How big was USA's role in defeating Germany in WW2?

to avoid a red card for too long a post the following posts go out to a new thread that masquaredes as an history article .

in the best cinematic tradition on par with my skills as a perfect Plan B From Outer Space type here is a trailer .

lend Lease and silver spoons .
the great fail of r16 on P-63s .
" If we remove the Lend Lease planes do the Russians loose air superiority on the front ? And the war ? "
examination of the oil targets in an incomplete way .
attrition it is .
"It is indeed foolish to suggest that Germans lost 36% of their fighter pilots in the first 4 months of Barbarossa and that could somehow influence the battle over Germany in any way ."
and yet more rambling .
 
returning to this thread and paraphrasing pages 217 to 219 of the Brute Force by John Ellis , tetraetyl lead and ethyline dibromide were the bottlenecks that could have crippled German syntetic aviation fuel production and they were produced only by the exact total of 4 factories in the Axis Europe . The location and purpose of each plant was known to Allies and the Bombing Survey already referenced in this thread is said to crisply conclude in page 45 of Overall (Europe) section or volume that ' These plants were not bombed , although the equipment and the processes used were such as to make them highly vulnerable to air attack ... A major opportunity in the Allied air offensive was unexploited ."

the thing goes on with the German electric grid which received only 0.05 % in weight of the aggrate total of bombs dropped by the 8th Air Force and 0.07 % of the RAF Bomber Command . The interesting thing is this . Back in 1941 when the Americans started their warplanning they lacked any plans for on industrial attacks . The question they asked how they could hurt the US economy immediately . They went out and asked it to the industrialists and the electric suply came on top . It seems destruction of 95 power stations would have taken out 50 % of German " electricity " . Something to ponder as Albert Speer is reported as suggesting that 60% loss would have stopped the German industry for good .
 
sorry but ı don't see a coherent strategy to win a war in the Allied air raids . Unless of course one factors in the Bomber Harris , he seems to be in favour of burning German cities for the reason that they were German cities . For Americans , their own bomber fleets and political clout to influence RAF operations over the howling mad opposition of Harris meant they laid waste to German oil targets , transportation system and the like . Though by the time this happened it is arguable that the writing was on wall . It was either a bait for the Germans to come up and get shot down or an attempt to faciliate uninterrupted advance of the Western Allies as the Russians had already liberated much of their country and were set to offer -uhmm- "freedom" to lots of Europe . Was kinda a race ...

and this pathetic little worm of a poster will go on . With the destruction of Dresden , the USAAF is said to have joined with gusto , shortly followed by the firestorms in Japan where American bomber crews vomited over the smell of burned human flesh . To test the waters and convince averages on the street that a new age was dawning . A early end to war would have meant an end to a certain little project that was sure to make an impression on my ilk , one that could even overcome fabled General Winter of the Russian steppes through heat , one could mean eternal domination of the world by the - uhmm uhmm - Anglosaxons .
 
returning one hopes saner and more responsible discussion one must still ask what would have happened without Lend Lease .

how about this still weird notion ? One that presumes everybody was looking forward to the impending clash of America and Germany as the Nazis were loudmouths openly asking for it . Everybody was looking forward to blank cheques from the bulging chequebooks ? At least nominally expecting the awesome surge of American productivity that would swamp the Germans ?

even in case that certain undesirables managed to keep the Yanks out of the European war , the Western democracies were looking forward licence production of their wares in North America , French tanks and planes , definitely British tanks . (Though one could put some extra 20 000 Spitfires to good use ) Even the KV-1 and T-34 ended up in the US as candidates for American production . And it was somehow expected by the American industrialists themselves . One of my favourites the P-47 was arrested in the prototype form at the USAAC Army Air Station where it arrived unannounced . Or how the airminded brass were surprised they were supposed to order at least 200 000 parachutes when Roosevelt announced the plans to build 50 000 warplanes . Nobody was caring for the war actually . You won't see it any reference books how Hub Zemke rolled his eyes when he heard the beast could fly from London to Berlin and back . He would probably have done exactly so had USAAF not preferred the Mustang over the stupidly delayed 'N . All of it must be some sort of a Pavlovian response on brand loyalty . You know the Hawker Board deciding to build a thousand Hurricanes on their own in 1936 . Meaning a calculated extra 600 fighters available in the summer of 1940 . Something Hawker apologists will tell you that saved England . Hence the world .

