized our identities changed all across Europe, and the centralization of the state led to the centralization of ethnic identities as well. No more Transylvanians, Burgundians or Catalans; we all had to be Hungarians/Romanians/Germans, French, Spanish, etc. A millennium of historical ethnic and social development was fed into the meatgrinder of European nationalism, and the result was very different than anything that had gone before - for better or worse.

Thanks for the clarification C. -




No probs. Obviously, some of the things you talk about famously manifest themselves in Nazi ideology, which is probably why the importance of many of these ideas have declined in current thinking. The Nazis, though, are the worst example.

Thanks for the articles BTW :goodjob:
 
Calgacus wrote:

I just meant suggestions for further reading and, more importantly, the books you used in composing the articles. The importance of this rises with the importance of the topic. I'd suggest the Tannenburg article and this one

O, I get it - you meant a bibliography. I will indeed provide one, this evening from home.
 
I think Calgacus' idea, that e provide a bibliography or at least a selected readings refence with our articles, is a good one. I will try to list only those accessible to English-speaking audiences, unless a particular work is too important to skip.

A selected bibliography for this article:

Archaeology and Language, The Puzzle of Indo-European Origins, by Colin Renfrew; Penguin Books 1987

In Search of the Indo-Europeans; Language, Archaeology and Myth, by J.P. Mallory; Thames and Hudson 1989

Az írás, az emberiség emlékezete ("Writing, the Memory of Humanity"), by Georges Jean (translated from the French by Katalin Lukács); Park Könyvkiadó (Budapest) 1991

The Myth of Nations, the Medieval Origins of Europe, by Patrick J. Geary; Princeton University Press 2002

Nationalism and the State, by John Breuilly; University of Chicago Press 1991
 
Originally posted by Vrylakas
My intent was to illustrate the disproportionate attention and importance attached to ethnicity in the 19th century

Hmmm ... I'm a little confused at this point ...

French had in the moment of 1789 revolution a population which 45% doesn't speak French as maternal language.
The Tsarist, Habsburg ( and after 1867 Austro-Hungarian ), Ottoman Empire - which was very important "actors" of XIXth century was very "cosmopolitan" states ... with mixed population ...
I'm not sure - but in many aspects the same is probably valid for United Kingdom - which had of course a colonialist, "imperialist" policy, but not a true "nationalistic" one !!! :rolleyes:
In fact probably only Germany, Italy and Romania ( the Old Kingdom ) are example of succes of "nationalist ( or patriotic - anyway ) movement" ... and the 2 ones with strong involvment from free-masonery ... :p

The BIG DIFFERENCE IMHO is that the XIXth century almost completely eliminate in Europe one major "mental actor" ( sorry - don't know a exact english word for this ) - RELIGION which sometimes/often fade the ethnical distinctions ... :confused:

I don't know - here is a tricky point ... I hope we will discuss it a little bit more ... :)

Regards,

P.S. : Excuse me my bad english - I hope I succeded to transmit my main ideea ...

P.S.S. : This assumption of "century of nationalism" sounds somewhat stereotipical for me ... :rolleyes:

P.S.S.S. : But - one of yours example - the Catalons are a different people/ethnicity from Castilians and have somekind of "extended authonomy" - isn't it ?? :confused: :confused:
 
Mîtiu Ioan wrote:

Originally posted by Vrylakas
My intent was to illustrate the disproportionate attention and importance attached to ethnicity in the 19th century.

Hmmm ... I'm a little confused at this point ...

French had in the moment of 1789 revolution a population which 45% doesn't speak French as maternal language.
The Tsarist, Habsburg ( and after 1867 Austro-Hungarian ), Ottoman Empire - which was very important "actors" of XIXth century was very "cosmopolitan" states ... with mixed population ...
I'm not sure - but in many aspects the same is probably valid for United Kingdom - which had of course a colonialist, "imperialist" policy, but not a true "nationalistic" one !!!
In fact probably only Germany, Italy and Romania ( the Old Kingdom ) are example of succes of "nationalist ( or patriotic - anyway ) movement" ... and the 2 ones with strong involvment from free-masonery ...

