New NESes, ideas, development, etc

By all means, continue to snipe at other people for their particular recreational style. It's super endearing.

I have no clue why you are choosing to exempt Luckymoose from this particular offense considering he pointedly insulted the intelligence of other posters for disagreeing with him.

Moderator Action: No more trolling, please.
Please read the forum rules: http://forums.civfanatics.com/showthread.php?t=422889
 
CivOasis is/will be running a story game in the IOT forum entitled Voices in the Dark, that has a similar concept, you might want to check it out.

Yes, I hadn't advertised it over here, but I did a sort of collaborative background thread, which you can see the results ofhere if you'd like. Full disclosure that I was going for a world that contributors would enjoy, but would still be a bit distinct from traditional settings, rather than one I though would be particularly realistic.

I'm basically waiting for a new computer to come in, and then it'll be the last little bits of development on my end (tech trees, etc - game is drawing a bit of inspiration from civ mechanics-wise; probably the biggest reason I hadn't advertised over here) before launch.
 
Can i get your thoughts on the plausibility of this scenario? The idea is to create a near-future Earth (I chose 2112) without a major nuclear war or other massive catastrophe that would effectively make it not a 'near-future' world at all.

The questions regarding the following scenario is: 1) What should I change to make it more plausible, even realistic? 2) Is the time-frame appropriate?




Spoiler 2112 Scenario :
The Conflict


As the twenty-first century progressed, the relentless march of globalization continued. International trade, intentionally or not, continued to concentrate wealth in the hands of fewer and fewer people, expanding the gap between the poor and the rich. The influence of multinational corporations continued to increase and nations which had previously been happy to attract investment and profit by serving as flags of convenience to multinationals often found their governments, over time, serving as little more than a public relations mouthpiece for the increasingly amalgamated, increasingly monopolistic, corporations.



Resource development and exploitation (though they were careful not to call it this) continued, oil and mineral wealth continuing to drive growth and public spending as it had in the 20th century and earlier portions of the 21st. Ecologists warned us again and again and even as a significant portion of the population adopted new, greener, energy sources and manufacturing methods, the entrenchment of the existing systems, and even the very forces of the market itself served to reinforce the need to explore and exploit new resources, often to the detriment of local populations who’s power and influence to stop these companies were just not competitive with multinational-backed lobbyists.



In the late 20th and early 21st century the public had grown disenchanted with their governing bodies, pessimistic and apathetic in regards to their ability to truly influence their futures. Economic hardship and political disenfranchisement accelerated this process through the middle 21st century; in the United States national Presidential elections plummeted from 55% in 2000 to less than 15% in 2050. The same thing was happening across the world.



As the multinationals grew to become transnationals and, through their wealth and influence, came to effectively dominate first third world nations, then increasingly, the emerging nations, they were awarded more and more powers, gaining independent sovereign territory in Panama, Liberia, and the Marshall Islands in the late 2030s and hosting large swathes of sovereign territory and private armies in central Asia, the Balkans, some south-American states and even Canada by the 2040s.



The public did not react well. The unemployed, the working poor, the underemployed, the indebted youth, sympathetic academics, idealists, environments, and socialists were increasingly disenfranchised but perhaps unfortunately too poor, too unconnected, too disorganized to stand in the face of the established powers and their influence over government, and increasingly, non-government institutions. Between the twenty-oughts and the twenty-sixties, a series of small rallies (similar to the early 21st century movement calling itself "Occupy"), and grassroots cooperative organizations blossomed and fell, moments of often brief publicity that did much to keep the subject of wealth inequality top-of-mind but more often than not, doing more to harm their cause then to help it. Rallies turned to riots in the 2030s and 40s and by the 2050s armed, organized, anti-government, anti-corporate groups were increasingly in the public eye, their leaders terrorists, their adherents traitors.



At the same time, technology, globalization, and freedom of information all conspired against the powers of governments. Virtual currencies were becoming increasingly popular and privatized, international black-markets first competing with then dwarfing national currencies and regulated markets. This made tax collection and wealth accumulation in the administrative institutions increasingly difficult amidst a population that had long ago lost trust in their governments.




In this world of super-globalization, predatory transnationalism, failing governments, and extreme wealth inequality, it was only a matter of time before something broke. And so finally, as conditions worsened, and the world’s population reached 9 billion, as unemployment or underemployment continued to rise, as water and food security became very real concerns for more than half the world's population, as housing and energy accessibility began to define the haves and have-nots, as extreme climate instability caused unprecedented devastation on a wide scale, violent rebellion broke out first in isolated flares, then within half a decade, was widespread across the globe.



The 2060s saw the single greatest conflict in world history, a world war that made World War II look like an regional conflict. Ultimately it was more similar to the Russian Revolution of 1917 than the conventional wars of the mid-twentieth century, except that this revolution spanned not just one nation, but the entire globe. Even early in the conflict the media began to describe the rebellion as the final clash between two ultimately, irreconcilable systems, democracy and capitalism. That narrative proved both popular with the news-entertainment market and incendiary with the population and the growing rebel movement.



The narrative of capitalism vs. democracy was a popular one for academics and idealists, and those with the resources to feel somehow outside the conflict- at least initially- but for those involved it was more a conflict to secure water, food, energy, to dismantle the systems, primarily corporate, but also government and others, that had disenfranchised them for too long.



Socialist and anti-capitalist, anti-corporate coups rocked many nations, ignoring national borders using many of the same tools the Islamic revolutions of the twenty-twenties and thirties had already established and tested. The corporations had the money and they had the guns but the people had the numbers and increasingly, a fanatical will.



