Could Kim Jong Un be a serious dude who might actually start a war?

[ELITEOFWARMAN8]

The North Koreans would get PWNT if they launch a offensive.

 

[Old Hippy]

The North Koreans would get PWNT if they launch a offensive.

yes,even the NK probably knows that...

but the US has been of the opinion that its been the balance of power that has kept the peace for 50 years... its also of the general view that if presssed to believe that an attack is coming a preemptive strike would be the result as it would take 10-14 days to get US support into position, so a NK gamble on taking Seoul is actually the US best guess of what may happen... even up to a 75 days before acually taking the fight to NK,on the ground...

In an emergency, US ground forces in Korea can be roughly tripled in size within ten days. Initial reinforcements would include the 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii. In addition, a brigade’s worth of army equipment and a brigade’s worth of Marine Corps equipment stored in pre-positioned ships in the Indian Ocean would arrive shortly thereafter, to be manned by troops airlifted from the US. After several weeks, a number of ships could also arrive from the US. Eight SL-7 fast sealift ships carrying a US-based heavy armoured army division could reach Korea after some 20–30 days. In the same timeframe, many large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off vessels, as well as more ground forces and marines could also reach the Peninsula. More aircraft carriers and other ships, possibly serving in the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, or off the west coast of the US could also be redeployed. Within 75 days, according to official plans, the entire transport operation could be complete. In practice, the operation might take 100 days given the inevitable complications concerning actual deployments and the potential need to clear North Korean mines, submarines, and missile boats from South Korean waters before unloading supply ships.

http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/the-conventional-military-balance-on-the-kore/

 

[Dachs]

yes,even the NK probably knows that...

but the US has been of the opinion that its been the balance of power that has kept the peace for 50 years...

I'm sorry, I smelled the term "balance of power".

Could you explain, precisely, what that means, and how it has "kept the peace"?

 

[Old Hippy]

I'm sorry, I smelled the term "balance of power".

Could you explain, precisely, what that means, and how it has "kept the peace"?

, I got a cold and did not notice the wiff of it...

it's a smaller version of the MAD approach
from the US and SK point of view the cost is just to high to attack NK, and NK knows if it attacks that it would lose the war and therefore power so , for 50 years it been balanced,

the recent advances in US technology has left the NK military(reaching it's used by date) less and less of a deterrent to an attack and , they have gone for the WMD approach, while emphasizing their massive artillery close to Seoul, the US has show stealth bombers and NK has reacted, by stressing just how costly it would be to remove them...

So now it is a game of brinkmanship and the first person to blink loses and the only way to win is to strike first... classic MAD
thats why it is such a problem now, after a more or less steady truce for 50 years, the 'balance' is going from being each side of the DMZ to a broader global perspective, with the US, and Japan now being effected(nukes/missles), it raises the stakes and NK has lost the balance...

 

[Dachs]

, I got a cold and did not notice the wiff of it...

it's a smaller version of the MAD approach
from the US and SK point of view the cost is just to high to attack NK, and NK knows if it attacks that it would lose the war and therefore power so , for 50 years it been balanced,

the recent advances in US technology has left the NK military(reaching it's used by date) less and less of a deterrent to an attack and , they have gone for the WMD approach, while emphasizing their massive artillery close to Seoul, the US has show stealth bombers and NK has reacted, by stressing just how costly it would be to remove them...

So now it is a game of brinkmanship and the first person to blink loses and the only way to win is to strike first... classic MAD
thats why it is such a problem now, after a more or less steady truce for 50 years, the 'balance' is going from being each side of the DMZ to a broader global perspective, with the US, and Japan now being effected(nukes/missles), it raises the stakes and NK has lost the balance...

Mmmm.

It seems to me that you're getting several principles confused.

Deterrence is not based on any sort of "balance". In general, deterrence is a relatively low-cost strategy employed in the absence of forces comparable to an enemy. While "balance" is basically never defined (one of the reasons the term sucks so much), the word itself implies power that is at least comparable.

Notably, North Korea's military is not "comparable" to that of the United States in any meaningful sense.

In the absence of "balancing" forces, deterrence is designed to make oneself sufficiently annoying/deadly/dangerous that an enemy views an attack as too costly. You prevent an attack on yourself by superior military forces not by erasing their advantage, but by ensuring that an attack on you will not be a relatively costless walkover, that there will be consequences.

