The end of World War I led to an immediate reduction in armies worldwide, as victors and vanquished alike rapidly demobilized the enormous hosts raised for the war. Reductions went far below the level of the "normal" peacetime establishments prior to the war, if only because no one seriously believed there would be another major war, particularly since Germany's armed forces had been reduced to little more than a constabulary.
The end of the war also took care of two of the principal navies in the world, those of Germany and Russia, the one reduced to insignificance by the Treaty of Versailles and the other by revolution and civil war. Two others, those of France and Italy, fell decisively into the second rank of naval power, due to lack of funds. Three navies remained strong, the American, the Japanese, and the British. Moreover, all three seemed intent in further increasing their fleet size.
Aside from eliminating several first class navies, the Great War vastly altered the balance of naval power in another way, for it threatened to dethrone Britain from its traditional naval supremacy. Subtracting the obsolete vessels from her inventory, Britain's margin of superiority over either of the two other major navies was nonexistent, and considering the number of capital ships being built, the prognosis was not good for the Royal Navy.
The strain of the war had prevented Britain from ordering many new capital ships, while both Japan and the U.S. had been busy indeed. Moreover, the wily newcomers had delayed the actual start of construction so that they were able to incorporate the lessons of the war. As if that were not enough, Japan had announced that it planned to build its Navy on the "8-8-8 Plan," which stated that the first-line strength of the fleet would always consist of eight battleships and eight battlecruisers no more than eight years old, plus older vessels. This meant the Japanese would add two capital ships to their fleet every year, shortly giving them the largest battle fleet in the world, a matter of concern to the U.S.
America, of course, responded by planning to expand its fleet as well. In the face of Japanese and American threats to their naval primacy, the British reluctantly began planning to expand as well. A major naval arms race loomed, with all the attendant expense. The cost would be heavy for the U.S., heavier still for the U.K., and heaviest of all for Japan.
If the Japanese actually did try to implement the "8-8-8 Plan," they would be able to bear the expense for only six or eight years before running out of money and credit, by which time (1928-1930) they would have about forty serviceable battleships and battlecruisers, almost all less than 15 years old. At the point the Japanese would either have had to abandon the "8-8-8 Plan," thereby admitting they were not a first-class power, or go to war to secure the resources necessary to become one. In American and British naval circles the latter course seemed more likely.
In an effort to halt the incipient naval arms race, in 1921 the British suggested a naval disarmament conference, in compliance with the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. The response was surprisingly warm, and led to one of the most successful instances of international disarmament in history, the naval disarmament treaties of 1922 and 1930.
On November 12, 1921, delegates from the United States, Britain and Japan convened in Washington (chosen to overcome isolationist feats that Uncle Sam was being hustled), with France and Italy invited out of politeness. On the very first day, the American Secretary of State dropped a bombshell. Subtly observing that the U.S. had the economic wherewithal to outbuild both its rivals, he announced that America would be willing to scrap a significant portion of its existing fleet and of vessels still under construction, if the other powers would do the same and agree to limitations on the size of their fleets. The offer was greeted "with almost indecent haste," as the naval historian L. Sprague de Camp put it.
The Washington Naval Treaty (1922) was worked out in a remarkably short time, and implemented with considerable good will. Including further refinements of the agreement concluded in 1930 (the London Naval Treaty), 15 existing capital ships were scrapped (Britain 8, U.S. 7, Japan 2) and 31 of those abuilding (Britain 8, U.S. 13, Japan 10) were cancelled or converted to aircraft carriers (2 each for the U.S. and Japan). In addition, restrictions were imposed on the replacement of existing vessels, and on the displacement (35,000 tons standard) and size of guns (16 inch) that future battleships could tote.
In addition, the three major powers agreed that the U.S. and Britain, each of which had interests in both the Atlantic and Pacific, "needed" more capital ships than did Japan, which had interests only in the Pacific. The Japanese accepted this deal when the other powers sweetened it by barring new fortifications between Singapore and Hawaii and by giving Japan a better ratio in other categories of warships. A total tonnage limitation was placed on the size of the navies of all the signatories in the ratio 5:5:3.1:1.75:1.75 for the U.S., Britain, Japan, France and Italy. Some other restrictions were placed on other classes of ships as well, which were rigidly defined as to size and armament, including the introduction of the distinction between the light cruiser and heavy cruiser, a matter of gun caliber (6 inch/152mm or under, as opposed to anything over, up to 10 inch/255mm).
Although Britain failed to get submarines banned, these were agreements that did make a difference, as fleets actually were reduced. However, the treaties had some unintended results. Perhaps the biggest was that Japanese militarists would later use the treaties to argue that Japan had been insulted by relegation to a state of inferiority. Efforts at further significant reductions in naval armaments, which were made well into the 1930s, came to grief due to demands for "parity" by a militarized Japan and a resurgent Germany. Thus treaties aimed at reducing tensions and armaments eventually increased both. Disarmament doesn't always work out the way you think it will.
At the time, and afterward, particularly during WWII, many American navalists (the maritime equivalent of militarists) argued, and indeed continue to argue, that the disarmament treaties strengthened Japan, with disastrous results in 1941. This was hardly the case. In fact, had the U.S. adhered to the letter of the treaties, building up to allowable limits, its margin of superiority over the Japanese would have been much greater than was actually the case in 1941. However, fiscal conservatives, pacifists, and isolationists on both left and right combined to reduce the fleet to limits even lower than those prescribed by the treaties.
For example, a 1927 proposal by the Coolidge administration to build five aircraft carriers and 25 cruisers, as permitted by the treaty, was cut down to one carrier and 15 cruisers, which became law in 1928, although no ships were actually laid down until 1930, and some not until 1936. As a result, on December 7, 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy was not about 60% the size of the U.S. Navy, as prescribed by the disarmament treaties, but around 80%, and that only because Roosevelt had been fighting for several years to strengthen the fleet.
