90 Years of Contemplation: The Origins of World War I

Vrylakas

The Verbose Lord
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Greetings,

I want to kick off a thread recognizing the recent 90th anniversary of the assassination of the Archduke, Franz Ferdinand, and more importantly the 37 day crisis that followed with a discussion on the origins of the war and its consequences. For as much as World War I was an immensely impactful and shaping experience for the world and a (the?) defining event of the 20th century, its beginnings are perhaps some of the most bizarre in modern historical annals.

A short and ailing Balkan nationalist, as a part of an underground nationalist organization, assassinates the very unpopular and very nearly-disenfranchised runner-up for the imperial throne, and as a consequence all the great powers of the era plunge into a 4 year long slugfest that ends up destroying 4 of the largest empires in the world and seriously undermining the remainders. That's a bit like saying "A Canadian nationalist assassinated the American Vice President, and as a consequence Russia and China declared war against one another." In other words, there needs be some explanation as to how we got from point A to point Z, and so many history books don't bother with that - they stop at the dead archduke.

I want to take the process a part some. It is a strange process that had almost nothing to do with Serbian nationalism or Imperial Viennese dignity. I'll walk through the basic 6-step process of going from a street-corner brawl to a world-wide war. Please bear with me as each step requires some…background. This is not a chronology of the events, but rather an exploration of their meaning and how they were understood at the time. I am assuming that you, the readers, already have a basic idea of the events. I especially want to underline the point that an intelligent and educated observer on the evening of 28. June, 1914, reading their newspaper and digesting the impact of the day's events, would probably not have guessed that a mere month and a half later the world's greatest armies would be marching against each other.

1. *Bang* and down he goes. Gavrilo Princip, a barely-18 year old Serbian Bosnian, just got the opportunity he'd dreamt of when Franz Ferdinand's coach driver had realized he'd made a wrong turn and stopped to reverse course. Princip took two steps forward, fired off several shots, killing almost instantly both the Archduke and his wife Sofie (or "Zofia", as Vienna derisively called her, a reminder of her Czech middle class-commoner origins). So we have a ghastly murder, and two are dead. The Sarajevo crowd, by the way, was infuriated with Princip's action and instantly pounced on him and began to pummel him. He was saved by gendarmes who also had to, after rescuing him, prop him up so he could vomit because in the melee he had managed to swallow a cyanide pill but it turned out not to be a fatal dosage. No matter; Princip already knew he had tuberculosis, a disease that was almost always fatal back then. (He would die of it ironically in 1918, in the Habsburg prison fortress of Spielberg in Austrian Brüno (modern Brno, Czech Republic). If Princip had just lasted a few more months, he probably would have been released by the intensely anti-Habsburg Czechs and welcomed home to the new "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" where he could die an agonizing but hero's death instead of in a cold Austrian dungeon. Oh well, c'est la vie.

In any event, this whole assassination episode needs some explanation. In 1815, Serbia was the northern-most province of the Ottoman empire and was a frontier state that saw frequent clashes between two hostile empires, that of the Ottomans' and the Habsburgs'. As such Serbia was subjected to a severe police regime by the Ottomans and worse yet, the main military forces in Serbia were the dreaded Janissaries who were once a crack military force dedicated exclusively to the Sultan's service but long since having devolved into a large mafia organization that ruled its own regions in a thugocracy that was as likely to ignore as to obey any command from the Sultan or Constantinople. The Janissaries had become very much like the Swedish armies in the closing years of the Thirty Years War, wandering southern Germany leaderless and pillaging at will, becoming a scourge in the lands they controlled. The Janissaries provoked the Serbian revolt of 1815 but could not completely suppress it, leading to decades of on-and-off warfare that eventually resulted in Serbian independence from the Ottoman empire. By the time of total independence in 1878, Serbia was a brutalized peasant state with a near-messianic nationalism.

But that year, 1878, was a crucial year for the Serbs and the Balkans. In 1876 the Bulgarians had revolted (again) against Ottoman rule and the Janissaries, since evicted from Serbia, wreaked a terrible revenge against the Bulgarian peasantry. This act - well, OK, other Balkan interests that conveniently utilized this act as a pretext - provoked Russia to declare war. Things see-sawed for a while but suddenly in the closing months of 1877 the Russian armies surged forward and seemed almost destined to take Constantinople itself. The Russians ended the war by imposing the Treaty of San Stefano on the Ottomans, in which they created a massive Bulgarian state that encompassed most of the southern Balkans and in which St. Petersburg intended to station large Russian armies. In other words, Russia was going to transform the Balkans into a Russian protectorate. This was amazingly crass behavior for the Russians because the Treaty of San Stefano knowingly broke several treaties and agreements Russia had with the other European powers. (More about that later.) The European powers in response convened the Berlin Conference in the summer of 1878 which re-organized the Balkans in such a way as to continue a general European policy decades old; namely, keeping Russia out of Europe and away from those damned (Dardanelles) Straits.

The Berlin Conference had enormous consequences for Europe. It finally drew the two German powers, Prussia (known by then as "Germany") and Austria back together in a rapprochement, restoring a Pan-German front in Europe damaged in the 1866 Austro-Prussian War. It once again re-organized the system of alliances among the smaller states of Europe, generally creating a widely anti-Russian alliance system. Germany preferred to let Vienna deal with the smaller states though their policies were coordinated, so that over the 1870s and 1880s Vienna signed treaties with Bulgaria, Serbia, Italy, Romania and Greece, locking the Russians out of the Balkans. This system of alliances had cracks, however, as the events of 1914-18 would show but a crucial one for Austro-Serbian relations started immediately in 1878.

No self-respecting international peace conference can ever truly end without the great powers grabbing at least some real estate, and 1878 was no different. The Ottomans in the fracas of 1876-77 had been forced to withdrawal from several ancient medieval provinces south of the Sava River known collectively by only two of the several involved-provinces' names, "Bosnia-Herzegovina", and while the Conference ultimately decided these should remain Ottoman territories it did assign protectorate status to Vienna for these lands. In other words, on paper they answered to Constantinople but in reality they were now Austrian turf. Austria in 1878 was enjoying a revival of sorts, having sorted out some of its internal problems by splitting the monarchy in two the decade earlier between the German Austrians and the Hungarians (thus becoming "Austria-Hungary") and the new imperial authorities were indeed in an imperial mood. The Habsburg armies marched into Bosnia and unleashed a ferocious campaign of "pacification" designed to eliminate any hint of dissent or potential dissent. Nationalism gave Vienna and Budapest both the heebie-jeebies. Very broadly speaking Bosnia's urban centers were actually quite cosmopolitan and very connected, both culturally and economically, to the rest of Europe, while Bosnia's "interior" or rural areas tended to be some of the most backwards regions of Europe. Just as broadly speaking, the urban centers were generally populated by Slavic Moslems and Catholic Croats, while much of the countryside tended to be Serbian - although there's much to quarrel with definitions at this point in history. After the "pacification" ended, Bosnia's urban centers enjoyed the benefits of suddenly being given much greater access to the Habsburg economic and cultural centers, and would flourish while the countryside languished in its centuries' old poverty and hatred of the cities. Remember again that when Princip fired those fatal shots, he had to be rescued from the Sarajevo crowds by the gendarmes; Franz Ferdinand was genuinely popular in Sarajevo. (More on that later too.) General Mladic's artillerymen remembered this when they trained their fire on the Sarajevo center in the 1990s "Bosnian" Serbian siege of the Bosnian capital; the rural Serb hatred for the cosmopolitan Bosnian urban centers still burned.
 
Part II:

The Serbians were aghast at the Austro-Hungarian bloodless acquisition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878 and immediately began to develop a Russian-style "gathering of all the historic lands" ideology. Bosnia had been a medieval Southern Slavic state with very eclectic origins that had briefly flourished in the later middle ages. Several of the smaller states now incorporated into modern Bosnia - Hum, etc. - gravitated more towards the West, especially Venice and Hungary. In any event, the Serbs of 1878 became convinced Bosnia was a long-lost Serbian province since usurped by Slavic Moslem traitors (sort of pseudo-Turks in Serbian eyes) and neighboring empires, and the whole region was just begging for a restored Serbian empire encompassing all lands where Serbs had ever set foot. Of course, much of the Balkans would also come to the same conclusion about their own lost histories and lands - real and imagined - but the Serbs were unique in that they had no consistent supporting power. The growth of Serbian power in the Balkans suited neither Vienna, Budapest nor St. Petersburg so they each generally ignored Serbian interests to the extent that Belgrade bounced back and forth between Imperial sponsors in the decades leading up to 1914, with almost no outside power ever effectively moderating Serbia's expectations or demands. In this way Serbia became radicalized much moreso than even her most vigorously nationalistic neighbors in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

In the final decade before 1914, the Serbs jettisoned their Austrian-leaning dynasty (the Obrenovices) in favor of a Russian-leaning dynasty (Karadordevices), resulting in the royal family getting hacked to little pieces in their palace in 1903. This set Serbia on a collision course with Vienna, and if anyone wondered at the time what would be the ultimate spark for the powderkeg Austro-Serb relations had become, they got their answer in 1908 when the Habsburgs coordinated a double-shocker for Europe with Bulgaria by which Bulgaria declared its outright independence from the Ottomans and Vienna announced the official annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

An aside about History, Eastern Europe and Princip today: It's important to understand the relationship to history Eastern Europe has. 19th century nationalism really turned things upside down in Eastern Europe, completely altering centuries-old social relationships and in the process re-creating (read: "inventing") their histories. It's sort of like the old Lord Dunsany story: It is not good enough that one exists no more; it must be that one has never existed. The past must be re-written to legitimize the present.

This means that History is an ever-present reality for Eastern Europeans, and still very relevant to modern events and life. It's not just the quaint older buildings we walk by or the street names; it's an omni-present reality, a kind of constant background noise that we're used to. This is why Hungarians and Slovaks can still very passionately argue about 16th century Pozsóny/Bratislava or Greeks and Macedonians can come to blows over simple names - they're not arguing the past, they're arguing the present while using the language of the past.