The BIG DIFFERENCE IMHO is that the XIXth century almost completely eliminate in Europe one major "mental actor" ( sorry - don't know a exact english word for this ) - RELIGION which sometimes/often fade the ethnical distinctions ...

I don't know - here is a tricky point ... I hope we will discuss it a little bit more ...


There were many big differences. Prior to the Treaty of Westphalia, the concept of "country" was very different, being more of a geographic term rather than an organized state one owed one's loyalty to. The average person did not identify with "their country", because the state was the exclusive domain of the aristocracy. In 1415 after the failed Dózsa György revolt in Hungary, the Hungarian aristocracy produced some anti-serf laws in a famous proclamation that began, "De natio Hungarica...", "To the Hungarian nation". By "Hungarian nation" he did not mean every ethnic Hungarian (our modern definition) or even everyone who lived in the Hungarian kingdom, he meant all the aristocrats who ruled Hungary - many of whom were ethnic Croats, Germans, Slovaks, etc. That was the "Hungarian nation" in 1415. In 1848, when Lajos Kossuth made proclamations to the Hungarian nation, he had a very different meaning. The ethnic cleansing and forced Magyarization/Germanization/Russification that occurred in the late 19th and throughout the 20th centuries would never have occurred to anyone living in 1584 or 1325. It's not that they minded all the killing or were more civilized; it's that their identities had very different foundations. Religion played an important role as you mention, but as well did class, social structure, and economics.

The sudden emphasis on ethnicity as a major component of modern European identity happened all across Europe. Some were successful in achieving statehood under the German "Ein volk, ein Nation" concept in the 19th century as you mention - Serbs, Greeks, Germans, Italians, Romanians, Bulgarians - and some failed though not for lack of trying: Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, etc. (This second list is longer.) Even in those countries where states already existed (France, Denmark, Sweden, Spain, etc.) there was a painful process of modernization that transformed the states' older feudal (i.e., aristocratic-oriented) structures. Several feudal empires survived - Ottoman, Russian, Habsburg, etc. - but only barely, as indeed all met doom in 1918. We moderns started calling these empires "multi-ethnic" because it seemed so curious to us that a state would or could contain so many different peoples - and our modern history books say they were inevitably doomed because of their multi-ethnic populations, though we forget most of them survived for many centuries and had much longer lives than our modern democracies have had yet...

P.S.S. : This assumption of "century of nationalism" sounds somewhat stereotipical for me ...

It was only the beginning, but there was a significant contrast between how Europeans saw themselves in the 18th and the 19th centuries. The idea that some peasant working a field had cultural value would have been ludicrous to a 17th century European nobleman, but 19th nobility were falling all over themselves trying to imitate their local peasants and their customs.

P.S.S.S. : But - one of yours example - the Catalons are a different people/ethnicity from Castilians and have somekind of "extended authonomy" - isn't it ??

Ethnicity is an extremely relative term. My point was that the concept of Spanish identity - as an example - is a modern construct, a modern attempt to create a monolithic cultural standard where historically many have existed. Regionalism was suppressed in favor of nationalism, and national identities had to be created. For instance, to have a nation one needs to have a national language, one that everyone in the nation speaks. Well of course in reality languages - especially with pre-literate populations - are horribly fragmented with regional dialects, which is normal. However in the 19th century languages all across Europe were suddenly harnessed, formalized, standardized, alphabets changed (like Romanian switching from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet), foreign words expelled, etc. Usually the capital city's dialect became the "official" dialect, i.e., the official language. Look at German, whose severe fragmentation forced 19th century German national linguists to practically invent a standard, Hochdeutsch. Polish became wrapped around the ugly Warsaw dialect, while just try to speak non-Parisienne French in France. Through 10,000 years of human history humans rarely concerned themselves with their languages beyond the necessity to communicate, but suddenly in the 19th century Europeans started seeing their languages as a badge of their national identities, and they hijacked them for their national use.

