Alternate History Thread V

Then he didn't try the crusade? :dunno:

Well, what about parts of France - not just the north, that's old hat, but elsewhere around the edges? It's certainly fragmented enough. I doubt the Germanic territories are rich enough to coax them in, unfortunately. North Africa?
 
Then he didn't try the crusade?

The idea is that something like a crusade did eventually happen and did have some initial success before inevitably falling apart into bickering. Nonetheless, the newly-restyled Kingdom of Ruthenia a) did end up forming some rather more long-lasting and useful connections with the west, both in politics, and, after a fashion, in religion and b) created some more long-lasting domestic political institutions. The Lithuanians turned towards both Catholicism and a war with the Tatars earlier and found their eastwards advance at once militarily easier and politically more tricky due to their Ruthenian allies/vassals. The balance of power in Eastern Europe in the 14th century was thus significantly altered, and from this, as well as some butterfly effects and changes in Church politics, proceeded the most important changes elsewhere in Europe. That's the short of it, anyway.

Well, what about parts of France - not just the north, that's old hat, but elsewhere around the edges? It's certainly fragmented enough. I doubt the Germanic territories are rich enough to coax them in, unfortunately. North Africa?

I was rather hoping to leave North Africa Islamic... I can't but wonder if the overall slower and less certain spread of Western Christianity in this world might allow the Vikings to remain pagan for longer and so actually convert to Islam after conquering and settling in Muslim lands. Obviously they will be just about as pious as the Turkic ghulams of the 9th century, that is, not at all, especially as far as alcohol is concerned. Now wouldn't that be crazy.
 
Independent Midi please!
 
Independent or dominant?
 
Oy gevalt. Can someone summarize this discussion?

Some of the massive difficulties I've been encountering in crafting a REALISTIC TNESII update are beginning to be resolved by an intensive look at Russo-Steppe power interactions, provided by After Tamerlane, and some investigations into the tactics of the Boer Wars. It is surprisingly difficult to simulate wars in areas where no direct OTL analogue exists.

I would veeeeerrry much appreciate it if someone (das) could give me some slightly more specific information on the ethnic composition of the Volga/Astrakhan/Ural/etc. areas of the TL. Grazie.
 
The idea is that something like a crusade did eventually happen and did have some initial success before inevitably falling apart into bickering. Nonetheless, the newly-restyled Kingdom of Ruthenia a) did end up forming some rather more long-lasting and useful connections with the west, both in politics, and, after a fashion, in religion and b) created some more long-lasting domestic political institutions. The Lithuanians turned towards both Catholicism and a war with the Tatars earlier and found their eastwards advance at once militarily easier and politically more tricky due to their Ruthenian allies/vassals. The balance of power in Eastern Europe in the 14th century was thus significantly altered, and from this, as well as some butterfly effects and changes in Church politics, proceeded the most important changes elsewhere in Europe. That's the short of it, anyway.
So even when I was right, I was wrong. :lol: Well, it's good to see that cleared up, at least. How'd this lead to Republicanism, anyway?
das said:
I was rather hoping to leave North Africa Islamic... I can't but wonder if the overall slower and less certain spread of Western Christianity in this world might allow the Vikings to remain pagan for longer and so actually convert to Islam after conquering and settling in Muslim lands. Obviously they will be just about as pious as the Turkic ghulams of the 9th century, that is, not at all, especially as far as alcohol is concerned. Now wouldn't that be crazy.
It'd be EXCELLENT! :D And maybe when they do end up heading south, they can pick up some ideas from Christians on the way down and add them to the already-extant rather odd brand of Islam that was practiced in parts of North Africa (universalist Almoravids?)!
Oy gevalt. Can someone summarize this discussion?
Bavarian duke intervenes in the 740s Pippinid civil wars successfully unlike OTL, helping fragment Francia and forestalling Charlemagne. The Lombards are free to muck around with the Pope unlike OTL, but after a few years Konstantinos V barges in and kicks them out, reclaiming Byzantine control over the Pope and protecting Rome again in exchange for support for his New Iconoclasm. This leads to an overall greater interaction by the Byzantines in central and southern Italy, as well as the Balkans, where the Bulgars initially take a beating. Meanwhile, Bavaria, the Saxons, and so forth continue to gain in strength, picking off bits and pieces from Francia, which eventually just collapses as Greater Aquitaine takes over in the south and a swath of principalities and petty states arise in the north, under heavy Anglo-Saxon, Viking, and Germanic influence.

