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Rkingb has registered just to resurrect an over decade old thread. 
Do you think Germany's failure to destroy the BEF at Dunkirk was a major setback?
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James Stuart
King
Just getting to this because I knew it would be a long post. I'll try.
A) Blitzkrieg is a wonderful campaign strategy that enables you to quickly overwhelm your enemy, ending a campaign in a very short period of time. While different technologies enable variations of this strategy, the basics boil down to this; a single fast moving column either flanks or penetrates an enemy line, then sweeps around to attack it from the side/ behind. While blitzkrieg only gained a name after WWII, the basic idea has existed for centuries; take away aircraft, and substitute horses for tanks, and you are left with a basic Mongol strategy.
The risk with using blitzkrieg, however, is that your attempt to sweep around the enemy is blocked. Blitzkrieg requires a concentration of force; usually it is used when one's enemy is stronger than the attacker, and therefore places their defences in a line or at strategic chokepoints. The attacker concentrates a much larger force in one area than is normal, uses brute force to smash a hole in the enemy's line, and relies on speed and surprise to achieve their objective. In France in 1940, this worked beautifully. It worked even better for the US-led Coalition in Iraq in 2003, where General Tommy Franks took Baghdad in two weeks.
There are cases, however, where the initial advance becomes stalled. The most well-known example of this also comes from WWII; Operation: Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, failed to reach Moscow. The Soviets, who had far greater resources than Germany, then advanced on a broad front, pushing the Germans back slowly and surely until they took Berlin. That is the first risk of a stalled advance.
The second risk of a stalled advance during a blitzkrieg is that the army you've sent behind the enemy line will be trapped there. This was the German fear during the invasion of France, and it happened twice during WWII; once on the Eastern Front, and once in the West. The best-known example is the Battle of Stalingrad; the German 6th Army advanced into Stalingrad, only to have several Soviet armies, which had been kept in reserve and successfully hidden from the Germans, cut the 6th Army off from the remained of the German force in the area, in what is known as a pincer movement. The 6th Army was unable to escape, and the Germans, though they tried, were unable to either rescue Paulus's troops in the face of superior Soviet forces, or keep him re-supplied by air. The 6th Army held out for months, but eventually they were forced to surrender.
A less well-known, but better, example, is the Battle of the Bulge. This is one of the fastest advances in military history; an attack, personally planned by Hitler and led by English-speaking SS officers in captured American uniforms, swiftly cut through American lines in the Netherlands and Belgium, darting towards Antwerp. This created a bulge in the previously straight(ish) Allied front line, from which the battle gets its name. This fast-moving German force, however, lacked the fuel, men, and munitions to conduct a sweep and crush the Americans they had just outflanked. They reached as far as they could go, and stopped. The Allies proceeded to cut the German supply lines, stranding them behind enemy lines, rescued the American pocket at Bastogne, and cut the Germans to ribbons. It was simultaneously one of the greatest tactical successes for Germany in the war - the speed of advance and the territory re-taken - and one of the worst strategic defeats; Germany may have had the necessarily talent to exploit such an opening, but her military lacked the fuel, arms, ammunition, and vehicles required.
The Battle of the Bulge is closer to the situation in 1940 than Stalingrad is. The German armies sweeping into France were, contrary to what most people think, numerically and technologically inferior to the French. They defeated the French because they essentially defeated one small French force at a time with their whole army, while the French were unable to concentrate their own forces for a counter-attack. If, however, the French had been able to regroup - and a major reason they didn't was simply the incompetence of the French leadership, rather than an inability of the French soldiers on the ground - they could have attacked the German supply corridor, cut off Heinz Guderian's advance force from the rest of the German army, and annihilated most of Germany's armoured vehicles in short order.
The Germans were justifiably frightened of this scenario, especially after Colonel De Gaulle, acting on his own initiative, commandeered an armoured force and launched his own local counter-strike, which proved that the French knew the necessary tactical counter to blitzkrieg. Guderian was very lucky that De Gaulle was a relatively junior officer at the time, and his ideas were not in favour with the establishment, or France may have regrouped more quickly. As it was, the French did not keep enough forces in reserve for a counter-attack, but the Germans didn't know this at the time. If they had, they may have been less cautious.
