LightSpectra
me autem minui
The Origin and Apex of Prussian Militarism, pt. I
by LightSpectra
The subject of Prussian militarism is a difficult one to observe in detail due to the large amount of 19th century historiography being deeply biased by ethnic German nationalism. Although the aforementioned historians trace the origin of Prussian society's unique affiliation with soldierly virtues as far back as the Battle of Teutoberg Forest (Hermannsschlacht) in AD 9, and additionally cite the military-state of the Teutonic Knights, modern historians typically speak of the beginning of a “new” Prussian state in the 17th century. At this time, the Markgrafschaft von Brandenburg was in personal union with the Herzogtum Preußen under the Hohenzollern dynasty. Its political course was largely tied to the House of Habsburg prior to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, wherein one of Kaiser Ferdinand III's concessions was to allow the states of the Reich independent foreign policies, though Brandenburg-Prussia had allied itself with the anti-imperial side in the war itself due to being overwhelmed by the Swedes.
Friedrich Wilhelm “der Große Kurfürst”, Elector of Brandenburg and Duke of Prussia, transformed his joint dominion's army from a tiny force of 2,000 soldiers in 1650 into a relatively enormous, professional army of 23,000 at the beginning of the Scanian War in 1675. Such was seen as necessary by both the Brandenburgian aristocracy and the Elector himself due to the Swedish and Habsburg armies causing severe devastation in northern Germany during the later stages of the Thirty Years' War. In Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm was able to levy additional taxes on the traditional nobility (die Junker) through a royal promise not to intrude upon aristocratic privileges, which was well within the Duke's powers as his dominions became increasingly centralized during the course of his reign.
The Brandenburgian-Prussian Army achieved an esteemed reputation amongst the European powers during the Scanian War, when Reichsfreiherr Derfflinger lead the Elector's forces to a victory against the Swedes at the Battle of Fehrbellin in 1675. The Swedish Army after the reforms of Gustavus Adolphus was the most accomplished in Europe, filling the vacuum of the then-outdated Spanish tercio; thus, it's obvious why European monarchs would be impressed by hearing reports of a great Brandenburgian victory over the Swedes. Though such prestige might have been unwarranted -- the majority of the Swedish casualties having been due to a lack of supplies during a hasty retreat -- this victory resulted in an increase in demand for Prussian soldiers to be loaned to other nations for use (primarily the Habsburg Monarchy). Such political power gave Friedrich Wilhelm's successor, Friedrich I, the ability to ascend to “King in Prussia” (König in Preußen) in 1701 in exchange for Brandenburg-Prussia's entrance in the War of Spanish Succession on the side of Erzherzog Karl. Under Friedrich I, his dominion's army grew to 30,000 men by 1713.
Friedrich I was succeeded by Friedrich Wilhelm I, King in Prussia in 1713. Friedrich Wilhelm I can be said to be the first true ultra-militarist monarch in Prussian history. His epithet was “der Soldatenkönig.” He spent a great deal of his time creating and admiring the “Potsdam Giants” (Potsdamer Riesengarde und Grenadiergarde) regiment, a unit consisting entirely of soldiers at least 6'2” tall, being alleged to have said “The most beautiful girl or woman in the world would be a matter of indifference to me, but tall soldiers -- they are my weakness.” He was deeply ashamed of accounts of Imperial and Swedish soldiers looting and raping Brandenburgians during the Thirty Years' War, a result of his dominion unable to protect itself from outside influences. His great-grandfather Georg Wilhelm's cession of Pomerania to the Swedes in 1630 was especially intolerable. Despite the apparent obsession of Friedrich Wilhelm I with his army, Prussia engaged in few wars during his reign. One of his objectives was to reclaim Pomerania from Sweden, which was partially accomplished when Prussia allied with Russia and Poland in the summer of 1715 as part of the Great Northern War.
It would be historiographically archaic to attribute the growth of Hohenzollern affluence prior to Friedrich II entirely to their expanded military, though that was likely the primary factor. Even so, this was due to excellent public relations and mercenary contracts on behalf of of the first two Kings in Prussia; the army was not used for aggressive expansion prior to 1740, but rather to prevent Prussia from being utterly dominated by its neighboring Great Powers. One of the other main reasons “for this anomalous rise in power was the efficiency of Prussia's system of tax collection” (Kiser & Schneider, 187). Furthermore, Friedrich Wilhelm I was able to partially divorce the landed aristocracy from the state bureaucracy, which lead to the government becoming the most efficient in Europe.
