Creasy's 15 decisive battles of the world

Interesting. I've heard the argument in the past that, had they gone with the original plan and just send a small force, it would have been a low-risk venture and they could have simply achieved the mission they had been asked to do and left. There's even the argument that they were originally going to have more support from Magna Graecia, but the size of the Athenian fleet caused them to back off, since they distrusted Athenian intentions.

But I do think Nicias was right that actual war on Syracuse required a large fleet and investment. After all, Syracuse did fight Carthage to a stand-still for decades. Maybe I'm overstated Carthage's power at this point, but, to me, that's damn impressive.
 
In the OP's linked-to Wikipedia article, I thought some of the post Creasy suggestions interesting. A few were silly, of course. Including the Tet Offensive of 1968, because it turned US public opinion against the war in Vietnam is pretty myopic and could only have been written in the 1970s. History has since quit believing that anything about the Vietnam War was important.

But if you had to boil down Germany's defeat by Russia in the Second World War to any single battle, Stalingrad would seem to be the best choice.

On a larger point, I wonder how relevant it is to dismiss any given battle as "decisive" on the basis that the outcome allegedly decided was "going to happen anyway." The conceit in the question is that battles decide things. I'm not sure that those "decisions" are less so because they confirm rather than reverse a particular tendency in course of history leading up to the said battle.

I'll suggest a trivial example because it deals with Texas and because I just saw a museum exhibit about it last week. One Texas historian in the Wiki article wrote a book called the Battle of San Jacinto the "16th Battle" because it permitted the establishment of the English speaking Republic of Texas and laid the groundwork for the extension of the United States all the way to Alta California.

The obvious counter to including the small scale scrape in what is now the Lynchburg Ferry neighborhood of the Houston Ship Channel is that the United States was probably going to take over Alta California anyway. The Mexican nation was corrupt, almost feudal, and had been engaging in almost nonstop civil war since its founding 15 years before San Jacinto. Despite the natural wealth of Alta California, the upper Pacific coast had remained nearly undeveloped under Spanish and Mexican rule. On the other hand, the American nation was growing, aggressive, and nearly busting at the seams trying to get out into the west and exploit the mineral wealth of the interior and the far west. Some sort of clash was inevitable. And given that, the triumph of the Anglo Americans over the Hispano Americans was all but assured by the politics, economics, and technological disparity of the day.

But given that trend, and that "inevitable" outcome, what then can we say was the decision point, the historical moment at which those historical forces were consumated? Do you deny the conceit and claim that it's wealth, efficiency, and national vigor, not just one hour's clash of arms, that decides history? That seems a waste. If history is decided by economics, then where is the value of the individual? Where is the human drama? Where is the glory in the clash of arms? Why go through the trouble and toil of killing your fellow man in war, or why study those who killed and died, if the matter is really decided by whose factory happens to spit out the sharpest widgets?
 
And indeed, what happens when wars are not decided by what side has more or better factories or more or better productive citizens?
 
I never thought this list to be very good anyways, because it is rather Eurocentric.
 
Yeah, the Ottomans weren't going to maintain a serious presence in central Europe without massive military reforms, which probably weren't going to happen. Capturing Vienna in either 1529 or 1683 might have been quite bad for the Habsburgs in the short term, but in the long term the Ottomans weren't going to hold that territory and the ultimate winners would probably have been the French. John Lynn has hypothesized that Louis XIV would be able to make bank one way or the other out of an Ottoman victory in 1683, perhaps even to the point of being elected Holy Roman Emperor; Willem van Oranje, of course, would make an excellent alternative candidate, as would Maximilian Emanuel. So you can certainly say that there would have been knock-on effects in Western Europe, but it's hard to say what they would have actually been. Fertile ground for an ATL, of course.

Which Willem do you mean? Willem van Oranje was solidly dead in 1683.
 
The one who became king of England and Scotland for a decade.
 
But if you had to boil down Germany's defeat by Russia in the Second World War to any single battle, Stalingrad would seem to be the best choice.

Stalingrad wasted a lot of manpower, but that was more a tactical defeat than a strategic one. The Battle of Kursk, on the other hand, permanently drained the Axis' capability for offensive movements; and then Operation Bagration annihilated the entire Axis center on the Eastern Front.
 
I never thought this list to be very good anyways, because it is rather Eurocentric.

I can't think why on earth that would be.
 
Wow, just noticed the date, I was going to mention Stalingrad...
 