no Lend Lease might well cause the grumbling Serbian officers to refuse the American demands that they should either join in or suffer after the war . Unlike Cash and Carry you know , Americans were offering credits that they knew would not be repayed . Might have convinced the Bulgarians to join a neutrality bloc extending from Adriatic to the entire Southern coast of the Black Sea shielding Ploesti from encroachment from the South . However unlikely . No Lend Lease or its unmentionable mentions beforehand might well mean Russians digging the Stalin Line or whatever behind the warning trip line of occupied Poland . No Lend Lease might well mean those 6.5 million Russians who were captured or otherwise eliminated early on could have a better chance to absorb the initial assault . Or whatever .

even the Brits were expecting so much of actual announcement of the Lend Lease . Everybody knows the drill . No point in my pointless discourse . That's what happens when one learns history from Herman Wouk's Winds of War .
 
I would say between the two threads you have posted here that is a pretty engaging piece of research and insight, barring some of the unnecessary self-deprecating, even if some is hearsay or opinion. :)

on various points picked from the thread

......
b) aluminium was the first thing Stalin wanted in the Lend Lease after an initial shipment of flak guns , greatly surprising Harry Hopkins who had gone to Moscow to discuss the aid programme . Russian improvement of aircraft have indeed depended much on the availability of aluminium . Changing the wooden spars of Yaks provided extra volume for extra fuel and so on . Yet one must remember the Lagg 3 was sort of wooden and La-5FN / 7 had metal spars in the wing yet still the same in construction . Properly handled wood construction matched the best in composites up to 1990s . ı don't know the situation now .

in a similar vein one must remember the 109F and its puny armament , that single 15 mm cannon + 2 machine guns of rifle calibre . Russians followed a similar strategy . Yeah it was only suitable for the sharpshooters but the German correction in the shape of 109G was sort of a disaster . Had Germans managed to get straight from F to K it would have been allright but the 109G-6 had no place in any airforce as far as what ı have read goes .

c) maybe they were a bunch of closet Commies but the volunteer French fighter group on the Eastern European Front , the Normandie Niemen regiment took Yak-3s when the entire gamut of Russian and Lend Lease fighters were available to choose from .

b) I knew the early Russian fighters, like the Hurricane and Dewoitine, did not use much metal, wasn't sure about the later ones. The Mosquito was an excellent example of an all-wooden design that was a strong plane, and probably had some early 'stealth' capability as well.

True the Me-109F was a 'rapier' when the Luftwaffe pilots were looking for a 'saber', but it could outmatch the Spitfire Mk V, the most numerous variant.

c) Maybe the French volunteer aces had some sympathies but I think their choice was based on the feel of the aircraft.

......

e) mobile forces lacked artillery -generally- and in return were supported from the air . Lack of trucks for artillery movement will obviously limit the rate of advance and increase the casualties allowing concentration and hence more effective counter attacks from the Germans , there is no doubt for that . Israelis attempted to answer that issue - of lack of balanced formations - with improved tank gunnery . It worked in 1967 . It did not in 1973 .

f ) in early 1942 it was seen the German infantry in Russia was averaging 4 kilometers per hour walking . Trucks and tanks did 2 while panje carts were the fastest at 4.5 km/h . As a result more horse carriages were added to Panzer Divisions .

Yep. Though the Panzer and motorized rifle divs. had enough trucks to haul their artillery around, when conditions permitted it. The anti-tank and heavy guns in their mobile forces provided the pivot point that enabled them to execute many pincer movements in their early successes. But I think the contribution of horse transport to both sides on the eastern front, when cross-country motorized transport wasn't even possible, needs to be recognized.

Between this thread and the other you've summarized as follows:

to avoid a red card for too long a post the following posts go out to a new thread that masquaredes as an history article .

in the best cinematic tradition on par with my skills as a perfect Plan B From Outer Space type here is a trailer .

lend Lease and silver spoons .
the great fail of r16 on P-63s .
" If we remove the Lend Lease planes do the Russians loose air superiority on the front ? And the war ? "
examination of the oil targets in an incomplete way .
attrition it is .
"It is indeed foolish to suggest that Germans lost 36% of their fighter pilots in the first 4 months of Barbarossa and that could somehow influence the battle over Germany in any way ."
and yet more rambling .