Prussian foreign policy was completely reversed by Friedrich Wilhelm I's son, Friedrich II “der Große,” who ascended to the throne in 1740. Though Friedrich II was less interested in cataloged minutiae of the army than his father, he decided to use his soldiers to rapidly expand his realm. Silesia, then a territory of the Habsburg Monarchy, was an auspicious target: it contained raw materials necessary for growing Prussian industry; its population was mostly Protestant, which would make it easy to pacify (the Hohenzollerns were predominately Calvinist, whereas the Habsburgs were Catholic); and the Habsburg government was in serious turmoil due to the troubles faced by Kaiser Karl VI, who had recently died without a male heir in 1740. Friedrich II's casus belli was the Treaty of Brieg of 1537, in which the Hohenzollerns were to inherit a segment of Silesia, which never came to fruition. In the December of 1742, Prussian soldiers quickly invaded and occupied Silesia, which the small standing Habsburg army could do little to oppose -- thus starting the War of Austrian Succession (Österreichischer Erbfolgekrieg).
Part two of this article will talk about the history of Prussian militarism from 1742 on.
Bibliography
Berdalh, Robert. 1973. “The Stande and the Origins of Conservatism in Prussia.” The Johns Hopkins University Press 6, no. 3: (Spring), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3031687>.
Blackbourn, David. History of Germany 1780-1918: The Long Nineteenth Century second edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003.
Fann, Willerd. 1978. “Peacetime Attrition in the Army of Frederick William I, 1713-1740.” Cambridge University Press 11, no. 4: (December), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545845>.
Kiser, Edgar and Schneider, Joachim. 1994. "Bureaucracy and Efficiency: An Analysis of Taxation in Early Modern Prussia." American Sociological Review 59, no. 2: (April), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2096226>.
by LightSpectra
The subject of Prussian militarism is a difficult one to observe in detail due to the large amount of 19th century historiography being deeply biased by ethnic German nationalism. Although the aforementioned historians trace the origin of Prussian society's unique affiliation with soldierly virtues as far back as the Battle of Teutoberg Forest (Hermannsschlacht) in AD 9, and additionally cite the military-state of the Teutonic Knights, modern historians typically speak of the beginning of a “new” Prussian state in the 17th century. At this time, the Markgrafschaft von Brandenburg was in personal union with the Herzogtum Preußen under the Hohenzollern dynasty. Its political course was largely tied to the House of Habsburg prior to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, wherein one of Kaiser Ferdinand III's concessions was to allow the states of the Reich independent foreign policies, though Brandenburg-Prussia had allied itself with the anti-imperial side in the war itself due to being overwhelmed by the Swedes.
Friedrich Wilhelm “der Große Kurfürst”, Elector of Brandenburg and Duke of Prussia, transformed his joint dominion's army from a tiny force of 2,000 soldiers in 1650 into a relatively enormous, professional army of 23,000 at the beginning of the Scanian War in 1675. Such was seen as necessary by both the Brandenburgian aristocracy and the Elector himself due to the Swedish and Habsburg armies causing severe devastation in northern Germany during the later stages of the Thirty Years' War. In Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm was able to levy additional taxes on the traditional nobility (die Junker) through a royal promise not to intrude upon aristocratic privileges, which was well within the Duke's powers as his dominions became increasingly centralized during the course of his reign.
The Brandenburgian-Prussian Army achieved an esteemed reputation amongst the European powers during the Scanian War, when Reichsfreiherr Derfflinger lead the Elector's forces to a victory against the Swedes at the Battle of Fehrbellin in 1675. The Swedish Army after the reforms of Gustavus Adolphus was the most accomplished in Europe, filling the vacuum of the then-outdated Spanish tercio; thus, it's obvious why European monarchs would be impressed by hearing reports of a great Brandenburgian victory over the Swedes. Though such prestige might have been unwarranted -- the majority of the Swedish casualties having been due to a lack of supplies during a hasty retreat -- this victory resulted in an increase in demand for Prussian soldiers to be loaned to other nations for use (primarily the Habsburg Monarchy). Such political power gave Friedrich Wilhelm's successor, Friedrich I, the ability to ascend to “King in Prussia” (König in Preußen) in 1701 in exchange for Brandenburg-Prussia's entrance in the War of Spanish Succession on the side of Erzherzog Karl. Under Friedrich I, his dominion's army grew to 30,000 men by 1713.