Many thought it was the end-times. It was a civil war, but fought on a global scale, and almost every part of the globe was directly involved. The transnationals simply did not concern themselves with the wishes of most national governments and the national governments were powerless to prevent this. Without the funds and guns of the transnationals and without the support of their populations, the governments simply weren’t. As international law was openly broken by almost every nation remaining and the transnationals, who were as powerful or more than most nations themselves, were not represented upon its councils directly, the UN also failed.



The class war, which came to be known simply as 'The Conflict' was not fought like a conventional war, with uniformed soldiers on each side killing each others in the millions until such time as men in ties signed paper saying it was over. Rebel leadership was diverse and, often, conflicting. Initially many transnationals and governments had seen the confusion and violence as a means to undercut their competitors or rivals and had attempted to sponsor particular groups, 'aiming' them when possible. That proved shortsighted and within a few years the process had stopped as most of the entrenched system was fighting for their very survival.



Idealists of all stripes fought against the established order to try and establish a future they envisioned. Socialists, communists, faithful of most religions all fought for their own causes. Old tribal and racial banners were raised to replace the fall of national flags.



While some would come to some compromise and the fighting would end, others would be mounting a new offensive. The conflict might smolder for a few years in one location or another but across the world, it did not die out for a long, long time. Even now it is difficult to say exactly how long the war and violence lasted and how many were lost. The Conflict was perhaps the single greatest moment of confusion and anarchy in written history. While major wars between nations soon petered out, the violence continued, on and off again, in flares that brought down entire nations or transnational corporate-states who's GDP could rival, in some cases, western European nations.



By the late 2080s, the world seemed to have had enough. Twenty-five years of world-wide conflict had tore through hundreds of years of post-industrial nation-building, socio-economic stratification, and human culture.



When the dust settled, the world was unrecognizable. Nations had simply stopped existing. Supranational organizations, corporations, socialists, idealists of every variety had taken over. The violence abated and the people of the world looked around them, disbelief, relief, sorrow, or horror overtaking them; realizing that it would never be the same as it once was. It was the post-national era.



In the 30 years since the Conflict, we have organized ourselves. We govern ourselves primarily through voluntary membership in post-national organizations we call phyles. Phyles organize their membership along ideological lines; in the reality of a global transport infrastructure, it is very easy to ignore traditional territorial or previous national boundaries. Some phyles are the remnants of aggregate transnationals, phyles like Subarashī or Ares operating as corporations and their population as employees. Others are the remnants of the ideological dreams people once fought over, such as the Common Socialist Union, a cooperative democracy and economy based on the economic democracy writings of the US economist David Schweickart, or the Apauruṣeya, who base their organization upon a progressive interpretation of the Hindu religion and many mystical elements of Hindi culture. Phyle membership is almost always voluntary though many phyles are hard to join. The majority of the world's population belong to one phyle or another, with membership usually requiring tax payments and labor on behalf of the phyle. Those without phyles, informally called 'recluses', inhabit the bottom rungs of society, with no real organization or laws to protect them and often serving to fill the most menial positions of society.




Most of the phyles have devolved some small portion of their power to form a supraphyllic government they call the Consensus. Similiar in some ways to the UN of the 20th and 21st centuries, the Consensus is intended mainly to provide for the co-existence of, and peaceful economic activity between phyles with potentially very different values.


The year is 2112.






Also- props to Diamond Age from which the idea of transnational phyles is blatantly stolen.

If you want to hear more, check out my signature.
 
I'm going to through this like an editor might. This isn't meant to be personally combative, but to genuinely assess the idea.

Can i get your thoughts on the plausibility of this scenario? The idea is to create a near-future Earth (I chose 2112) without a major nuclear war or other massive catastrophe that would effectively make it not a 'near-future' world at all.
Here's the most important thing to take away from this critique: the scenario as presented is completely antithetical to this statement. What you describe below is exactly a massive catastrophe. You have a 25 year long war that makes "World War II look like an regional conflict" such that "When the dust settled, the world was unrecognizable." There is nothing "near-future" about this premise at all; it's equally as divorced from our existence as a post-nuclear scenario, because they both occur after "the end of the world as we know it."

The main reason for this is that the moment of change, "the Conflict," has already transpired and is almost 30 years past by the end of the scenario, reshaping the world into something unrecognizable to the common person. Anything that is "near-future," almost by definition, should broadly resemble the present in some fashion, even if an upheaval of some sort or another has occurred; if that was your goal, the easiest immediate solution is to axe the entirety of the "the Conflict" and end the scenario well before it occurs.

I'm going to discuss some particular details in the spoiler below and return to the main thrust of the argument afterwards:

Spoiler :
As the twenty-first century progressed, the relentless march of globalization continued. International trade, intentionally or not, continued to concentrate wealth in the hands of fewer and fewer people, expanding the gap between the poor and the rich. The influence of multinational corporations continued to increase and nations which had previously been happy to attract investment and profit by serving as flags of convenience to multinationals often found their governments, over time, serving as little more than a public relations mouthpiece for the increasingly amalgamated, increasingly monopolistic, corporations.
[...]
As the multinationals grew to become transnationals and, through their wealth and influence, came to effectively dominate first third world nations, then increasingly, the emerging nations, they were awarded more and more powers, gaining independent sovereign territory in Panama, Liberia, and the Marshall Islands in the late 2030s and hosting large swathes of sovereign territory and private armies in central Asia, the Balkans, some south-American states and even Canada by the 2040s.
This is a trope ("the megacorp"), and I know from your own statements elsewhere that this is more or less lifted entirely out of Kim Stanley Robinson's Mars Trilogy, particularly as regards Praxis and Subarashī. As a genre feature of science-fiction this belongs overwhelmingly to 1980s cyberpunk (especially William Gibson and works that drew inspiration from him). There's a long line of cinematic megacorps to draw from like OCP and Weyland-Yutani. They appear in games like Shadowrun. But by and large they appear in stuff from the 80s and sometimes the 90s and have sort of disappeared since. Why?

