What do people think of these?

[Mouthwash]

George Friedman is one of the best nonfiction writers I've ever come across. I've gathered a few of his writeups on geopolitics, wherever I could find them, for CFC's appraisal. This is precisely how all history should be done (by which I refer to the prose and method, not that all historical works ought to be short monographs ).

1. Some political theory.

2. The United States, part one and two.

3. Turkey.

4. Israel.

5. China.

6. Egypt.

7. Angola.

8. Russia.

Please tell me what you think. You don't have to read all of them or even several; if you know a lot about one particular country I'd want to hear your opinion, too. I'm also interested in finding similar writers, because I'm sick of dry history.

 

[Plotinus]

I glanced through the one on Political Theory. There seem to be some odd and confused ideas in there.

Protestantism elevates conscience to the pinnacle of human faculties and conscience dictates choice. When the Enlightenment joined choice with reason, it created the idea that in all things — particularly in political life — the individual is bound not by what he was taught to believe but by what his own reason tells him is just and proper. Tradition is superseded by reason and the old regime superseded by artificially constructed regimes forged in revolution.

A common mistake, but a serious one. Conscience doesn't dictate choice - it limits it. When you follow reason you are not making a choice, you are doing what reason forces you to do. Friedman appeals to Protestantism, but he forgets what Luther supposedly said to Charles: "Here I stand, I can do no other." Luther felt he had no choice precisely because his conscience and his reason forced him to take a stand one way rather than the other.

The distinction he goes on to draw between being "American" and a "citizen of the US" makes no sense to me. I don't understand what "being American" means if it doesn't mean "being a citizen of the US", and he doesn't explain. All he does is describe various differences he thinks there are between them, but while he explains what he thinks being a citizen of the US is, he doesn't say a word about what he thinks being an American actually is.

It all seems to be a romantic idolising of nation, as when he goes on to say:

Loving America is simple and natural. Loving the United States is complex and artificial. This is not only about the United States, although the linguistic problem is the most striking. Consider the Soviet Union and its constituent nations, or France as opposed to the French Republic.

But what is America if it's not the United States? I assume he's not distinguishing between the country and the continent. What is France if it's not the French Republic? They're exactly the same thing, aren't they? Could a person love France and hate the French Republic, or vice versa?

He seems to think that there's an intrinsic difference between love of one's country and love of one's state, such that the former is natural and the latter unnatural. Not a single argument is given for this, merely a series of assertions. He seems more interested in asserting that love of one's state is unnatural and takes it for granted that the reader will agree that love of one's country is natural, because it is "love of one's own". Even if we accept that it's natural to love "one's own" (and he doesn't even begin to explain what that means), he doesn't explain why it's natural to identify one's country as "one's own". Why should an American "naturally" take America to be "her own"?

This mushiness leads to the following dreadful two paragraphs:

This leads us to nationalism — or, more broadly, love and obligation to the community to which you were born, be it a small band of nomads or a vast nation-state. The impulse to love oneʼs own is almost overpowering. Almost, but not quite, since in modernity, self-love and the love of acquired things is celebrated while love of oneʼs own is held in suspicion. The latter is an accident. The former is an expression of self and therefore more authentic.

Modern liberalism and socialism do not know what to do with nationalism. On one side, it appears to be an atavistic impulse, irrational and unjustifiable. Economists —who are the quintessential modern thinkers — assume with their teacher Adam Smith that the primary purpose of individuals is to maximize their self-interest in a material sense. To put it simply, acquire wealth. They argue that this is not only something they should do but something that all men will do naturally if left to their own devices.

First, this is outright inconsistent: he claims that the impulse to love one's own is "almost overpowering", but then goes on to say that socialists and liberals reject is, as if socialists and liberals represent a tiny, strange minority.

Second, he is mistaken in his explanation for why socialists and liberals reject nationalism. He thinks that it's because nationalism is this warm, fuzzy, natural attitude that has nothing to do with material calculations, and socialists and liberals are all Marxist materialists who calculate happiness solely in terms of material wealth. But this is false. For one thing, it's absurd to lump socialists and liberals together here, as if they're the same thing. On nationalism in particular I think that socialists have a tendency to be much more nationalistic than liberals do, because many socialists are concerned for the working classes in their own country specifically, and will support e.g. higher tariffs that help workers in their own country at the cost of foreign ones. Liberals are less likely to do that. And I would say that liberals (to the extent that one can speak of all of them as if they had identical views) reject nationalism precisely because it is unnatural: because it is about an attitude to a non-natural, non-existent entity that takes the place of actual people. I don't think that nationalism is "natural" any more than racism or sexism are natural; like them, it's ultimately a form of bigotry. Repeatedly in the essay he identifies "one's own" with countries:

At the root of modern liberal society, the eccentric heart of the human condition continues to beat — love of oneʼs own. Its eccentricity can be clearly seen now. Why should we love those things that we are born to simply because we are born to them? Why should Americans love America, Iranians love Iran and Chinese love China? Why, in spite of all options and the fact that there are surely many who make their lives by loving acquired things, does love of oneʼs own continue to drive men?