So, Princip: Was he a hero? The answer has real political consequences, as the 1990s implosion of Yugoslavia certainly shows. The Serbian government of 1914, while very sympathetic to his cause, certainly did not approve his methods. Indeed, while modern Serbs like to dwell on the success of Princip's act and then quickly fast-forward to 1918 and the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, they forget that Princip's actions brought great woe to Serbia and the nation was only saved by the actions and immense sacrifices of foreign troops far away in Western Europe and Greece. Serbia, after initially repulsing the Austro-Hungarian invasions of 1914, was defeated and overrun in 1915 with the straggling survivors of its army forced into an agonizing winter retreat southward through the Balkan mountains in Albania, finally finding refuge at an Allied camp in Salonika where it sat out the rest of the war. Tens of thousands of Serb soldiers and civilian refugees died along the way from starvation, freezing temperatures or from raids and attacks by Albanian tribes. Austrian and German authorities brutalized the Serbian population during their occupation, and indeed Nikola Pasic - the Serbian prime minister - had Princip's sponsor, Dimitrejevic (the head of the terrorist group Crna Ruka and a liaison between several other Serbian terrorist groups) arrested and executed in 1917 for treason. The Serbs of 1915-October 1918 would have probably seen Princip's actions in a very different light.

As for Princip himself, while it is highly unlikely that many could have guessed on 28. June 1914 that a terrorist action in faraway Sarajevo would precipitate a world war, one still must ask what exactly Princip expected to happen. He (and Serbia) are quite lucky that Princip's actions did precipitate a world war, because Serbia alone facing the Austro-Hungarian military (with no Russian threat to draw away A-H forces) would have been crushed and faced humiliation and enfeeblement as never before. As it was, Belgrade did achieve most of its 1914 foreign policy goals in 1918, but the reality of what they represented became very clear as the Serb-dominated Yugoslavia had to constantly deal with the rising nationalism of the country's non-Serb groups and their commensurately growing anti-Serb disaffection, and as well Belgrade's success with most of its real estate-grabbing goals had created some very powerful enemies in its immediate neighborhood - Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Austria and by proxy Germany - which bore nasty fruit in 1941.

So here we are almost a century later, and while we can say that Princip's goals of a Greater Serbia were largely realized in the intervening years, they resulted over a century's time in the deaths of several hundred thousand Serbs (as well as neighoring peoples) and ultimately, at century's end, almost all of these gains were lost when the Serb proxy-state Yugoslavia imploded, ironically leaving Belgrade with borders very similar to those of 1914 but with the added bitter bonus that the wars of the 1990s resulted in the uprooting and destruction of several centuries-old Serbian communities and enclaves beyond modern Serb borders whose histories and regional cultures are lost forever.

Princip did Serbia no favors when he shot Franz Ferdinand, and the continued glorification of his terroristic actions merely serves to hold modern Serbia back from modernization and integration into modern Europe's political and economic structures.

Back to the narrative:

2. The next step was the first escalation of the crisis. So the Archduke was assassinated. Who cared?

As several have alluded already, the Archduke had made himself very unpopular with many in the ruling groups of the empire. He had married a commoner and almost was forced to abdicate his position as being the next in line for the imperial throne over it. His uncle, emperor Franz Josef I, hated him because he touted "modern" reformist ideas that often implied the current state of affairs in the empire was somehow wrong or inadequate. Also, Uncle Franz Josef's favorite for succession to the throne, his athletic and loyal son Rudolf, had committed suicide in 1889, leaving the emperor with his schmuck-of-a-nephew who just didn't seem to grasp the whole aristocracy-as-a-gravy-train thing. Franz Ferdinand was also a proponent of the Federalist idea, whereby the empire would be re-organized along federalist lines allowing equal representation for all ethnic groups. There were many opposed to this idea, but two groups in particular hated the Archduke for it:

A. The Hungarians. They had just re-achieved a sort of independence with the 1867 Ausgleich (Compromise) and now ruled half of the Habsburg domains. They had a good thing going and had no intention of sharing with other non-German groups in the empire. The Hungarian ruling group reacted swiftly to the Archduke's suggestions for federalization with an almost daily polemic vitriol in the Hungarian press, slandering and cursing the Archduke. He came in time to return that hatred, and repeatedly swore how he'd enjoy gutting Hungarian privilages when he became emperor. So bad was the blood between Franz Ferdinand and the Hungarians that when he was assassinated, it was initially feared in Vienna that a Hungarian agent had committed the deed.

B. The Serbs. Franz Ferdinand wanted to allow the empire's minorities fullest access to power and representation, building on ideas from the 1870s and 80s (ultimately suppressed at the time) of creating not just a dual-monarchy but a multi-lateral monarchy, giving large minorities like the Czechs, Serbs and Romanians access to critical decision-making processes. So if Franz Ferdinand wanted to improve the lot of Austrian Serbs, why did Belgrade hate him so much? Because they didn't want Austrian Serbs to be living happier in the Empire; Belgrade wanted them all united into one single Serbian state. If minority Serbs in Austria-Hungary saw real benefits to living in the empire, their enthusiasm for a Greater Serbia might wane.
 
Part III:

However, no self-respecting empire can allow pesky and annoying neighboring states to assassinate its leadership, regardless of their popularity (or lack of) at home. So as soon as the news hit Vienna that the Archduke had been shot dead, Austria-Hungary knew it had a war on its hands. This is the first step towards World War I, the fact that the Habsburgs knew they had to react to this political murder and do so decisively.

In another thread I once compared Vienna's situation in late June 1914 to that of Washington's in September 2001, though many disagreed with my analogy. Yes, there are many important differences between the two cases but a few important similarities exist: Both governments found themselves the victims of a terrorist act, but worse yet one which was perpetrated by a stateless organization that had taken up residence and virtually hijacked a sovereign state. In the U.S.' case, it saw Al Qaeda based in Afghanistan and although the (Taleban) government of Afghanistan had not attacked the U.S. it harbored the group that had and continued to protect them. In 1914 Serbia, a new underground terrorist organization - Crna Ruka, "The Black Hand" - had been created in the wake of the 1908 Austrian annexation of Bosnia, and while this group officially was independent of the Serbian state its leadership and resources both came from major members of the Serbian government and military. Its by now infamous leader, Colonel Dragutin Dimitrejevic ("Apis", the Bull), was particularly unhappy with the Serbian prime minister of 1914, Nikola Pasic, and his seemingly passive attitude towards Austria-Hungary. Simply said, Pasic wasn't dumb enough to provoke a war with the Habsburg empire so although he agreed with Crna Ruka's ultimate goal of a Greater Serbia, he felt diplomacy to be the more sensible route. This is why Dimitrejevic felt he had to force the situation by having Franz Ferdinand assassinated in Sarajevo as he visited for review of Austro-Hungarian army maneuvers in Bosnia on 28. June 1914.

So what was Vienna to do? The Habsburg secret service fairly quickly traced Princip's associates back to Belgrade and had, by the standards of the day and still today, a substantive casus belli. There were however several schools of thought in the empire about how best to resolve the crisis and this proved crucial to the first escalation of the crisis. The Austrian imperial commander-in-chief General Count Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf wanted to attack Serbia immediately, and led the "hawk" party in Vienna. Another critical group, however, delayed any action through their indecision and dallying, dragging the crisis out through most of July. The Hungarians, while not unhappy to see Franz Ferdinand in a box, understood that imperial dignity demanded redress. However, they had great concerns about the outcome of any war and refused to give their crucial support to a war. Everyone assumed the Austro-Hungarian army would have a cake-walk into Serbia, but the Hungarians were concerned that Vienna might get greedy and decide to punish Serbia by grabbing some Serbian real estate in the post-war settlement - and the last thing Hungary wanted was more non-Germans or non-Hungarians in the empire. The 1900 and 1910 censuses in Hungary had showed that the Hungarians only constituted roughly 50% of the population in their half of the empire and the Hungarian birth rate was falling. Hungarians were about to become a minority in their own country, and this really shook the ruling elites in Budapest. This may sound like an obscure point but it was enough that the Hungarian prime minister, Gróf (Count) István Tisza, dug in his heels and refused to consent to a declaration of war until Vienna promised no annexations.

This is, I think, the most important aspect of this first escalation of the crisis, because this delay of several weeks allowed other Great Powers to digest the events and more importantly their implications in greater depth, and several began to smell opportunity. One wonders if Vienna had been able to act swiftly and decisively within the first week or two after the assassination if there would have been a World War at all; perhaps only a few obscure regional historian-geeks like myself would remember these events much as few modern people remember the Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911. Tisza eventually did cave in and Vienna promised no new annexations, but by the time the Austrian river flotilla steamed down the Danube river and began shelling Belgrade on the night of 28. July 1914 (the first shots of the war), the whole situation had changed.

So there is the 2nd point, the first escalation of the crisis. We went from an assassination of a public figure to the (eventual) resolve of Vienna to punish Serbia by removing the government in Belgrade and replacing it with a "friendly" (i.e., puppet) government.

Next point: The 2nd major escalation, and it is a MAJOR escalation; Russia.

3. The next escalation was indeed a major escalation. While the Habsburgs were procrastinating with how they dealt with Serbia, the Russians decided they needed to protect Serbia or, better said, they decided their status as a great power would not survive the destruction of Serbia. This is quite odd because despite what Russian and Serb nationalists today like to believe about "traditional" Russo-Serb friendship, St. Petersburg had been at best a perfidious friend to Belgrade since Serbs sought freedom from the Turks, on a few occasions abandoning the Serbs altogether in their darkest hour of need. What was different about for instance the war of 1876 when Serbia tried to exploit a Bosnian Serb rebellion against the Ottomans, which ended with a complete route of Serb forces by the Turks, for which St. Petersburg did not lift a finger to help as their "ally", Serbia, got pummeled and the crisis of June-July 1914? Why was Serbia disposable to St. Petersburg in 1876 but crucial in 1914? It is critical to note that this escalation of the crisis, Russia's decision to protect Serbia "at all costs", is the first point where the actors on Europe's diplomatic stage could begin to see the shape of the World War to come. St. Petersburg knew that its participation likely would result in a Continent-wide war - and yet it still took the plunge. Why?

Some histories of the war speak of a German-front "hegemony" on the Continent, but that needs some explanation. From Russia's point of view, it's not that simple. So let's take a journey back to the final Napoleonic years. Get used to the ride; we'll be taking this journey at least once more.