I like the take on Chalons in "Fatal Victories" that it actually hastened the fall of the Western Roman Empire because Aetius held back from annihilating Attila's army because Aetius might need them for his own wars. I always thought it odd that anyone would consider it decisive when Attila invaded Italy the next year.

I like Paul Davis' "100 Decisive Battles," though it would be better titled "100 Important Battles." You can quibble with that list, too, but he at least has several battles in China and India. It's nice to have accounts of battles like Thymbra and Badr which were more important that a lot of more famous battles.

Edit: IMPORTANT battles. The battles didn't have sexual problems.
 
I like the take on Chalons in "Fatal Victories" that it actually hastened the fall of the Western Roman Empire because Aetius held back from annihilating Attila's army because Aetius might need them for his own wars. I always thought it odd that anyone would consider it decisive when Attila invaded Italy the next year.
What does that have to recommend itself, other than novelty?
 
What does that have to recommend itself, other than novelty?

Essentially that the Roman generals were more interested in their own ambitions than protecting the citizens of Rome. In this case resulting in a ravishing of northern Italy.
 
Essentially that the Roman generals were more interested in their own ambitions than protecting the citizens of Rome. In this case resulting in a ravishing of northern Italy.
Well, yeah, but that was how Rome got into the mess in the first place. It was always the civil wars that destroyed the empire, not the Huns, who were practically incidental - a brief interruption of two years' time - before and after which the Romans got down to the proper business of killing each other.

I agree that the outcome at the Catalaunian Fields was not particularly "decisive" in any meaningful sense of the word; the Huns had already started to pull back, after all, and it was not as though Aetius, Thiudareiks, and their troops inflicted a defeat that barred Attila from destroying the western Christian world or some nonsense. Much of its reputation is founded on the fact that it was a large and very bloody engagement. The oft-quoted number from Hydatius is that both sides suffered a total of three hundred thousand casualties in the battle (a number which is obviously pure crap) and which would have made the twentieth of June the bloodiest single day in human history, including the nukings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even though the number was smaller, it was still quite a big battle. It's hard for a lot of people to get past the notion that the large military engagements are the ones that matter most to the course of a war or of the fates of states and peoples.
 
The true significance of Châlons was the fact that Merovech, a legendary sea monster-king, served alongside the Romans, thus giving the impetus for the Franks under Clovis to conquer Gaul with divine right in the next few centuries.
 
I agree, the Metarus wasn't really that decisive. I really think The Battle of Dertosa in 215 BC won by the Scipio brothers against Hasdrubal Barca's army he was bringing to Italy. It really dealt Hannibal's efforts a terrible blow. Not only did he lose a large contingent of men coming to support him from Spain, but massive reinforcements from Africa were sent to replace those men lost to the Scipios to defend Spain.

Essentially, this victory prevented Carthage using up to four armies in Italy. Hasdrubal in the north would have applied pressure on the allies there, while Hannibal would have had new troops to defend his allies better while allowing him to take back the initiative lost due to not being able to be in two or more places at once, while Spain would have been fairly secure as the Romans may well have been concerned with the large Carthaginian forces in Italy.

At such a critical time, with Rome on the back foot after Cannae, this could well have been what Hannibal needed to win the war... but of course, some things were not in Hannibal's control. Of course it would have been far from certain - but Hannibal struggled because he had too many obligations, and too few troops, while the Romans had an overwhelming advantage in manpower on the peninsular. Directly after Cannae, if lots in the north had joined the course from Etrusca and Umbria among others, while his southern land could be held more firmly, Hannibal could have taken the offensive, instead of remaining on the defensive for years, caught mainly between protecting Capua and Taras!

Of course, Hannibal's generals weren't up to much good - but still, it was an important moment and an extra 70,000+ men would have not gone amiss in Hannibal's calculations. How many of Rome's allies would have remained faithful with four large Carthaginian armies marching about in Italy? They weren't allied to Rome out of any particular loyalty for the most part, but out of survival and fear of hegemonic aspirations of their neighbors who they had been at war with in the past. Hannibal only had one and managed to turn over 40 percent of the allies from her!
 
I'm fond of Anthemius and Constantius III myself.
 
Nikolay II.
 
A little odd that Creasy passed over the Seven Years' War entirely. The campaign culminating in Wolfe's capture of Quebec City (1759) seems as decisive as anything in the eighteenth century. For one thing, the American revolution would have been entirely different in nature if the French had retained Quebec.
 
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