But why should, say, the Iranian's "one's own" be Iran? Why shouldn't it be the Middle East in general? Or Muslims in general, if she's a Muslim? Or men in general, if he's a man? Or human beings in general, if he's a human being? Or, narrowing it, Tehranians in general, if she's from Tehran? Or people with black hair in general? Or left-handed people in general? Or whatever? Friedman just assumes that the natural group to identify as "one's own" is one's country, and he ignores all other possibilities. And he doesn't address the disturbing implications that this raises. What if "one's own" is one's own race, or one's own sexual preference, or one's own gender? Does this love of "one's own" seem quite so cozy and natural and fuzzy and warm and romantic then?

There's an awful lot of the classic right-wing snobbery against intellectuals and the middle classes (I use the term in the British sense, not the American sense employed by Friedman), here depicted in the standard right-wing way as wealthy liberal internationalists who don't understand the earthy, naturalistic, nationalist working classes. That's a caricature taken directly from the Daily Mail. Friedman tries to defend it by arguing that wealthy people have the security to be willing to see their country take risks while poor people don't; and that may be true, but it errs by identifying wealth with class (it's perfectly possible to be an upper-middle-class intellectual and have very little money, and perfectly possible to be working class and wealthy - this is something Americans still seem to have difficulty understanding) and by identifying political views with class. All the working-class people I know are more left-wing than I am.

This essay isn't history, and it rather puzzles me that you should hold it up as an example of how history should be written. It's not political theory either - it's more like a defence of a particular political outlook. But I don't think it's a very good defence; although there a few shrewd observations along the way, it makes too many assumptions that go undefended, and it spends too much time strawmanning.

In fact none of the pieces you've linked to seem to be history - they are instead political analyses of the current state of affairs in these countries, backed up with geographical explanations for their circumstances, Jared Diamond-style. In fact the historical component of each essay is extremely slight, without any discussion of sources; for example, the piece on Israel takes it for granted that the Old Testament narrative of Joshua and King David is uncontroversially true! Fine as political analysis, perhaps, but it's not history.

BTW, a "monograph" is a book-length piece of research, not an essay.

 

[Masada]

George Friedman is the dude who thinks that people of Mexican descent in the United States are a fifth column who can't or won't integrate and will eventually want enosis* with Mexico because reasons.

* Henceforth to be referred to as "guacamolosis".

 

[Kyriakos]

I read the post above by Plotinus, and from the passages he includes by the author himself, i quickly lost any interest in reading anything by that author. Worth noting, briefly, that the idea people somehow were dumb, misguided, or locked in a non-self-interest state from the beginning of humanity to just prior to some end of the medieval era or a couple of centuries after it, is utterly ludicrous.

 

[Traitorfish]

This is precisely how all history should be done.

That's quite a claim. Are you able to elaborate?

 

[Mouthwash]

I glanced through the one on Political Theory. There seem to be some odd and confused ideas in there.

"Glanced" being the key word; you've missed the point totally.

A common mistake, but a serious one. Conscience doesn't dictate choice - it limits it. When you follow reason you are not making a choice, you are doing what reason forces you to do. Friedman appeals to Protestantism, but he forgets what Luther supposedly said to Charles: "Here I stand, I can do no other." Luther felt he had no choice precisely because his conscience and his reason forced him to take a stand one way rather than the other.

How is this relevant? He didn't 'appeal' to Protestantism to prove anything. There may be a philosophical point here to quibble with, but little else.

The distinction he goes on to draw between being "American" and a "citizen of the US" makes no sense to me. I don't understand what "being American" means if it doesn't mean "being a citizen of the US", and he doesn't explain. All he does is describe various differences he thinks there are between them, but while he explains what he thinks being a citizen of the US is, he doesn't say a word about what he thinks being an American actually is.