The reason is that the megacorp, as a trope, is a product of its time, and is one that has fallen largely out of fashion since then. There are companies that exist today that have soft monopolies on whole sectors (e.g., Microsoft) or almost unfathomable control over the flow of information (e.g., Google) but nobody is particularly concerned in this day and age about the rise of megacorps; they largely died with cyberpunk itself. It's interesting that you identify Neal Stephenson's The Diamond Age as an influence because that work is distinctly Postcyberpunk. I would personally argue that Stephenson's previous Snow Crash was the apex, subversion, and end of Cyberpunk all at the same time; Cyberpunk taken to its logical conclusions to the point of self-parody, ushering the way forward into Postcyberpunk. That gives us a time of death for Cyberpunk in 1992.

The Mars Trilogy, released 1993, 1994, and 1996, echoes this, being sort of Cyberpunk-in-Space: just like Bud (a typical Cyberpunk protagonist) dies to establish The Diamond Age's Postcyberpunk setting, John Boone (the cowboy), Frank Chalmbers (the manipulator), and Arkady Bogdanov (the revolutionary) all die to establish the Mars' Trilogy's Postcyberpunk setting: in the end it's really a gradual transformation of social consciousness at large that brings down the Metanats, not violent upheaval and class warfare.

By now you're thinking "Why the history and literary lesson?" and the answer is: because this premise is 20 years past its sell-by date. I understand that the general arc of your scenario is Cyberpunk → Revolution → Postcyberpunk, but the problem with that is we already live in a Postcyberpunk world. In many ways we are in a Post-Postcyberpunk world. Being that future scenarios are as much science-fiction as they are anything "realistic," this is a tonal problem with the scenario: it ignores the 20 years that have transpired since the end of its primary influence(s).

Having established that it's this arc underpinning this scenario, we can address elements within the arc on the basis of it in addition to whatever their "plausibility" is."

Resource development and exploitation (though they were careful not to call it this) continued, oil and mineral wealth continuing to drive growth and public spending as it had in the 20th century and earlier portions of the 21st. Ecologists warned us again and again and even as a significant portion of the population adopted new, greener, energy sources and manufacturing methods, the entrenchment of the existing systems, and even the very forces of the market itself served to reinforce the need to explore and exploit new resources, often to the detriment of local populations who’s power and influence to stop these companies were just not competitive with multinational-backed lobbyists.
Although this is plausible it again links back into this very pessimistic top-down Cyberpunk ethos. There are, no doubt, climate-change deniers in policy-making offices who both espouse (and probably genuinely believe) things like "God made oil a renewable resource" who do receive campaign funding from corporate concerns, but they aren't all linked together into a massive conspiracy or something.

In the late 20th and early 21st century the public had grown disenchanted with their governing bodies, pessimistic and apathetic in regards to their ability to truly influence their futures. Economic hardship and political disenfranchisement accelerated this process through the middle 21st century; in the United States national Presidential elections plummeted from 55% in 2000 to less than 15% in 2050. The same thing was happening across the world.

[...]

The public did not react well. The unemployed, the working poor, the underemployed, the indebted youth, sympathetic academics, idealists, environments, and socialists were increasingly disenfranchised but perhaps unfortunately too poor, too unconnected, too disorganized to stand in the face of the established powers and their influence over government, and increasingly, non-government institutions. Between the twenty-oughts and the twenty-sixties, a series of small rallies (similar to the early 21st century movement calling itself "Occupy"), and grassroots cooperative organizations blossomed and fell, moments of often brief publicity that did much to keep the subject of wealth inequality top-of-mind but more often than not, doing more to harm their cause then to help it. Rallies turned to riots in the 2030s and 40s and by the 2050s armed, organized, anti-government, anti-corporate groups were increasingly in the public eye, their leaders terrorists, their adherents traitors.
This doesn't really make sense to me. People opt out of the political system in order to undertake political action outside the system? People usually take action outside the system only when the system doesn't permit them to take action within it: the Arab Spring, the 2009 Iranian election protests, the mass incidents in the PRC, the Catalan and Scottish independence movements, even the 2009 US Presidential election are all examples of this. Most people exercise frustration through the system rather than attempting to topple it. That is by and large the function of democracy as implemented: a safety valve that brings the masses to the table where they at least nominally have some influence on the agenda of the elites.

The US Presidential election is easily one of the least democratic aspects of the American political process (because the vote doesn't count due to the Electoral College) but it always has a much higher turnout than the Congressional midterms precisely because people identify the office as having more importance even though in many cases it's less important, as 5-6 years of Congressional gridlock has shown. People want to be involved. The elite (whomever they are, whatever their ideology) usually want them to be involved too because it keeps them invested in the system.