In our modern day these severe national identities have begun to break down a bit with the re-emergence of local regional identities - Corsica, Catalan, even a Transylvanian movement (Read any of Andrei Codrescu?). We'll see where this takes us...
 
Originally posted by Vrylakas
There were many big differences. Prior to the Treaty of Westphalia, the concept of "country" was very different, being more of a geographic term rather than an organized state one owed one's loyalty to.

Possibly ... but this is just one aspect of the problem - one explanation may be that a "country" in those time doesn't need the loyality of the most of its population ... fear was enough and easily to obtain ... :rolleyes:

The average person did not identify with "their country", because the state was the exclusive domain of the aristocracy.

Even in cities like ones of Hansa League ?

The ethnic cleansing and forced Magyarization/Germanization/Russification that occurred in the late 19th and throughout the 20th centuries would never have occurred to anyone living in 1584 or 1325.

I'm totally doubtfully at this point - I read Machiavelli and he recomend to a "ideal principle" that before sending armies in one teritory send settlers there - which doesn't affect its prestige in case of failure ....

Well of course in reality languages - especially with pre-literate populations - are horribly fragmented with regional dialects, which is normal. However in the 19th century languages all across Europe were suddenly harnessed, formalized, standardized

This is not a process begining XIXth century IMHO ... the influence of the reformation to translate the Bible in "national languages" was probably the first and major step in creating "the literal", "unified" language.
In the case of Romanian ( or better the Daco-Romanian dialect ) this happened in the 1688 when a elaborated translation of the Bible finnally and completed was printed as difused to Ortodox Curches - the so-called "The Bible from Bucharest" ... but I bet this is not a single case ...

alphabets changed (like Romanian switching from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet)

This had another motivation ...

In our modern day these severe national identities have begun to break down a bit with the re-emergence of local regional identities - Corsica, Catalan, even a Transylvanian movement (Read any of Andrei Codrescu?). We'll see where this takes us...

This is happened on different basis ... IMHO, but this is probably another discution ... ;)
 
I apologise for the delay Ioan; my time is tied up a lot nowadays.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Originally posted by Vrylakas
There were many big differences. Prior to the Treaty of Westphalia, the concept of "country" was very different, being more of a geographic term rather than an organized state one owed one's loyalty to.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Possibly ... but this is just one aspect of the problem - one explanation may be that a "country" in those time doesn't need the loyality of the most of its population ... fear was enough and easily to obtain ...

Fear was a part of the equation for some, but for most they simply wanted peace and the ability to survive. As you mentioned for them religion in the late Middle Ages played a key role, but as I pointed out later in the above paragraph there were other aspects of their identity that were important as well. Ultimately though, compared to modern times, ethnicity came in pretty low.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The average person did not identify with "their country", because the state was the exclusive domain of the aristocracy.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Even in cities like ones of Hansa League ?

Obviously a limited exception with commercial cities like the Hanseatic League in terms of aristocracy, but still their identity had nothing to do with ethnicity. These were merchant cities ruled as the exclusive domain of the wealthy middle class, who could be just as exploitive of the local serfs as aristocracy. Similarly the northern Italian city-states or the Dalmatian city-states (Ragusa, etc.) did not fit the rule, though they still did not organize their political or economic lives around ethnic lines as we do nowadays. This still doesn't disprove the rule.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ethnic cleansing and forced Magyarization/Germanization/Russification that occurred in the late 19th and throughout the 20th centuries would never have occurred to anyone living in 1584 or 1325.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I'm totally doubtfully at this point - I read Machiavelli and he recomend to a "ideal principle" that before sending armies in one teritory send settlers there - which doesn't affect its prestige in case of failure ....

First of all, Machiavelli was a theoretician, not a politician. In other words, he never practiced what he preached or got to see if his policies would succeed or fail. He was a diplomat at one point during the Medici interregnum but he was never able to practically put his beliefs to the test of reality.