He does, actually:

Andre Malraux wrote once that men leave their country in very national ways. An American expatriate is still an American and very different from a Mongolian expatriate. Wherever one chooses to go, whatever identity one chooses to claim, in the end, you cannot escape from who you are. You can acquire as many loves as you might, yet in the end, whether you love oneʼs own or not, you are what you were born. Your room for maneuver is much less than you might have thought. A man may have given up his home, but his home has not given him up. You can reject your obligations — you can cease to love — but your own remains your own.

His point is that someone will always going to view the world from your original, primal perspective. Ergo, people are divided by their conception of the world and never become wholly estranged from their roots.

So, for instance, someone brought up as a Sunni Muslim in Egypt is almost certainly never going to become a "natural" British progressive. He might move to Britain, speak perfect English, agree totally with secular, Western values, and fit in, but his thoughts and actions are always going to be what another Arab Muslim would feel in the same shoes. It's not the exact same thing as national feeling, but the two are generally conterminous.

But what is America if it's not the United States? I assume he's not distinguishing between the country and the continent. What is France if it's not the French Republic? They're exactly the same thing, aren't they? Could a person love France and hate the French Republic, or vice versa?

America the nation, the ideal, the brotherhood of Americans. Same thing goes for France, although obviously the two are going to be qualitatively distinct in some manner.

He seems to think that there's an intrinsic difference between love of one's country and love of one's state, such that the former is natural and the latter unnatural. Not a single argument is given for this, merely a series of assertions. He seems more interested in asserting that love of one's state is unnatural and takes it for granted that the reader will agree that love of one's country is natural, because it is "love of one's own".

Why not? It seems fairly obvious that someone might identify as British while not liking the British government.

Even if we accept that it's natural to love "one's own" (and he doesn't even begin to explain what that means), he doesn't explain why it's natural to identify one's country as "one's own". Why should an American "naturally" take America to be "her own"?

I'm not in a position to give details, I'd need to know a heck of a lot of sociology and intellectual history to give a minimally adequate description of American nationalism. Yes, I grew up in America. But in general, it's not wise to ask people about their own nationalism because that just invites bias. For instance, I recall a girl in my 9th class saying that America doesn't really have a culture, that we're just an open country. This is ethnocentrism at its most extreme; the idea that people from your country are the "normal," vanilla people, and it's everyone else who just acts oddly.

First, this is outright inconsistent: he claims that the impulse to love one's own is "almost overpowering", but then goes on to say that socialists and liberals reject is, as if socialists and liberals represent a tiny, strange minority.

I expect he's biased because he's not used to dealing with the common socialist on the street. He's referring to anti-nationalist ideas among intellectuals. Friedman studied Marxism and wrote a book on the Frankfurt school, so I doubt he just doesn't know what he's talking about.

For one thing, it's absurd to lump socialists and liberals together here, as if they're the same thing.

He doesn't. In fact he specifically goes out of his way to differentiate the two:

It is interesting to note that economic liberals and Marxists, on the surface mortal enemies, both shared a single common view that the nation, understood as a unitary community that made all other things possible, was at best a convenience and at worst a prison. Both expected the nation and other communities to whither away, one through the transnationalism of capital, the other through the transnationalism of the working class.

Moving on...

On nationalism in particular I think that socialists have a tendency to be much more nationalistic than liberals do, because many socialists are concerned for the working classes in their own country specifically, and will support e.g. higher tariffs that help workers in their own country at the cost of foreign ones. Liberals are less likely to do that.

So doesn't this completely prove his point? That internationalism, seen through lofty socialist lenses, rarely has any relation to the actual desires of the working class?

And I would say that liberals (to the extent that one can speak of all of them as if they had identical views) reject nationalism precisely because it is unnatural: because it is about an attitude to a non-natural, non-existent entity that takes the place of actual people. I don't think that nationalism is "natural" any more than racism or sexism are natural; like them, it's ultimately a form of bigotry.

Racism and sexism were natural at some point or the other. Neolithic humans didn't have the conceptual framework to understand race egalitarianism, even in principle. If you placed one in Africa, they'd just see bizarre tool-using apes where we would see Africans. And if women occupied a critical place in society as homemakers, with a sharper biological division of labor among the sexes, then why would sexism be an unnatural viewpoint? It's only empirical changes brought about by the modern world that has made it clearer what women and races are.

Regarding nationalism, you're right that there has to be a case to be made for it. But I don't think it can be easily dismissed as unnatural. Are familial or tribal connections also unnatural? To your viewpoint, they obviously are. There isn't any metaphysical relationship between you and your parents, just instinct trying to make sure genes get passed on. But what about ants? An individual ant doesn't owe anything in particular to the queen. But eusociality is real, and it can't simply be referred to as "that psychological bias that some animals have." You see what I'm getting at?