The Avars don't kick the bucket quite so quickly since Charlemagne et al. aren't there to lay the hurtin' down on them, so the Magyars elect to take advantage of tottering Bulgaria and settle in the lower Danube Valley instead, reviving the moribund Bulgar state for a few more centuries of mad Balkan wars. This and their Italian interest forces the Byzantines to decrease their involvement somewhat on the eastern front, probably going after Cilicia and some minor border adjustments a la Kamachon at most for the foreseeable future. Great Moravia never really formed because the Avars never really died, so that particular avenue (along with Bulgaria) of Christian proselytization was stillborn for awhile, leading to - apparently - Jewish Rus'ians! Vikings also don't convert so quickly, so when the Normans do start spreading around and reach North Africa, they go straight from Norse polytheistic beliefs to Islam. I guess?
Thlayli said:
Some of the massive difficulties I've been encountering in crafting a REALISTIC TNESII update are beginning to be resolved by an intensive look at Russo-Steppe power interactions, provided by After Tamerlane, and some investigations into the tactics of the Boer Wars. It is surprisingly difficult to simulate wars in areas where no direct OTL analogue exists.
Oh look bombshoo, he's doing your war! :D
 
Well, the Boer War stuff is more relevant for other areas, maybe. Not really too happy with the amount of diplomatic/military ambiguity that several players left me with...it has been one of the main delaying factors, tbh.

Huh. So is direct influence over Ravenna reclaimed or not?

Also, interested in what long-term retention of Byzantine power in the Central Mediterranean would mean for Spain and the Western Med...shame it's slightly too late for the Visigoths. (But seriously, who doesn't like the idea of 4 way Arab/Byzanto/Viking/Asturian chaos in Hispania?) And won't later Isaurians be itching to reclaim Carthage as well? It hasn't been too long since they lost it.

It is also unfortunate that Constantine takes power 1 year after the fall of pseudo-Byzantine Ceuta.

Given lessened Latin influence...if the Vikings interact with Ireland and THEN with Asturias, both of which have a lot of residual Celtic mysticism stuff still going on, well...there's significant chance for the evolution of a third, Hispano-Celtic "Far Western" strain of Christianity here, isn't there? With all possible respect to das, Celtic Christian Vikings in North Africa is the coolest possible outcome here, IMO. :p

Also, later on: Normanodoxy, anyone?
 
Huh. So is direct influence over Ravenna reclaimed or not?
"Influence"? The idea was that the Byzantines would actually care about Italy. It's all back, thematically integrated, the Lombard Duchies too after some decades. Otherwise, what effect would it have?
Thlayli said:
Also, interested in what long-term retention of Byzantine power in the Central Mediterranean would mean for Spain and the Western Med...shame it's slightly too late for the Visigoths. (But seriously, who doesn't like the idea of 4 way Arab/Byzanto/Viking/Asturian chaos in Hispania?)
That's pretty much beyond the limits of Byzantine power projection, bereft of any real interest IMHO. We figured the reconquista would happen largely as OTL, maybe resulting in Iberian equilibrium of some kind.
Thlayli said:
And won't later Isaurians be itching to reclaim Carthage as well? It hasn't been too long since they lost it.
Syrians, not Isaurians. And no, they probably won't. Africa lacks incentive for the effort required to conquer it - no ready-made Popes to help solidify rule and serve as political allies back home, for instance, and a whole lotta Muslims in the way.
Thlayli said:
It is also unfortunate that Constantine takes power 1 year after the fall of pseudo-Byzantine Ceuta.
Ah, no. For a variety of reasons. Just no.
 