So here we are in March 1814, the Allied Coalition is threatening Paris and a desperate Napoleon is hoping that by launching a feint across the Marne he can draw them away from his capital, then quick-step march for 3 days south where he will link up with loyal armies there and then drive the Allies out of France. Unfortunately the Russians intercepted his orders, and the Allies made a bee-line to Paris, which capitulated at 2.00 a.m. on 31. March. Yes, I said "Russians" - in France! Tsar Alexander I himself accompanied his armies across the European plain and set up shop at Versailles where he and the Allies would await Napoleon's increasingly inevitable surrender. While Tsar Alexander I and his Russian forces did indeed play a crucial role in the destruction of Napoleon's empire in 1814 - the British, Austrians and Prussians desperately needed their Russian allies who, after all (i.e., the events of 1812) were not just along for laughs, there was still a general uneasiness about bringing the Russians for the first time in history into Western Europe. The sight of Cossacks bivouacking on Paris streets horrified not only Parisians but the sensibilities of Western "gentlemen" everywhere. Paris, the cradle of Western civilization! Mind you, most of Europe agreed that if anyone deserved to have Cossacks bivouacking in their capital's streets it was certainly the French of 1814, but still, there was a fear that in their drive to defeat Napoleon the Allies had cut a deal with dark forces and recruited barbarians from the deepest reaches of the Asian steppes. The Allies represented the "conservative" forces of Europe who upheld the imperial model of society and Alexander I's Russia certainly fit that bill but as the post-war peace conference would show (after Napoleon had really been defeated…) the Allies wanted Russia to be a part of Europe and have its place in Europe…and that place would be decidedly east. The Western gentlemen of 1814 who witnessed Paris' surrender wondered just what historical doors had been opened. They feared what did happen in 1945 when another Western coalition allied itself by necessity with Russia - or perhaps even worse. The deposed emperor himself, in conversation with his guards on Elba in October 1814, is said to have told them the following:

If the Russians succeed in uniting the Poles [*cough, cough* - author] heartily in a common interest, the whole of Europe ought to dread them. It will be impossible to foresee or to limit the consequences. Hordes of Cossacks and barbarians, having seen the riches of more civilised countries, will be eager to return. They will overrun Europe, and some great change will probably result from it, as has been the cause in former times from the incursions of barbarians.
Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, a Study in Allied Unity 1812-1822; HBJ, 1974: pg. 82

At first, simple Western chauvinism accounted for most of this anti-Russian attitude but it wouldn't be long before genuine conflicts of interest began to influence European policies towards Russia. The Congress of Vienna (1815) tried to create a Continental system of security that would mitigate future Continental-wide wars that threatened the current political order in Europe. This system was not designed to stop wars, per se, but rather to make sure that none of them got out of hand and threatened any monarch's job. This "Concert of Europe" underwent at least three major transformations throughout the 19th century but its basic goal was the same: make sure the existing empires of Europe endured and their power unchallenged.
 
Part IV:

There was a second underlying goal for this international system in Europe, however; to keep Russia out of Europe. There was never a formal treaty or alliance for this goal but it was muttered about in the proverbial smoke-filled backrooms where diplomats arranged the affairs of nations. It might seem strange that a system with Russia as a major player would have such a goal, but for some time at least this suited the Russians fine; it gave them a sphere of influence where no other empires could interfere and it secured for Russia a place in the highest power structures of Europe. However, as the 19th century advanced Russia increasingly found its goals and interests coming into conflict with other powers and the very obvious restraints of being relatively excluded from the Continent began to make themselves felt in St. Petersburg. Since the late 18th century Russia had been waging in regular intervals wars against her southern neighbor, the creaking Ottoman Empire, with increasing success. However, as the 19th century advanced, the Western powers began to see the Ottoman empire has a crucial doorstop keeping the Russians out of Europe, especially the Balkans. They were even willing to go to war against Russia in 1854-65 in the infamous Crimean War to limit the impact of Russian victories over the beleaguered Turks. Why would London care about Russians in the Balkans? Because while London might not care much what happened to Bulgaria - nurse Nightingale be damned - London did care about keeping the Mediterranean an effectively British lake, property of the Royal Navy, and to do this required that one ensure Russian battleships stay bottled up harmlessly in the Black Sea, blocked by the Ottoman closure of the Dardanelle Straits to the Russian Navy. The Russians had tried to circumvent its previously-frustrated attempts to gain the Straits through the back door, through the Caucasus, by focusing on the other obvious route on the other side of the Black Sea, through the Balkans. The 19th century saw a myriad of Russian alliances and invasions of Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia, all with Constantinople as their ultimate aim. This is why it was worth it in London's eyes for British and French soldiers to be laying siege to Sevastopol and making wild lunatic charges of light brigades in the Crimean hills. St. Petersburg could only grit its teeth as its armies would repeatedly be victorious in the field against the Turks only to have the fruits of victory stolen from them by a conference of Europe's powers who would negate most Russian gains, and then swipe a few for themselves before adjourning. The ultimate humiliation came with the Berlin Conference of 1878, already mentioned, in which Russia's spectacular victory over the Porte almost allowed it to finally establish a Balkan foothold in the guise of a massive Bulgarian satellite - but to no avail, as we have seen. The reason the conference was held in Berlin, of course, was that while Britain and France had their own reasons for containing Russia, Germany and Austria also had their own obvious reasons for keeping Russia out of Europe as they shared a long border with the Russian imperianum and competed for the same spoils with the Russians.

The British had other reasons to keep the Russians "contained"; namely, several of the mid-19th century's decades saw a "cold war" of sorts between London and St. Petersburg over Russian attempts to penetrate Central Asia. British and Russian imperial interests clashed in Afghanistan, northern India and Persia as St. Petersburg reached for a warm-water Indian Ocean port, through British possessions. For most of the 19th century, from c. the 1820s until the 1890s, Britain regarded Russia as its main rival and as the main threat to British interests worldwide. As I mentioned, it didn't take long for real conflicts of interest to supersede mere anti-Russian prejudice.

Oddly enough, the only European power (beyond 1890s France) who ever flirted with bringing the Russians into Europe in the 19th century was the empire with the most to lose from Russian gains in Europe: the Habsburgs. This Habsburg "lapse in judgment" however was born of necessity: in 1848, as elsewhere in Europe, the Austrian empire had exploded in revolution. The Habsburgs were able in the following months to re-assert their authority and suppress the revolutions in their domains - with the exception of Hungary. The Hungarian revolution repeatedly repulsed Habsburg armies well into 1849, and Vienna had to resort to asking assistance from the Russians, who obliged Vienna. Russian armies invaded Hungary in 1849 and defeated the Hungarians in a series of battles across the country, finally suppressing the Hungarian quest for independence. For this act of aid the Austrians tolerated some Russian adventures in Romania and the Ottoman Balkan lands throughout the 1850s and 60s, but took the opportunity of rapprochement with the Prussians/Germans in 1878 to re-assert Austrian authority in the Balkans and boot the Russians out.

So OK, you get the idea. The 19th European powers all had a vested interest in keeping Russia out of Europe (proper). Russia had another problem though, in connection with this issue: its own strength. When Russia exploded onto the European political scene in the18th century, Russia was indeed far behind the other European powers in economic and social development terms but its vast military, sprinkled with some Western tactical and technological advances, was able to make up for much of the difference in the arena where 18th century power politics counted most - the battlefield - so Russia was quickly accepted into the Great Power club. Its crucial role in the defeat of Napoleon enhanced Russian prestige considerably - the Russians were aware of the horror the sight of their armies in Paris streets provoked in the West, and enjoyed it much as Americans enjoyed the similar horror Japanese felt when the uncouth and seemingly uncivilized Gaijing American soldiers occupied Tokyo in 1945. But the Times They Were A'Changin'. In the late 18th century Britain began to experience a huge transformation of its economy called (later) the Industrial Revolution, which over time provided Britain with immense economic advantages that translated into very real military advantages. Post-Napoleonic France soon followed suit, and through the 19th century most of the European great powers also plunged into this most radical of social and economic transformations since perhaps the very dawn of agriculture. As the 19th century advanced - and I wonder how many times I'm going to use that phrase before I finish - Russia found itself increasingly farther behind in economic development compared to the other European powers, and this time its military couldn't close the gap. It was an increasing liability that haunted St. Petersburg, but the basis of the problem lay in St. Petersburg. Finally in the closing two decades of the 19th century Russia began to experience the first signs of an industrial revolution, but the extreme nature of Russian autocracy and the stifling stranglehold it held on the empire's economy - coupled with the occasional irrational Russian spasm of anti-Semitism that resulted in hundreds of violent pogroms, suppressing and disenfranchising the only tiny (mostly Jewish) fledgling middle class imperial Russia could boast (at a time when Britain had already had its first Jewish prime minister) - and the result was a severe stunting of any Russian industrial revolution, delaying it for decades later when an extreme dictator would impose it by brute force on Russia at the cost of an estimated 15 million lives.

An industrial revolution, while ultimately bestowing immense benefits and advantages onto a country, is not fun-and-games when it's in progress. It truly is a revolutionary experience, re-shaping society and destroying centuries' old social ties and relationships in a matter of a few decades. The sense of uprootedness and social dislocation an industrial revolution creates often - usually - fuels extreme reactions within the society experiencing it. No country that has undergone an industrial revolution has escaped major labor troubles, almost always involving violence and extremist groups threatening revolution of some sort. The history of every modern European and Western country over the past 200 years is the history of a country trying to come to grips with these powerful social forces unleashed by the industrial revolution, and sometimes also includes the necessity of reacting to how a neighboring country is dealing with their similar troubles. Russia in the 1880s finally began to experience its own industrial revolution, but as I mentioned this revolution was constantly stifled and stymied by the unusually powerful forces of reaction in Russia, the aristocracy who stood to lose their titled and hereditary positions of power if Russia succumbed to the same changes currently shaking other European powers. This is not to say the aristocrats ever managed to completely stop the process of industrialization once it started. In fact, it would have been better for Russia if they had, but as it was Russia in the 1880s and 1890s did begin to industrialize, but aristocratic pressure managed to choke off much of the benefit while still allowing the engines of industry to create the massive social dislocation that accompanies every industrial revolution. The average Russian increasingly saw their (already shockingly meager) traditional lives undermined and destroyed while seeing no tangible benefits in return for their new lives. The result should not require a genius to predict: Russia slid increasingly towards revolution.
 
Part V:

So let's take a quick survey of Russia in 1900: It was still accepted as a great power by the rest of Europe but a very humbled one, whose influence had been successfully contained largely into its borders (in Europe) and most of whose major policy goals in Europe had been thwarted. Its population was increasingly restive, while its ruling elite were as uncompromising as ever. Russia was still a member of the critical "balance of powers" in Europe (as the old post-Napoleonic "Concert" had devolved into) but its presence was out of pure necessity: France, humiliated in the 1870-71 war with Prussia/Germany, desperately needed a military counter-weight against Berlin. So while once again Russia was allowed into Europe's political sandbox to play with the other great powers exclusively because of its military potential in a European war scenario, the Russia of 1900 was far weaker vis-à-vis the other Great Powers than the Russia of 1800, despite playing the same game. And to make matters worse, St. Petersburg's one trump card - its military potential - was about to get a nasty black eye.