A large number of the Continentalist philosophers of the 20th century (e.g., Althusser, Lacan, Badiou) will essentially tell you that the system as it exists is designed to be maximally inclusive (although it both won't and can't, by necessity, include everyone) in order to perpetuate itself. As conjectured this is it more or less deliberately entering a self-destructive mode. To have an elite that permits the body politic to walk away suggests an elite that is both moustache-twirling evil and also largely incompetent due to being blinded by its delusions (another standard feature of Cyberpunk). I rate this quite negatively on plausibility: it's possible, sure, but it comes across as another example of the overarching theme being applied to get the intended end result. We need a dramatic social upheaval, so when people are disenfranchised they all become what Zizek identifies as political passive-aggressives letting the system drive itself off the cliff precisely to get that upheaval. It strikes me as teleological and rather assuming of the popular political consciousness as well.

At the same time, technology, globalization, and freedom of information all conspired against the powers of governments. Virtual currencies were becoming increasingly popular and privatized, international black-markets first competing with then dwarfing national currencies and regulated markets. This made tax collection and wealth accumulation in the administrative institutions increasingly difficult amidst a population that had long ago lost trust in their governments.
Given the history of BitCoin (and Dogecoin, etc.) to date, I find this one particularly laughable. Cryptocurrency is fundamentally incapable of replacing even a fraction of the normal economy; the only way to scale a system up is to have it centralized in some fashion. What you describe already exists and has little to do with such things: it's called System D and it piggybacks off existing market structures instead of replacing them, because by and large those structures are already optimized and are what need to exist for the services to work.

In this world of super-globalization, predatory transnationalism, failing governments, and extreme wealth inequality, it was only a matter of time before something broke.

[...]

The class war, which came to be known simply as 'The Conflict' was not fought like a conventional war, with uniformed soldiers on each side killing each others in the millions until such time as men in ties signed paper saying it was over. Rebel leadership was diverse and, often, conflicting. Initially many transnationals and governments had seen the confusion and violence as a means to undercut their competitors or rivals and had attempted to sponsor particular groups, 'aiming' them when possible. That proved shortsighted and within a few years the process had stopped as most of the entrenched system was fighting for their very survival.

Idealists of all stripes fought against the established order to try and establish a future they envisioned. Socialists, communists, faithful of most religions all fought for their own causes. Old tribal and racial banners were raised to replace the fall of national flags.
This is all extremely vague. Aside from that, I'd point out that people that should nominally be allied in fighting a common foe are actually often the bitterest of enemies (e.g., WWII Allied Powers, CCP and KMT vs. IJA, FSA and ISIS vs. Assad) and also that decentralized revolutionary movements without a clear power structure (e.g., OWS, Iran 2009) have a bad track record of succeeding and also a bad track record of transitioning to the open violence often necessary to achieve revolutionary aims.

In the 30 years since the Conflict, we have organized ourselves. We govern ourselves primarily through voluntary membership in post-national organizations we call phyles. Phyles organize their membership along ideological lines; in the reality of a global transport infrastructure, it is very easy to ignore traditional territorial or previous national boundaries. Some phyles are the remnants of aggregate transnationals, phyles like Subarashī or Ares operating as corporations and their population as employees. Others are the remnants of the ideological dreams people once fought over, such as the Common Socialist Union, a cooperative democracy and economy based on the economic democracy writings of the US economist David Schweickart, or the Apauruṣeya, who base their organization upon a progressive interpretation of the Hindu religion and many mystical elements of Hindi culture. Phyle membership is almost always voluntary though many phyles are hard to join. The majority of the world's population belong to one phyle or another, with membership usually requiring tax payments and labor on behalf of the phyle. Those without phyles, informally called 'recluses', inhabit the bottom rungs of society, with no real organization or laws to protect them and often serving to fill the most menial positions of society.
As you said, a blatant theft from The Diamond Age. My critique of this is mostly operational. How does this actually work differently from nation-state based conflict? Considering phyles are purely voluntary and ideologically based, there's no reason for them to really attempt to conquer other phyles, nor to hold territory beyond what's required for self-sufficiency or security (if indeed any territory is required for it at all). Conflict between them is generally zero-sum or purely negative; they largely only stand to lose. Not only are they wildly divorced from the "near-future" understanding of Humanity, they lack a lot of sources of conflict.

Indeed, other than the introduction of MacGuffins that will allow one to brainwash all other Phyles or exterminate them, or allow some other Phyle to do the same, the only reason they should really interact with one another let alone fight, assuming easy access to resources akin to in The Diamond Age, is misunderstandings. Not really the basis for an interesting setting.

To return to my primary point: this world has no relation to ours. The way this world is arrived at is essentially a teleological process whereby everybody sees the problems but nobody stops them. And the overarching theme guiding that teleological process is Cyberpunk, which as far as such things go is quite old, retrod, and worn out by now.

I have additional problems with the premise in so far as that the world of 2112, even with (and perhaps especially because of) a 25 year war between us and it will look nothing like ours technologically (in-article link is broken, full-scale downloadable version here), a point on which there is broad consensus. This feeds back into the question of why phyles would be a rich source of conflict, or indeed why the situation would have gotten so bad as to percipitate "the Conflict" to begin with. This is all without getting into the will-there-be-won't-there-be of the possibility of the Singularity.

Science-fiction connects best when it deals, in some way, with contemporary issues through a new lens. While the problems with capitalism certainly are a contemporary issue, a scenario that has already dealt with them after wrapping them in trappings that are 30 years past their prime doesn't seem like the best way of doing it to me. Accelerando by Charles Stross, despite going on 9 years old and being a bit too fast-paced for my liking, is a much more contemporary look at the same issues, and is probably a good place to start.
 