Dachs said:
"Influence"? The idea was that the Byzantines would actually care about Italy. It's all back, thematically integrated, the Lombard Duchies too after some decades. Otherwise, what effect would it have?

Caring tightening the lease probably isn't a good thing for all the Imperial cities and soon-to-be city states like Venice is it? Wouldn't the themes and other military accouterments take precedence over the needs of the mercantile elites? I can just see the emperors rolling back whatever privileges Venice had acquired post-Romani control and effectively suborning Venice into playing a military role instead of a trade role assuming that it can even fill the former what with the loss of its timber in the long run and its relative lack of freedom of movement. I just don't see trading with Alexandria and the like going ahead uncontested, why would it? There are other better placed and probably more loyal Romani cities which could be utilized and the increased degree of central control and interest would predicate against it taking over the trade-lanes like it did. It has the capacity to tap into the trade coming out of southern Germany like in OTL but I don't think it has the capacity to push much further than southern Italy or Sicily. Which leads me into my next point.

Haven't we just shifted the whole economic center of gravity away from Italy towards eastern Spain and southern France which have a relatively good chance of becoming politically fragmented enough to I don't know engage in trade? It wouldn't take much to turn southern France into an economic powerhouse, have some Muslims -- non-universalist ones don't cha' know -- move into southern France bringing with them mulberry trees and silks worms and their farming practices. That will setup a strong economic foundation for small polities to break away from whatever central state they have to deal with Greater Aquitaine(?) because of the new thus far un-taxed silk production. If the state has already decentralized its taxation then I'd be willing to bet on the cities on the Med. simply buying an army or better yet bringing in an army and revolting -- more Norman shenanigans(?).

The eastern Spanish coast is easy to play around with to, wasn't it already fairly fractured in OTL? Might have something to do with the narrow coastal plain and relatively defensible terrain. In any case, it shouldn't be hard to have whatever central authority is trying to rule over the region hit his head on a roof tile while walking one fine spring morning. Couldn't we just have a messier less effective Muslim conquest, I'm sure we could find Visigoths willing to roll over provided they were left in de-facto independence. Then when the time come and long after the original rulers are either made into puppets by their own cities and towns or deposed by cities which now have a window on a resurgent (richer) Italy (demanding luxury goods) and soon-to-be economic powerhouse southern France and are linked into the broader Med. trading network via it's Muslims and Jewish citizens(?). That would effectively allow them to take over the Venetian role at least in the east with the chance to expand via some sort of "LET'S LIBERATE AFRICAN CITIEZ GUYZ AND MALTA AND IF WE'RE O RLY LUCKY SICILY AS WELL!" agreement with the Romani which goes horribly wrong for the latter.

This may of course have been a nonsensical rant but I'm rather hoping it isn't! :mischief:

Dachs said:
That's pretty much beyond the limits of Byzantine power projection, bereft of any real interest IMHO. We figured the reconquista would happen largely as OTL, maybe resulting in Iberian equilibrium of some kind.

Muslim Norman Spain! You know you want to... I do, the fortress building capabilities would be awesome! It would also help the Muslim south's military capabilities by giving them what I presume would still evolve into 'knights' with an eastern influence (?).
 