With Europe and Central Asia effectively insulated against Russian expansion St. Petersburg turned its attention eastward in the 1890s towards Manchuria and Korea. Signing a treaty with China in 1895 allowing Russia to extend the Trans-Siberian railroad through Chinese Manchuria to a coastal port where Russian industrial goods (unable to compete in the European markets) could be shipped to Far East Asian countries, and then effectively seizing the port of Port Arthur in 1897 despite the treaty with China, Russia positioned itself to be the commercial leader of Asia. With the close of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, the Russian troops dispatched to Beijing did not return home but instead seized control of northern Manchuria. At first the Japanese, seeing opportunity, contacted the Russians and asked if they would simply like to partition northeastern China with Tokyo; Japan would get southern Manchuria and keep Korea, while Russia could annex northern Manchuria. St. Petersburg however told Tokyo that it did not make imperial deals with inferior "yellow peoples", so the Japanese executed a brilliant - if somewhat ruthless - attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in February 1904, launching the Russo-Japanese War, which stunned the world almost daily with its news of an Asian people's repeated victories on land and at sea over a major European power. As the historian Nicholas Riasanovsky puts it while comparing pre-war Russian and Japanese attitudes and actions, "Japan proved to be the more skillful aggressor." (Riasanovsky, 1969: pg. 446) The war effectively ended in May 1905 when the Japanese annihilated a Russian fleet that had steamed halfway across the globe from the Russian Baltic, at the Battle of Tsushima Straits. U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt helped negotiate the formal end of the war, with the Treaty of Portsmouth (New Hampshire) in August 1905 between Russia and Japan but the damage had been done to Russia's one remaining institution with prestige: it's military. And by the way, another little jab in Russia's very humbled pride came from the fact that the British had secretly aided the Japanese during the war, including having their secret agent Sydney Reilly (posing as a shipping clerk in Port Arthur) direct the opening Japanese assault of the war. The British also didn't want the Russians expanding into Far Eastern Asia.

And what better way to top off a major military defeat and subsequent international humiliation, than with a good old-fashioned general revolution at home of the masses, fed up with their collapsing living conditions (industrialization) and the news from the front revealing just how incompetent the empire's leadership was? Of course, the fact that St. Petersburg gendarmes shot down a peaceful demonstration of workers in January 1905 demanding food and better working conditions, killing 130 and wounding hundreds more (including women and children as workers had brought their families), might also have done something to provoke the Russian masses. In any event, the Revolution of 1905 in Russia truly shook the empire to its core, and was fueled in large part among the empire's considerable minorities - Poles very much included - by the happy news that Russia had been and therefore could be defeated in open battle. A horde of Polish revolutionaries after 1905 descended on Tokyo through various circuitous routes to both congratulate the Japanese and try to win support for a Polish-Japanese alliance that would of course begin with the Japanese liberation of Poland from Russian rule. Hey - ya gotta dream. Anyway, the subsequent October Manifesto in Russia, a concession by the well-intentioned but ill-informed and ill-prepared Tsar Nikolai II, quieted the worst aspects of the revolution but again, the damage was done. Russia's international reputation was in shreds, but it wasn't just a matter of pride for St. Petersburg, as I've been trying to show, it was seen by the Russian leadership as undermining and threatening Russia's very status as a great power, and possibly therefore its very existence.

So at this very low ebb in Russian fortunes, what did St. Petersburg decide to do? It actually did what any empire in its position would do: when it was finally able to get most of the egg off its face and straighten out its depleted finances, it launched a massive re-armament program. In 1910 Russia began a huge overhaul and modernization of its military, and went on a shopping spree throughout Europe (and the U.S.) for military hardware. As Norman Stone brilliantly analyzes in his work The Eastern Front, 1914-1918, new hardware does not necessarily a better military make, especially when the old officer corps and upper leadership is left intact (as events in August 1914 would bear out all too painfully for the Russians), but such a massive growth of Russia's military between 1910 and 1914 nonetheless made Europe nervous and had important consequences abroad. This re-armament program helped launch a European-wide arms race, as the growth of militaries threatened the (perceived) balance of power on the Continent. One country in particular, Germany, reacted with alarm to the Russian re-armament program (although its industries happily took part in the bidding wars to sell Russia its new military). We'll explore this point more in the next point of escalation, Point 4.

So - finally - let's fast-forward to the events of June and July 1914. Russia had scored a minor victory when in 1903 it had helped precipitate the overthrow of the Obrenovices in Serbia (and the other European powers had either declined or failed to act), and had since cultivated Serbia as an "ally" (read: "satellite"), a lone Russian outpost in a very Austro-German Balkans. In the 1912-13 Balkan wars, Russia had thrown away an opportunity to re-gain Bulgaria as an ally by erring on the side of caution and sticking with Serbia, abandoning Bulgaria and guaranteeing Bulgar political orientation towards the Germanic powers for the coming decades. In fact, the Russian ambassador in Belgrade had been bankrolling some Serbian terrorist activities in the 1910s, especially the larger and more famous Narodna Odbrana ("National Defense League"), although it's not known if Russian money supplied Crna Ruka as well, such are the tangled webs of Serbian terrorism of the day. By the way, modern Serbia still won't allow researchers access to the surviving records of the day. Russia was supporting Serbian terrorism as a low-grade lever against the Ottomans and Habsburgs - terrorism almost always being a tool of the weak against the strong - but in no way did Russia ever anticipate something like the assassination of an Austrian virtual head of state. The Tsar was not interested in igniting a repeat of 1848 across Europe or setting the precedent for shooting emperors. St. Petersburg was made aware that in June 1914 Belgrade had sent a cryptic warning to Vienna about Bosnian Serb revolutionaries slipping into Bosnia after receiving training in Serbia, but somehow nobody connected the dots with Franz Ferdinand's imminent public visit. Worse, nobody in Vienna or St. Petersburg apparently was aware that the Archduke's visit to Sarajevo coincided with a critical anniversary in the Serbian mystical-nationalist calendar, the 525th anniversary of the first Serbian defeat at Kosovo Polje by the Ottomans on 28. June, 1389. Once the assassination did take place however, St. Petersburg panicked at what of its own complicity might be uncovered - seemingly confirmed when on 2. July Vienna announced the seven captured revolutionaries had confessed (either mistakenly or deceptively) to working for Narodna Odbranba - as indeed it was not aware of how deep its own complicity went.

In the days between 2. July and 5. July, Russia was busy panicking about how its possible involvement in the murder of the Archduke might be discovered but Austria did something that historians argue over to this day. As I mentioned in Point 2, Conrad von Hötzendorf was immediately ready for war when news of the assassination arrived but two parties held out in the Habsburg empire against war: the Hungarians (led by Tisza) and the Emperor, Franz Josef I. Tisza's objections I've already explored, but the Emperor was simply afraid of war. Despite his bouts of senility, the Emperor understood that even a successful war, much less a disastrous one, might unleash the social and ethnic forces he knew his empire couldn't survive. In any event, von Hötzendorf, infuriated at being stymied at immediate action, took matters into his own hands and dispatched a message to Germany, asking what Germany would do if Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia. The obvious implication that haunted many Habsburg nightmares was that Russia might support Serbia, so Hötzendorf wanted to allay them by pre-emptively getting German support and protection. This the Germans gave when, on 5. July, the German foreign minister Bethmann-Hollweg gave the Austrian Count Höyös the infamous carte blanche, which von Hötzendorf trumpeted in Vienna. British military historian John Keegan points to this as a crucial mistake, saying that if Vienna had merely attacked on its own right within two weeks of the assassination, that most of Europe would have acquiesced but by immediately consulting Germany and seeking Berlin's collaboration in the upcoming war - even before Russia made its position known - von Hötzendorf inadvertently provoked the European-wide war his emperor feared.
 
Part VI:

This shifted the focus for Russia: St. Petersburg went from being paralyzed by the fear some string of complicity might turn up in an Austrian investigation of the assassination to a realization that their last beacon of influence in the Balkans was about to be extinguished. St. Petersburg knew Austria-Hungary would not act alone because of the precarious international environment (and, quite frankly, the Habsburg's pathetically weak military position as they had only belatedly joined the 1910-1914 arms race), but with a German guaranty of support, Austria-Hungary could act with impunity in the Balkans, even against a Russian ally. (For a taste of intrigue, a crucial Russian diplomat assigned to both the Belgrade and Vienna legations died mysteriously on 10. July…) What slowed things down (as if things didn't already move at molasses speed in St. Petersburg) more was the anticipated very public visit by French President Poincaré and his prime minister Viviani to Russia starting on 20. July for three days, during which time the two countries could work out the kinks in their alliance. Although Paris and St. Petersburg often spoke publicly of their alliance, the Russians had been afraid to commit fully, fearing being drawn into a Franco-German war that everyone after 1871 assumed was inevitable. However, in July 1914 Russia suddenly saw the merit in the Franco-Russian alliance, and was eager to talk with Poncairé. Vienna delivered its ultimatum to Serbia literally just after Poncairé and Viviani left St. Petersburg, timed carefully so that France and Russia would not be able to immediately discuss the ultimatum and their reaction to it.

The decisive moment finally came on the following day, 24. July, when Vienna officially notified Russia, Britain and France of the ultimatum and its contents. The Russian foreign minister, Sazanov, outlined much as I have done here a brief history of Russia's relations with the West and emphasized how the loss of Serbia would be a fatal blow to Russian prestige. Russia immediately considered at least partial mobilization - and the rest is history. The next day the Tsar met with the Council of Ministers, and agreed to preparations for partial mobilization. By 28. July mobilizations were ordered in several Russian military districts, on 29. July the Germans threatened Russia if it did not stop its mobilization (while it recommended simultaneously to Austria that it should mobilize its army immediately), but with Austrian guns having already shelled Belgrade Russia was set on its path. Notwithstanding, that evening Tsar Nikolai II orders full mobilization, then retracts it hours later, then re-orders the mobilization the next day for 31. July after Austria-Hungary refuses to halt its attacks-in-progress on Serbia. On 31. July, Germany learns of the Russian general mobilization just about the time the Russians are blowing up a bridge on the Vienna-Warsaw train line. Germany declared war on Russia the next day, 1. August, and a Russian border unit opened fire on a German patrol in Poland. War had arrived.

All of the last three paragraphs are really just minutae of how things actually panned out; the tracks had already been laid though. Russia in 1914 was a weakened and cornered power desperate to at least preserve its position in Europe, and Vienna - quite for its own reasons - was threatening the last symbol of Russian power in Europe, Serbia. From the moment the Serbian terrorist organizations began to proliferate in 1908, a collision between Belgrade and Vienna was inevitable, and this ultimately translated into an inevitable Russian confrontation with the Habsburg empire, with all of the consequences that naturally flowed from that. Russia saw its choice in June-July 1914 as being between continued status as a great power, or being relegated to secondary power status and possibly carved up and exploited by neighbors much as China had been. A crucial player in the Russian decision-making process, though they themselves were less aware of this and had their own focus, were the Germans. They are the next step in our little history of the escalation of the June-July Crisis of 1914, Point # 4.

