Pangur Bán
Deconstructed
Many of you undoubtably will have already heard of both of these men. In this short article, I merely aim to address a few questions regarding Thebes in the age of Pelopidas and Epaminondas say, from the Theban "revolution" in 378/9 to the pyrrhic victory of 2nd Mantineia in 362.
What are some of the problems with the sources for Theban power in the 4th century?
Thebes has a sad place in Greek historiography. There seems to have been a widespread dislike of Thebes in the ancient Greek world, cursed in mythology and despised for its betrayal of the Greeks in the Persian Wars. Thebes as a city does not get much attention in the writings of ancient and modern historians. It did not have the seductive constitution of the Spartans or the cultural prestige of Athens. Furthermore, Thebes suffers at the hands of Xenophontic and Herodotean prejudice, a fact that undoubtedly influenced the priorities of later historians and discouraged the preservation of writings about the city (e.g. the disappearance of Plutarchs Life of Epaminondas). That is one factor.
Another is the tragic fact that our main written source for the period (i.e. Xenophon) goes out of his way not to write about Thebes. It is like those two barely existed for that predjudiced "phillacedaemonian". Added to this is the fact that Alexander the Great destroyed the city, decreasing whatever archaeological evidence would be available if anyone bothered to give it the archaeological attention it merits.
There are too many unavailable facts to make sense of the growth of Theban power. Some were mentioned above. Others, like the exact make-up of the post-378 Boeotian constitution, the demographic trends in the period up until 371 and the goings on of the Theban assemblies would shed much needed light of this topic but sadly almost nothing of these things is available. Lack of information is the real problem for studying 4th century Thebes.
Did Epaminondas and Pelopidas intend for a wider unity for mainland Greece in 371-368 BC?
Anyone who felt certain about a firm answer to this question would be delusional. There are no diaries and no declarations of intention by Pelopidas or Epaminondas. In light of the lack of evidence, any debate on this issue may be comparable with arguing over the colour of an invisible hat. However, it is not quite as bad as this. The actions of the Theban state give some ideas about the intentions of its chief policy makers, and since no other Theban in the sources gets much of a mention for this period, we have to assume that Pelopidas and Epaminondas are the chief policy makers. So can Theban behaviour in this period be explained as attempted unification or as something else?
Thebes concern in this period is her own security in the north and her war against Sparta. All of the Theban actions can be explained in these terms. She was still fighting Sparta and the Peloponnesian campaigns were part of this war. Epaminondas sought to weaken Sparta while he could and destroy the old Peloponnesian League, and he did so by founding Megalopolis, Messene and re-creating Mantinea, thus strengthening his Arcadian allies and creating a new ally whose very existence brought the Spartan social system to its knees. At the same time, there were campaigns in Thessaly and Macedon to prevent the emergence of a hostile coalition to the north. The coalition they formed with the states of the Peloponnese around the time of Leuctra was anti-Spartan rather than anything else. After the initial campaigns had killed off the Spartan threat, the Peloponnesian alliances began to weaken but the accounts from the period do not indicate that the Thebans were overly concerned. The Peloponnesian alliances were thus not important in themselves.
But the best way to discover the intentions of a state is examining the demands it makes at a Peace Conference. According to Xenophon (VII. i. 36), Thebes primary demand at the 367 conference is that Messene be kept independent and Athens give up its attempts to possess Amphipolis. The importance of the former to the Thebans indicates the importance they placed on keeping Sparta busy and weak and the latter to prevent a resurgent Athens becoming too strong. If the Thebans had sought unity for mainland Greece, they would not have made such unacceptable demands to a Persian against fellow Greeks.
Therefore, the Thebans were interested in hegemony and not unification.
How vital was Pelopidas to Theban success?
Pelopidas is one of the initial 379/8 revolutionaries. Plutarch explains (Pelopidas 8-14) that Pelopidas took part in the revolution but says nothing to make us certain that the revolution would have collapsed without him. He was not in command at Leuctra and not present at Mantinea. However, he was in command at Tegyra and Cynocephalae. If we believe Plutarch, his personality created additional Theban influence in Thessaly (Pelopidas. 31), and with the Great King (ibid. 30)
How vital was Epaminondas to Theban success?
Epaminondas is the man given credit for being the brains behind Theban success, for his innovative battle tactics and devastating strategic thinking. His actions are well known; so I do not need to go into them. However, a note of caution must be added. The lack of evidence for Theban history distorts our picture of development in Theban military thinking. We know almost nothing about the history of Theban military thinking and we hear very little about Theban battle tactics before the age of Epaminondas. So, if the tactics of Epaminondas suddenly appearing at Leuctra and then Mantinea were part of a gradual development, then we would not know it. Furthermore, Thucydides reveals that the tactics of deepening the lines was not new to the 370s when he describes how, at the battle of Delium (424/23), the Theban side of the Boeotian army was drawn up 25 shields deep (Thuc. IV. 93).
Spartas internal and diplomatic weakness should also be borne in mind as factors affecting Theban success. Before Leuctra Sparta had been playing hegemon by bluff, to a certain extent. Her manpower had decreased drastically in the previous century, making her reliant on her allies, mercenaries and Persian gold rather on the martial valour of her citizen elite. When Sparta was deprived of most of her allies after Leuctra, she was defenceless against Epaminondas invasion of Laconia. The 400 homoioi lost at Leuctra would almost certainly not have prevented this.
Another point is the role of other Theban statesmen. We know that the elite Sacred Band was the conception of Gorgidas. We also know that both were put on trial just after the 3rd invasion of the Peloponnese, indicating maybe that the Thebans did not give them the same credit given to them by other Greeks. It may even have been resented (Tod no. 130).