Caring tightening the lease probably isn't a good thing for all the Imperial cities and soon-to-be city states like Venice is it? Wouldn't the themes and other military accouterments take precedence over the needs of the mercantile elites?
Explain what you mean by this sentence, please.
Masada said:
I can just see the emperors rolling back whatever privileges Venice had acquired post-Romani control and effectively suborning Venice into playing a military role instead of a trade role assuming that it can even fill the former what with the loss of its timber in the long run and its relative lack of freedom of movement. I just don't see trading with Alexandria and the like going ahead uncontested, why would it? There are other better placed and probably more loyal Romani cities which could be utilized and the increased degree of central control and interest would predicate against it taking over the trade-lanes like it did. It has the capacity to tap into the trade coming out of southern Germany like in OTL but I don't think it has the capacity to push much further than southern Italy or Sicily.
All well and good, but a reestablishment of control in central and southern Italy doesn't lead to Venice failing to get less autonomous necessarily at all. Considering the heavy Agilolfing involvement in northern Italy I expect the place might be able to use Bavaria as it did the Carolingians, with roughly the same result.
Masada said:
Haven't we just shifted the whole economic center of gravity away from Italy towards eastern Spain and southern France which have a relatively good chance of becoming politically fragmented enough to I don't know engage in trade? It wouldn't take much to turn southern France into an economic powerhouse, have some Muslims -- non-universalist ones don't cha' know -- move into southern France bringing with them mulberry trees and silks worms and their farming practices. That will setup a strong economic foundation for small polities to break away from whatever central state they have to deal with Greater Aquitaine(?) because of the new thus far un-taxed silk production. If the state has already decentralized its taxation then I'd be willing to bet on the cities on the Med. simply buying an army or better yet bringing in an army and revolting -- more Norman shenanigans(?).
Stop being weird and playing with assumptions like "political unification helps lead to a greater volume of trade", it makes my head hurt. :crazyeye:
Masada said:
Couldn't we just have a messier less effective Muslim conquest, I'm sure we could find Visigoths willing to roll over provided they were left in de-facto independence.
Predates the PoD.
Masada said:
Muslim Norman Spain! You know you want to... I do, the fortress building capabilities would be awesome! It would also help the Muslim south's military capabilities by giving them what I presume would still evolve into 'knights' with an eastern influence (?).
I doubt the warrior gentry will become anything like the Western European style of the High Middle Ages even with the advantages of having a) Normans and b) the usual Hispanic land tie business. Mostly because I don't expect the Normans to last that long even if they do hijack the Cordoba caliphate when it dies. Assuming it becomes a caliphate.
 
I'm not even entirely sure why you're assuming Normans (i.e. Normandy as a coherent polity/homeland) turn out the way they do if Frankish internal politics are vastly messed around with.

I propose a much greater incidence of (lasting) trans-Pyrenees states due to the lack of a solid West Francia in the first place.
 
I would veeeeerrry much appreciate it if someone (das) could give me some slightly more specific information on the ethnic composition of the Volga/Astrakhan/Ural/etc. areas of the TL. Grazie.

Give a slightly more specific query. ;) Do you just want to know the ethnic composition of the Golden Horde? Just the western parts of it? And/or plus eastern Muscovy? And are there any other related questions other than just the composition?

Also, later on: Normanodoxy, anyone?

See, we were actually trying to avoid that. But on the other hand if we did have them take over Syria as I thought of earlier, we could get Orthodox or even Maronite Normans. Maybe we could have them branch out?

Explain what you mean by this sentence, please.

I think he means that the attention of a strong imperial government is generally undesirable for budding mercantile city-states.

All well and good, but a reestablishment of control in central and southern Italy doesn't lead to Venice failing to get less autonomous necessarily at all. Considering the heavy Agilolfing involvement in northern Italy I expect the place might be able to use Bavaria as it did the Carolingians, with roughly the same result.

On one hand, yes, on the other hand, all their trade routes are belong to who if the Byzantines establish themselves on both sides of the Adriatic?

Haven't we just shifted the whole economic center of gravity away from Italy towards eastern Spain and southern France which have a relatively good chance of becoming politically fragmented enough to I don't know engage in trade?

We haven't yet, actually, but we might as well! A general shift of economic (and later cultural) activity to the Western Mediterranean is entirely imaginable, and the Muslim Normans of Maghrib fit in quite well with that I think.

What would all that mean for local urban, political and cultural development, and for later maritime exploration?

Mostly because I don't expect the Normans to last that long

Why not? Petty Muslim Norman feudal (taifa, if you will) states seem feasible and even tenable to me, troublesome though the Berbers could get.

