Imagine you're a negotiator between the Ukraine and Russia... how would you solve this problem?

[Gorbles]

We were only discussing if the "west" refused to send observers of the referendum vote. It now is settled that it did refuse.
@Gorbles , my intention was to settle this side-point in the discussion (according to which, supposedly the "West" wanted to send election observers but was denied by Russia). And obviously "military observers" don't serve any similar role to "election observers".

That wasn't what I was trying to talk about at all. But hey.

 

[Yeekim]

The prevention of the next war is a more desirable outcome than the "bad guys" "losing".

Having the bad guys lose this one is the only way to prevent the next one. Should really be clear by now.

 

[Senethro]

Having the bad guys lose this one is the only way to prevent the next one. Should really be clear by now.

Yeah, quite possibly, but some guys here think it is a desirable end in itself. Identical tribal nationalists with a different flag.

The guys who think that righteousness cannot fail, we are righteous, therefore we do'nt even need a plan or clear goals.

 

[Ajidica]

I think trying to split hairs between election observers and military observers is unhelpful.

Election observers and military observers are two very different things with very different roles, responsibilities, and political implications.
I'm particularly familiar with OSCE observers, but UN Military Observers function as the 'eyes on the ground' of the UNSC with responsibilities to observe military movements, log any breaches of a ceasefire, and work to deescalate situations. Election Observers observe, well, an election, and issue a report. Their mandate may include the running of the election itself (were all ballots counted correctly, any shortages of ballots, etc) or the wider environment of an election (did all candidates have equivalent opportunities to campaign, was there fair access to media and resources, etc).

 

[Gorbles]

Election observers and military observers are two very different things with very different roles, responsibilities, and political implications.
I'm particularly familiar with OSCE observers, but UN Military Observers function as the 'eyes on the ground' of the UNSC with responsibilities to observe military movements, log any breaches of a ceasefire, and work to deescalate situations. Election Observers observe, well, an election, and issue a report. Their mandate may include the running of the election itself (were all ballots counted correctly, any shortages of ballots, etc) or the wider environment of an election (did all candidates have equivalent opportunities to campaign, was there fair access to media and resources, etc).

I understand the distinction. I'm saying it's hair-splitting because focusing on the difference in role sidesteps the obvious issue of a free referendum vs. one conducted with armed forces in the region (after having annexed the region on behalf of another nation).

 

[Gorbles]

That you (falsely) argued not allowing those military observers, meant loss of needed checks for the referendum, is obvious from this exchange you had:

I didn't falsely argue anything. I've been asking question after question, to try and get you to refine your proposal, but if you want to gloves off for a bit, that's fine by me too

The political implications of a UN team (to borrow Ajidica's point) is different in of itself to an OSCE team (even if both are military observers). The whole tangent started from independent observer. A question, I should note, remains unanswered.

Do you think that if the UN, or the OSCE, or even the fabled Knights who say Ekke Ekke Ekke Ptang Zoom Boing, sent any kind of team to Crimea in a fictional alt-history 2014, they would've been let in? Is that your honest and serious belief?

Because, to be clear and upfront, it isn't mine. I would argue that Russia, who very intentionally and knowingly labels things like an illegal invasion a "special military operation" (and have people who defend this phrasing, because "war" apparently means something much worse and horrifying, a perspective I suspect is lost on the victims of said operation), is well-versed in what the OSCE can and cannot do. By inviting the OSCE to monitor, they know the OSCE can't, because it would have validated the illegal land grab. It is, as they say, a win-win, politically. Either the OSCE does, which grants inherent political clout to said annexation, or the OSCE doesn't, and we get the history we all know and love instead.

 

[Ajidica]

The political implications of a UN team (to borrow Ajidica's point) is different in of itself to an OSCE team (even if both are military observers).

To clarify, I was only referring to UN observers (military/election) because I'm more familiar with them than OSCE; that was it. The political implications of any sort of UN observers vs any sort of OSCE observers was not something I intended to raise.

 

[Ajidica]

I've been thinking about this the last few days.
Imagine you're a (neutral) negotiator between the Ukraine and Russia... how would you solve this problem/war?

Russia says it wants to re-establish Russia a world power, just like it was in the times of the USSR. To be honest, I think he's mostly after the land, resources and food that the Ukraine provides.
He also says he doesn't want the EU and the NATO at Russia's doorstep.

Ukraine - well, they just want the war to be over and the Russians to leave. They also want to Westernize, and minimize the influence Russia.

I think the best way is when the EU and the US threaten Putin with a massive war he can't possibly win and in return give Russia some favorable Trade Agreements that Putin can wave around saying he bargained for a great price on food, oil, gas etc.

To answer the OP, I think the best potential for a negotiated peace* rests on:
a) Ukraine agreeing to permanent neutrality in political, military, and economic spheres.
b) Permanent acceptance of pre-2014 Russian military bases in Crimea.
c) Formal recognition of the Russian language as co-equal with Ukrainian.
d) Some sort of 'de-nazification' for Russian tv cameras.
e) Various safeguards to ensure democratic representation of territories under Russian military control.

