Rise to Power : Tokugawa Ieyasu

Knight-Dragon

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According to the official genealogy as adopted by Tokugawa Ieyasu, he claimed descent from the prestigious Seiwa Genji lineage, through the branch line as begun by Nitta Yoshishige (1135-1202). The founder of this line took the Nitta name from the locality in the province of Kozuke where he was first assigned as an estate manager. In the following generations, this lineage branched out into numerous sublines; each taking the name of its residential base as its surname. One such was the Tokugawa, taking its name from a village of the same name in the Nitta district of Kozuke province.

Eight generations later, the Tokugawa seemed to have left the Kozuke province and assumed leadership of the Matsudaira, chiefs of a village bearing the same name in neighbouring Mikawa province. Ieyasu was the ninth head of this Matsudaira line, according to his offically adopted genealogy. He was also the one who petitioned the Kyoto court to formally change the family surname to Tokugawa in 1566.

We need not take this genealogy too seriously, since there're issues about its authenticity. Descent from a prestigious lineage, regardless of official documentation, was a necessity in the struggle for national prominence, during these turbulent times when lords were struggling for control of all Japan. In any case, it wasn't until his final victory at Sekigahara in 1600, when he finally adopted one set of pedigrees, tied to the Minamoto line, one of the prime military lineages of the time.

Most studies of the Tokugawa house began in the mid 15th century instead, when the sources permit a more reliable account. At the time, a new generation of provincial military lords, termed as Sengoku daimyo, was on the rise and challenging the old order of the Muromachi shoguns and their provincial agents, the shugo daimyo. The power of these new lords was based on tightly-knit housebands of increasing size and military effectiveness, and their close lord-vassal relationships.

We can trace the beginnings of the Matsudaira line in a number of hilltop forts, common to samurai families, above the valleys of the Yahagi river and its upper tributaries. The Matsudaira village itself was on the Asuke river, some distance above its confluence with the Yahagi. The first two generations were confined to this mountainous area but the third chieftain, Nobimitsu (?-1488) greatly expanded the family holdings into the middle plain of Mikawa province and occupied the castle of Anjo in 1471.

The Matsudaira maintained themselves at Anjo for about 50 years but its location to the west and south of Matsudaira village made it difficult to hold, in the face of the expansion of the Oda house in neighbouring Owari province. In 1524, Kiyoyasu, the chieftain, pulled back to east of the Yahagi river, and based himself at the castle of Okazaki. This castle would serve the Tokugawa until Ieyasu's time, on and off. The castle was well-placed and by the 1550s, the Matsudaira had controlled several districts, covering the interior one third of Mikawa province.

However, the Matsudaira were still non-players in the national struggle, and they existed within a regional power structure aligned to the Imagawa house, whose heads were military governors of Suruga province, and sometimes of Totomi and Mikawa provinces as well. During the 1550s, the Matsudaira were split over whether to remain as vassals to the Imagawa or to realign with the Oda, who were expanding aggressively out of Owari province.

Kiyoyasu's move to Okazaki and towards the east was an implicit decision to look to the Imagawa. However he was killed in 1535 and his successor, Hirotada (1526-1549), father of Ieyasu, acknowledged the Imagawa overlordship, resulting in a branch of the Matsudaira breaking off and joining the Oda. As a result, from the age of six until fourteen, Ieyasu found himself first as a hostage of the Oda and then of the Imagawa.

It was only in 1556 that Ieyasu was allowed to return to Okazaki castle, as head of the Matsudaira family, despite his father having passed away in 1549. He found the Matsudaira houseband in disarray, and was also constantly in the field, as vassal of Imagawa Yoshimoto (1519-1560), during the next few years. Nonetheless, Ieyasu did what he could to repair the damage done during the years of internal dissension.

By the mid 16th century, the contest for the national overlordship was increasingly hot. Imagawa Yoshimoto was one of the first to attempt it. In 1560, he led an army of 25000 men across Mikawa on the way to the capital, but was decisively defeated by a much smaller force led by none other than Oda Nobunaga and was killed during the action. Released from his vassalage, Ieyasu lost no time in entering into a formal alliance with Nobunaga.

Thus Ieyasu now formally began on his rise to power, on his own terms. And now the substance of the article (I'm becoming as wordy as Vry... :hmm: ).

Using Okazaki castle as his base and protected westwards by Nobunaga, Ieyasu pressed eastwards into the lands of his former overlords, the now weakened Imagawa, as well as those of the still powerful Takeda in Suruga province. By 1565, he had controlled Mikawa entirely. In 1566, confident of his position, Ieyasu petitioned the court to change his surname to Tokugawa, leaving the Matsudaira name attached to principal cadet families as well as to be used as a 'gift name' for allies. Along with the surname, Ieyasu received his appointment as the governor of Mikawa and was now recognized as a member of the military aristocracy.