I thank you hugely for your analysis. Maybe if you were willing, I would very much appreciate your input on how to get to 'this' point in a realistic and plausible way. Can we "talk" on #nes at some point?

PS: Accelerando was horrible and I couldn't finish it.
 
If something like that were to happen it seems overwhelmingly likely that it would happen as a result of emergent technologies and self-selection into ideological groups mingling together to create systems parallel to (but not immediately replacing) the nation-state order. Gilpin in Global Political Economy identifies three possible routes forward (p. 378-379):

Neither domestic economies nor the increasingly integrated world economy can rely on markets alone to police themselves. An international governance mechanism is needed to assume several functions in the new global economy; in particular, it must provide certain public goods and resolve market failures.

[...]

Although many neoclassical economists and some liberal thinkers believe that only minimal rules are necessary, many scholars of international political economy argue that extensive or formal regimes are needed. There are three predominant positions regarding governance: neoliberal institutionalism, new medievalism, and transgovernmentalism. Neoliberal institutionalism, based on the continued importance of the state, believes that formal international regimes and institutions are necessary. [...] The new medievalism is based on the assumption that the state and the state-system have been undermined by economic, technological, and other developments and are being eclipsed by nongovernmental actors and the emerge of an international civil society. [...] Transgovernmentalism argues that international cooperation by domestic government agencies in specific functional areas is rapidly replacing the decision-making functions of centralized national governments in the management of the global economy.
I would say the trajectory in the 13 years since the book was written, for good or bad, has been mostly toward neoliberal institutionalism, but I guess you could have that breaking down and a swing toward new medievalism, enabling the rise of something like phyles.
 
“Science-fiction connects best when it deals, in some way, with contemporary issues through a new lens.“ Agreed 100%

I think I’ll start with where I want to get with the world-building exercise.

Firstly, the idea is that it must be a recognizable earth- distinct and divergent from what we inhabit, but it must be plausible and preferably appear even likely. So maybe not near-future, but certainly, importantly, recognizable.

Secondly, I want to develop a world that is post-cyberpunk. Cyberpunk is often characterized by rebel characters fighting an oppressive tyranny, as you say, an overused trope such as the megacorps fits with that. The idea of the ‘conflict’ was the end of the cyberpunk era in the setting I wrote about. The birth of an open future where hope was rekindled. Megacorps, in a way serve nicely because they die in the conflict, or come to an understanding and compromise with the majority of humanity.

Thirdly, I want to explore the concept that capitalism is inherently anti-democratic, preferably exploring large-scale and functional societies based on communalism, democratic economics and other ‘alternatives’ to free-market capitalism. This is just a personal preference.

Fourthly, I want to explore early colonization of space, in particular the use of the moon to help power H3-based fusion reactors.

Fifthly, I want to explore the birth of post-scarcity. In the world I envision fusion power is a thing but expensive to implement H3- fusion reactors are much more productive but require lunar resources- which is sort of fun for a setting. Molecular assembly (compilers) are a thing but only about 5-6 years old. They are energy intensive to use as well. So while the parts are in place for post-scarcity, the world building i envision would outline the transition to that state.

A note on phyles. I disagree that they make a boring setting. Perhaps in a truly post-scarcity world they would have no reason to interact but prior to that, they still need to compete. Consider a race for the H3 of the moon (since I mentioned that earlier).



So yeah, ultimately, I would love help in fixing (or scraping and replacing) my timeline to hit these goals while making it something plausible and realistic and preferably original in some ways.





I'm going to through this like an editor might. This isn't meant to be personally combative, but to genuinely assess the idea.


Here's the most important thing to take away from this critique: the scenario as presented is completely antithetical to this statement. What you describe below is exactly a massive catastrophe. You have a 25 year long war that makes "World War II look like an regional conflict" such that "When the dust settled, the world was unrecognizable." There is nothing "near-future" about this premise at all; it's equally as divorced from our existence as a post-nuclear scenario, because they both occur after "the end of the world as we know it."

The main reason for this is that the moment of change, "the Conflict," has already transpired and is almost 30 years past by the end of the scenario, reshaping the world into something unrecognizable to the common person. Anything that is "near-future," almost by definition, should broadly resemble the present in some fashion, even if an upheaval of some sort or another has occurred; if that was your goal, the easiest immediate solution is to axe the entirety of the "the Conflict" and end the scenario well before it occurs.

I had envisioned the ‘conflict’ as the fall of the old ways before the adoption of a post-cyberpunk world. And you are right it isn’t ‘near future’ at all. And maybe ultimately that is not what I wanted. I think ultimately what I am looking for is to rework social and culture framework and keep population, technology and other aspects of sci-fi.

Spoiler :

This is a trope ("the megacorp"), and I know from your own statements elsewhere that this is more or less lifted entirely out of Kim Stanley Robinson's Mars Trilogy, particularly as regards Praxis and Subarashī. As a genre feature of science-fiction this belongs overwhelmingly to 1980s cyberpunk (especially William Gibson and works that drew inspiration from him). There's a long line of cinematic megacorps to draw from like OCP and Weyland-Yutani. They appear in games like Shadowrun. But by and large they appear in stuff from the 80s and sometimes the 90s and have sort of disappeared since. Why?