Secondly, Medieval Europe did indeed send settlers all over the place, but the point was to put productive peasants and craftsmen in barren regions; no heed was paid to ethnicity. After major wars or famines, princes would advertise across Europe for immigrants to fill his empty fields and towns, and they would accept just about anyone who could work the fields or do the work in the towns. This is how northern Poland ended up with Scottish towns, why there are Germans in Transylvania, why there were Polish and German coal miners in Belgium, etc. Again, the idea was to get devastated regions economically productive again, and they reached for any people from just about anywhere to do the job. Nowadays when European states worry about their falling population replacement rates, they discuss native birth and death rates; immigration is rarely raised as a solution. Why? Because we today are more concerned with (our perception of) ethnic homogeneity than Medieval Europe was.

Finally, my statement above bears out my point; for instance the reason the Hungarians began to process of Magyarization among their minorities was that the first censuses of the late 19th century showed that Romanians, Slovaks, Serbs and Croats were expanding their populations much faster than the Hungarians, and would soon outnumber the Hungarians within Hungary. This caused a panic in 1880, a panic that would have baffled a 15th century Hungarian nobleman. His reaction would have been, "So what? They're still in your empire and making you money!"

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Well of course in reality languages - especially with pre-literate populations - are horribly fragmented with regional dialects, which is normal. However in the 19th century languages all across Europe were suddenly harnessed, formalized, standardized
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This is not a process begining XIXth century IMHO ... the influence of the reformation to translate the Bible in "national languages" was probably the first and major step in creating "the literal", "unified" language.

In the case of Romanian ( or better the Daco-Romanian dialect ) this happened in the 1688 when a elaborated translation of the Bible finnally and completed was printed as difused to Ortodox Curches - the so-called "The Bible from Bucharest" ... but I bet this is not a single case ...


But this is quite different. The movement in many countries to translate the Bible into the various European languages began with the barbarian invasions and the collapse of western Rome - remember Wulfilla and the Gothic Bible? - but a critical difference is that these efforts were not because of ethnic pride (although some modern nationalists like to portray them that way), they were born of a desire for average people to be able to understand their own masses and liturgy; they wanted to be able to understand their own religion. The Bible was translated into Polish a full century and a half before it was translated into English, and yet the English developed a modern "ethnic consciousness" and nation-state long before Poland.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
alphabets changed (like Romanian switching from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This had another motivation ...

Romanian switched to the Latin alphabet in 1859-60 as a direct result of the foundation of modern Romania under Prince Cuza. There had been a few jump-start attempts since the late 18th century, but that still fits our general timeline. The driving reason behind the break with the Cyrillic alphabet has to do with the Romanian Orthodox Church's attempts to break from the Old Slavonic liturgy and Greek control, both very tied to the unification of Moldavia and Wallachia (i.e., the founding of the first Romanian nation-state). As I recall, the Romanian Orthodox Church did not gain full patriarchy status until the early 1920s, after nearly all ethnic Romanians were gathered into the Romanian state.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In our modern day these severe national identities have begun to break down a bit with the re-emergence of local regional identities - Corsica, Catalan, even a Transylvanian movement (Read any of Andrei Codrescu?). We'll see where this takes us...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This is happened on different basis ... IMHO, but this is probably another discution ...

This is a separate discussion because it is ahistorical to discuss current events - as I allude above, we have no idea where they're developing. But it is obvious that some of our nation-state myths are breaking down...
 
Originally posted by Vrylakas
I apologise for the delay Ioan; my time is tied up a lot nowadays.

Mine too ... :(

Nowadays when European states worry about their falling population replacement rates, they discuss native birth and death rates; immigration is rarely raised as a solution. Why? Because we today are more concerned with (our perception of) ethnic homogeneity than Medieval Europe was.

Not necessary a ethnic homogenity, but also a cultural one probably ... :rolleyes:

The movement in many countries to translate the Bible into the various European languages began with the barbarian invasions and the collapse of western Rome - remember Wulfilla and the Gothic Bible? - but a critical difference is that these efforts were not because of ethnic pride (although some modern nationalists like to portray them that way), they were born of a desire for average people to be able to understand their own masses and liturgy; they wanted to be able to understand their own religion.