4. So, our progress so far has brought us to point No. 4, the next step in our description of the escalation of the June-July 1914 crisis from a local Balkan incident to a World War. This next point centers on Germany.

To re-cap a bit, Point No. 1 dealt with the circumstances and events that brought the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and Gavrilo Princip together on the morning of 28. June, 1914. Point No. 2 addressed the first escalation, the reality that the creaking Habsburg empire, dangling on the political abyss, had no choice but to respond militarily. They managed to botch that one up, losing considerable moral advantage in the world's eyes, but nonetheless while Vienna did screw things up it is unthinkable in any realistic scenario that the Austro-Hungarian empire could have not responded militarily to the assassination. Point No. 3 brought us to Russia, who after several decades of being shut out of Europe and seeing her own imperial "mojo" fading, saw in any Austrian attack on Serbia a grave final, possibly fatal, threat to Russian imperial interests and therefore resolved fairly early on to support Serbia at any cost. Now we come to the next major escalation of the conflict, but this one is not just another escalation; it is the decisive one.

Germany's role in the June-July 1914 crisis has been quite muddled by historians since, battered on the seas of historiographical fads and politics. The historical approaches have ranged from the relativists' "It's everyone's fault, with no one power to blame" to the Fritz Fischer-style school that says "No, Germany truly is pretty much the only one responsible." One sticky point in particular modern historians have grappled with and bent over backwards to distance themselves from is the stigma attached to the following clause, seemingly innocuous, that begins the reparations portion of the Treaty of Versailles, the infamous Article 231:

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

In other words, the Allies of 1919 were saying "The whole thing was exclusively Germany's fault." Such was the level of rejection of this article in Germany that even several decades later in 1961 West Germany, when respected historian Fritz Fischer published his work Germany's Aims in the First World War which said more or less "Well, while there is much blame to go around the reality is we (Germany) really do deserve the largest share of it for starting the First World War," he was hounded out of German academia and received death threats. Still today in the West there are some who react to any hint of blaming 1914 Germany at least partially for the war with cries of "Victor's justice!" The truth is however that Germany's participation in the events of the June-July 1914 crisis was critical, and Berlin is the first place we must go to see the first outlines of the war to come.

This installment should be much shorter, BTW, because I do not need to go back as far and German history is not nearly as unfamiliar to most as Eastern European history is. Also, it's quite helpful that the crux of German participation in transforming what could have been just the Third Balkan War into World War I is neatly encapsulated in just seven days. Now that's German efficiency! It took Vienna and St. Petersburg a bloody month to get their ducks in a row, but Berlin was already printing "Somebody Conquered Russia and All I Got was this Lousy T-Shirt and a Polish Estate" souvenir polos by 5. July.

Everyone knows the story of Germany's unification under Bismarck over the corpse of Napoleon III's France, how unstable Wilhelm II was compared to his predecessor, the naval arms race Wilhelm II kicked off with Britain, and Germany's striving to become a great world power. It is surprising however just how erratic German foreign policy was between 1890 and 1914, seemingly desperate to find the magic diplomatic bullet that would finally elevate Berlin to the same status as rival London. While the Austro-Hungarian empire was chiefly concerned with a very conservative foreign policy designed simply to hold the line, Berlin was seeking the avenue that led to super power status. In the process the Germans often managed to alienate close allies. This almost frantic style of diplomacy lasted right up until the two Balkan wars of 1912-13, wherein Germany had made overtures to Italy (at the expense of Habsburg interests) and very nearly drove Vienna into the Anglo-French political camp (almost completely isolating Germany), resulting in Kaiser Wilhelm sending a bizarre panicky note to Vienna claiming that Germany would honor any and all Austrian interests, and would even regard Austrian foreign ministry instructions and directions as having the force of orders to the German foreign ministry counter-parts.

What led to the German panic of 1913 was that there was going to be a war, and Berlin didn't think it was ready yet. Ever since the defeat of France in 1870-71, Germany had assumed there would be another war, a final showdown between Germany and her enemies - France and Russia, who had since united as allies in an anti-German coalition. Again, everyone is aware of the Schlieffen Plan and its implications but the bottom line is that Germany began full preparations for another eventual war against France and Russia in the 1870s, though the form of this war as envisioned by Berlin changed over time. Germany had tried to lull Russia into a pseudo-alliance in the 1870s and 1880s but Wilhelm II would have no more of this farce and dispensed with it in 1890. Berlin watched with glee as evidence of Russian weakness revealed itself in the Russo-Japanese War and subsequent Revolution of 1905, but glee turned to panic as Russia moved rapidly in 1910 to modernize and expand her military capabilities, coordinating her efforts with ally France. In 1910-12 a strange economic war raged between France and Germany in the Balkans, whereby each partook in cut-throat competition in selling the various new Balkan regimes military hardware and offered loans. By 1913, the older and more developed French capital markets had easily pushed Germany out of the Balkan finance markets and Greco-Serbian military successes in the Second Balkan war - illusory, as it would later turn out in the First World War - seemed to indicate a French superiority in arms technology.
 
Part VII:

The Russian re-armament program is what put the real scare in Berlin, however, and German military planners began to make terrifying projections of Russian military strength by 1917. A siege mentality began to take hold in Berlin as it saw itself surrounded by enemies determined to keep Germany from becoming a world power. This is why from 1910 onwards, Germany was operating under the assumption that there would be a Continent-wide war soon; it only hoped that Berlin would have the opportunity to dictate where, when, and under what conditions this new war began.

There was only one real variable in Germany's view of the upcoming war: whither Britain? Russia and France had developed a fairly sound alliance but while France and Britain had drawn closer together since 1904 there was no formal alliance or treaty binding Britain to aid France in any Franco-German war. Indeed, while the "cold war" between London and St. Petersburg of the mid-19th century had cooled off considerably by 1910, there still was a great deal of mistrust that even mutual alarm about German expansionism couldn't quell. For public (i.e., German) consumption Britain and Russia - at French insistence - had signed a concordat in 1907 but privately St. Petersburg still referred to the British as "Jews" and the British still looked upon the Russians as murderous barbarians. German dreamers still hoped as late as July 1914 for a German-British alliance but more realistic heads in Berlin hoped only to keep Britain neutral in the upcoming war. There was also the Kaiser, who held a strong admiration for his cousin, King George V, as well as all things English and while he viewed Britain as a declining power by 1910 he still hoped for an Anglo-German alliance coupling British naval power with German land power. The Kaiser was also steeped in the Fichtean racial theories of the day and believed that the "Germanic Powers" (Germany & Britain) should ally against the "Slavic-Gaullic Bloc" in a final civilizational showdown. When in the June-July 1914 crisis it became apparent Britain would neither ally with Germany nor remain neutral, Kaiser Wilhelm II reacted with the fury of a betrayed lover.

So, on to those crucial seven days:

In the Balkan crises of 1913 Germany's policies were dictated by the belief the German military was not yet ready for the coming war, so the crises must be resolved diplomatically and several powers felt the urgency and near-panic in German communications. Some German military leaders had pushed for war anyway, but the over-riding consensus that now was not the time. When the Austrian archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated, the initial reaction in Berlin was similar and the first cables from Berlin to Vienna strongly urged caution. The Austro-German alliance system was seen as increasingly unreliable as Italian and Romanian intentions were vague, and there were deep concerns about the impact of a war at this point on the popularity of socialists in Germany and throughout Europe.

However, almost immediately members of the Foreign Ministry and military began to agitate for a war, seeing a final opportunity in 1914 for Germany to once and for all eradicate Russian and French constraints on German imperial growth. Oddly enough one theory, that recent Anglo-German cooperation in Africa (re: the Portuguese colonies) might have built up enough trust in London for Germany and would lead Britain to remain neutral, played a role in convincing many that a confrontation with Russia and France was "do-able". That the Germans had so badly mis-read British interests in Europe and antipathy towards Germany shows just how deluded the German Foreign Ministry was, and would continue to be about many aspects of the world in the coming war. The biggest surprise for the "hawk" party came on 4. July when the Kaiser himself broke his silence and effectively told his ambassador in Vienna, Heinrich von Tschirschky, to shut up and stop urging the Habsburgs to be cautious; instead, the Kaiser urged the Austrians to act swiftly and crush Serbia. The very next day a Habsburg envoy, von Höyös, arrived in Berlin and he was given the assurance that Germany would support Austria no matter what came: the infamous carte blanche.

Germany had decided that the long-awaited war was finally here, that July 1914 was as good an opportunity Germany would have to defeat France and Russia before their re-armament programs surpassed Germany's military abilities. For the rest of the July Crisis German diplomats cleverly danced around and negated British offers to mediate the dispute, working only to try to keep Britain itself out of the war, although early on German planners had already made contingency plans should Britain enter the war.

This is why I call this the critical point of the June-July 1914 Crisis, because as of 4. July war effectively became inevitable though many would not recognize this fact until later. The Crisis dragged on for three more weeks as diplomats across Europe tried with increasing desperation to find a way to end the crisis but a crucial factor undermining all their efforts was that Germany had already decided that it wanted this war. It had not provoked the war, but it had seized an opportunity for a final "OK Corale" showdown with its perceived enemies. After this 4th point of escalation, all that remained to be decided was who else would join the war, and on whose side.

A note about this "Guilt Clause": There was an odd situation about this clause whereby it was initially drafted by the Americans as a simple preamble to the reparations portion of the treaty (by John Foster Dulles himself, actually) but was immediately seized upon by the British and French as an appropriate place to make it clear who was going to bear the brunt of blame for the war. It was argued over bitterly at the conference, the Americans fearing a politicization of the clause, and finally it was watered down to its present state, presenting the Central Powers' guilt of aggression matter-of-factly. However, when translated initially to German by the German delegation in France in May 1919, they seized upon this paragraph exactly as the French and British wanted them to, and they deliberately mis-translated it to read that Germany exclusively was the guilty party ("Alleinschulde", I think the word was), unlike the actual statement which says that Germany and her allies were guilty. This sounds like a minor syntactical issue but it went all the much farther in inflaming German public opinion against the treaty, although none of the other defeated states' publics reacted to this particular statement at all, though it was included in all the Versailles system treaties.