Edited to correct spelling errors.
The end of the war also took care of two of the principal navies in the world, those of Germany and Russia, the one reduced to insignificance by the Treaty of Versailles and the other by revolution and civil war. Two others, those of France and Italy, fell decisively into the second rank of naval power, due to lack of funds. Three navies remained strong, the American, the Japanese, and the British. Moreover, all three seemed intent in further increasing their fleet size.
Aside from eliminating several first class navies, the Great War vastly altered the balance of naval power in another way, for it threatened to dethrone Britain from its traditional naval supremacy. Subtracting the obsolete vessels from her inventory, Britain's margin of superiority over either of the two other major navies was nonexistent, and considering the number of capital ships being built, the prognosis was not good for the Royal Navy.
The strain of the war had prevented Britain from ordering many new capital ships, while both Japan and the U.S. had been busy indeed. Moreover, the wily newcomers had delayed the actual start of construction so that they were able to incorporate the lessons of the war. As if that were not enough, Japan had announced that it planned to build its Navy on the "8-8-8 Plan," which stated that the first-line strength of the fleet would always consist of eight battleships and eight battlecruisers no more than eight years old, plus older vessels. This meant the Japanese would add two capital ships to their fleet every year, shortly giving them the largest battle fleet in the world, a matter of concern to the U.S.
America, of course, responded by planning to expand its fleet as well. In the face of Japanese and American threats to their naval primacy, the British reluctantly began planning to expand as well. A major naval arms race loomed, with all the attendant expense. The cost would be heavy for the U.S., heavier still for the U.K., and heaviest of all for Japan.
If the Japanese actually did try to implement the "8-8-8 Plan," they would be able to bear the expense for only six or eight years before running out of money and credit, by which time (1928-1930) they would have about forty serviceable battleships and battlecruisers, almost all less than 15 years old. At the point the Japanese would either have had to abandon the "8-8-8 Plan," thereby admitting they were not a first-class power, or go to war to secure the resources necessary to become one. In American and British naval circles the latter course seemed more likely.
In an effort to halt the incipient naval arms race, in 1921 the British suggested a naval disarmament conference, in compliance with the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. The response was surprisingly warm, and led to one of the most successful instances of international disarmament in history, the naval disarmament treaties of 1922 and 1930.
On November 12, 1921, delegates from the United States, Britain and Japan convened in Washington (chosen to overcome isolationist feats that Uncle Sam was being hustled), with France and Italy invited out of politeness. On the very first day, the American Secretary of State dropped a bombshell. Subtly observing that the U.S. had the economic wherewithal to outbuild both its rivals, he announced that America would be willing to scrap a significant portion of its existing fleet and of vessels still under construction, if the other powers would do the same and agree to limitations on the size of their fleets. The offer was greeted "with almost indecent haste," as the naval historian L. Sprague de Camp put it.
The Washington Naval Treaty (1922) was worked out in a remarkably short time, and implemented with considerable good will. Including further refinements of the agreement concluded in 1930 (the London Naval Treaty), 15 existing capital ships were scrapped (Britain 8, U.S. 7, Japan 2) and 31 of those abuilding (Britain 8, U.S. 13, Japan 10) were cancelled or converted to aircraft carriers (2 each for the U.S. and Japan). In addition, restrictions were imposed on the replacement of existing vessels, and on the displacement (35,000 tons standard) and size of guns (16 inch) that future battleships could tote.
In addition, the three major powers agreed that the U.S. and Britain, each of which had interests in both the Atlantic and Pacific, "needed" more capital ships than did Japan, which had interests only in the Pacific. The Japanese accepted this deal when the other powers sweetened it by barring new fortifications between Singapore and Hawaii and by giving Japan a better ratio in other categories of warships. A total tonnage limitation was placed on the size of the navies of all the signatories in the ratio 5:5:3.1:1.75:1.75 for the U.S., Britain, Japan, France and Italy. Some other restrictions were placed on other classes of ships as well, which were rigidly defined as to size and armament, including the introduction of the distinction between the light cruiser and heavy cruiser, a matter of gun caliber (6 inch/152mm or under, as opposed to anything over, up to 10 inch/255mm).
Although Britain failed to get submarines banned, these were agreements that did make a difference, as fleets actually were reduced. However, the treaties had some unintended results. Perhaps the biggest was that Japanese militarists would later use the treaties to argue that Japan had been insulted by relegation to a state of inferiority. Efforts at further significant reductions in naval armaments, which were made well into the 1930s, came to grief due to demands for "parity" by a militarized Japan and a resurgent Germany. Thus treaties aimed at reducing tensions and armaments eventually increased both. Disarmament doesn't always work out the way you think it will.
At the time, and afterward, particularly during WWII, many American navalists (the maritime equivalent of militarists) argued, and indeed continue to argue, that the disarmament treaties strengthened Japan, with disastrous results in 1941. This was hardly the case. In fact, had the U.S. adhered to the letter of the treaties, building up to allowable limits, its margin of superiority over the Japanese would have been much greater than was actually the case in 1941. However, fiscal conservatives, pacifists, and isolationists on both left and right combined to reduce the fleet to limits even lower than those prescribed by the treaties.
For example, a 1927 proposal by the Coolidge administration to build five aircraft carriers and 25 cruisers, as permitted by the treaty, was cut down to one carrier and 15 cruisers, which became law in 1928, although no ships were actually laid down until 1930, and some not until 1936. As a result, on December 7, 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy was not about 60% the size of the U.S. Navy, as prescribed by the disarmament treaties, but around 80%, and that only because Roosevelt had been fighting for several years to strengthen the fleet.
Edited to correct spelling errors.