I agree with you - but what I want to show is that process of creating a "unified language" appear a little bit earlier ... ;)

But my ideea is the following one - the French in 1789, even proclaming, "a nation" refer to this like a "source of legitimacy" against the "absolutist monarchy". Still no ethnicity involved ...
The real "ethnical call" was made IMHO by the germans during the try to fight somekind of guerilla/underground movement against the Napoleonian rule. Theoretically and even practically the Napoleonean Empire was more "progresist" like the old germans states - so probably they need to switch another "public feeling" to have a chance to succes ...
And this "model" was used in the following period in many "eliberation movement".

And please don't forget that the XIXth century was the one in which another basis for "revolution" and "public opinion" was used - the socialist/marxist ideea of "class strugle" ! :rolleyes:

I repeat - IMHO is a exageration and somekind of "reductionism" to said that XIXth century is the one of "ethnicity" .... :confused:

Romanian switched to the Latin alphabet in 1859-60 as a direct result of the foundation of modern Romania under Prince Cuza.

In fact no ... the Latin alphabet was first time introduced and adapted for Romanian languages by the writers belonging from "Scoala Ardealana" ( Transylvanyan School ) cultural movement and already in general use in 1848. But this is a marginal problem ...

This is a separate discussion because it is ahistorical to discuss current events

Exactly. :cool:

Regards,

P.S. : This time my english was completely awfull - but I hope I wasn't completely uninteligible ... :(
 
Mîtiu Ioan wrote:

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nowadays when European states worry about their falling population replacement rates, they discuss native birth and death rates; immigration is rarely raised as a solution. Why? Because we today are more concerned with (our perception of) ethnic homogeneity than Medieval Europe was.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Not necessary a ethnic homogenity, but also a cultural one probably ...

But most Europeans equate ethnicity with culture. These are relative terms subject to wide interpretation, and that's really my point. When someone today talks about "Danish culture", yes they are including all the foreign, Non-Danish influences that have also contributed to create modern Danish culture but the end product for them is still Danish culture, almost indistinguishable from any concept of Danish ethnicity. As cultural anthropologists say, an ethnic group is nothing more than a group of people who define themselves as an ethnic group - through a common language, living space, religion, or any combination of these and other identity elements. There is no scientific way to define ethnicity - though when we use this word today, most people have a very definite idea what we mean.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The movement in many countries to translate the Bible into the various European languages began with the barbarian invasions and the collapse of western Rome - remember Wulfilla and the Gothic Bible? - but a critical difference is that these efforts were not because of ethnic pride (although some modern nationalists like to portray them that way), they were born of a desire for average people to be able to understand their own masses and liturgy; they wanted to be able to understand their own religion.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I agree with you - but what I want to show is that process of creating a "unified language" appear a little bit earlier ...

But there is still no doubt that at a critical point, people with a new ideology of nationalism in late 18th century and 19th century Europe hijacked linguistics as a tool to achieve their vision of "nation".

But my ideea is the following one - the French in 1789, even proclaming, "a nation" refer to this like a "source of legitimacy" against the "absolutist monarchy". Still no ethnicity involved ...
The real "ethnical call" was made IMHO by the germans during the try to fight somekind of guerilla/underground movement against the Napoleonian rule. Theoretically and even practically the Napoleonean Empire was more "progresist" like the old germans states - so probably they need to switch another "public feeling" to have a chance to succes ...
And this "model" was used in the following period in many "eliberation movement".


This idea I more or less lay out in my original post for this thread, how the Germans were the first to formulate our modern concepts of nationality, ethnicity, etc. in the Napoleonic years.

And please don't forget that the XIXth century was the one in which another basis for "revolution" and "public opinion" was used - the socialist/marxist ideea of "class strugle" !

I repeat - IMHO is a exageration and somekind of "reductionism" to said that XIXth century is the one of "ethnicity" ....