So if North Korea is attempting to deter an attack with its artillery and rockets, then practically by definition there is no "balance" at all.

The concept of MAD does not really enter into the equation, because that was a fairly specific response to a fairly specific problem: the US-Soviet nuclear rocket arms race of the 1960s and later. It forms the foundation of the theories of the so-called Realists. These Realists claimed that the threat of escalating a crisis to nuclear war offered a choice for politicians: risking war, which for Realists would "self-evidently" be a no-win scenario, or backing down. So despite constant crises and threats, the USA and USSR would never actually initiate nuclear war. It relied on what its proponents described as openness and a certain, clear appraisal of the relative forces and motivations in play, so that there could be no mistakes or miscalculations. Apparently they didn't really care about the negative effects of leaving an entire world in the constant grip of fear for decades.

MAD and brinkmanship were effectively polar opposites. Where MAD theorists attempted to ensure world peace through nuclear arms and clearly understood intentions, brinkmanship proponents relied on a great deal of lack of information. In attempting to push things as far as they could go without war, a politician practicing brinkmanship had to rely on a large degree of secrecy, even misinformation, in order to prevent opposing leaders from figuring out whether his or her threats were serious or not. It was a Romantic notion, almost, of winning the game of Chicken, staring another person down and getting one over on him through sheer willpower. It is not the same concept as merely threatening somebody to get what you want.

Unfortunately, it is next to impossible to find any analog to MAD in the Korean Peninsula. The RoK doesn't consider a war with the DPRK to be a no-win scenario: it considers it to be a costly win, but a win all the same. And brinkmanship doesn't even enter into the equation, because it is a largely made-up concept that virtually nobody has ever employed. Kennedy and Khrushchev weren't using brinkmanship models in 1962; even Reagan didn't go that far. It's hard to see how Kim Jong Un is supposedly employing brinkmanship when North Korea doesn't even have a seriously held diplomatic position. What demands does he expect to extract from the United States or South Korea?

So, "balance of power", not so much. "MAD" and "brinkmanship", not really either.

 

[bhsup]

"Tripwire" was how I always viewed the US forces in Korea.

 

[ace99]

"Tripwire" was how I always viewed the US forces in Korea.

The plight of the American soldier. Being used as a speedbump at the Fulda Gap in Germany and a trip wire in Korea.

 

[Dachs]

Yeah, I have a feeling that if war had actually broken out, the 11th ACR would've been less of a speedbump and more like...uh, something that kills ALL THE THINGS.

 

[ace99]

Yeah, I have a feeling that if war had actually broken out, the 11th ACR would've been less of a speedbump and more like...uh, something that kills ALL THE THINGS.

Depends on the year:


Link to video.

 

[Dachs]

If that show had been made in the mid-1970s instead of the mid-1980s, it would've been right-ish. But as much as I enjoyed that show (not as much as TToI), I wouldn't use it as an accurate barometer of USAREUR during the Reagan administration. Especially not when they were going for cheap laughs.

But you knew that.

 

[Old Hippy]

Mmmm.

It seems to me that you're getting several principles confused.

yes probably, but maybe the NK are too...we probably had the same dictionary/encyclopedia
Definition of BALANCE OF POWER


: an equilibrium of power sufficient to discourage or prevent one nation or party from imposing its will on or interfering with the interests of another

Deterrence is not based on any sort of "balance". In general, deterrence is a relatively low-cost strategy employed in the absence of forces comparable to an enemy. While "balance" is basically never defined (one of the reasons the term sucks so much), the word itself implies power that is at least comparable.

Notably, North Korea's military is not "comparable" to that of the United States in any meaningful sense.

but on the DMZ, they are, a deterent and a threat thus the US depolyed nukes in about 1958...

Spoiler :

The State Department requested on January 8, 1958, via telegram, information on the exact timing of the introduction of the atomic cannons and missiles. The gist was that although the State and Defense Departments mutually agreed to move the atomic cannon and missile battalions without publicity, it was important for the State Department to be fully aware of the timing of the deployments in anticipation of the Koreans who would give this action considerable play in official statements and in the press upon arrival of the weapons. The Department of Defense responded in a letter on January 16, 1958, indicating that the 100th (Honest John) and the 663rd (280mm gun) field artillery battalions were being deployed to Korea that month.