During the next few years, Ieyasu spent his time reorganizing his holdings and resources. In particular, he began converting heads of collateral houses as dependant hereditary vassals, maintaining an even stronger grip over his non-kin military commanders. He also enlarged his houseband at the lowest levels, taking in large numbers of rural samurai, and assigned his enfeoffed vassals to command new expanded military units, formed out of these new recruits.

Ieyasu also worked on maintaining the relationship between the peasantry and his samurai retainers, as well as beginning a systematic survey of his lands. He also confronted the troublesome Ikko religious communities in Mikawa, militant and politically independent, and brought them into his orbit.

On the national level, Ieyasu worked closely with Nobunaga. Ieyasu's control of Mikawa protected Nobunaga's advance on Kyoto in 1568 whereas Nobunaga's control of Owari gave Ieyasu the freedom to concentrate on his eastern front. By 1570, he had taken all of Totomi from the Imagawa and moved his headquarters to Hamamatsu castle, a port town in Totomi. With Nobunaga's help, Ieyasu also began on an all-out effort to destroy the Takeda in Suruga and Kai, though it wasn't until 1582 that the stubborn Takeda were defeated. Which formalized his control of all Suruga province as well.

By now, Ieyasu had control over all or parts of the five provinces of Mikawa, Suruga, Totomi, Kai and Shinano. He was now one of the dozen or so most powerful daimyo in Japan, and acknowledged as 'lord of the five Tokai provinces'. However in 1582, Nobunaga was assassinated by Akechi Mitsuhide and Japan was plunged into temporary chaos.

Ieyasu was then at the port city of Sakai, without a following. By the time he had made his way back to his own forces, Toyotomi Hideyoshi had already killed Akechi and was in the process of taking over the Oda coalition. Ieyasu had missed his chance. He also knew it was dangerous to give in too much to Hideyoshi's takeover. In the next few years, Ieyasu took up the cause of Nobukatsu (1558-1630), Nobunaga's second son, to work off his obligations to the Oda, against Hideyoshi. This involved some actual fighting in the field.

Ieyasu invaded Toyotomi territory in Owari province, winning an engagement at Nagakute, but was fought to a stalemate at Komaki. Though these were minor engagements, they installed a certain respect for the other, in the two men. The standoff was ended with Ieyasu shrewdly submitting to Hideyoshi with a formal visit of submission to Hideyoshi at Osaka castle in 1586. Hideyoshi also found it expedient not to press the issue.

Ieyasu's 2nd son was given to Hideyoshi for adoption while one of Hideyoshi's sisters was given in marriage to Ieyasu. For a time, Hideyoshi's mother was also kept as a hostage in the Tokugawa household. During this time, Ieyasu moved his headquarters further east, to Sumpu. Thus, from 1586 until 1598 when Hideyoshi died, Ieyasu served as a willing ally. Having stood his own in battle, Ieyasu had gained Hideyoshi's respect (and caution) and was thus spared from needlessly depleting his own forces in fighting Hideyoshi's battles.

Hence when Hideyoshi was sending large armies into Shikoku and Kyushu (the two islands to the south of the main island of Honshu), Ieyasu was in the east expanding his holdings, improving on his military and perfecting his administration. He also enlarged his castle at Sumpu and gathered large numbers of personnel there. It was also during these years that he continued on the systematic survey of cultivated land, now the standard practise all over Japan.

By 1589, Hideyoshi had accomplished the subjugation of Kyushu. Now the only remaining contenders were the Hojo in the Kanto region, and the Date, Gamo, Tsugaru and other families in the far north. At first, Hideyoshi tried to win over the Hojo, using Ieyasu as an intermediary; Ieyasu having married off one of his daughters to Hojo Ujinao (1562-1592). But Ujinao refused to capitulate and Hideyoshi prepared for war. Ieyasu was obliged to participate; his lands were lying between the two. The Hojo was headquartered at Odawara castle and controlled the six Kanto provinces of Izu, Sagami, Musashi, Shimosa, Kazusa and Awa.

In the event, Ieyasu took the initiative and invaded with an army of 30000 men in 6 divisions. The Hojo held out for three months at Odawara castle before it fell in the summer of 1590. Before this, the Date and other daimyo in the north had pledged their allegiance to Hideyoshi. Thus now, Hideyoshi controlled all the daimyo and could claim to the chief of the military estate.

