Ask a Philosopher

[Neverwonagame3]

Doesn't philosophical skepticism win out in a rational debate making philosophy pointless? I've heard people say that skepticism can be refuted on probabilities, but that assumes the concept of probability is legitimate.

 

[Mouthwash]

Doesn't philosophical skepticism win out in a rational debate making philosophy pointless? I've heard people say that skepticism can be refuted on probabilities, but that assumes the concept of probability is legitimate.

Answered here.

 

[Perfection]

Yes.

There are many different conceptions of free will. Some are incoherent. Some are not incoherent. At least one of the non-incoherent conceptions of free will is instantiated in our world.

How do you know that?

Also, how do you know that those conceptions of "free will" are actually about free will? For instance I could say that I conceive of "free will" as being deserts involving yellow fruits and dairy and the existence of banana cream pies would confirm it. Would that qualify as proof?

 

[ParkCungHee]

How do you know that?

Also, how do you know that those conceptions of "free will" are actually about free will? For instance I could say that I conceive of "free will" as being deserts involving yellow fruits and dairy and the existence of banana cream pies would confirm it.

That would be a terrible confirmation, but it's a wonderful mental image.

 

[Neverwonagame3]

Answered here.

I'll ignore the question of the world exists to simply look at logic. Noting that only the part of skepticism to do with logic has been answered.

Proving that it is impossible to be consistent in doubting X, whether true or not, is NO evidence whatosever as to if X is true or false. It could be that it is impossible to consistently doubt X, and yet X is false.

The reason for doubt here is that we cannot rule out the evil demon hypothesis, therefore we cannot rule out logic being false. Since we don't know if probability is in any way valid (even if we feel like it is), how can we solve this rationally?

 

[Mouthwash]

I'll ignore the question of the world exists to simply look at logic. Noting that only the part of skepticism to do with logic has been answered.

Proving that it is impossible to be consistent in doubting X, whether true or not, is NO evidence whatosever as to if X is true or false. It could be that it is impossible to consistently doubt X, and yet X is false.

The reason for doubt here is that we cannot rule out the evil demon hypothesis, therefore we cannot rule out logic being false. Since we don't know if probability is in any way valid (even if we feel like it is), how can we solve this rationally?

The evil demon hypothesis is dependent upon certain logical assumptions already. Which makes it unparsimonious, I guess. To even argue that we might not have a coherent grasp of reality still presupposes a Platonic truth exists out there. So logic can't be "valid" or "invalid," because the question isn't even meaningful.

There's a whole lot of modern literature dedicated to this already.

 

[Angst]

Doesn't philosophical skepticism win out in a rational debate making philosophy pointless? I've heard people say that skepticism can be refuted on probabilities, but that assumes the concept of probability is legitimate.

The problem is that people are trying to be objectively consistent, something which is impossible outside of pure logic. Solipsism is certainly the most consistent safeguard of epistemological standpoints, but it is also very much the most useless of them.

 

[lovett]

Does the existence of so many different conceptions of free will make free will an unhelpful term?

Often, yes. If one is clear about the precise way one is using the term (as many are not) then it can be helpful.

How do you know that?

Also, how do you know that those conceptions of "free will" are actually about free will? For instance I could say that I conceive of "free will" as being deserts involving yellow fruits and dairy and the existence of banana cream pies would confirm it. Would that qualify as proof?

How do I know there are many different conceptions of free will?

Because people have advanced different conception of free will in papers and books, and I have read some of these papers and books.

How do I know that these are conceptions of free will?

As a competent speaker of English, I know what English words mean. Pertinently, I can tell when they are being used wrongly (How I can tell is a quite different question). So I can tell when the word 'free will' is being used wrongly. I do not think that the word is being used wrongly in many of these conceptions of free will. My confidence in my competence is amplified by the fact that others agree with me. It is very difficult, although perhaps not impossible, for a community to be completely wrong about what a word means. That is because the meaning of a term is typically fixed by how that term is used in a community.

How do I know some conceptions of free will are coherent and some not?

A conception of free will is coherent just in case it could possibly be instantiated, assuming fairly uncontentious background assumptions. Some conceptions of free will could not possibly be instantiated, because they require of free will impossible thing, on fairly uncontentious background assumptions (classical logic, for instance).