Ofcourse, it won't be quite like OTL European feudalism, but that's just as fine; we might get something more commerce-oriented out of it. Not to mention piracy-oriented, since we have Vikings on the Barbary Coast.

I'm not even entirely sure why you're assuming Normans (i.e. Normandy as a coherent polity/homeland) turn out the way they do if Frankish internal politics are vastly messed around with.

We aren't, that's the problem. The Norman discussion started when we realised that we will have to dump all those spare Normans (or Norsemen if you prefer) somewhere, and then decided to be original about it.
 
I think he means that the attention of a strong imperial government is generally undesirable for budding mercantile city-states.
Fair enough, but why involve the themes in that discussion?
das said:
On one hand, yes, on the other hand, all their trade routes are belong to who if the Byzantines establish themselves on both sides of the Adriatic?
Yeah, that's fair. At least there won't be the Bari, Sicilian, and Cretan Arab pirates to worry about! :D
das said:
Why not? Petty Muslim Norman feudal (taifa, if you will) states seem feasible and even tenable to me, troublesome though the Berbers could get.
What I mean is, they won't really stay Norman after three or four centuries, right?
das said:
Ofcourse, it won't be quite like OTL European feudalism, but that's just as fine; we might get something more commerce-oriented out of it. Not to mention piracy-oriented, since we have Vikings on the Barbary Coast.
Awwww yeah son!

We need to map this out at like 1500 or so. :evil:
 
Given that the Vikings' pattern was always to go after soft targets, why exactly would the removal of any power in Carolingian Europe capable of effectively opposing them result in them evacuating the OTL Empire en masse in favor of the one place in the entire world where they got comprehensively wrecked?
 
Das said:
I think he means that the attention of a strong imperial government is generally undesirable for budding mercantile city-states.

Basically, this. The loss of the ability to set their own independent trade policy and taxes is not a good thing for any budding mercantile elite.

Dachs said:
Fair enough, but why involve the themes in that discussion?

Competition for taxes capital. Also, the potential for a shift in government emphasis from nascent cities which haven't really evolved yet to fostering the themes.

Dachs said:
All well and good, but a reestablishment of control in central and southern Italy doesn't lead to Venice failing to get less autonomous necessarily at all. Considering the heavy Agilolfing involvement in northern Italy I expect the place might be able to use Bavaria as it did the Carolingians, with roughly the same result.

Das more or less answered this question. Byzantine control of the Adriatic and Sicily have effectively choked off the major markets for OTL Venice. It will still be a regional power but I doubt it'll be able to make it past the Adriatic, simply because the Byzantines are far better served handing over trading privileges to a city they can more easily keep a finger on.

Das said:
On one hand, yes, on the other hand, all their trade routes are belong to who if the Byzantines establish themselves on both sides of the Adriatic?

If we felt like it we could affect some-sort of Hellenization of Italian via Greek speaking merchants. North-Eastern Italy might shift from being dominated by merchants to being dominated by a mercantile-nobility who effectively act as intermediaries with Bavaria but don't do more than store the wares they've purchased before on-selling them. Imperial edicts could fairly easily make it too expensive for the Italians to leave their own shores. They'd still make money but nowhere near as much as they could have.

Are there still at this stage 'Greek' communities in Sicily and southern Italy? It would certainly pay for them to discover their ancestry as quickly as they could. I'm sure some sort of legal connivance could be set-up, an Imperial edict favoring Greeks, which is obeyed more in spirit than in reality when a bunch of 'Greek' Sicilians qualify a generation after its enactment? I'm just throwing things out but favorable legislation existed, even if I'm not sure if its based on ethnicity, which I suspect not.

Das said:
We haven't yet, actually, but we might as well! A general shift of economic (and later cultural) activity to the Western Mediterranean is entirely imaginable, and the Muslim Normans of Maghrib fit in quite well with that I think.

We have really, we've cut off a major source of income for the merchants of the eastern coast of Italy. That will probably stop them organizing sufficiently to deal with the nobles ensconced in their castles(?). At the very least that renders trade prohibitively expensive and screws them that way.