But why should, say, the Iranian's "one's own" be Iran? Why shouldn't it be the Middle East in general? Or Muslims in general, if she's a Muslim? Or men in general, if he's a man? Or human beings in general, if he's a human being? Or, narrowing it, Tehranians in general, if she's from Tehran? Or people with black hair in general? Or left-handed people in general? Or whatever? Friedman just assumes that the natural group to identify as "one's own" is one's country, and he ignores all other possibilities.

It isn't necessarily just your own country. But it figures large in it.

And he doesn't address the disturbing implications that this raises. What if "one's own" is one's own race, or one's own sexual preference, or one's own gender? Does this love of "one's own" seem quite so cozy and natural and fuzzy and warm and romantic then?

As I've argued above, yes. Although we should be glad that nationalism is not anything so crippling as a biological drive to sustain a colony or whatever. The point of the essay is that nationalism is an inevitable consequence of the human condition, and isn't something to be despised or feared.

Friedman tries to defend it by arguing that wealthy people have the security to be willing to see their country take risks while poor people don't; and that may be true, but it errs by identifying wealth with class (it's perfectly possible to be an upper-middle-class intellectual and have very little money, and perfectly possible to be working class and wealthy - this is something Americans still seem to have difficulty understanding) and by identifying political views with class. All the working-class people I know are more left-wing than I am.

Wouldn't people with comparable amounts of wealth behave similarly? So, Noam Chomsky and a steel worker in Detroit might both readily identify as socialist, but humans aren't simple or consistent enough to simply have ideology correlate to experience. Noam Chomsky might want an international union of workers, yet the steel worker, as you've pointed out, would be more likely to focus on the livelihoods of himself and those around him.

This essay isn't history, and it rather puzzles me that you should hold it up as an example of how history should be written.

Well, not that in particular. I just thought it went with the rest of them.

It's not political theory either - it's more like a defence of a particular political outlook.

The two are not mutually exclusive, and it's obvious from the first couple of pages that he is trying to explain things with layman concepts. Feels like political theory to me.

In fact none of the pieces you've linked to seem to be history - they are instead political analyses of the current state of affairs in these countries, backed up with geographical explanations for their circumstances, Jared Diamond-style.

It seems to rely pretty heavily on history. The main theme is geopolitics, but every extrapolation he makes is analogized to historical events. It's not history in and of itself, but it's a framework upon which history could be written. Just suppose that the focus was more on the events themselves, and you get what I'm saying.

I read the post above by Plotinus, and from the passages he includes by the author himself, i quickly lost any interest in reading anything by that author.

Good to know that a few bad quotes and criticism is enough to to turn you off. But will you be able to resist his essay on Greece?

No doubt you'll be offended by it, and rant about "geographical determinism." That's how I've seen most Greeks respond to it.

Worth noting, briefly, that the idea people somehow were dumb, misguided, or locked in a non-self-interest state from the beginning of humanity to just prior to some end of the medieval era or a couple of centuries after it, is utterly ludicrous.

If you don't read the essay, you can't expect that your criticism will be taken seriously. This isn't even close to what he says.

That's quite a claim. Are you able to elaborate?

Sure. I admittedly haven't read much history, but apparently those who have think Peter Green is an excellent writer. I decided to take their advice, and recently read his biography of Alexander the Great. The first half is adequate, although it mainly focuses on the rise of Macedon under Phillip. The second half is worse. For instance, I hardly get any detail on how Alexander's empire operated while he was still in Anatolia or the Levant or Egypt. Literally nothing about governance, or the attitude of the people living there. Nor does it get better with Iran. Essentially all he has to say about it is that the Zoroastrian priests opposed him and saw him as an enemy of the natural order. I know nothing about the outside world as well. How did Persia react to his early victories? How was he viewed in different places? But no, Green just follows Alexander around in his exploits, as if in a void. There are points where he does elaborate a bit, but it's too little, too late. It's hard for me to remember details that way, and harder for me to care. In other words, I want history I can actually gain something from, not just a tedious rundown of What Alexander Did.

If you glance at Friedman's essays, you can immediately see how perfectly understandable they are. Sure, they're for complete laymen, but the style in which he writes allows everything to be properly contextualized. The main points and little details are both incredibly clear, and he doesn't have to treat the reader like a five-year-old. I've also read his book on America's recent wars in the Middle East, so I know it can be translated into something more thorough, like an actual scholarly narrative.