I'm still not sure what your answer is to the question:

returning one hopes saner and more responsible discussion one must still ask what would have happened without Lend Lease .
....
You know the Hawker Board deciding to build a thousand Hurricanes on their own in 1936 . Meaning a calculated extra 600 fighters available in the summer of 1940 . Something Hawker apologists will tell you that saved England . Hence the world .

Didn't know about that but its true the contribution of the Hurricane over Britain and elsewhere is greatly underrated.
 
It is difficult to believe that anything short of Hitler not being in power could have changed German economic and industrial policy, nor could any changes made have improved the German military to the point where it could compete with the UK, USSR, US or even France. Germany's economy was simply that much weaker than its competitors. Even Italy's economy and industry was stronger, though Mussolini did a fantastic job of screwing that up.

But on the sideways, this begs an answer for me: how, then, did we manage to perform so poorly? The closest answer I could give myself searching independently was Benito's whole-hearted support of Franco's war squandering our reserves.
 
But on the sideways, this begs an answer for me: how, then, did we manage to perform so poorly? The closest answer I could give myself searching independently was Benito's whole-hearted support of Franco's war squandering our reserves.
Poor military morale and readiness was a big factor. By and large, the Italian veterans who'dfought on Franco's side in the Spanish Civil War were not the same troops as those who were invading Egypt and Greece in 1941. Those troops who were didn't really care about their missions - unlike the Germans, who had very high morale and who genuinely believed much of what Hitler said, even if they didn't go quite so far - and were also thrown into situations with very poor planning and crappy logistics.

Mussolini invaded France opportunistically, with very little planning. Italian troops performed fairly well during that short invasion, but they were also faced with virtually no defenders. When Mussolini stupidly, without consulting any of his allies, ordered Italian and Albanian troops to invade Greece, he was invading a rugged, mountainous country along one of its most easily-defensible borders, without adequate planning or support. The Italian troops there performed horrendously, as one would expect, and so needed German assistance. The Italian troops in Libya, being poorly supplied and inadequately prepared for the outbreak of war in 1940, also needed German assistance to get their crap together.

This created an image, even among the Italians themselves, that they were inferior to their German allies, even though this was not necessarily the case. The Regia Marina certainly had the capacity to give the British a run for their money in their Mediterranean, but poor leadership and a lack of will led to it being used sparingly, and poorly, even before the brilliantly-executed Taranto Raid by the British.

Italy should have performed very well in WWII. When they were in situations where they were fighting for things that mattered to them, like fighting the Russians or defending Italy itself (for both the Allies and the Germans) they performed satisfactorily. But without morale, and with inadequate support from the Italian government, even their most competent officers didn't have much to work with.
 
hurricane was a good plane for its time yet its time ran out comparatively quicker . Would have been replaced by the Typhoon as soon as possible . Tempest didn't make much sense to British airchiefs in 1938-39 . They kinda didn't have the engine anyways

regarding the early start of production , well the point is kinda tricky . Wouldn't want people shift blame as the decision sort of poisoned the rosy relationship between London and Berlin .

regarding the question of Lend Lease the Serbians for one would have been much better without it . Doubt a million casualties were covered by the amount of aid Yugoslavia received , quite a bit of it in the Cold War period too . But then it is me , dealing with the sublime nonsense . Case in point . Think how the Serbians would have mocked themselves silly with the question /answer game on what was the effect of the bombing of Belgrade out of hate on the air war . They would tell this to any American military personnel though the price would be watching the gun camera footage of the F-117 that went down .

yeah , nothing exactly clear on what ı say ? Well , the history is such a thing . ı would like to be able to give a clear answer with the clarity that matches 2 + 2 = 4 . It is not easy . Just like another chance encounter with a PDF file . An English report says the 4 factories about high octane avaition fuel were capable of building a large reserve , allowing a stock of 9 months for Germans . In 1943 attacking them would be risky for little return , in 1944 other elements of the fuel industry was under attack and the prosecution of the 4 would have been a diversion . Also it says jets were coming online and the need to bomb the factories would be even less in time . Yeah , whatever . All scientific cover up for the fact that in 1943 Germany could have been bombed out of the war . Actually should have been .
 