Das said:
What would all that mean for local urban, political and cultural development, and for later maritime exploration?

Italy probably doesn't urbanize anywhere near as much as it did. The area's around Genoa and Naples might still experience some-sort of urbanization and they might well be larger than our time-line simply because they can secure a larger than OTL hinterland to provide the food they need. Eastern Italy on the Adriatic probably isn't going to see all that much urbanization, what's going to support it, some mediocre regional trade? Northern Italy degenerating into a highly feudalized stomping ground between Bavaria and the Byzantines would be interesting - it certainly has all the requisite characteristics for that to happen now - with a small patch of sanity around Genoa and Naples. The parts closest to the Byzantine south with access to Greek merchants and perhaps under the influence of a reconciled Pope(?) might go Greek?

I still believe that if silk production was introduced into southern France alongside silk weaving you would see southern French cities tossing out whatever feudal overlord they had the moment he/she weakened. It probably wouldn't hurt if glass working and especially shipbuilding were arrived at around the same time. Increased urbanization might well prevail with increased Genoese influence and *shrug* they already have wine, salt and cloth, flax and metal from the north in the future.
 
Given that the Vikings' pattern was always to go after soft targets, why exactly would the removal of any power in Carolingian Europe capable of effectively opposing them result in them evacuating the OTL Empire en masse in favor of the one place in the entire world where they got comprehensively wrecked?
Maybe because with the collapse of the Rhenish trade networks, northern France won't be as desirable a target, while North Africa probably won't be as difficult of a target after a coupla centuries of naval war with the Byzantines on their side of the Med, instead of in the Aegean and Ionian? :dunno: It's a good point.
Competition for taxes capital. Also, the potential for a shift in government emphasis from nascent cities which haven't really evolved yet to fostering the themes.
Since the area isn't exactly in need of colonization, what exactly were you thinking the government could do in terms of city development?
Masada said:
If we felt like it we could affect some-sort of Hellenization of Italian via Greek speaking merchants. North-Eastern Italy might shift from being dominated by merchants to being dominated by a mercantile-nobility who effectively act as intermediaries with Bavaria but don't do more than store the wares they've purchased before on-selling them. Imperial edicts could fairly easily make it too expensive for the Italians to leave their own shores. They'd still make money but nowhere near as much as they could have.
But at this stage you don't really see a whole lot of Byzantine government intervention in trade maintenance - that doesn't start until the eleventh century. The most the Byzantines usually do at this point is stuff like Theophilos - crank up copper coinage production for an economy that's already ready for expansion, ?????, profit. I dunno exactly how much the government is even going to legislate against the movement of Italian middleman merchants. Especially since ethnically motivated legislation like that doesn't really make sense considering there's no actual ethnic identity problem separating the relevant parts of Italy and the Byzantines. See below.
Masada said:
Are there still at this stage 'Greek' communities in Sicily and southern Italy? It would certainly pay for them to discover their ancestry as quickly as they could. I'm sure some sort of legal connivance could be set-up, an Imperial edict favoring Greeks, which is obeyed more in spirit than in reality when a bunch of 'Greek' Sicilians qualify a generation after its enactment? I'm just throwing things out but favorable legislation existed, even if I'm not sure if its based on ethnicity, which I suspect not.
Already on it, pal. Southern Italian coast is full of Greeks from now until the middle of the Italian Renaissance, when things get a bit cloudier. Actually, in the eighth and ninth centuries the Greek population is near the highest it's been, due to immigration from Sklavenian Greece - which, when it was resettled, was mostly resettled from Anatolian excess population, not Italian Greek. So there's plenty to go round.
Masada said:
We have really, we've cut off a major source of income for the merchants of the eastern coast of Italy. That will probably stop them organizing sufficiently to deal with the nobles ensconced in their castles(?). At the very least that renders trade prohibitively expensive and screws them that way.
I dunno, I think you're overrating the negative effects of Byzantine political control in Central Italy and underrating bonuses like getting rid of Muslim piracy out of Bari and Crete.
Masada said:
The parts closest to the Byzantine south with access to Greek merchants and perhaps under the influence of a reconciled Pope(?) might go Greek?
They already are Greek, homes. :p It's more of a question as to whether Central Italy will look more Greek, not the south. Hell, even the Lombard Duchies rule over a mostly-Greek population as far as we can tell, and that's only going to increase when they lose political independence in the late eighth/early ninth centuries.
Masada said:
I still believe that if silk production was introduced into southern France alongside silk weaving you would see southern French cities tossing out whatever feudal overlord they had the moment he/she weakened. It probably wouldn't hurt if glass working and especially shipbuilding were arrived at around the same time. Increased urbanization might well prevail with increased Genoese influence and *shrug* they already have wine, salt and cloth, flax and metal from the north in the future.
So what political knock-on effects will this have for Greater Aquitaine? Maybe not so great, or some kind of equivalent for the OTL thirteenth century era of comparative centralization?
 