George Friedman is the dude who thinks that people of Mexican descent in the United States are a fifth column who can't or won't integrate and will eventually want enosis* with Mexico because reasons.

* Henceforth to be referred to as "guacamolosis".

Why are you always attacking people? Stop it, for Christ's sake. You are one the greatest driving forces in the mob rule of the forums. You go where the majority goes and chastise others whenever you think people will praise you for it.

You are a trouble-seeker. You show up wherever you can call someone you don't like a racist. Just because two other people aren't buying the OP doesn't mean you have to join in with mockery.

 

[MilesGregarius]

Why are you always attacking people? Stop it, for Christ's sake. You are one the greatest driving forces in the mob rule of the forums. You go where the majority goes and chastise others whenever you think people will praise you for it.

You are a trouble-seeker. You show up wherever you can call someone you don't like a racist. Just because two other people aren't buying the OP doesn't mean you have to join in with mockery.

The irony is just dizzying.

 

[Mouthwash]

I think that irony is a far too complex word for this thread.

 

[r16]

a cursory glance at the Turkish one . As far as ı can see it omits the Orthodox Church's "effect" . An area that would prefer to be kept out of the rest of the Christianity and vast holdings of land that could be confiscated to establish a Turkish presence without truly antagonizing the local population . That's the secret of the Ottoman success and not some geography "forcing" this or that strategic option . Such farsight to embroil Turkey in Crimea , as we are witnessing with such quiet and "Turkey will be an Empire, so up yours, Man!" attitude . With the usual attacks on this stupid "Peace at Home, Peace in the World" thing . One will never ever be surprised by American "strategic" thought afterall . Had they spent half the amount of the effort they spent on sending us to war the World Poverty would have ended , right ?

 

[Kyriakos]

Good to know that a few bad quotes and criticism is enough to to turn you off. But will you be able to resist his essay on Greece?

That is like asking if i am able to resist falling into a heap of trash :\

 

[Traitorfish]

Sure. I admittedly haven't read much history, but apparently those who have think Peter Green is an excellent writer. I decided to take their advice, and recently read his biography of Alexander the Great. The first half is adequate, although it mainly focuses on the rise of Macedon under Phillip. The second half is worse. For instance, I hardly get any detail on how Alexander's empire operated while he was still in Anatolia or the Levant or Egypt. Literally nothing about governance, or the attitude of the people living there. Nor does it get better with Iran. Essentially all he has to say about it is that the Zoroastrian priests opposed him and saw him as an enemy of the natural order. I know nothing about the outside world as well. How did Persia react to his early victories? How was he viewed in different places? But no, Green just follows Alexander around in his exploits, as if in a void. There are points where he does elaborate a bit, but it's too little, too late. It's hard for me to remember details that way, and harder for me to care. In other words, I want history I can actually gain something from, not just a tedious rundown of What Alexander Did.

If you glance at Friedman's essays, you can immediately see how perfectly understandable they are. Sure, they're for complete laymen, but the style in which he writes allows everything to be properly contextualized. The main points and little details are both incredibly clear, and he doesn't have to treat the reader like a five-year-old. I've also read his book on America's recent wars in the Middle East, so I know it can be translated into something more thorough, like an actual scholarly narrative.

Right, but that's about presentation, not history. What I'm asking is what about Friedman's work makes it a model for historians. Particularly, I'm curious as to what historians working outside of political history are to make of it, such as social historians, economic historians or ethnohistorians, who aren't usually concerned with political narratives, and so to whom the significance of a clearer or more contextualised style of political narrative isn't immediately obvious.

 

[Masada]

George Friedman asserts that Germany will collapse because its population is going to decline. In its place he suggests that Poland will become a major power. Nevermind, that Poland has a similar TFR to Germany. France actually has a higher birth rate than both.

George Friedman thinks that China will collapse this decade because of economic inequality between regions will spur the growth of powerful regional elites who will seek to remove themselves from the authority of the Central Government. We're like 4 years into this prediction... and nothing seems to be happening. If anything, the hand of the Central Government has only grown stronger. Bo Xilai one of the leading regional dynasts who are meant to become the new warlords... is in prison. While the succession of Li Keqiang and Xi Jinping, the handpicked successors of Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao, went off without a hitch.

Anyways, we have already established that in the Friedmanverse TFR's are important and that China is going to collapse. In China's place Friedman raises up... Japan. Yep, the country with a TFR almost the same as Germany.