As can be seen through to the 1994 publication of U.S. diplomatic correspondence during the 1950s, the U.S.F.K. started deploying nuclear weapons in January 1958 at the latest. But according to a secret report written by the U.S. Pacific Command, nuclear weapons were first deployed to South Korea in 1957 and withdrawn in 1991. The Washington Post also reported in October 2006 that "In 1957, the United States placed nuclear-tipped Matador missiles in South Korea, to be followed in later years ... by nuclear artillery..." It should be noted that the expression "January 1958 at the latest" has been used by the author since it is not clear whether the initial introduction of nuclear weapons occurred in late 1957 or early 1958. On a side note, the U.S.F.K. did confirm the arrival of the 280mm atomic cannons and Honest John nuclear missiles in South Korea on January 28, 1958, and proceeded to disclose and test-fire them on February 3 and May 1, 1958, respectively.
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lee-Jae_Bong/3053

In the absence of "balancing" forces, deterrence is designed to make oneself sufficiently annoying/deadly/dangerous that an enemy views an attack as too costly. You prevent an attack on yourself by superior military forces not by erasing their advantage, but by ensuring that an attack on you will not be a relatively costless walkover, that there will be consequences.

So if North Korea is attempting to deter an attack with its artillery and rockets, then practically by definition there is no "balance" at all.

if this was the view of the US, there would not be all this fuss at present...

Unfortunately, it is next to impossible to find any analog to MAD in the Korean Peninsula. The RoK doesn't consider a war with the DPRK to be a no-win scenario: it considers it to be a costly win, but a win all the same. And brinkmanship doesn't even enter into the equation, because it is a largely made-up concept that virtually nobody has ever employed. Kennedy and Khrushchev weren't using brinkmanship models in 1962; even Reagan didn't go that far. It's hard to see how Kim Jong Un is supposedly employing brinkmanship when North Korea doesn't even have a seriously held diplomatic position. What demands does he expect to extract from the United States or South Korea?
So, "balance of power", not so much. "MAD" and "brinkmanship", not really either.

well maybe the DMZ itself is the analogy...

Second, this was followed by the forward deployment of its conventional forces in a 'hugging the enemy' strategy so that the use of nuclear weapons would endanger friend as well as foe, civilian as well as soldier. The reasoning was that if forward deployed North Korean forces near the DMZ came under attack from nuclear weapons, U.S. and R.O.K. forces deployed in the forward areas would perish, as well as civilians in nearby regions who would be collectively exposed to radiation. This specter would discourage and deter their adversary from reckless use of nuclear weapons. Kim Il-Sung went so far as to say that the U.S. would not be able to use nuclear weapons in a situation where North and South Korean troops were jumbled together in combat. General Schwartz reported to the U.S. Senate in March 2001 that seventy percent of North Korea’s active force is positioned within 150 kilometers of the DMZ.
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lee-Jae_Bong/3053

also why the US is rapidly moving their forces further south...
and I think the NK would have followed general Schwartz career closely(from his time in SK, let alone Iraq), and they have spent 20 years getting missles and nukes to restore their balance, adapting to the technological advances of the US, as for demands, well SK is introducing industrial complexes into NK, and did not the US supply aid recently...

 

[Mechanicalsalvation]

Since I am traveling through Soul (and staying over night) in two weeks time I really do hope there will not be any military interkorean version of gangnam style....

 

[IAM]

Since I am traveling through Soul (and staying over night) in two weeks time I really do hope there will not be any military interkorean version of gangnam style....

Well the shelling of seoul will begin at 3:33am local time on May 1, 2013 so be full of care. The average NK artillary round flies at 1800 mph =/-. Sorry I can't be more specific. I'm not sure if the NK will coordinate fire so that all shells land at the same time or if they are just going to fire all at the same time.

 

[NedimNapoleon]

Is 3:33 linked with the reported Kims obsession with the number 9?

 

[IAM]

Is 3:33 linked with the reported Kims obsession with the number 9?

Yea and it's not just him. Number fetishes in the elite seem fairly common in asian cultures. In the west it's our poorest that have the number fetishes with their lotto numbers.

website so you can see what your local time will be when all hell breaks loose in korea: http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/converter.html

My local time for the event will be April 30, 2013 at about 2:30pm or 14:33 hours.