That's...not what I meant. :mad: Oh well. Gift horses and all that.

Running to Stand Still.

“Fight for your country – that is the best, the only omen!”
-Hektor, the Iliad

With the conclusion of the Peace of Andrusovo in January 1667, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth could return to peace once more. It had been a long twenty years. Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s revolt back in 1648 had served as a spark for a general conflagration that reached crescendo in the 1650s, as Brandenburg-Prussia, Sweden, Muscovy, and the Ottoman-ruled Danubian Principalities dispatched soldiers to take advantage of the Commonwealth’s weakness. But slowly, inexorably, Polish forces, led by the implacable Jan II Casimir and his allies, men like Stefan Czarniecki and Paweł Sapieha, clawed their way back from the brink. Sweden was ejected, the Brandenburgers made to heel, and now Muscovy had been ejected from most of Lithuania, though concessions had had to be made. Poland-Lithuania had weathered the deluge, and life could return to normal.

Except, of course, that it couldn’t. The ink was hardly dry on Andrusovo before war with the Tatars was renewed, raiding increasing dramatically on both sides. Polish-allied cossacks, after Khmelnytsky had been crushed, were few and far between now, so stopping Tatar raids was harder than ever. And fundamental cleavages within the Commonwealth remained unsolved. The men who had joined Karl X of Sweden and his puppet, Janusz Radziwiłł, remained largely unpunished, and Lithuania still harbored grievances against Poland – and vice versa. Admittedly, the deluge had been ended in large part by a patriotic uprising in 1656 – but if the Commonwealth needed to rely on the atrocities of its enemies to win a war, it was screwed indeed. Polish-Lithuanian magnates still had the rights of konfederacja and liberum veto, both of which severely undermined central authority. While many fortifications were being improved in these years and many Polish military theorists demanded that the proportion of infantry in the predominantly-cavalry army be increased, these demands were ignored on the grounds that the levy system needed to provide such infantry would be a threat to the citizens’ liberties.

So an exhausted, badly weakened Poland-Lithuania was once more dragged into a war with an enemy with which it could not easily grapple. The Tatars and their Ottoman allies had, as mentioned, stepped up their raiding. Into the mix was thrown one of the chief leaders of the cossacks, Petro Doroshenko, who in 1667 with the reimposition of Polish suzerainty decided that neither the Commonwealth nor Muscovy was a good ally. He sent a request, then, to the Ottoman Sultan, Mehmed IV, for protection from both of his neighbors. In 1669 the Sultan granted his request and began to move troops from Hungary to the Ukraine in preparation for a proper Polish war. His forces would be facing off against the hetman, Jan Sobieski, a veteran of the deluge. For a victory over a numerically superior force of raiding Tatars and Cossacks at Pidhaytsi in the fall of 1667, Sobieski had been made hetman by the Sejm, due in no small part to the backing of Jan Casimir. Even though Casimir abdicated in 1668, the new king, the nonentity Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki, chose not to oppose the appointment, which went ahead successfully.