These are just some of the quibbles I have with his work.

Why are you always attacking people? Stop it, for Christ's sake. You are one the greatest driving forces in the mob rule of the forums. You go where the majority goes and chastise others whenever you think people will praise you for it.

Which views do I hold in common with "the majority" and just who comprises "the majority" on the forum? Some examples would be nice.

You are a trouble-seeker. You show up wherever you can call someone you don't like a racist. Just because two other people aren't buying the OP doesn't mean you have to join in with mockery.

I've never called Friedman a racist. I admit that I've had a lot of success showing others just how repulsive your political views are. But you sorta did most of the work yourself though so I can't take all the credit.

I'd also point out that only one other person had commented before I did and that he tackled the issue in a different way using wholly different examples.

 

[The QC]

I skipped over the essay, as it looked boring on first look. I read the Turkey article and I admit I thought it was interesting, although it's hard to tell, not being an expert, how much of it is correct.

He certainly gives a huge weight to geography, probably even more than Jared Diamond would, these days (JD recants on some of his more exaggerated ideas in the newer edition of Guns, Germs and Steel).

I also thought that the present day view was the least credible. He seems to still see everything in terms of military dominance of territories, which is not what creates wealth these days and isn't likely to be a path that modern Turkey would afford to take (he seems to think that they will or should try to conquer the Levant...).

I'm also not sure I buy that the attack on Vienna was a defensive move. Vienna is in a very good defensive position, sure, that's why they needed to go through it, it doesn't mean they planned to stay behind it forever.

 

[Mouthwash]

Right, but that's about presentation, not history. What I'm asking is what about Friedman's work makes it a model for historians. Particularly, I'm curious as to what historians working outside of political history are to make of it, such as social historians, economic historians or ethnohistorians, who aren't usually concerned with political narratives, and so to whom the significance of a clearer or more contextualised style of political narrative isn't immediately obvious.

I suppose it could help them make their work more unified. Explain the relationship between political history and economy, society, and demographics better.

George Friedman asserts that Germany will collapse because its population is going to decline. In its place he suggests that Poland will become a major power. Nevermind, that Poland has a similar TFR to Germany. France actually has a higher birth rate than both.

George Friedman thinks that China will collapse this decade because of economic inequality between regions will spur the growth of powerful regional elites who will seek to remove themselves from the authority of the Central Government. We're like 4 years into this prediction... and nothing seems to be happening. If anything, the hand of the Central Government has only grown stronger. Bo Xilai one of the leading regional dynasts who are meant to become the new warlords... is in prison. While the succession of Li Keqiang and Xi Jinping, the handpicked successors of Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao, went off without a hitch.

Anyways, we have already established that in the Friedmanverse TFR's are important and that China is going to collapse. In China's place Friedman raises up... Japan. Yep, the country with a TFR almost the same as Germany.

These are just some of the quibbles I have with his work.

Like I said, engaging in criticism normally implies that you've read the work beforehand, and haven't simply skimmed over its Wikipedia article.

I've never called Friedman a racist.

Oh no. You just heavily implied it.

Which views do I hold in common with "the majority" and just who comprises "the majority" on the forum? Some examples would be nice.

Varies by thread. An example is below:

I admit that I've had a lot of success showing others just how repulsive your political views are. But you sorta did most of the work yourself though so I can't take all the credit.

I'd also point out that only one other person had commented before I did and that he tackled the issue in a different way using wholly different examples.

No, but you were aware that doing so would provide you with the full backing of the crowd without actually availing yourself to respond. Debaters who want try to go deeper than Penn and Teller style mockery soon realize that they would have to take the concept of ethnic cleansing much more seriously than they would Jim Crow to try to debunk it- sound like they were taking it seriously- implying a far greater loss of status than soaring casually above white supremacism, effortlessly trashing it without a hint of sympathy.

Everyone who's tried to argue with me seems to have ended up writing casual mockery, and oddly enough, none of the rainbow freedom fighters ever seem to engage the arguments in technical detail. Which is pretty much what you'd expect a correct but weird-sounding idea to look like.

 

[Traitorfish]

I suppose it could help them make their work more unified. Explain the relationship between political history and economy, society, and demographics better.

But, how? Historians have been pursuing "total history" for a century or more, and it's not obvious to me what innovation Friedman is introducing. Your compare him favourably to Green, but it's a comparison made entirely in the terms of military-political history, that Friedman is a better military-political writer because he draws on outside disciplines, and that's fair enough so far as it goes, but it only tells us that his work might represent a richer military-political history, not that it can serve as a model for other kinds of history.