Friedrich I was succeeded by Friedrich Wilhelm I, King in Prussia in 1713. Friedrich Wilhelm I can be said to be the first true ultra-militarist monarch in Prussian history. His epithet was “der Soldatenkönig.” He spent a great deal of his time creating and admiring the “Potsdam Giants” (Potsdamer Riesengarde und Grenadiergarde) regiment, a unit consisting entirely of soldiers at least 6'2” tall, being alleged to have said “The most beautiful girl or woman in the world would be a matter of indifference to me, but tall soldiers -- they are my weakness.” He was deeply ashamed of accounts of Imperial and Swedish soldiers looting and raping Brandenburgians during the Thirty Years' War, a result of his dominion unable to protect itself from outside influences. His great-grandfather Georg Wilhelm's cession of Pomerania to the Swedes in 1630 was especially intolerable. Despite the apparent obsession of Friedrich Wilhelm I with his army, Prussia engaged in few wars during his reign. One of his objectives was to reclaim Pomerania from Sweden, which was partially accomplished when Prussia allied with Russia and Poland in the summer of 1715 as part of the Great Northern War.
It would be historiographically archaic to attribute the growth of Hohenzollern affluence prior to Friedrich II entirely to their expanded military, though that was likely the primary factor. Even so, this was due to excellent public relations and mercenary contracts on behalf of of the first two Kings in Prussia; the army was not used for aggressive expansion prior to 1740, but rather to prevent Prussia from being utterly dominated by its neighboring Great Powers. One of the other main reasons “for this anomalous rise in power was the efficiency of Prussia's system of tax collection” (Kiser & Schneider, 187). Furthermore, Friedrich Wilhelm I was able to partially divorce the landed aristocracy from the state bureaucracy, which lead to the government becoming the most efficient in Europe.
Prussian foreign policy was completely reversed by Friedrich Wilhelm I's son, Friedrich II “der Große,” who ascended to the throne in 1740. Though Friedrich II was less interested in cataloged minutiae of the army than his father, he decided to use his soldiers to rapidly expand his realm. Silesia, then a territory of the Habsburg Monarchy, was an auspicious target: it contained raw materials necessary for growing Prussian industry; its population was mostly Protestant, which would make it easy to pacify (the Hohenzollerns were predominately Calvinist, whereas the Habsburgs were Catholic); and the Habsburg government was in serious turmoil due to the troubles faced by Kaiser Karl VI, who had recently died without a male heir in 1740. Friedrich II's casus belli was the Treaty of Brieg of 1537, in which the Hohenzollerns were to inherit a segment of Silesia, which never came to fruition. In the December of 1742, Prussian soldiers quickly invaded and occupied Silesia, which the small standing Habsburg army could do little to oppose -- thus starting the War of Austrian Succession (Österreichischer Erbfolgekrieg).
Part two of this article will talk about the history of Prussian militarism from 1742 on.
Bibliography
Berdalh, Robert. 1973. “The Stande and the Origins of Conservatism in Prussia.” The Johns Hopkins University Press 6, no. 3: (Spring), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3031687>.
Blackbourn, David. History of Germany 1780-1918: The Long Nineteenth Century second edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003.
Fann, Willerd. 1978. “Peacetime Attrition in the Army of Frederick William I, 1713-1740.” Cambridge University Press 11, no. 4: (December), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545845>.
Kiser, Edgar and Schneider, Joachim. 1994. "Bureaucracy and Efficiency: An Analysis of Taxation in Early Modern Prussia." American Sociological Review 59, no. 2: (April), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2096226>.
. Should make a good narrative read.
- part of that new wave of transnational histories that are all the rage? Mmm, transnational history of militarism...