Following the Hojo surrender, Hideyoshi ordered Ieyasu to move out of his Tokai provinces and occupy the vacanted Hojo domains in Kanto. This seemed like an advancement, since it gave Ieyasu control of 6 of the 8 Kanto provinces, and making him the largest landholder in Japan, larger in fact than Hideyoshi's own holdings. However, this move put Ieyasu even further away from Kyoto, the political center of Japan, and uprooted him and his followers from their secured historic holds. Ieyasu's senior vassals saw it as an exile.

Nonetheless, Ieyasu rapidly accomplished the move to Kanto. He received Hideyoshi's formal command on the 13th day of the 7th month, but he had made some plans, having had some prior warning back in the 4th month. By the 1st of the 8th month, he had entered a small castle at Edo, his new headquarters, and center of the future metropolis of Tokyo. Settling in took almost a year. Thousands of families picked up their entire households and equipment to move to new houses in unfamiliar territory. Just as rapidly, Hideyoshi filled the vacanted castles in the Tokai provinces with his own trusted men.

This marked a major turning point in Ieyasu's fortunes, with many unforeseen consequences. There was some evidence to suggest that Hideyoshi expected Ieyasu to have some problems managing the rural samurai in Kanto. However, Ieyasu's prior experience with absorbing the lands of defeated rivals, particularly the Kai province that was taken from the Takeda, held him in good stead. Rather than displaced the rural samurai and even some enfeoffed vassals left behind by the Hojo, he absorbed them all into his organisation and recognized their status as held while under the Hojo.
 
Also, the move to Kanto had given Ieyasu a chance to further reduce the independence of his samurai vassals, down to the lowest levels. Whereas earlier, the rural samurai had their own personal fiefs and were less dependent on their daimyos, now the samurai were directly in the daimyos' pay (and control) and the lands were instead administered by an impersonal field administration, directly from the castle headquarters. In effect, it gave Ieyasu a critical organisational advantage.

Possession of the Kanto made Ieyasu the largest landowner in Japan, well over twice his former holdings. The task of administering this domain was delegated to an enlarged military and administrative establishment. Ieyasu had taken with him as many of his housemen as possible but was still shorthanded. Thus he adopted into his service numerous samurai who had been cast adrift by the Hojo or in other provinces by the fortunes of war.

It would take decades for the Tokugawa to fully develop their new Kanto holdings. Ieyasu adopted Edo as his capital and assigned fiefs to his followers. He also had to convert his holdings into using the new rice-tax system, as imposed by Hideyoshi. And to assign his military forces around. Ieyasu also needed to solve a number of logistical problems at Edo such as building a suitable castle, draining swamps for urban construction, drawing of fresh water into the city and improving port facilities. All he would solve in good time.

OTOH, Hideyoshi was working on institutionizing his military power into a national government. In 1590, he attempted an invasion of China (through Korea) in an effort to further demonstrate his powers of command over his vassal daimyo. The invasion ended in failure, with the participating daimyo weakened considerably. In fact, the invasion was still in progress when Hideyoshi died in 1598, resulting in many important daimyo being out of the country and out of the picture. For this invasion, because he was so far away to the east, Ieyasu was only obliged to send a token backup force to Kyushu in 1592, which never saw action. Thus while the other daimyo were busy with the invasion, Ieyasu was busy expanding and strengthening his Edo castle, as well as improving his administration and military.

Although a very successful military leader, Hideyoshi proved to be less capable as a political organizer. It wasn't until nearing the end of his life when he finally devised a formal system to delegate political authority, and to manage the transfer of power to his successor, Hideyori (his son). To this end, he appointed a board of five regents; with Ieyasu as the head and other 4 members being the most powerful daimyo allied with Hideyoshi. Concurrently, a board of five commissioners was appointed to manage the more mundane, administrative portions of government; drawn from long-serving members of Hideyoshi's house administration.

This structure was unstable, and didn't survive Hideyoshi's death in 1598 for long. The members of the two boards were pre-occupied with their own domestic problems; one by one they abandoned the capital area. With the death of Maeda Toshiie, the only daimyo more experienced than Ieyasu as well as being a member of the board of regents and guardian to Hideyori at Osaka castle, in 1599, he took Toshiie's position in Osaka castle and was recognized as the obvious tenka-dono (lord of the realm). However, there was still some more work left to be done.

Opposition still remained, in the form of powerful heads of certain daimyo leagues located mostly in western Japan. There were also those who had owed their positions and power to Hideyoshi and whose fortunes were tied to his house. Like, for example, Hideyoshi's house daimyo, as well as his field generals. These centered themselves around Osaka castle, but they lacked a single charismatic leader and there was also friction between the various sub-groups.

