Which is why I repeat, they were indistinguishable from everybody else's light cavalry. The British issued lances to ALL their light cavalry until just before World War One.
Here is an English propaganda picture from the time of the Crimean War, we are looking for pikes on it.
The Germans issued lances to all of their cavalry of every type until the late 1920s, almost a decade After World War One.
Total arming of the Germans with pikes occurred...
in 1889.
Now for the details.
1. In fact, indeed, in the 1840s in Russia they put forward the idea of a "sole" cavalry, the main armament of which was the pike. And the idea, like the ghost of communism, began to roam Europe. However, the problem is that the cavalrymen had MANY other ideas, especially after the American Civil War, when the feasibility of the cavalry charge as the main tactic was questioned.
As a result, even in Russia itself in the 1860s there was a "dragoon revolution" 2.0., when the pikes were taken away even from the cavalry units that had previously had them. And, in general, as practice has shown, it was a step in the right direction.
However, towards the end of the 19th century, there was a massive fascination with the "moral factor" (obviously, in connection with the total transition to mass armies with all its features). This served as an additional argument in favor of the "terrible" pikes. However, the consistent implementation of the idea of a unified cavalry on the Prussian model was by no means the rule. In other words, total lancers are already contemporaries of magazine rifles (as well as steel pikes and nickel–plated cuirasses). Such is the military-technical paradox.
2. Even the pikes of the Cossacks are not equivalent to European lancers. If we take the sample of the 1830s, which lasted until the end of the century, then it is a quarter longer. Given that the standard European "toothpick" barely protruded from behind the horse's head, 70 cm is a significant difference. At the same time, we are talking about the "statutory" model, in fact, the Cossacks used longer ones. Both before and after the "standardization", although very sporadically.
3. And, what is an order of magnitude more important, very different cavalrymen were attached to different peaks. Cossacks are "natural" cavalry, that is, they have been trained to ride since early childhood. The average European uhlan could not boast of this. And this is the duration of the daily journey and many other features.
4. Finally, there is a big difference – getting horses from steppe herds or from a stud farm.
About Dragoons. From the mid-17th century European armies were classified as consisting of "Horse, Foot, and Dragoons" because dragoons rode to battle but (supposedly) fought dismounted. However, by the end of that century in French, English and German states' armies the dragoons were already taking on more and more of the characteristics of regular cavalry, helped by the fact that regular cavalry like Carabineers and even Cuirassiers were being issued carbines and pistols for mounted fire and dragoons were starting to carry sabers or swords for mounted melee.
Actually, there is a huge difference between episodic use in equestrian formation and episodic dismounting. So, I'm afraid the same French statutes of the first half of the 18th century, which officially considered dragoons infantry, disagree with you about the "standard" of Peter's dragoons.
Each dragoon regiment was to have 11 dragoon and 1 mounted grenadier companies. In 1704 - 1705 they began combining the separate mounted grenadier companies into Mounted Grenadier Regiments, but the Mounted Grenadier Regiments did not become permanent organizations until after 1708.
Yes, that's exactly what it's about. Dragoons were not the only cavalry option even in 1699-1708, and later mounted grenadiers are also present as separate regiments.
Sorry, when the howitzer was invented in Sweden in the early 1690s it was specifically to achieve a high, arcing trajectory to deliver explosive 'bombs' over walls into towns during sieges.
Sorry, but in Sweden at the end of the 17th century, a
cheap cast-iron howitzer was only invented. After that, they began to massively rivet it there specifically for field artillery. This invention has a first name, a last name, and presumably a journal of very famous experiments.
It was, basically, a Terror weapon against the civilian inhabitants of towns and cities.
Original look, but no. Mortars were quite enough for non-targeted attacks on squares. The howitzer is, of course, for relatively accurate shooting.
When it started being used as field artillery shortly afterwards, one of its uses was to attack enemy formations behind hills and other obstructions BUT this was later (mid-1700s and on) taught in the technical artillery schools in France and Britain as a 'last resort' because of the inaccuracy of the howitzers and unreliability of the fuzes.