Here's an example: one conception of free will has it that the exercise of free will must both reflect an agents character, and be such so that the action the agent performs is to no extent pre-determined. Such a conception is impossible to instantiate, and so incoherent.

How do I know that at least one of the coherent conception of free will are instantiated?

There are conceptions of free will which are instantiated if the world is deterministic, and conceptions of free will which are instantiated if the world is indeterministic. The world is either deterministic or indeterministic. There, at least one coherent conception of free will is instantiated.

Doesn't philosophical skepticism win out in a rational debate making philosophy pointless?

No.

By philosophical scepticism, I suppose you mean the thesis that we don't know anything. Even if this were true, we could still fruitfully engage in philosophical debate and the empirical science. However, our aims would not be knowledge, but rather justified beliefs (or defensible theory choice, or coherent belief sets, or any other such thing).

In any case, it is not true. There are many solution to scepticism (of this sort) in the literature. The one I favour is externalist: as long as we are in roughly the world we think we are in (I.e. we are not brains in vats), then we know roughly what we believe we know. One reason for this is that we should reject something called the KK condition: we don't need to know that we know that P, in order to know that P. [where 'P' is some proposition'].

In general, the correct response the sceptical hypotheses is to revise ones epistemic theory, rather than endorse the hypothesis.

 

[Neverwonagame3]

Mouthwash: Could you explain further what you mean by logical assumptions? Also, Platonic Truth is not required. A Correspondence Truth theory is sufficient.

Logic as commonly perceived is valid because in any possible universe it must hold true.

Angst: Can you clarify what you mean by objectively consistent? Also, I should note the following. I call it the Truth Doctrine:

It is pointless and silly in philosophy to believe anything in philosophy for any reason except it's truth. Solipsism may be useless, but that is irrelevant if it is true.

lovett: The same criterion that are used as a guide to reality are the criterion to determine what is epistemically justified. They are not separate things- only in the case of understandable mistakes is there a difference.

Your solution does nothing to show that the world is roughly like what we think, which is the skeptical problem in the first place. Therefore, it does nothing.

 

[Angst]

Angst: Can you clarify what you mean by objectively consistent? Also, I should note the following. I call it the Truth Doctrine:

It is pointless and silly in philosophy to believe anything in philosophy for any reason except it's truth. Solipsism may be useless, but that is irrelevant if it is true.

meh i'm a little tired so sorry if this is craptastically formulated

Objectivity is inherently impossible to a subject. Pretending to accomplish it is always done so for practical purposes. This is in the realm of the natural sciences where you need consistent objects in order to actually do any progress. But the objects you treat in the natural sciences are founded in empirical experience.

Also, your truth doctrine isn't well phrased. It's ignoring philosophies that aren't trying to archieve objectivity as well as philosophies that aren't epistemological in nature. Which is pretty annoying for an æstheticist

Your solipsist ideal is only an ideal because you wish to archieve the objective.
Here's your problematic logic:

p1 Epistemological analysis of experience can not be doubted (ie must be objective)
p2 Experience can be doubted (ie it's not)
e Epistemological analysis is invalid

Now, however: Plenty of epistemologies are functioning, consistent philosophies

My answer is: Basically, you're wrong. Solipsism is not needed. I take it, naively and perhaps rudely, that you do not know of philosophy beyond Hume, Kant and Descartes? If you want epistemologies that work within the fundamental framework, check out modern papers on the scientific method. The scientific method would be meaningless if its conclusions are undoubtable - therefore doubt has to exist! Also I'm a big fan of phenomenology, but I warn you, it can be a tad difficult to get your head around. Spoiler: Subjectivity and objectivity are the same thing. Woah!

EDIT: Reading the rest of your post, I apologize for my comment about Humkandescartes stuff and my following assumptions.

But my point is: Objectivity is an ideal. But it's actually not. It's ideal for some things, not ideal for others.

 

[lovett]

lovett: The same criterion that are used as a guide to reality are the criterion to determine what is epistemically justified. They are not separate things- only in the case of understandable mistakes is there a difference.

Your solution does nothing to show that the world is roughly like what we think, which is the skeptical problem in the first place. Therefore, it does nothing.