While Ieyasu did not formally declare his ambition to succeed Hideyoshi to national hegemony, however he did increasingly act the part of one. In early 1600, after Maeda Toshiie's death, he openly moved into the western enclosure of Osaka castle. His numerous letters to his fellow daimyo were couched in statesmanlike concern for national peace. When Uesugi Kagekatsu (1555-1623), one of the regents, began mobilizing his troops in Aizu, which threatened the rear areas of the Tokugawa lands, Ieyasu expressed alarm and ordered nearby daimyo to prepare for a move against him.

By now, Ieyasu was issuing orders as though he was indeed the hegemon. Some daimyo from the Toyotomi faction began to offer him pledges of support and even send him hostages; like some of the Toyotomi generals as well as the Ikeda in Bizen province and the Yamanouchi in Totomi province. By the summer of 1600, the country was visibly divided between those who were loosely united behind Hideyori as a symbol of national unity and those who supported the Tokugawa. The former consisted of daimyo like the Ukita, Chosokabe, Mori, Konishi, Nabeshima and Shimazu; whose lands were mainly west of Osaka. The Tokugawa supporters were mostly based in the east.

Ishida Mitsunari, prime mover behind the western faction, denounced Ieyasu's move against Aizu as an usurpation of national authority and assembled a large military force to march towards Kanto. The latter, having anticipated this for some time, left the Aizu operation to others, namely Date Masamune and Yuki Hideyasu, and quickly marched out to meet this new threat. As Ieyasu's army marched out of the Kanto, all the daimyo along the way joined him.

On the 15th day of the 9th month (21 Oct 1600), the two armies met at Sekigahara. Ieyasu had an estimated 70000 men, while the western faction had slightly more, 80000, but were poorly positioned and somewhat unreliable. Only half saw action. The battle see-sawed throughout the morning, but with the defection of the Kobayakawa, victory went to the eastern faction, sealing Ieyasu's hold on the reins of national hegemony.

Ieyasu used this occasion to effect the largest land transfer in Japanese history, larger than even his own earlier move to the Kanto region. 87 daimyo who opposed him lost their lands. 3 others had their lands drastically decreased. A large swathe was taken out of the Toyotomi lands. 43 daimyo were transfered to new holdings. New daimyo were created. Ieyasu also raised the status of 40 of his own housemen to daimyo, and gave them additional lands. An additional 20 was given the daimyo status but without land increases. Finally, he granted daimyo status to 8 rear vassals who had distinguished themselves.

With all these land confiscations, transfers, and new creations, the balance of power was now heavily in Ieyasu's favour. In the aftermath of the battle of Sekigahara, as the eastern troops poured into Osaka, Ieyasu undoubtably had the capacity to seize Osaka castle, defended by Mori Terumoto on behalf of Toyotomi Hideyori and his mother, Lady Yoko. However he was a sworn trustee of the Toyotomi polity and many of his supporters still had strong emotional ties to Hideyoshi. Ieyasu also had few allies in western Japan.

Thus Hideyori was allowed to remain at Osaka castle and to hold up to 1/3 of the former Toyotomi lands. Although he was now a mere daimyo, the court still merited him with high rank, as the heir to Hideyoshi. The facade couldn't be expected to last, but Ieyasu put off finishing off this last remnant of the Toyotomi polity, in trying to avoid another war that would put to question the ultimate loyalty of all the military houses, until the years 1614-1615.

By 1602, the last of the Sekigahara settlement had been carried out, with the Shimazu of southern Kyushu acknowledging Ieyasu's overlordship. A year later, the emperor Goyozei, would install him as sei-i tai-shogun. It was now that Ieyasu put up his adopted genealogy, showing his links to the Minamoto lineage. Concurrent with this appointment, he also received the traditional designations of Genji no choja (chief of the Minamoto lineage), Junna, Shogaku ryoin betto (rector of the Junna and Shogaku colleges), second court rank and udaijin (minister of the right). These titles added legitimacy to Ieyasu's overlordship.

In 1605, Ieyasu 'retired' and made Hidetada, his son, the next shogun. Adopting the style of ogosho (retired shogun), he established himself at the subsidiary castle at Sumpu and gathered advisors around himself, whereas Hidetada was to be based at the Tokugawa residence in Kyoto. He entered the capital at the head of 100000 troops, using the occasion to impress the country on the might of the Tokugawa house.

Ieyasu's move was a way of making the Tokugawa succession more secured, and setting a precedent for a direct succession. Also to make sure Hidetada was safely in place as shogun before Ieyasu's death, denying any attempt to promote Hideyori as the next shogun. And more importantly, it allowed Ieyasu to develop basic strategy and policy.