The reason is that the megacorp, as a trope, is a product of its time, and is one that has fallen largely out of fashion since then. There are companies that exist today that have soft monopolies on whole sectors (e.g., Microsoft) or almost unfathomable control over the flow of information (e.g., Google) but nobody is particularly concerned in this day and age about the rise of megacorps; they largely died with cyberpunk itself. It's interesting that you identify Neal Stephenson's The Diamond Age as an influence because that work is distinctly Postcyberpunk. I would personally argue that Stephenson's previous Snow Crash was the apex, subversion, and end of Cyberpunk all at the same time; Cyberpunk taken to its logical conclusions to the point of self-parody, ushering the way forward into Postcyberpunk. That gives us a time of death for Cyberpunk in 1992.

The Mars Trilogy, released 1993, 1994, and 1996, echoes this, being sort of Cyberpunk-in-Space: just like Bud (a typical Cyberpunk protagonist) dies to establish The Diamond Age's Postcyberpunk setting, John Boone (the cowboy), Frank Chalmbers (the manipulator), and Arkady Bogdanov (the revolutionary) all die to establish the Mars' Trilogy's Postcyberpunk setting: in the end it's really a gradual transformation of social consciousness at large that brings down the Metanats, not violent upheaval and class warfare.

By now you're thinking "Why the history and literary lesson?" and the answer is: because this premise is 20 years past its sell-by date. I understand that the general arc of your scenario is Cyberpunk → Revolution → Postcyberpunk, but the problem with that is we already live in a Postcyberpunk world. In many ways we are in a Post-Postcyberpunk world. Being that future scenarios are as much science-fiction as they are anything "realistic," this is a tonal problem with the scenario: it ignores the 20 years that have transpired since the end of its primary influence(s).
Spoiler :


I am inclined to agree with everything you wrote. Do you have suggestions regarding what to use instead, especially as a veil between ‘cyberpunk’ (or immediate future) and ‘post cyberpunk’ or future I have outlined in the goals I set out above? Megacorps are easy- I agree- and not particularly original- I agree. But new ideas are HARD. So… what is not only plausible but serves the same function.


Having established that it's this arc underpinning this scenario, we can address elements within the arc on the basis of it in addition to whatever their "plausibility" is."

[snip]

This doesn't really make sense to me. People opt out of the political system in order to undertake political action outside the system? People usually take action outside the system only when the system doesn't permit them to take action within it: the Arab Spring, the 2009 Iranian election protests, the mass incidents in the PRC, the Catalan and Scottish independence movements, even the 2009 US Presidential election are all examples of this. Most people exercise frustration through the system rather than attempting to topple it. That is by and large the function of democracy as implemented: a safety valve that brings the masses to the table where they at least nominally have some influence on the agenda of the elites.

The US Presidential election is easily one of the least democratic aspects of the American political process (because the vote doesn't count due to the Electoral College) but it always has a much higher turnout than the Congressional midterms precisely because people identify the office as having more importance even though in many cases it's less important, as 5-6 years of Congressional gridlock has shown. People want to be involved. The elite (whomever they are, whatever their ideology) usually want them to be involved too because it keeps them invested in the system.

A large number of the Continentalist philosophers of the 20th century (e.g., Althusser, Lacan, Badiou) will essentially tell you that the system as it exists is designed to be maximally inclusive (although it both won't and can't, by necessity, include everyone) in order to perpetuate itself. As conjectured this is it more or less deliberately entering a self-destructive mode. To have an elite that permits the body politic to walk away suggests an elite that is both moustache-twirling evil and also largely incompetent due to being blinded by its delusions (another standard feature of Cyberpunk). I rate this quite negatively on plausibility: it's possible, sure, but it comes across as another example of the overarching theme being applied to get the intended end result. We need a dramatic social upheaval, so when people are disenfranchised they all become what Zizek identifies as political passive-aggressives letting the system drive itself off the cliff precisely to get that upheaval. It strikes me as teleological and rather assuming of the popular political consciousness as well.

My thoughts were based something on social apathy driving failure of democracy in the face of capitalist wealth and its influence, leading to revolution.

That’s insightful and perhaps food for thought for alternative means of social upheaval and cultural redesign? I would ask that you continue your thought process and see what can be drawn from it that would get us to the goals I outlined –in a way that is more practical and plausible.


Given the history of BitCoin (and Dogecoin, etc.) to date, I find this one particularly laughable. Cryptocurrency is fundamentally incapable of replacing even a fraction of the normal economy; the only way to scale a system up is to have it centralized in some fashion. What you describe already exists and has little to do with such things: it's called System D and it piggybacks off existing market structures instead of replacing them, because by and large those structures are already optimized and are what need to exist for the services to work.

Okay- I was trying to make failures of government more realistic. I need something else.

me said:
In this world of super-globalization, predatory transnationalism, failing governments, and extreme wealth inequality, it was only a matter of time before something broke.

[...]

The class war, which came to be known simply as 'The Conflict' was not fought like a conventional war, with uniformed soldiers on each side killing each others in the millions until such time as men in ties signed paper saying it was over. Rebel leadership was diverse and, often, conflicting. Initially many transnationals and governments had seen the confusion and violence as a means to undercut their competitors or rivals and had attempted to sponsor particular groups, 'aiming' them when possible. That proved shortsighted and within a few years the process had stopped as most of the entrenched system was fighting for their very survival.

Idealists of all stripes fought against the established order to try and establish a future they envisioned. Socialists, communists, faithful of most religions all fought for their own causes. Old tribal and racial banners were raised to replace the fall of national flags.
This is all extremely vague. Aside from that, I'd point out that people that should nominally be allied in fighting a common foe are actually often the bitterest of enemies (e.g., WWII Allied Powers, CCP and KMT vs. IJA, FSA and ISIS vs. Assad) and also that decentralized revolutionary movements without a clear power structure (e.g., OWS, Iran 2009) have a bad track record of succeeding and also a bad track record of transitioning to the open violence often necessary to achieve revolutionary aims.