Poor military morale and readiness was a big factor. By and large, the Italian veterans who'dfought on Franco's side in the Spanish Civil War were not the same troops as those who were invading Egypt and Greece in 1941. Those troops who were didn't really care about their missions - unlike the Germans, who had very high morale and who genuinely believed much of what Hitler said, even if they didn't go quite so far - and were also thrown into situations with very poor planning and crappy logistics.

Mussolini invaded France opportunistically, with very little planning. Italian troops performed fairly well during that short invasion, but they were also faced with virtually no defenders. When Mussolini stupidly, without consulting any of his allies, ordered Italian and Albanian troops to invade Greece, he was invading a rugged, mountainous country along one of its most easily-defensible borders, without adequate planning or support. The Italian troops there performed horrendously, as one would expect, and so needed German assistance. The Italian troops in Libya, being poorly supplied and inadequately prepared for the outbreak of war in 1940, also needed German assistance to get their crap together.

This created an image, even among the Italians themselves, that they were inferior to their German allies, even though this was not necessarily the case. The Regia Marina certainly had the capacity to give the British a run for their money in their Mediterranean, but poor leadership and a lack of will led to it being used sparingly, and poorly, even before the brilliantly-executed Taranto Raid by the British.

Italy should have performed very well in WWII. When they were in situations where they were fighting for things that mattered to them, like fighting the Russians or defending Italy itself (for both the Allies and the Germans) they performed satisfactorily. But without morale, and with inadequate support from the Italian government, even their most competent officers didn't have much to work with.

Wasn't the Italian military stuck with rather poor equipment as well? I seem to recall that the vast majority of Italian tanks in 1940 were small tankettes which were virtually useless in any real war. I don't think they ever produced any tanks that could match the allies, at least not in any great number.
 
Wasn't the Italian military stuck with rather poor equipment as well? I seem to recall that the vast majority of Italian tanks in 1940 were small tankettes which were virtually useless in any real war. I don't think they ever produced any tanks that could match the allies, at least not in any great number.
This is also true, yes.
 
how, then, did we manage to perform so poorly?

lack of funds in a primarily commercial structure. In the 1930s Italy was a first rate military power . r16 rant begins:They wanted the second wave to begin with a slapping of my country , other world powers wanted to avoid this as we might have turned communist in the rump that remained r16 rant ends . So they picked up on the Ethiopians . War costs a whole lotta money and commercial companies in weapons developments fell behind . By 1938 Italians were getting to get it , say by the way they were kicked rather badly on the ground in the Spanish Civil War . Yet they chose to ignore the warning , say by the successes of the CR-32 in the air in Spain . By 1940 they knew they were behind . Their army was on par with the French and let's admit it the British Army was not ahead . And the Germans had just done a spectacular Caporetto on the Allies . Firing up the imaginations and considerations about a modern war where Italy was not ready .

so with about 274 000 troops in the East Africa and considering they would be comparatively better to be sent to an "active" theater , Italians were short of morale , of supplies everywhere , modern weaponry and formations trained in their use . Their commanders were timid with their chances of success in combat and it all showed up . Once beaten Italians didn't have much confidence in themselves . Nor they could reverse the trend . Yet those in the East Africa did spectacularly as their opposition was not that ahead ; no Matildas in Ethiopia to crush anti tank guns under their tracks .

ignore my rant and it still kinda stands .
 
But on the sideways, this begs an answer for me: how, then, did we manage to perform so poorly? The closest answer I could give myself searching independently was Benito's whole-hearted support of Franco's war squandering our reserves.

You should look up the East Africa campaign. To me, its obscurity and uniqueness make it one of the most interesting theatres of the war.