I put the very passionate German outrage against this clause - and just about every German knew of Article 231 - more at the feet of effective war-time propaganda in Germany. The average Germans were fairly effectively insulated from the real events and effects of the war throughout most of the war, being fed a very engineered stream of information. To be told for four years after horrific sacrifices that the inevitable victory was always just around the corner, only to suddenly be told abruptly in October 1918 the war was lost was a major shock for Germans, and despite so much evidence to the contrary around them many Germans already began to succumb to the Dolchstoss theory that claimed the Reichswehr had never actually been defeated militarily in the field, but rather that it was undermined by the evil politicians on the home front. Hindenburg and Ludendorf, seeing the proverbial handwriting on the wall, were very careful to allow a civilian administration take over German governmental affairs so none of the war-time military leadership's signatures or finger prints would ever be on any of the surrender documents. This is why Weimar Germany, despite some very surprising diplomatic and economic successes in the 1920s, was ultimately doomed.

5. The next step in our description of the escalation of events in the June-July 1914 Crisis is not a major escalation, though it was a sign of just how far the crisis had evolved. By the time France decided to "act in accordance with her own interests", everyone pretty much knew they had a world war on their hands. This step is always the most bizarre for me, because no matter how understandable or logical the steps that got us to this point, it always stuns me to think that a very local conflict in the Balkans, unfolding in a sleepy backwater city nestled between East and West that was still trying to shake off the 18th much less the 19th century, would mean that boys from Provence and Saxony would be lobbing hundreds of tons of steel and explosives at one another in Flanders and northeastern France while spraying each other with showers of deadly lead and developing deeper and deeper underground defenses to avoid the showering steel and explosives. And to make it worse, they would eventually be joined by boys from Saskatchewan, Benin, Indochina, Melbourne and Kansas. Can you imagine telling a European in May 1914 that within the next few years Vimy Ridge would become a legend in Canadian military history, or that circumstances of the coming war would pit Australians and New Zealanders against Turks on a craggy peninsula in the eastern Mediterranean?

France was very much the next logical step in the escalation of this crisis though, and indeed the moment Points 3 and 4 were sorted out all of Europe looked to France to see what she would do. The decision for France was already made, however; Paris desperately needed her Russian allies and could do nothing but stand by St. Petersburg.

In 1890 France, isolated after the 1870-71 debacle and noticing the recent German spurning of Russia, sent secret military intermediaries to St. Petersburg to sniff out Russian attitudes towards France. The Russians seemed cool to the idea but never completely ruled out an understanding with France, so in this way Paris and St. Petersburg danced secretly for almost four years before signing a secret military convention. Most of Europe came to look upon the improvement in Franco-Russian ties as a formal alliance, but in reality the Russians had never given up on the hope that Germany would someday renew the various treaties of friendship from the Bismarck era, and as everyone assumed there would eventually be another Franco-German war the Russians were careful to avoid any absolute statements binding their fortunes to France. However, as the new century dawned so to did the realization that Russia needed its European ally as much as France needed Russia.

This is important because the Franco-Russian "alliance" played a major role in German strategic thinking, and fed some strange and paranoid German nightmares about being isolated on the Continent. The German military and foreign ministry constantly screamed 'encirclement', which became a rallying cry for greater militarization and an increasingly aggressive approach to international affairs.
 
Part VIII:

With the onset of the new century both Paris and St. Petersburg were concerned about how many divisions the other could field in a war against Germany and how soon. Germany was not the only country worried about isolation and having to face an overwhelming enemy alone. Both Paris and St. Petersburg had nightmares of a war scenario whereby the one or other procrastinated or stalled until their mobilization was optimal before joining the fighting, while the Germans were able to concentrate their focus on one of the allies, mauling them. The French population was substantially smaller than Germany's and the German economy was roaring through industrialization, while Russia counted on its massive manpower reserves and military reputation (discussed earlier) to make up for its inability to compete with Germany economically or technologically. The Franco-Russian alliance - which it most certainly had become by 1900 - was definitely one of necessity.

However, it was soon to receive a near-fatal blow, from which it would eventually recover (such was its need) with the added bonus of slowly bringing another power into the Franco-Russian fold: Britain.

The Japanese brought many French nightmares to life when they trounced the Russians on land and at sea in the 1904-05 war, effectively destroying in the process the Russian navy and seriously mauling the Russian army. In a few quick masterful strokes, the Japanese had removed Russia - if only temporarily - from the European military equation, and Paris suddenly found itself facing Germany very alone. Had Germany attacked France in 1905, there was nothing the Russians could have done. Berlin of course was keenly and gleefully aware of this, and chose this moment of French horror to drive that point home by provoking the first Moroccan crisis (March 1905), contesting growing French influence in that north African sultanate by landing the Kaiser and his kancellar at Tangier and having them prance about making bellicose speeches. As often was the case with Wilhelmine and later Hitlerite foreign policy, however, the Germans had seriously misunderstood other major powers' interests and the German attempt to isolate France backfired.

Britain was very wary of France, though the two had found much common ground in the 19th century as the Western democracies. This did not preclude conflicts of interest, however, as indeed the two had almost came to war over the Sudan (Fashoda) in 1898 before reaching more amicable arrangements in their imperial divisions of Africa. With Russia suddenly a non-entity in 1904 however, London and Paris initiated a series of talks involving their respective army staffs and while these did not initially lead to a formal alliance the Germans helped facilitate this by provoking the First Moroccan Crisis which forced the British to realize they had vital economic and military interests in the survival of fellow democratic France and containing German hegemony over the Continent. Paris was forced to back down somewhat in 1906 with the Algeciras conference (Spain) that "resolved" the First Moroccan Crisis but sadly, as too often was the case, Berlin did not draw the obvious lessons and provoked a second crisis in 1911, this time steaming a battleship into the Moroccan port Agadir. This time, Britain publically and privately informed the Germans that war with France meant war with Britain; the Germans had unwittingly found France another ally, and by 1911 Russia was on its way to military recovery. From 1911 on, Britain and France together began planning for an assumed war against Germany, to take place with a German initial invasion of Belgium into northeastern France.

Still, though there was much binding the three allies together, there were no formal commitments on paper forcing any one of the three to aid the other in the event of a war so that when push came to shove in the June-July 1914 Crisis, St. Petersburg and Paris both sat biting nails trying to get some sort of statement of commitment out of the other to enter the war as soon as possible against Germany. (I'm going to address the treaties later in my summation.) Luckily for Paris, as we've already explored, Russia had critical interests at stake in sparing Serbia from the Habsburg's wrath - however righteous - and for St. Petersburg, France needed her eastern ally too desperately not to stand by Russia. By the time Berlin sent its dual ultimatums (ultimata?) to St. Petersburg and Paris on 31. July demanding Russia back down from mobilization and France declare its neutrality, France and Russia both replied to Berlin fully confident that the alliance was intact and would coordinate all military efforts. By 03. August, Germany had declared war on both. Britain's position was still unclear, but the Germans - as usual with the inept foreign policy - would help sort that one out the very next day. That's Point No. 6, the final step in my exploration of the June-July 1914 Crisis.

6. The British entry into the war: The British entry itself contributed nothing to the outbreak of the war, simply because by the time London made up its mind the war was already a fact. There was going to be a war whether the British joined or not. What the British entry did do was to widen and deepen the scope of the war, making it a truly global conflict; it drew a significant proportion of humanity (in the guise of the British Empire) into the war and drastically widened the geographical potential for conflict, while at the same time it prolonged the war by playing a crucial role in helping France to survive the German onslaught.

A colleague of mine has spent a considerable amount of time reading British pop fiction from the decades immediately leading up to 1914, the sort of brain candy that would be the equivalent of watching an Adam Sandler movie today. His conclusion is that Britain scared itself into the rivalry with Germany in the 1890s-1910s, with a large proportion of British popular culture of that time revolving around the theme of a foreign invasion of Britain by some Continental power. (Remember that this is the age of Bram Stoker's Dracula, one interpretation of which can be the fear of large-scale immigration to London of unwashed masses from Eastern Europe, bringing with them their superstitions and plagues.) This is not to ignore the reality of the economic and military (especially naval) aspects of the rivalry with Germany, but rather that along side these issues was the development of a xenophobic siege mentality in Britain that, over some 30 years' time, imbibed the British public with the belief that there eventually would be a war with Germany that may have colored the outlook of some of the politicians - Asquith, Eden, etc. - of 1914 and may have made war just that much more inevitable. He sees this development as a self-fulfilling prophesy. I've seen this theory in at least one other place since, though I must confess I do not fully believe this to be as important a factor as he believes. There was still, as we shall see shortly, much opposition to joining the war in Britain during the crisis of June-July 1914, and as I mentioned above no other country joined the war because of the British entry; lines had already been drawn. As well, as the old saying goes, just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they aren't really all out to get you; Germany really was trying to challenge British interests and really was preparing for a military showdown with Britain if necessary to realize its goals. The Kaiser may have bleated about "Germanic unity" and peace between Berlin and London but he meant these in the context of a subordination of British interests to German, something clearly unacceptable to the British.

So bang, down goes the Archduke in Sarajevo. Aside from an aversion to the shooting of royals, the British initially had little interest in the events unfolding eastward on the Continent. In fact, the British barely took notice at all at the storms brewing over Europe during much of the crisis, until the Habsburg ultimatum to Serbia was issued, at which point London became a fury of activity. Up until this point Britain was focused on some unsettling events unfolding in Ireland; an infamous Unionist, (Sir) Edward Carson, had raised a substantial private army to "protect" Protestant Ulster from Home Rule whereby all of Ireland would be autonomously ruled from (Catholic) Dublin and a substantial proportion of the officers leading the British army units on hand to dismantle Carson's private army had refused to do so in what amounted to a virtual mutiny. In this way, distracted by the never-ending troubles of Ireland, the British had suddenly realized with the ultimatum at the end of July that they had a Continental war on their doorstep, and that they needed to act quickly. As already mentioned, Britain had become increasingly chummy with France and, to a much lesser extent, Russia, but London had always been careful to leave its options open and not to tie itself automatically to aiding either of its "allies" in the event of a war. Still, as events unfolded in July the reality of British interests asserted themselves and the British Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, realized that despite appearances Britain did have a stake in the outcome of this war. And still more, despite the adept political maneuvering of Asquith and his supporters, it would take an amazingly silly thing to bring his fellow Britons to the brink of war.
 