After months of raid and counter-raid, of border violations and troop buildups, Sobieski finally occupied Right-Bank Ukraine to forestall some of the raiding in 1671. The Crimean Tatar khan, Selim Giray, pleaded for assistance; the Ottomans seized on this as a pretext and declared war. Mehmed IV, deciding that he wanted to play the part of warrior-king, set off with 80,000 men, accompanied by his son Mustafa, his favorite concubine Rabia Gülnüş Emetullah (Mustafa’s mother), and his Köprülü grand vezir, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa. Their goal was the Polish frontier fortress of Kamianets-Podol’skiy, capital of the Podolian province. Its acquisition would allow the Ottomans to tighten their grip on their Danubian vassals, and further demonstrate the ever-expanding Ottoman power. Despite some logistical setbacks, the fortress was captured in the 1672 campaign. Sobieski simply didn’t have the manpower to hold onto it, and had to content himself with pinprick attacks against isolated Turkish units and raids against their supply lines.

The fall of Podolia spurred King Michał to agree to a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire, but even the fractured Sejm refused to give up so quickly. While not substantially reinforced, Sobieski was ordered to recapture some of the Podolian forts around Kamianets to weaken the Ottoman hold on the province. His target was the fortress of Khotyn. To improve his ability to capture the fort, he was not given more men, but instead a secret weapon: Kazimierz Siemienowicz, the engineer, and his rockets, which would hopefully crack open the fortress before Ottoman relieving forces could arrive and/or do the Ottomans serious damage in the event of a field battle. Dependent in large part on the rockets to make up for his deficiency in numbers, Sobieski was caught flat-footed by the weather. Heavy rains prevented the use of Siemienowicz’s rockets, and by the time things cleared up, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and a fresh army were near. Sobieski had to retreat out of Podolia, barely warding off an attack on his rearguard by Doroshenko that added injury to insult, as it were.

During the Khotyn campaign, King Michał had died, of course. This was more dangerous than it seemed. While Sobieski had been a shoo-in before his Khotyn failure, afterwards things didn’t look so good. There were now two other main candidates at the free election. Jan Paweł Sapieha’s successor at the voivodeship of Wilno, Jan Kazimierz Sapieha, commanded a strong following. Like the late Michał, his status as son of an able war leader lent him credit, and his family’s prominence played a huge role as well. The second challenger was the German elector of Brandenburg, Friedrich Wilhelm. Formerly a vassal of the Polish sovereign as duke of Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm had made Ducal Prussia’s independence from the Commonwealth a stipulation of the Treaty of Wehlau, made with Jan Casimir during the deluge. He had then entered into the conflict in Western Europe. The Dutch war, launched by Louis XIV in 1672, had already dragged much of the Empire into fighting, and Brandenburg-Prussia had been among the states that had sided with the Dutch. But in 1673 Friedrich Wilhelm had extracted himself from the war by the Treaty of Vassem with France. Due to the poor health of the Polish sovereign, the Elector had stipulated that the French must support a Brandenburg-Prussian candidacy in the next Commonwealth free election. The French ties in Poland-Lithuania were not inconsiderable, and formed the core of the elector’s bloc of support.

Sobieski, of course, still had his partisans, but he was far from certain to gain the crown, and so appeared at the free election in the spring of 1674 backed up by a few thousand soldiers to try to bludgeon the electors into voting for him. Friedrich Wilhelm planned for that contingency as well. On one hand he persuaded Sapieha to resign his candidacy in return for the promise of increased holdings and nepotistic office-appointments for his supporters, and support for the office of hetman when it reopened. On the other, he too brought troops: Feldmarschall Georg von Derfflinger at the head of six thousand veterans. After a heated confrontation that nearly turned to violence, Sobieski backed down and dispersed his (illegally gathered) troops. Friedrich Wilhelm was duly elected to the crowns of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as Fryderyk I.
 
Dachs hates lack of comments and demands a response. Matt says its a tad odd about the sudden french turnaround, but then again, which does Matt know?:p
 
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