I advise you to explain what you take the sceptical problem to be, and why it is a problem. For you seem to have a non-standard construal of 'the sceptical problem'.

 

[Mouthwash]

Why is an appeal to consequences taken seriously as an argument against utilitarianism? For instance, you would have to sacrifice your life or suffer horrendous pain in situations where it would bring greater utility. Yet this seems to be an aspect of utilitarianism, not an objection to it.

 

[Angst]

Several utilitarians believe that humans should be the goals of ethics - not the means.

 

[lovett]

To address you specific example:

The argument many people would endorse is thus:

P1. We have overriding reason to act morally.
P2. There are some case where we do not have overriding reason to maximize happiness.
C. Therefore, we wouldn't always be acting morally by maximizing happiness.

The conclusion is a contradiction of utilitarianism. The second premise gains support -in part- from cases in your specific example. The idea is that we never have overriding reason to put ourself in immense pain, and then death. The first premise gains support from a host of factors, such as the motivational power of moral consideration, the structure of our reactions of blame and praise, and (for some) the Kantian source of morality.

In general, the consequences of a theory are an excellent place to look for reasons as per why that theory is false. This is what one is doing when one is looking at the logical implications of utilitarianism. One is seeing what the theory implies, and then seeing if these implications are actually true. The above argument argues they are not (I.e. it forces one to drop P1 or P2 if sticks with C).

In the same way, looking at cosmological phenomena (e.g. refraction of light around black holes) was an excellent way to see if General Relativity was true, for it implied certain things about these phenomena. Likewise, looking at he features of animals in different generations was an excellent way to see if the Lamarckian theory of evolution was true, for it implied certain things about these features.

 

[Neverwonagame3]

Angst: Why do you believe objectivity impossible? Do you mean all objectivity or total objectivity?

A so-called philosophy that has nothing to do with the truth is worthless because it says nothing. It's the sort of thing which leads to people dismissing philosophy as impractical.

You misunderstand my logic. If the evil demon hypothesis were true, we could have no epistemically justified trust whatsoever in our beliefs about logic. We do not know the hypothesis is false. Therefore we do not know our beliefs about logic are trustworthy. If we know on probabilities, that begs the question of if probability is legitimate.

lovett: People assume that they are sane, that their memories have some correlation with reality, that their senses have some correlation with reality, and that inductive rules of probability work. All these are epistemically unjustified assumptions.

If you start off without assuming anything, you can't justify them. If you do start with assumptions, you're no better than the idiot Christian who takes God purely on faith in that your beliefs are vulnerable to the Isolation Objection to Coherentism. Any belief against which the Isolation Objection could be used must be rejected.

 

[Angst]

are you questioning logic or are you questioning truth

 

[Neverwonagame3]

Both, contingent on the Evil Demon argument. Other than variants of that, however, I see no way to plausibly question either.

 

[Angst]

Ok. I'm not sure whether we're getting each other. To be very oversimplifying:

Doesn't philosophical skepticism win out in a rational debate making philosophy pointless

yes

edit this is actually not true, do-over. FIXING:

Doesn't philosophical skepticism win out in a rational debate making rationalphilosophy pointless

yes

phew that was better

Doesn't philosophical skepticism win out in a epistemological debate making philosophy pointless

no



"Rational" implies a certain form of thinking that has nothing to do with, say 'reasonable'. And logic isn't truth nor is it applicable to it. :/ Truth can be archieved without arguing objectivity as relevant, but not in a rational mode of thinking.

I don't know the difference between objectivity and total objectivity though. That might be what I'm not getting in your question.

 

[lovett]

lovett: People assume that they are sane, that their memories have some correlation with reality, that their senses have some correlation with reality, and that inductive rules of probability work. All these are epistemically unjustified assumptions.

If you start off without assuming anything, you can't justify them. If you do start with assumptions, you're no better than the idiot Christian who takes God purely on faith in that your beliefs are vulnerable to the Isolation Objection to Coherentism. Any belief against which the Isolation Objection could be used must be rejected.

Perhaps you could explain why you believe the bolded claim.

I take it you want to appeal to the possibility of a manipulating Evil Demon, but it's not yet clear how.

 

[Perfection]

Read any good books on causality?