C is far and away the easiest. Formal recognition of a language is hardly unusual, and frankly I feel is something Ukraine should have done a long time ago.
D is easy but politically unpalatable for Ukraine; though I'm sure if push came to shove the Ukrainian government could dig up some right wing nutters (like the Azov group who even the US government expressed unease with) who aren't thrilled about having a jewish president for some prison time.
B is also probably doable, as unpalatable as it is.
E is also doable, but going to be tricky in the details as nobody trusts each other. This would be stuff like no mass expulsions of those considered to be 'disloyal', full voting rights, etc. Its going to be long and messy, requiring something like the stabilization and trust building missions that are still running in the Balkans.
A is the single biggest problem, and unfortunately, probably intractable. During the Cold War Austria and Finland could get away with permanent neutrality, but I don't think the political or economic conditions today fit that. Any sort of economic treaty with the EU is going to be viewed in Russia as inherently political. Any attempt by Europe/America to push Ukraine into accepting permanent neutrality is going to be viewed as a betrayal.

It is clear the "fighting Russia to the last Ukrainian" isn't happening; and Russia is, you know, the invader. Given how A is basically intractable at the stage, I don't see the potential for a negotiated peace any time soon.
If I was in charge of US foreign policy, I think the best approach is to continue and step up military support for Ukraine, while also making it clear to them behind the scenes to either knock it off with the 'freedom fighter' attacks inside Russia, or at least do so in a way no American equipment is used at all.


*ie Ukraine hasn't established control over its 2014 borders and the Russian military hasn't been completely degraded.

 

[red_elk]

c) Formal recognition of the Russian language as co-equal with Ukrainian.
...
C is far and away the easiest. Formal recognition of a language is hardly unusual, and frankly I feel is something Ukraine should have done a long time ago.

I doubt it would be easy though, it's quite a major issue too. Even during Yanukovich who was deemed as "Russian puppet" they granted Russian language only "regional" status in territories where ethnic Russians were majority or significant minority. And after Maidan this status was revoked immediately.

 

[Ajidica]

Then America and Europe need to tell the Ukrainian government to put their big boy pants on and start acting like a modern European nation and not some Balkan embarrassment.
The national and regional government engaging in these language shenanigans and playing footsy with nazis militias, speaking personally, did a big disservice to how they were viewed internationally before 2022.

 

[Gorbles]

Then America and Europe need to tell the Ukrainian government to put their big boy pants on and start acting like a modern European nation and not some Balkan embarrassment.
The national and regional government engaging in these language shenanigans and playing footsy with nazis militias, speaking personally, did a big disservice to how they were viewed internationally before 2022.

Bit hard to sell the "act like a modern European nation" when insisting they remain neutral and have to accept a Russian military presence (of any kind, whatsoever, post-invasion).

 

[REDY]

I think that B is paradoxically only viable. A is denial of country soveregnity and setup for invasion n2. Others are symbolic, not important for Russia except symbolic humiliation and therofore not passable to free Ukrainians either.
I would stick on Crimea for freedom, preferably some autonomous republic status where can be stationed observers and soldiers from both countries.
I know that examples are not exactly great (free city of danzig, HK,...) but it can be setup for some further cooperation (theoretically) and bring some legality there.

.

 

[red_elk]

I naively thought freedom was about asking people what they actually want, and accepting their decision.

 

[Senethro]

I naively thought freedom was about asking people what they actually want, and accepting their decision.

Definitely a bit sick of you to say this.

 

[FriendlyFire]

Definitely a bit sick of you to say this.

Ivan: Iam for self determination
also Ivan: Except for Syrian Kurds, Ukrainians, Belarussian, or Chechans

 

[amadeus]

I naively thought freedom was about asking people what they actually want, and accepting their decision.

Turnin’ into rothbard_elk

 

[pob]

1. The first step in any negotiation is finding common ground. It could be something as simple as agreeing that the extra long negotiation table is well polished, or that my ushanka is a stupid thing to wear in summer.
2. Build on existing agreements by increasing the prisoner exchange program, the grain deal, protecting the gas pipeline that is still in use.
3. Agree to areas of ceasefire, particularly long range attacks, gradually limiting the fighting to smaller and smaller areas at just the contact line. Increase this to areas of demilitarization such as around nuclear power plants, hydroelectric dams, and eventually along the border monitored by neutral third parties or peacekeepers.
4. Prevent it from becoming a frozen conflict by further negotiation. The Minsk agreements make a good starting point, but add reparations to Ukraine, Russian language protections and greater third party monitoring of Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea with timelines for their self-determination. Unlike most people, I wouldn't include removal of sanctions by other countries in this negotiation or Ukraine's potential neutrality.
5. Set up a UN criminal tribunal similar to what was used in Yugoslavia (not the ICC) to find and prosecute war crimes against both sides.

 

[Lexicus]

I think the premise of the thread is fundamentally flawed in that I tend to think no real negotiations are possible with a criminal regime like Putin's. A prerequisite of negotiations must be the end of that criminal regime and free elections in Russia.

 

[Verbose]

Then America and Europe need to tell the Ukrainian government to put their big boy pants on and start acting like a modern European nation and not some Balkan embarrassment.
The national and regional government engaging in these language shenanigans and playing footsy with nazis militias, speaking personally, did a big disservice to how they were viewed internationally before 2022.

They could just as well start with telling Russia to stop like a corrupt autocratic petro-state armed with nuclear weapons first...

It's not like any of these features of current Russia are inevitable, or does Russia like of good.

Why is Ukraine the one that needs to be talked to like a toddler in your opinion?

 

[Remorseless1]

I think the premise of the thread is fundamentally flawed in that I tend to think no real negotiations are possible with a criminal regime like Putin's. A prerequisite of negotiations must be the end of that criminal regime and free elections in Russia.

Exactly. This is more similar to negotiating with bank robbers who are holding hostages inside the bank.