At Sumpu, he established a 'brain trust' to assist him in devising policies. Members included the Tendai priest, Tenkai, who was Ieyasu's spiritual adviser; Hayashi Razan, the Confucian scholar who drew up the legal codes; Ina Tadatsugu, a specialist on local administration; Goto Mitsutsugu, founder of the Silver Mint (Ginza) and advisor on currency policy and even an Englishman, William Adams, a navigator.

Much remained to be accomplished including designing more adequate forms for the administrative organs of the shogunate; organisation and assignment of the bakufu officials; relocation of daimyo for strategic and political purposes and problems of control over various groups such as the emperor and the court, the temples and shrines, the peasants and merchants and foreigners from Europe and China.

But the most pressing issue was Toyotomi Hideyoshi at Osaka castle, a potential rallying point for disaffected forces. The problem was more acute with each year as the boy came closer to maturity. There was already talk in courtly circles of appointing him as kampaku, or creating dual heads of state, one military and one civil. In 1611, Ieyasu's fears seemed to be confirmed when he met Hideyori at Nijo castle in Kyoto. Shortly after, he demanded that all daimyo swore a special oath of allegiance to him, as head of the military estate.

Ieyasu knew however that oaths were insufficient. So he resorted to a few tactics to weaken the Osaka faction surrounding Hideyori, like encouraging them to build temple monuments in memory of Hideyoshi to exhaust the huge bullion supply stored in Osaka castle. But it was insufficient and military action seemed the ultimate, final recourse.

In 1614, over a contrived issue, Ieyasu attacked Osaka castle. Although not a single daimyo joined Hideyori, nonetheless he was joined by large numbers of ex-daimyo defeated at Sekigahara and numrous masterless samurai, set adrift with the dissolution of so many daimyo houses. An estimated 90000 men, many Christians, defended Osaka castle, while Ieyasu's forces numbered twice that. But the castle proved impregnable, not even to newly acquired firearms. The first seige cost Ieyasu the lives of many of his men.

Ieyasu called for a political compromise and a military truce, fearing a defeat at this point would turn a large number of daimyo who had once supported Hideyoshi but joined the Tokugawa side later on. Hideyori, or rather his mother, agreed, before realizing too late that the Tokugawa work gangs brought in to fill the castle moat had considerably accomplished their job. Once the castle defenses were weakened, Ieyasu renewed his attack in May 1615 and was successful. Osaka castle was burned and Hideyori and his mother committed suicide. The Toyotomi were at last destroyed.

Barely a year later, Ieyasu passed away. But he had left behind a firm foundation for his successors to build on, and was considerably more successful than either Nobunaga or Hideyoshi. His successors would finish the task began by Ieyasu, and the Tokugawa shogunate would last until the 1860s.

Drawn fr Warrior Rule in Japan, edited by Marius B. Jansen
 
I was thinking about doing an article on this subject, although
I was planning on contrasting the actual events with the
picture painted in James Clavell's novel Shogun. But
you beat me to the punch...

BTW, great article.
 
No harm in going ahead with it. ;)

I was just reading thru on the history of the guy and thought it was pretty impressive; rising fr nothing to become hegemon over a sizeable nation.
 
Wow...very interesting to read. It just reinforces my belief that Tokugawa is The Man.

And I'm impressed at how accurate some games covering his time like Shogun and Kessen have been.
 
Nice article XIII! Last year was the 400th aniversary of the founding of Edo- billed as "400 years from Edo to Tokyo". In celebration I visted the tomb of Ieyasu in Nikko, and was very impressed with it. Amoung other things it includes the original three wise monkeys- although these are on the temple stables rather than associated with the tomb itself.

As well as the rise to power, it is interesting to consider the social system established by the Tokugawa that enabled them to keep potential rivals weakened and thus remain in power.
 
Ah, yes, making all the daimyo spend every other year at Edo, thereby decreasing the chances that they could plan a rebellion.
 
Originally posted by The Yankee
Ah, yes, making all the daimyo spend every other year at Edo, thereby decreasing the chances that they could plan a rebellion.

Right- and iirc those who had been against the Tokugawa had to spend even more time in Edo. They also took the precaution of making them leave their wives and dependents there more or less permanently. Also more general measures such as fixing social classes so that one could not traverse between them.
 
And now the substance of the article (I'm becoming as wordy as Vry... ).

You are indeed progressing well, grasshopper. The day will come when you are able to pound out reams and reams of historical material that no one reads. And my work here will be done.

Excellent article, 13! We need more non-Western stuff around here.
 
No. I tend to write stuff, when the 'moment' seizes me, rather than have some preset objective before setting down to work... ;)
 
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