A century is a long time and you are absolutely correct to point out that several contradictory ideals and concepts developed in the 19th century, but any century will do the same. I did not say that nationalism was the only thing to come out of the 19th century; I merely said that its modern incarnation was born in the 19th century (or rather late 18th) and rapidly became a powerful driving force in European politics and culture. If you were to list the top 3 ideologies to emerge in 19th century Europe and rank them in terms of their impact on European history, nationalism would be in the top 3. Go just a century earlier and nationalism would be a negligible aspect of European civilization.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Romanian switched to the Latin alphabet in 1859-60 as a direct result of the foundation of modern Romania under Prince Cuza.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In fact no ... the Latin alphabet was first time introduced and adapted for Romanian languages by the writers belonging from "Scoala Ardealana" ( Transylvanyan School ) cultural movement and already in general use in 1848. But this is a marginal problem ...

Transylvania was quite different of course, being ruled at the time by the Habsburgs and being heavily pressured to Catholicize and Westernize. In Regat Romania (Moldavia and Wallachia), the switch to the Latin alphabet happened at the time and under the circumstances I mentioned above.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is a separate discussion because it is ahistorical to discuss current events
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Exactly.

P.S. : This time my english was completely awfull - but I hope I wasn't completely uninteligible ..

Your English is quite readable, Ioan. ;)
 
Vrylakas ... you forced me to wrote something more ... and tommorow I go in hollyday !! O.K. - let it be ... ;)

I don't say that ethnicity is a "new concept" of XIXth century. If there is something new is the tendency to "enrich" soemthing preexistent ( or ... hijack to use your terminology ;) ) with some new "feature".

And I don't belive that the nationalism ( which I agree that was ONE OF THE MAJOR tendency of XIXth century, but not THE tnedency ) was necessarly to blame for many troubles of that time ... purely and simply the XIXth was more "dinamically" IMHO that many previous periods of time ... or ( better said maybe ) the new circumstances ( especially technologically ) formed somekind of "unstable foundations" for many societies/contries/human groups ...

And also don't forget to remember the new dilemma arised between "patriotism" and "nationalism" ... and ( a little bit later fact ) that a movement self-called "nationalistic" like "Action Francaise" oscilated from a "revanchiste" anti-german tendencies at end of XIXth to a cvasi-complete "colaborationist" atitude during the Vichy regime ( and if I'm correct - even before some of those movement activists cry for the German to be the only one to be the one who could solve ... the problems of French !!! :confused: ).

So - IMHO, I will repeat - the circumstances are faaar more complicated and I coudn't take as serious some image of a "bed nationalist which hijacked a inocent liguistic theory and BOOM!! - lot of blood and war suddenly appear ..." .... :D :D

Sorry if I disturbed you but ... hope we talk again in 10-12 days ... :cool:

Regards
 
Interesting article, Vrylakas.

One minor quibble. Sir William Jones is referred to as "Sir William," not "Sir Jones."
 
One minor quibble. Sir William Jones is referred to as "Sir William," not "Sir Jones."

D'oh! Corrected. :blush: Thanks YNCS!
 
Would it be off iopic to ask when the "Franks" stopped being German and started being French?

Well, strictly speaking they were never exclusively "German". The Franks were an amalgamation of a Germanic tribe that ruled over Romans and Celts. Whenever a ruling group rules over a mass population of a different ethnicity for a length of time, there usually is a certain level of ethnic mixing that goes on; that for instance is how the Turkic Bulgars became Slavicized. Traditionally historians look at the post-Carolingian partition at Verdun in 843, which created the Western and Eastern Frankish kingdoms (with Lotharia wedged inbetween), as the origins of France and Germany.
 
So Chalemagne (Charles the Great) was neither French or German? Or was he both? Or does the question have any meaning, since France and Germany didn't begin until 843, after his death? (post Carolingian).

Like asking if George Washington was Yank or Rebel when the distinction didn't arise until 1860 or so.
 
Back
Top Bottom