The real test of their importance would be to see how history would have unfolded without them. Obviously this is not possible, but some of the factors mentioned above are worth considering.
What are some of the problems with the sources for Theban power in the 4th century?
Thebes has a sad place in Greek historiography. There seems to have been a widespread dislike of Thebes in the ancient Greek world, cursed in mythology and despised for its betrayal of the Greeks in the Persian Wars. Thebes as a city does not get much attention in the writings of ancient and modern historians. It did not have the seductive constitution of the Spartans or the cultural prestige of Athens. Furthermore, Thebes suffers at the hands of Xenophontic and Herodotean prejudice, a fact that undoubtedly influenced the priorities of later historians and discouraged the preservation of writings about the city (e.g. the disappearance of Plutarchs Life of Epaminondas). That is one factor.
Another is the tragic fact that our main written source for the period (i.e. Xenophon) goes out of his way not to write about Thebes. It is like those two barely existed for that predjudiced "phillacedaemonian". Added to this is the fact that Alexander the Great destroyed the city, decreasing whatever archaeological evidence would be available if anyone bothered to give it the archaeological attention it merits.
There are too many unavailable facts to make sense of the growth of Theban power. Some were mentioned above. Others, like the exact make-up of the post-378 Boeotian constitution, the demographic trends in the period up until 371 and the goings on of the Theban assemblies would shed much needed light of this topic but sadly almost nothing of these things is available. Lack of information is the real problem for studying 4th century Thebes.
Did Epaminondas and Pelopidas intend for a wider unity for mainland Greece in 371-368 BC?
Anyone who felt certain about a firm answer to this question would be delusional. There are no diaries and no declarations of intention by Pelopidas or Epaminondas. In light of the lack of evidence, any debate on this issue may be comparable with arguing over the colour of an invisible hat. However, it is not quite as bad as this. The actions of the Theban state give some ideas about the intentions of its chief policy makers, and since no other Theban in the sources gets much of a mention for this period, we have to assume that Pelopidas and Epaminondas are the chief policy makers. So can Theban behaviour in this period be explained as attempted unification or as something else?
Thebes concern in this period is her own security in the north and her war against Sparta. All of the Theban actions can be explained in these terms. She was still fighting Sparta and the Peloponnesian campaigns were part of this war. Epaminondas sought to weaken Sparta while he could and destroy the old Peloponnesian League, and he did so by founding Megalopolis, Messene and re-creating Mantinea, thus strengthening his Arcadian allies and creating a new ally whose very existence brought the Spartan social system to its knees. At the same time, there were campaigns in Thessaly and Macedon to prevent the emergence of a hostile coalition to the north. The coalition they formed with the states of the Peloponnese around the time of Leuctra was anti-Spartan rather than anything else. After the initial campaigns had killed off the Spartan threat, the Peloponnesian alliances began to weaken but the accounts from the period do not indicate that the Thebans were overly concerned. The Peloponnesian alliances were thus not important in themselves.
But the best way to discover the intentions of a state is examining the demands it makes at a Peace Conference. According to Xenophon (VII. i. 36), Thebes primary demand at the 367 conference is that Messene be kept independent and Athens give up its attempts to possess Amphipolis. The importance of the former to the Thebans indicates the importance they placed on keeping Sparta busy and weak and the latter to prevent a resurgent Athens becoming too strong. If the Thebans had sought unity for mainland Greece, they would not have made such unacceptable demands to a Persian against fellow Greeks.
Therefore, the Thebans were interested in hegemony and not unification.
How vital was Pelopidas to Theban success?
Pelopidas is one of the initial 379/8 revolutionaries. Plutarch explains (Pelopidas 8-14) that Pelopidas took part in the revolution but says nothing to make us certain that the revolution would have collapsed without him. He was not in command at Leuctra and not present at Mantinea. However, he was in command at Tegyra and Cynocephalae. If we believe Plutarch, his personality created additional Theban influence in Thessaly (Pelopidas. 31), and with the Great King (ibid. 30)
How vital was Epaminondas to Theban success?
Epaminondas is the man given credit for being the brains behind Theban success, for his innovative battle tactics and devastating strategic thinking. His actions are well known; so I do not need to go into them. However, a note of caution must be added. The lack of evidence for Theban history distorts our picture of development in Theban military thinking. We know almost nothing about the history of Theban military thinking and we hear very little about Theban battle tactics before the age of Epaminondas. So, if the tactics of Epaminondas suddenly appearing at Leuctra and then Mantinea were part of a gradual development, then we would not know it. Furthermore, Thucydides reveals that the tactics of deepening the lines was not new to the 370s when he describes how, at the battle of Delium (424/23), the Theban side of the Boeotian army was drawn up 25 shields deep (Thuc. IV. 93).
Spartas internal and diplomatic weakness should also be borne in mind as factors affecting Theban success. Before Leuctra Sparta had been playing hegemon by bluff, to a certain extent. Her manpower had decreased drastically in the previous century, making her reliant on her allies, mercenaries and Persian gold rather on the martial valour of her citizen elite. When Sparta was deprived of most of her allies after Leuctra, she was defenceless against Epaminondas invasion of Laconia. The 400 homoioi lost at Leuctra would almost certainly not have prevented this.
Another point is the role of other Theban statesmen. We know that the elite Sacred Band was the conception of Gorgidas. We also know that both were put on trial just after the 3rd invasion of the Peloponnese, indicating maybe that the Thebans did not give them the same credit given to them by other Greeks. It may even have been resented (Tod no. 130).
The real test of their importance would be to see how history would have unfolded without them. Obviously this is not possible, but some of the factors mentioned above are worth considering.