(And, honestly, I'm not convinced that it is a richer military-political history. I've skimmed a few of the geopolitical essays, and they mostly seem to function as an attempt to reduce history to a game of Risk, or at best a game of Civilization, and the essay "The Love of Ones Own" is just bad, just a deeply confused collision of structuralism and romanticism which makes no kind of sense to me. Not to mention the anti-Semitic tropes at play in his discussion of "wealthy internationalists" and "common nationalists", which I'm a bit surprised you didn't pick up on.)

 

[Mouthwash]

But, how? Historians have been pursuing "total history" for a century or more, and it's not obvious to me what innovation Friedman is introducing. Your compare him favourably to Green, but it's a comparison made entirely in the terms of military-political history, that Friedman is a better military-political writer because he draws on outside disciplines, and that's fair enough so far as it goes, but it only tells us that his work might represent a richer military-political history, not that it can serve as a model for other kinds of history.

What the heck did you read? If anything, his essays much more resemble the works of economic or ethnohistorians. The main focus is on the underlying reasons for each country's successes and failures.

(And, honestly, I'm not convinced that it is a richer military-political history. I've skimmed a few of the geopolitical essays, and they mostly seem to function as an attempt to reduce history to a game of Risk, or at best a game of Civilization

Welcome to the wonderful world of geographical determinism!

and the essay "The Love of Ones Own" is just bad, just a deeply confused collision of structuralism and romanticism which makes no kind of sense to me. Not to mention the anti-Semitic tropes at play in his discussion of "wealthy internationalists" and "common nationalists", which I'm a bit surprised you didn't pick up on.)

How is that? Friedman talked at length about how Europe has always had a higher "pan-European" social class made up of the wealthy. It doesn't remotely sound anti-Semitic to me. I think you've probably just been reading too much into the humanities and have an outdated image of Jew hatred.

 

[Traitorfish]

What the heck did you read? If anything, his essays much more resemble the works of economic or ethnohistorians. The main focus is on the underlying reasons for each country's successes and failures.

But these are discussed in terms that would be unfamiliar to economic historians or ethnohistorians. They ae concerned with human cultures and societies, with how they operate and how they change over time, but Friedman seems to be concerned exclusively with states and their interaction. He's working with different a very subject matter and expressing only occasionally overlapping concerns or methods.

Welcome to the wonderful world of geographical determinism!

It's not that it's geographical determinism, it's that it's such a limited one. Geographical determinism is not incompatible with sophistication, depth or humanity of history, but Friedman again seems to be concerned only with a states and their interaction, which reduces geography to a game-board. There's no sense of geography as something which people inhabit, as you'll find in geographically-informed historians of a more social, economic or ethnological bent, only of geography as a vehicle for military-political activity.

How is that? Friedman talked at length about how Europe has always had a higher "pan-European" social class made up of the wealthy. It doesn't remotely sound anti-Semitic to me. I think you've probably just been reading too much into the humanities and have an outdated image of Jew hatred.

I'm not suggesting that Friedman is actively anti-Semitic. From what I can tell, he's not only Jewish, but lost much of his family in the Holocaust, which would tend to inhibit the formation of such views.

None the less, he makes use of tropes favoured by anti-Semitics without a great deal of criticism. Despite his qualifications, the "wealthy internationalist" elite he refers to aren't dukes and bishops, they're financiers and intellectuals, and are not merely guilty of cultural distance from the "commoner" owing (he claims) to divergent experiences of place, but of lacking any real experience of place and thus any authentic culture at all. This renders suspect, ignoble, incapable of civic virtue; in short, rootless cosmopolitans. While I don't intend to bring his character into question, it does cast doubt on the the robustness of his work, asks us to stop and think, wait, how does this guy actually imagine that the world works?

Basically, when propounding historical, social or political theory, you should stop every so often and ask yourself, "does this sound like something Hitler would say?", and I don't think Friedman's been doing that quite often enough.

 

[Mouthwash]

But these are discussed in terms that would be unfamiliar to economic historians or ethnohistorians. They ae concerned with human cultures and societies, with how they operate and how they change over time, but Friedman seems to be concerned exclusively with states and their interaction. He's working with different a very subject matter and expressing only occasionally overlapping concerns or methods.

It's not that it's geographical determinism, it's that it's such a limited one. Geographical determinism is not incompatible with sophistication, depth or humanity of history, but Friedman again seems to be concerned only with a states and their interaction, which reduces geography to a game-board. There's no sense of geography as something which people inhabit, as you'll find in geographically-informed historians of a more social, economic or ethnological bent, only of geography as a vehicle for military-political activity.