I think I worked backwards from my goals and this seemed plausible to get there. Basically to help get to ideology-based phyles in some future.

me said:
In the 30 years since the Conflict, we have organized ourselves. We govern ourselves primarily through voluntary membership in post-national organizations we call phyles. Phyles organize their membership along ideological lines; in the reality of a global transport infrastructure, it is very easy to ignore traditional territorial or previous national boundaries. Some phyles are the remnants of aggregate transnationals, phyles like Subarashī or Ares operating as corporations and their population as employees. Others are the remnants of the ideological dreams people once fought over, such as the Common Socialist Union, a cooperative democracy and economy based on the economic democracy writings of the US economist David Schweickart, or the Apauruṣeya, who base their organization upon a progressive interpretation of the Hindu religion and many mystical elements of Hindi culture. Phyle membership is almost always voluntary though many phyles are hard to join. The majority of the world's population belong to one phyle or another, with membership usually requiring tax payments and labor on behalf of the phyle. Those without phyles, informally called 'recluses', inhabit the bottom rungs of society, with no real organization or laws to protect them and often serving to fill the most menial positions of society.

As you said, a blatant theft from The Diamond Age. My critique of this is mostly operational. How does this actually work differently from nation-state based conflict? Considering phyles are purely voluntary and ideologically based, there's no reason for them to really attempt to conquer other phyles, nor to hold territory beyond what's required for self-sufficiency or security (if indeed any territory is required for it at all). Conflict between them is generally zero-sum or purely negative; they largely only stand to lose. Not only are they wildly divorced from the "near-future" understanding of Humanity, they lack a lot of sources of conflict.

Indeed, other than the introduction of MacGuffins that will allow one to brainwash all other Phyles or exterminate them, or allow some other Phyle to do the same, the only reason they should really interact with one another let alone fight, assuming easy access to resources akin to in The Diamond Age, is misunderstandings. Not really the basis for an interesting setting.

I think in a way it forces a re-evaluation of society. Instead of appealing to the middle ground, the world allows for some very extreme government types that normally would not exist. I don’t think conflict would be zero sum- resources still drive much of competition and conflict. Again I point to H3 lunar mineral mining.

I have additional problems with the premise in so far as that the world of 2112, even with (and perhaps especially because of) a 25 year war between us and it will look nothing like ours technologically (in-article link is broken, full-scale downloadable version here), a point on which there is broad consensus. This feeds back into the question of why phyles would be a rich source of conflict, or indeed why the situation would have gotten so bad as to precipitate "the Conflict" to begin with. This is all without getting into the will-there-be-won't-there-be of the possibility of the Singularity.

The link in my sig outlines some technologies I propose. The lack of consensus regarding future tech doesn’t mean we shouldn’t try to construct some future society based at least partially on them. I do outline an exocortex system similar to Accelerando’s go(o)gles but refuse his AI premises. I accept fusion but refute it as an unlimited source of free energy (due to costs and relative limits on efficiency). I embrace new technologies (rho –field- acts like levitation and military shields) but outline its limits.





So yeah, again, I appreciate all your helpful and insightful feedback. I realize you invested some time in it and thank you. If you are willing to invest more time, I would ask that you help me rewrite the future to make it more interesting, plausible, and ‘make sensical’ while still striving for similar goals.
 
Firstly, the idea is that it must be a recognizable earth- distinct and divergent from what we inhabit, but it must be plausible and preferably appear even likely. So maybe not near-future, but certainly, importantly, recognizable.
Well, if we're talking about likelihood, I'd say that Humans, which generally will pick a leader in any group larger than about 7, and which generally build ever more ornate power structures beyond any group larger than about 150, will continue to likely organize themselves into states, which have existed for about 5,500 years. I see no reason to believe they won't continue existing somewhere for another 5,500 years.

Stephenson's Phyles are really at their core a twist on the idea of states. They still have differentiated leadership structures, ideologies, strategic goals and agendas, and indeed territory, it's just that those things are decentralized rather than centralized around the idea of national territory. Citizenship is ideological (and racial) rather than territorial. Phyles are in many ways just states translated through the current idea of "the Cloud," although that phrase didn't exist when he wrote the book. They aren't remotely as radical as say, sovereign citizen movements or other ideas of individuals being sovereign, and in fact are directly antithetical to them.

The most realistic way to get from a territorial state to an aterritorial state-like entity is more or less a straight line, perhaps jagged, rather than a discontinuity.

Secondly, I want to develop a world that is post-cyberpunk.
Well, as I said, this world is Postcyberpunk. As it exists, this scenario goes Postcyberpunk→Decay into Cyberpunk→Revolution→Postcyberpunk. It's a circle. You are already at the destination you intend to reach. You could make it an alternate history starting in the 1980s where the 1980s vision of the future came to pass instead of our own, and eventually that was overthrown. But we in the year 2014 have already bypassed it. It's somewhat like saying you want a post-Jetsons future, or a post-2001: A Space Odyssey future. We are already in that future. We are already in the Postcyberpunk future.