Part IX:

Asquith's problem was that his government hung by a thread. The Liberals had trounced the Conservatives in the 1906 elections and ruled with a wide majority - until the 1910 elections, which the Liberals still won but by the skin of their teeth. Asquith's government by July 1914 was a cobbled-together compromise government, several of whose members were vehement about keeping out of any European war - a narrow sentiment that American isolationists would recognize. Still, Asquith did have several important allies in his government, among them his foreign secretary Edward Grey. In the week leading up to the ultimatum Grey had made several half-hearted attempts to organize a European-wide conference of the sort so common in the 19th century but his efforts - which he himself only took somewhat seriously - met refusals in Berlin and Vienna, for this was the third week of the crisis and while London didn't realize it yet Germany and Austria-Hungary had already resolved for war. Grey and the Asquith government did finally get this message when they read the Austrian ultimatum of 23. July, and Grey sprung to action by trying to get Vienna to extend the deadline for Serbia's response. By 25. July Grey tried more earnestly to organize a peace conference, but once again was rebuffed by Berlin and Vienna. Grey then tried to mediate between Berlin and St. Petersburg, but to no avail; their basic interests were too divergent for compromise.

At this juncture someone in the British government finally made a practical move to prepare the country for war; First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill ordered (with Asquith's approval) the British navy not to disperse as it normally would when it completed maneuvers on 28. July, and the next evening he ordered the fleet to battle stations (possibly without Asquith's approval) in the North Sea. This was a subtle way of saying to Berlin what Asquith's pacifist cabinet wouldn't: that German military action in France might result in the new and untried Kriegsmarine facing the awesome power of the fully-assembled Royal Navy. The British army, downsized and "professionalized" by experiences with colonial wars like the Boer War, was less an intimidating threat to Berlin but the Royal Navy still made the Kaiser's eye twitch.

On 31. July Grey found a way however around the cabinet's squeamishness. The cabinet had declared in a closed meeting that Britain should only enter into foreign wars to protect smaller, weaker nations from larger predatory states. Grey seized upon this moralism and issued a question to both Paris and Berlin as to whether they would mutually respect Belgian neutrality. This is simple but requires some comment.

In 1830 the southern, Catholic Dutch ("Vlaams", or Flemish) finally got fed up with the pot-swilling-and-prostitute-frequenting liberal Protestant northern Dutch (just kidding about the pot and hookers) and revolted. The rebellion resulted, after an international conference, in the creation of a new state in Europe, Belgium, as a combination of both Catholic Dutch ("Flemish") and French ("Walloon") areas. The new country's security was guaranteed by two leading allies and powers of the day, Britain…and Prussia. Fast forward to July 1914, and Europe is going through a major crisis that increasingly has the potential to go global, and as anyone with more than three brain cells and a map could see the most likely German invasion route into France is going to be through Luxembourg and Belgium. Nobody gave a crap about Luxembourg, BTW, and the German invasion of that small country on 02. August didn't raise an eye anywhere in Europe. Remember that; Luxembourg was the first road kill of World War I. Well, after the Archduke and his wife. Anyway, Grey had seized upon this obscure eight decade-old guarantee of Belgian security as an opportunity to seize the moral high ground from Germany, and force the cabinet to move. Let me repeat that a moment because although it is gone over in countless books and documentaries about the origins of the war, it is still amazing; it is Day 34 of the crisis and the focus is not Serbia, not Balkan nationalism, not Balkan terrorism, nor Russo-German rivalry in Eastern Europe anymore - it is, at a time in the crisis when France is desperately trying to get Britain into the war and Germany is just as desperately trying to keep Britain out of the war, Belgian neutrality. A Serb nationalist shoots a leading member of the local empire's elite and a month later Europe is grasping desperately for the full implications of what? Belgian neutrality. From Sarajevo to Brussels in 34 days.

So again, Grey sends the question simultaneously to Paris and Berlin asking if both will respect Belgium's neutrality. The result was predictable, and Grey was able to move the cabinet closer to war. Paris responded within an hour that it would respect Belgian neutrality, while Tony Blair is still today waiting for the German response. Incidentally, when the Germans issued their ultimatum to Belgium on 01. August for free transit of the Reichswehr on its way to trash France, they felt obliged to fabricate an excuse for this rather naked violation of Belgian sovereignty; they claimed that the French had already invaded Belgium and were on their way to the German frontier, so that Germany must act at once to protect both Germany and Belgium.

In fact, the French had not only not invaded Belgium but had, as a gesture to the British to prove they were not going to provoke any fighting, had withdrawn their forces (01. August) 10 kilometers (c. 6 miles) from the German and Belgian frontiers. This gesture helped Grey wrestle two concessions from the cabinet the next day, that the Royal Navy would protect the French coast from the Kriegsmarine (ostensibly to keep these ports out of the Kriegsmarine's hands) and more importantly - sort of - that Britain would stand by its commitment (with a straight face here) to protect Belgian neutrality.

That was the end of the matter. On 04. August Britain formally sent an ultimatum of its own to Germany, that Berlin halt all operations against Belgium (which invasion had begun that morning and already resulted in the execution of several Belgian hostages and the burning of a Flemish village) but again Germany did not respond. By 11.00 p.m. GMT that night (midnight Berlin time) Britain had declared war on Germany. World War I had started in earnest, with the last basic component (British participation) in place by 04. August, 1914.

This completes my exploration of the 6 steps that led from a backwoods terrorist act to World War, though I will actually finish - later this week - with an epilogue about some of the other issues that influenced the Great Powers of 1914 and may have drove them to war.

Epilogue:

In my “brief” survey of the six basic steps that transformed a small local conflict into a major global brou-ha-ha, I stressed that while each state had different motives they were each compelled by their own particular brand of desperation: Serbian desperation that great power politics would prevent indefinitely the creation of a strong Serbian state that encompassed most (if not all) Serbian-inhabited lands, Austro-Hungarian desperation that the rise of nationalism among its many minority groups in the 19th and 20th centuries would spark a systemic collapse within the empire with a provocation from one of the independent Balkan states, Russian desperation that her status as a great power was on the verge of being extinguished with an Austro-German elimination of Serbia (the last outpost of Russian influence in Europe) as a force in the Balkans, German desperation that the growth of Franco-Russian military power was about to eclipse her own, French desperation that she maintain the critical alliances that put her on a relatively equal par with her arch enemy Germany, and British desperation that German propaganda about the decline of the British empire might be true and that British commercial and military interests could not tolerate a German-dominated continent.

There is more, however; the First World War was a war of immense impact and dimension, influencing aspects of culture and life far beyond what one would expect, given previous wars’ records. It was not a long war, though it turned out to be much longer than most of its participants anticipated. Compare its measly four years to the Thirty Years War, to the 20+ years of the Napoleonic wars, or to the nearly 15 year Taiping Uprising in China. And yet those four “short” years managed to transform the world and usher in many of the beliefs and ideas that would define the 20th century. Clearly more was going on than just the dreams and fears of a few imperial capitals.
 
Part X:

The first thing I can think of is the final collapse of the post-Napoleonic peace systems, which had managed to keep the lid on most major European disputes throughout the 19th century. Again, this system wasn’t designed to prevent war – Clauswitz had early on expressed the belief of the period that wars were a normal form of state policy – rather it was designed to prevent wars from getting out of hand so as to endanger the basic political balance of Europe. In other words, it was designed to maintain the status quo, especially with regards to the entrenched ruling classes. The latest incarnation of the post-Napoleonic order was still in evidence in 1914, though in feeble form and of course ultimately it failed, sometime around 04. July to be exact. Why? Because the basic raison d’etre of the system as set up in 1815 – the preservation of the status quo – was no longer desirable for at least one of the Great Powers.

The alliances: These were the last manifestation of the post-Napoleonic systems, and they often get the blame for creating some sort of automatic atmosphere in 1914 that made war inevitable. This is simply not true, as is evidenced by the fact that while the war did finally explode along the “balance of power” lines defined by the alliances in 1914, they had successfully prevented wars countless times since 1890. None of the crises of the 30 years prior to 1914 were any less capable of sparking a world war than that of 1914. The system seemed to work – until 1914. The other critical thing about the systems of alliances was that none of them were automatic – none absolutely bound any state to join a war on behalf of another state. With each stage of the crisis in June-July 1914, the capitals of Europe buzzed with lawyers and politicians scrutinizing the fine print of treaties, trying to scry what their real obligations to their allies were. What each government eventually ended up doing was entering the war on the basis of their own national interests, not on the basis of any treaty. The historian Hew Strachan acknowledges this but adds that even if the treaties didn’t automatically lead to war, they at least laid out the route by which Europe fractured itself into the two opposing camps. Still, when push came to shove and the Great Powers each had to act, they all chose to do so based on their understanding of their immediate interests, and not on the basis of a legalese piece of paper.

The next major influence towards war came in the guise of a very complicated phenomenon that showed many faces. This could best be described as the rise of the Little Guy in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This was fed by the spread of universal education, the birth of the modern nation–state which very quickly followed with the birth of the modern welfare state, the massive development of new technologies that vastly widened the scope of average citizens and led to, among other things, the birth of the commuter which led to the widening of most people’s concepts of identity – resulting in nationalism. All of these and more ultimately added up to the birth of modern populism, and for the first time ruling elites began to feel the power and weight of “the masses” in the normal affairs of running the place. To be sure in the decades running up to 1914 the ruling elites had usually learned to manipulate this new force in politics but in the end, when push came to shove in June-July 1914, most governments found that years of playing up the local nationalist angle of politics had put severe restraints on their options in crisis. Russia in particular (though not alone) felt this weight when it scrambled for a reaction to the Archduke’s assassination; many Russian leaders like Sazanov recognized the danger of a world war to Russia but years of Russian propaganda about their “Orthodox Slavic brethren” in the Balkans they feared a popular backlash, perhaps even a revolt, if “brother” Serbia was abandoned. Repeatedly throughout the crisis different states tried to propose compromises, compromises that were often used in the 19th century to settle disputes but were now, in 1914, no longer do-able. Many of the governments had simply painted themselves into a corner.

Technology: The 19th and early 20th century had seen the largest growth of technology in human history (up until that point). The military fields were not left out as new and amazing technologies transformed the art of war in stunning ways – but unfortunately, in ways that were often not fully understood. Because of this governments often had a badly distorted view of their own military capabilities, deceived by the relatively minor and unequal conflicts they engaged in prior to 1914 that had taught (faulty) lessons about the application of military technologies in battlefield circumstances, lessons that would not be applicable in the context of the wider Great Power war that exploded in 1914. This deceptive understanding of their own power gave many – most? – governments an unrealistic belief in their chances for success and probably added much of the reckless angle of behavior during the 1914 crisis. The spread of militarism in the final decade before the war can be very much traced to this phenomenon. If they had only known what they were really getting into….