I repeat – the main purpose of a field howitzer is, in principle, to deliver something more effective than a cast-iron core to a decent distance. The effectiveness of which, even with the possibility of shooting ricochets, was frankly rubbish.
The 'Unicorn' was issued in 1 and 2 pud sizes for field, 5 and 10 pud sizes for siege, as listed in the 1720 table of the Russian Army. In game terms, there's no reason to make two units out of them.
That is, a difference of 5-10 times is not a reason? Do I understand correctly that the same logic works for conventional guns and you propose to combine field and siege artillery in general? Otherwise, the classic field artillery is 3-12 pounds against 36 for the siege.
The French lost the war of Big Detachments
And how does this negate the fact that the French also lost the war of small detachments? Sometimes with downright apocalyptic consequences for the big ones.
Actually, the figures of French combat losses in Spain in English-language historiography (91 thousand, etc.) are literally sucked out of the finger and do not correspond in any way to French basic documents like service records. The analysis of which shows that in general all the combat losses of the Napoleonic armies are no more than 200 thousand. The rest, as usual for the era – diseases, etc. At the same time, the most important problem of the Napoleonic troops in Spain
is precisely the inability to wage an effective small war.
At the same time, 1812, which began the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire, is a catastrophic defeat precisely as a result of a catastrophically lost minor war. If the army controls only the territory where there is a large crowd, it begins to die out even in Southern Italy. There is a very famous example in the confrontation between the weaker Spaniards, who had a lot of light cavalry, and the French, who did not have it.
As for terrible Russia, the winter in Moscow is colder than in western Europe south of Scandinavia
In fact, the January isotherm, which separates populated parts of Sweden and Finland from the sparsely populated north, runs almost exactly along the Russian border between the Baltic and the Sea of Azov. So it's colder in Moscow than in Stockholm, surprise.
only man-eating bears roaming the streets of Russia today are wearing FSB uniforms.
I'm actually Russian. My advice to you is to try to consume propaganda a little less.
Anyway, my ironic comment on the topic of European snot freezing in July is precisely that the "hellish" conditions are not even in Russia, but mainly in Belarus, actually not enough for the literal evaporation of a giant army. Moreover, severe frosts occurred only practically on Berezina. Which rather helped the remnants of the French escape than the other way around. In reality, the rapid disintegration of the Napoleonic army began at a very comfortable temperature – for see above.
The campaign of 1813 became possible both because Napoleon had thrown away a half million men in Russia
Yeah, and 9/10 of the French were not killed in battles, they were not eaten by killer polar bears and even FSB agents. It's just that the French communications and food requisitioning units died a little bit.
Moreover, in Russia, the mighty French light infantry was practically not noticed. Designed, in general, just for such a war.
and because both Prussia and Austria had been preparing for it for years before that.
But even the Prussians continued to prepare (morally) until the brazen Cossacks began to chase the soldiers of the French garrison right in the center of Berlin. The Kalisz Peace Treaty and the transition of Prussia to the Allied side happened about a week later. And yes, I don't even know where Napoleon's qualified light infantry was at that time.
Now slowly and with details. After Berezina, the Russian infantry was also significantly exhausted by the pursuit. However, Russia had many easy parts. As a result, Poland and Prussia turned into the theater of a very effective small war (the standard party is light cavalry, horse artillery and insufficiently good chasseurs), and the French garrisons were practically blocked in the cities.
Austria prematurely fought France in 1809 and got beaten, but gave Napoleon his first major battlefield defeat at Aspern.
Do you mean that the Austrians heroically held their positions behind such a modest river as the Danube?
Note that in 1809 and 1810 Russia was an Ally of France, not any liberator of anybody.
And brazenly engaged in sabotage of its allied obligations.
Note also that in the 1813 campaign, Austria provided more troops than Russia did, even including the Cossacks.
Please specify that this great achievement dates back to the
end of 1813. At the same time, the composition of the troops in the battle of Leipzig is "slightly" different. 127 thousand Russians and 87 thousand Austrians. Unsurprisingly, the Austrians ended up with more soldiers.
), a terrible human tragedy but not to be ignored like we wont ignore Mongol cosquest.