"Keren was as hard a soldiers' battle as was ever fought, and let it be said that nowhere in the war did the Germans fight more stubbornly than those [Italian] Savoia battalions, Alpini, Bersaglieri and Grenadiers. In the [first] five days' fight the Italians suffered nearly 5,000 casualties - 1,135 of them killed. [Lorenzini][1], the gallant young Italian general, had his head blown off by one of the British guns. He had been a great leader of Eritrean troops.[16]

The unfortunate licence of wartime propaganda allowed the British Press to represent the Italians almost as comic warriors; but except for the German parachute division in Italy and the Japanese in Burma no enemy with whom the British and Indian troops were matched put up a finer fight than those Savoia battalions at Keren. Moreover, the Colonial troops, until they cracked at the very end, fought with valour and resolution, and their staunchness was a testimony to the excellence of the Italian administration and military training in Eritrea.[19]"

-Compton Mackenzie

But yeah, Italy had a lot of potential as a war time ally, but as said before logistics and fascist buffoonery mucked it up.
 
ever since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution and its uprooting of communities for the necessary concentration of the workforce for the labour intensive creation of fabulous wealth , the leaders of countries have been extra wary of loosing control , upheavals and revolutions . Should have explained in the thick tome ı was always supposed to write as the ultimate history of the 20th Century , but ı am getting older by the day and it would be too much typing . The relevancy to the thread will probably be established when ı manage to complete the industrial aspects , however skimpy . Has to satisfy my urge to write for today with the clearly more scoffable parts . Though it follows the notion that the contribution of US Industry to the overall victory of the Allies is just the right thing , considering the said industry was somehow involved in the things that led to the war in the first place . A notion ı am bound to voice alone .

now , when the magnificient planning of the Great War ended in the disarray of the European empires since far too many men had died in the trenches and not much remained to occupy the defeated there was a serious problem . The thing feared rightly or wrongly had taken place in Russia and lower classes had taken over . Or at least it looked like so , arguably . It would be solved by the might of arms , although the expeditions already sent had failed to dent the threat . Even worse , those ill supported expeditions had caused a certain lack of concentration and the miserable specimens of humanity generally known as Turks had managed to throw out their contingent of invaders . Making mockery of all the great sacrifices and the efforts and keeping some perceived threat alive . A shuddering prospect , especially for the Brits who always saw this incredible monster beyond the checkpoints of Khaiber Pass . A Muslim revolt in India or a reignited one in the Francophone Africa was the reason why Paris and London agreed in 1902 or so , on this little expedition of doing away a threat and making an example of the Turks after all .

though in the 1920s there wasn't the willpower to do it . And reigniting the martial spirit could be risky , as there were people who knew . Britain finally had to guarantee that there would be no war for the next ten years . They accordingly cut the defence budget to subsistance level as well . On the other hand the Bolshies had finally grasped total control and were planning to take over the world , or whatever . The problem for the Communist leadership though they had been saddled with a practically agrarian country , not fully developed in the industrial fields and one of huge territorial expanse , tough to control effectively . Had the Commies managed to get Germany or succeeded a revolution in England or even France , it would have been rather interesting , won't you say ?

so they needed a time of relief , one of building up their industrial base and they were a huge market . Kinda . For those who were not true captains of industry , not of noble Capitalists . Blah blah blah . Consider the crash of 1929 in the stoopid reality of how wealth was eroded , how fortunes were evaporated and how only the mightiest could have survived . And link this to the First Five Year plan of the Commies in 1928 which openly aimed at industrial development so that the Red Army could be properly equipped .

guess am famous for saying strange things . Not really . It is the work of thousands of historians that Nazism came to power after the crash , the economic meltdown . ı simply say they were directed in . As an extra instrument of pressure . Yes , Nazis came to power after the crash failed . Perception rules , nobody cares for reality .

and it was the German rearmament that Hitler was sure to bring about that the West could once again arm itself . Because let's see between 1928 and '32 the Russians had built 960 examples of a neat little tank in an industrial output that probably matched the rest of the world combined . And they had successfully used the type against the Chinese in border clashes . On 20th of November , 1929 . To claim the potential of the armour was ignored throughout the world is an heresy historians will keep alive until the day history dies .

and as a hint for the next part it will be real easy to refute it by the fact that Russians were so happily sold the tank tech by the great Capitalists of the West . Who should have been enemies according to the flow of this particular post .

fukuyama started the celebrations too early .
 
I read somewhere that the Ford Motor Company produced more than Italy.
 
why , of course . Considering their output in Axis countries the overall effect of the US companies must easily dwarf anything else .
 
I'm not going to argument if the US did more or less than the Soviet Union. But I thinks it is much, much harder to accept that some other country did more than your own. National pride or trust or something likes that.
 
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