The Rivalries: The very real rivalries between the Great Powers played a critical role in transforming a minor conflict into the world war. That sounds obvious but think about this: Germany and Austria-Hungary had largely achieved their core war aims by March 1918 – and yet the war raged on, and they both eventually lost. Germany had successfully eliminated Russia as a threat and could concentrate against France and Britain, while by mid-1915 the Habsburgs (with German help) had trounced and pummeled Serbia, installing a puppet regime, These initial war aims were meaningless however by 1918, as the main point of the war lay in northeastern France and Belgium by then. The real story of World War I is the power struggle between London, Berlin and Paris, with everything else sinking to peripheral status already by September 1914. This isn’t to minimize or ignore the efforts and sacrifices other participants in other theaters made in the war, but rather only to note that for however the war officially started, it was not going to end until the rivalry that was playing itself out violently in Flanders and Belgium was resolved in some way.

Ultimately the question is, of course, why the hell waste so much time writing or reading all this, about a conflict that started 90 years ago? Well, besides having a generally anti-social disposition like most History geeks that leads sad people like me to spend inordinate amounts of time reading obscure things, I also think it is still quite relevant today. It is well known by now that during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 U.S. President John Kennedy reached for Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August for a guide on how things can get out of hand in a crisis and lead to war. But the First World War has played such a huge role in defining our times that it does deserve attention, especially since many of the circumstances the Great Powers found themselves in at that time can sound eerily familiar to modern politicians and peoples. Yes, all analogies have their limits but there are important similarities between the worlds of 1914 and that of 2004. There is still something to learn. Things like Islamic extremism and jihad, the rise of formerly colonial peoples, economic globalization, free trade, and a widespread backlash against modernization are all elements common to both worlds. Contrary to socialist propaganda of the day, the world’s capitalist leaders of 1914 were against war (for obvious economic reasons) and many believed as late as the end of July that the increasingly complex economic ties between the Great Powers would preclude any large-scale war from happening. And they were wrong. History is a subject with a million innate valid reasons for pursuing in study, but often – as in the case of the Crisis of June-July 1914 – there are other reasons and lessons very relevant to modern times as well.
 
I thought it'd be fun to give you some eye candy. There is something about a good map that can really get the blood moving, and tell such a story. This is a map, in Hungarian I'm afraid though I will translate shortly, of Eastern Central Europe's language topography in 1914 (with 1914 borders). Now, I will give you a brief legend below in English for detail but just looking at it, without even knowing what languages are involved yet, will already tell you a story: what a mess! And remember that this is the region the Great Powers' interests met and clashed in.
Orosz Birodálom - "Russian Empire"
Németország - "Germany"
Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia - "Austro-Hungarian Monarchy" (as it called itself)
Olaszország - "Italy"
Török Birodálom - "Turkish Empire"
Görögország - "Greece"
Dánia - Denmark

The legend:

Cobalt Blue: German
Green-blue - Danish
Light blue - Swedish
Dark blue - Italian
Darkest blue - Yiddish
Violet - Romanian
Brown - Polish
Yellow - Croatian
Light Yellow - Czech
Pastel yellow - Bulgarian
Green - Turkish
Dark Green - Russian
Dark Olive Drab - Slovak
Light Olive Drab - Ukrainian
Lightest Olive Drab - Belarussian
Red - Hungarian
Dark Orange - Slovenian
Orange - Serbian
Pink - Greek
Black - Albanian
Light-shaded gray - Lithuanian
Dark-shaded gray - Latvian

Minorities:

Brown/white vertical stripes (in Germany) - Sorbs/Wends, a small Slavic population still existing today, left over from Charlemagne's wars
Violet/white vertical stripes (in northern Italy) - Frisians, a long-Latinified Germanic people
Pink/white vertical stripes (in northern Greece) - Vlachs, ancient ancestors to modern Romanians, who still speak a Latin-based language. The Greek government still refuses to recognize their existence.
Blue/white vertical stripes (in eastern Switzerland) - the Romansch, or "Rheto-Romans" (not sure how they're called in English), who speak a language with an odd mixture of German, Italian and French.
Observations:

1. You can see the results of the 1864 Prusso-Danish War, whereby the Prussians seized all of Schleswig-Holstein, including the Danish-speaking regions.

2. Germany and Poland both look like they collectively heaved and barfed eastward, leaving a gazillion little splotches of their respective language colors spattered across other majority language areas. This is a historical phenomenon peculiar to both of settlements eastward, some of an imperialist nature but many of quite innocent labor migrations encouraged by local rulers in pre-nationalism days. These splotches usually represented a city or sizeable town which would be majoritably German or Polish, while the surrounding countryside would be the native population. It made modern nationalism fun! In 1944-47, nearly every one of these wayward splotches was eradicated, destroying centuries-old cultures. My own family derives from one of these splotches in Lithuania, Vilnius.

3. It goes without saying that the many darkest blue splotches representing Jewish populations across Russian-occupied Poland ceased to exist in 1941-1945.

4. You know the story of the c. 16 million Germans deported from Silesia, Pomerania, Prussia and Südetenland in 1945-47, making the language borders coincide starkly with the modern political borders.

5. The problem of Hungarian as a shrinking language within the Hungarian half of the Austro-Hungarian empire (dotted line) is also apparent. The post-war border settlements would also do a good job of creating massive Hungarian minorities abroad unnecessarily, guaranteeing whose side Hungary would be on in the next war.

6. Take a look at Bosnia-Herzegovina, and you see "1990s Yugoslav Implosion" written all over it.

7. Similarly, you can see the genesis of the Albanian migrations into Kosovo and Macedonia already. Fun just waiting for future generations! Imagine showing this map to an American or Canadian in 1914 and saying, "This will be your problem in the future."

8. If you look at the Anatolian coast you will see the ancient Greek populations - still there. They are not there today. In 1920 the Greeks saw opportunity with the Ottoman empire prostrated and launched a military adventure to seize the ancient Greek cultural centers of Anatolia. After some initial successes they got greedy and stretched further inland into Turkish areas, until they met a nasty defeat from Mustafa Kemal at the Battle of the River Sakaria in June 1921, followed by a Turkish counter-attack in August 1922 that drove all Greeks off Anatolia. The ancient Greek cities of the eastern Mediterranean - Smyrna, Ephesos, Antioch - were all abandoned as 1.2 million Greek refugees fled to Attica. Greece and by-now republican Turkey signed a treaty in 1922 that formalized this "population exchange", driving several hundred thousand Turks from Greek Thrace in reprisal. To add more fun, the Greeks had a similar experience with the Bulgars, resulting in another "population exchange". This is a central theme still today in Greek politics, with Greece and Turkey nearly going to war again as recently as 1999 over a couple uninhabited islets in the Aegean.

9. The red triangular splotch in central Romania is Transylvania, home to far worse demons than fairytale vampires. Ruled from c. A.D. 1000 to 1526 by Hungary, independent (though under Ottoman tutelage) from 1526 until 1688, then direct Austrian rule until 1867, Hungarian again from 1867-1918, finally to end up as Romanian in 1918 where it has remained since - except for that little 1939-1945 interlude, when the Hungarians got some of it back. There was also in 1914 a significant "Saxon" (i.e., German) population in Transylvania but most of these moved to Germany as soon as Ceausescu was overthrown in 1989. Each of the three major populations of Transylvania - Romanians, Hungarians and Germans - has their coterie of horror stories and atrocities inflicted upon them while one of the other two groups was in power, and all three of them pummeled the Gypsies at every chance.

10. If you look at "Beszarábia" northeast of Romania, you are looking roughly at the modern state of Moldova with its capital at Chisinau (Russian: "Kishinjev"), and you can see why this is probably the most violent state in Europe today. Rumsfeld was just in Chisinau a couple weeks ago praising their help in the war on terror - Moldova is one of the coalition in Iraq - but he needed heavy protection while there because Moldova has teetered on the brink of civil war for the past decade. Northern Moldova is primarily Romanian-speaking, and this is where the internationally-recognized government is situated but southern Moldova is Ukrainian and Russian-populated (with some Bulgars and Turks to boot) and they've declared themselves the independent state of Trans-Dniestr. Russia and I believe Belarus are the only states who recognize Trans-Dniestr, and Russia has obliged by retaining old Soviet-era bases in Moldova and has taken part in fighting occasionally. The government in Chisinau is a thugocracy, running its own little mafia state. When Moldova (as the "Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic") first declared its independence when the USSR imploded in 1991, most assumed it would be absorbed by Romania but the thugs in Chisinau realize they wanted their own gravy train unrestrained by Bucharest so they resisted joining Romania and the two since have had hostile relations.

11. You can see the coming Yugoslav/Serb/Slovenian/Italian/Austrian conflicts that would last until the 1990s, when Milosevic threatened at one point to seize part of the southern Austrian province of Karinthia/Karantje. Don't be surprised that Karinthia has produced the Austrian Volkspartei, with its nationalist leader Haider. Remember that in 1945-46 an Anglo-American army had to drive Tito's units out of Austria and the Italian cities of Trieste and Fiume, before signing a treaty that kept the first for Italy but gave the second to Yugoslavia - now modern Rijeka, in Croatia.

This is why I love maps; you can look at this 1914 map and see a whole century's worth of conflicts coming - and these are only some of the fun the region has produced! Follow the border of the Austro-Hungarian empire and count all the languages represented within it; can you see 1918 coming? Do you understand why the Hungarians and Franz Josef I himself dragged their feet on going to war in June-July 1914, even against piddling little Serbia?
 

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yay second post

very interesting, how long did it take to write?
 
I wrote this in installments, starting on 28. June and finishing this past weekend, as a sort of tribute to those who experienced the Great War but also because, as I mentioned in my epilogue, I think it still holds many lessons for the world today.

I don't ever start out with the intention of having a long text. It is an analysis, and one I am working through as I am reading/writing. I just plow ahead with the narritive and let the analysis take me where it will, and I finish when I'm done. Sometimes that's after a short paragraph, sometimes after 100 pages.

It just occurred to me I should probably follow up with a short bibliography of the texts I consulted, so I will do that this weekend.

I am hoping others will find it interesting enough to read and pick apart. I want discussion! The point isn't my text (although feel free to take issue with any of that), the point is the historical events I am exploring and their potential impact on today's world and/or relevance for us.
 
I've only read the first part and a half but I'll continue to read it. Very interesting asessment of the whole thing. It might interest you to know that a statue of Franz Ferdinand is going to be made at the spot of the assasination in Sarajevo. Also of note, there was much anti-Serb violence in Sarajevo following the assasination, although Muslim religious leaders sheltered some families and it cooled down eventually.
 
Could you upload it in a text file?
 
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