Cyberpunk is often characterized by rebel characters fighting an oppressive tyranny, as you say, an overused trope such as the megacorps fits with that.
I think it's important to unpack this because I don't think it's being used correctly. The "Cyber-" bit of Cyberpunk refers to the setting; the "-punk" refers to the focus on the outsiders, Others, etc. whom exist in opposition to the established order. When we say Postcyberpunk, we're really saying "Cyber post-punk," or a return to focus on characters within the established order, just in a futuristic ("cyber") setting. You don't need one to get to the other, they're different perspectives of similar (sometimes identical) material. (What someone in the American Midwest considers a perfectly fine bucolic existence, someone highly educated from the Atlantic Rim might consider some sort of Farmpunk hell to rebel against.)

Cyberpunk was a reaction to the New Wave which was itself a reaction to the Golden Age. Postcyberpunk was one of many reactions to Cyberpunk. Another example might be how superheroes went from being brightly colored power fantasies from the 30s-to-70s to dark, ultra-violent, Xtreme gritty antihero chronicles in the 80s and 90s only to return somewhat to form but different as a result of that era. You don't need to go back through the entire history of the movement to arrive at its current terminus, because we've already done that in real life, as I outlined above.

Thirdly, I want to explore the concept that capitalism is inherently anti-democratic, preferably exploring large-scale and functional societies based on communalism, democratic economics and other ‘alternatives’ to free-market capitalism. This is just a personal preference.
That's fine, but realistically if you want to do that you still need capitalism around as a thing to explore. Killing it off thirty years prior puts it on the ash heap of history full of junk nobody cares about. Generally speaking, nobody today is going around talking about Goldwater-Nichols Act and US service joint operations because it's a done deal and ancient history by now. Likewise, if the major conflict you want to investigate in a work has already happened, unless your work is a (future-)historical account or something, it's a non-issue by then. To give an example, you wouldn't write a novel (or make a game, or direct a movie, or...) about WWII where the setting is the Vietnam War.

Fourthly, I want to explore early colonization of space, in particular the use of the moon to help power H3-based fusion reactors.
I would suggest picking up High Frontier, Transhuman Space (as hilarious as its timeline can be) or Ben Bova's Grand Tour (also sometimes funny) if that's your real goal. Bova makes note in both Moonrise and Moonwar that extracting He-3 from regolith is likely to be more difficult than anticipated. There are some thoughts on the difficulty that differ, but the bigger problem is the size of the supply; you'd have to strip-mine the whole surface of the Moon to power Earth for much more than 20 years.

I disagree that they make a boring setting. Perhaps in a truly post-scarcity world they would have no reason to interact but prior to that, they still need to compete. Consider a race for the H3 of the moon (since I mentioned that earlier).
How often do corporations engage in shooting wars with one another? Decentralization on the one hand makes phyles somewhat less vulnerable than states against things like decapitating strikes, but on the other it makes them more vulnerable since their presence is much more diffuse and hard to guard. Imagine having to guard, say, Washington D.C., vs. all the McDonald's franchises in the world at the same time. What makes decentralization like that appealing is an environment of less risk. Now, if you have alternatives to direct armed conflict as points of interest, then sure, it's still viable as competition is still going on. If armed conflict is a focus though, the scenario itself is stacked against it.

My thoughts were based something on social apathy driving failure of democracy in the face of capitalist wealth and its influence, leading to revolution.
Well, if the people are so apathetic about things, why do they one day suddenly revolt? Happiness is as synthetic as it is real. People adapt. Conversion of dissatisfaction into discontent requires a catalyst and potential reward that would offset whatever risks one runs of upsetting the status quo. Indeed, the primary way the system legitimizes itself and maintains the status quo is by helping manufacture synthetic happiness; that's the fundamental basis of consumer capitalism.

There's no real reason given for the people to become less vocal and active (if anything, the internet and social media have made it easier for them to be more of both), and also no reason given for them to suddenly stop. If the process was to start, there's little reason to believe it would stop in a sudden fashion; it'd be the creation of a behavior sink. (The applicability of studies into behavioral sinks to Humans is questionable but the first time I read "Other males, a group Calhoun termed “the beautiful ones,” never sought sex and never fought—they just ate, slept, and groomed, wrapped in narcissistic introspection" I immediately thought of Hikikomori.)

Like I said, the simplest thing is to forego any crisis entirely and just assume a slow, gradual, disorganized rising political consciousness.

I am inclined to agree with everything you wrote. Do you have suggestions regarding what to use instead, especially as a veil between ‘cyberpunk’ (or immediate future) and ‘post cyberpunk’ or future I have outlined in the goals I set out above? Megacorps are easy- I agree- and not particularly original- I agree. But new ideas are HARD. So… what is not only plausible but serves the same function.
I think I've already made that clear piecemeal, but: a failure of neoliberal institutionalism (e.g., EU implosion, more countries walking away like Iceland did, growing regionalized economic systems, etc.) coupled with emerging technologies and social shifts leads to a diminished focus on nation-states in the public consciousness, eventually producing something like supra-national associations with nation-states either becoming somewhat irrelevant or dissolving.
 
NEB2 pre-release screenshot:



Note: rest of map to be assembled with player input

Edit: stats something along these lines:

Neo-Celtonian Union: Daftpanzer
Liberal Socialist Republic [flavours]
LP [population]: 20
PP [industry]: 2
Int [research / intelligence]: 2
Bank: $2 (+$1)
Notes: Distributed small-scale industry and urbanisation. Importing many raw materials and exporting finished goods. High Council appoints Ri or Presidency with overriding executive power.
 
I too would love to play that game Daft. Please save me a spot.
 
Seems very good.
 
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