Firstly, the comment I made about how all history should emulate Friedman was in reference to his writing and method of conveying information. Secondly, you're quite wrong to say he's only concerned with the state. Mainly that's what the essays focus upon, but the second piece on the US deals almost entirely with the American attitude and the rise of industry in North America.

None the less, he makes use of tropes favoured by anti-Semitics without a great deal of criticism. Despite his qualifications, the "wealthy internationalist" elite he refers to aren't dukes and bishops, they're financiers and intellectuals, and are not merely guilty of cultural distance from the "commoner" owing (he claims) to divergent experiences of place, but of lacking any real experience of place and thus any authentic culture at all. This renders suspect, ignoble, incapable of civic virtue; in short, rootless cosmopolitans. While I don't intend to bring his character into question, it does cast doubt on the the robustness of his work, asks us to stop and think, wait, how does this guy actually imagine that the world works?

Basically, when propounding historical, social or political theory, you should stop every so often and ask yourself, "does this sound like something Hitler would say?", and I don't think Friedman's been doing that quite often enough.

Sure, Hitler would have agreed that there was a wealthy international class that had no real connection to a particular nation. I might agree with that, too. What we wouldn't agree upon is that it was made up of Jews. Which is kind of important.

Hitler (or his anti-Semitic precursors) added a racialist element to an otherwise normal idea, and I think that this racialism goes hand in hand with the idea the wealthy class was inherently incapable of becoming part of any particular nation. There's no reason that we should read into Friedman's work a racist trope; you aren't inferring it, you're accusing him of it because his thoughts have some orthogonal similarities.

 

[Traitorfish]

Firstly, the comment I made about how all history should emulate Friedman was in reference to his writing and method of conveying information.

Well, your comment was that Friedman was a model for how "how all history should be done", not merely how it should be presented, and your follow-ups posts bring in issues like governmental and religious institutions, popular attitudes, etc., so you can forgive my confusion.

Secondly, you're quite wrong to say he's only concerned with the state. Mainly that's what the essays focus upon, but the second piece on the US deals almost entirely with the American attitude and the rise of industry in North America.

They're still framed in terms of states, though, which retain methodological and apparently ontological primacy for Friedman. People are a function of states, in his framework, rather than the reverse, and are significant to the extent they manifest at a geopolitical level. There's little sense that people are significant in and of themselves, which would tend to be the attitude of most contemporary historians.

Sure, Hitler would have agreed that there was a wealthy international class that had no real connection to a particular nation. I might agree with that, too. What we wouldn't agree upon is that it was made up of Jews. Which is kind of important.

Hitler (or his anti-Semitic precursors) added a racialist element to an otherwise normal idea, and I think that this racialism goes hand in hand with the idea the wealthy class was inherently incapable of becoming part of any particular nation. There's no reason that we should read into Friedman's work a racist trope; you aren't inferring it, you're accusing him of it because his thoughts have some orthogonal similarities.

If he was merely talking about the "internationalist" class in isolation, maybe, but the juxtaposition to a "common nationalist" class, combined with the moralistic tone of the comparison, leaves me suspicious. But, it was really just an off-hand observation, so it's probably better left there before I take it too far off-topic...

 

[Mouthwash]

Well, your comment was that Friedman was a model for how "how all history should be done", not merely how it should be presented, and your follow-ups posts bring in issues like governmental and religious institutions, popular attitudes, etc., so you can forgive my confusion.

Saying it like that in the OP would sound pretentious. Do you agree with me, btw, that Friedman is a model writer?

They're still framed in terms of states, though, which retain methodological and apparently ontological primacy for Friedman. People are a function of states, in his framework, rather than the reverse, and are significant to the extent they manifest at a geopolitical level. There's little sense that people are significant in and of themselves, which would tend to be the attitude of most contemporary historians.

Yeah, I'd tend to agree with you here. To be fair, his audience is just the average Joe on the web.

If he was merely talking about the "internationalist" class in isolation, maybe, but the juxtaposition to a "common nationalist" class, combined with the moralistic tone of the comparison, leaves me suspicious. But, it was really just an off-hand observation, so it's probably better left there before I take it too far off-topic...

Remember when I was talking about "decadence" and "barbarism" and you asked if I was a fascist? That was straight from George Friedman, albeit muddled because I knew nothing about politics, history or philosophy at that time.