B) This is fairly straightforward. You can't get troops onto ships nearly as quickly on a beach as you can from a port. Many vehicles and heavy pieces of equipment are impossible to embark on ships without the use of docking facilities. That is the reason ports are so important in naval and amphibious warfare. Dunkirk is not a port. The Germans, therefore, never imagined that the British could evacuate such huge numbers of personell from there; it is without a doubt the greatest successful retreat in history, even moreso than Mao's Long March. Since they didn't think the British could evacuate from a beach, there was no need for urgency in pressing the advantage against the BEF.
C) Strategic bombing is the idea that you can bomb your enemy into submission without using ground forces. This was a common belief during the 1930s and '40s. It fell out of favour after WWII, because it was blindingly obvious that ground forces were needed to secure every single objective in the war, for both the Allies and the Axis. In 1940, this was not yet obvious to the Germans, and as such they believed bombing to be more important to victory than it actually was.
This extended to their belief in the importance not just of strategic bombing, such as the bombing campaign that took place during the Battle of Britain, which was designed to either force Britain to surrender or to soften it up for an (impossible) invasion, but also to tactical bombing, or the bombing of specific targets in battle. Strategic bombing, for example, is bombing every bridge in a country to wreck their economy and force them to make peace; tactical bombing is bombing a single bridge to trap an enemy so you can kill them. The bombing at Dunkir, was tactical, but it had the hallmarks of the over-inflated belief in the importance of bombers that strategic bombing theories had popularised.
For what it's worth, strategic bombing is back in vogue, and as ineffective as ever; witness America's propensity to bomb its enemies, like ISIL, while announcing that they don't need "boots on the ground," because death from the sky will magically make a guerilla army lose morale, which is something that has literally never happened in the history of warfare. It actually makes them fight harder.
D) In warfare, one side often mis-estimates the forces available to the other side. The USSR, for example, was frightened of what they believed to be superior German military force in WWII, when in practice the USSR had far more military strength than Germany did. During the planning for the Battle of Midway, Japan did the opposite, underestimating the forces the US had available for combat, and as such walked into a crippling defeat. One reason for this is that, during warfare, soldiers often report merely damaged vehicles as destroyed, and in other cases communications between the central command and the front may be delayed. So the Germans may well have not realised exactly how many British vehicles they had already destroyed, and therefore held back in fear of a tank force that no longe existed.
E) Soldiers that have been consistently and comprehensively beaten often surrender. The Germans had grown used to this in their previous campaigns. They were quite surprised at the level of resistance they encountered from the BEF, as most enemies in this predicament would either surrender or collapse into confusion. This is what the French did, by the way. So it was understandable that the Germans might believe the British would do likewise.
Germany's paratroops took Holland and Greece even faster than they did France. They could have taken a port (that port NOT being Dover) and landed tanks slowly but surely. They wouldn't need a D-Day force if they were landing virtually unopposed. The problem was the numbers: a young beachhead is very vulnerable. The evacuees made that landing too risky without undisputed air superiority.
I doubt Hitler would have done a peace deal. He would have done a peace deal and then gone back on it.
I doubt Hitler would have done a peace deal. He would have done a peace deal and then gone back on it.
James Stuart
King
This is very, very wrong. Germany's paratroops were stunningly successful in a surgical strike in the Netherlands, it is true, but they were backed up very quickly by conventional forces. Germany didn't use paratroopers in Greece. I assume you mean the invasion of Crete, which was an unqualified disaster; Germany won because a New Zealand brigade evacuated an airfield after mistakenly believing they were facing a larger force than they really were. The paradrop itself was such a spectacular failure that it convinced the wehrmacht to never use paratroopers in such large numbers again.
Paradrops are a double-edged sword. While they can enable the quick seizure of objectives, unless the target is either much weaker - such as if the US invaded Bermuda - or has conventional forces advancing rapidly in support, they simply result in a bunch of soldiers trapped behind enemy lines, waiting to be annihilated by the surrounding army. This is what happened to the Allied paratroopers in Operation: Market Garden, the most famous use of paratroopers in the history of war.
I have no idea how you think Germany would get several hundred paratroopers across the English Channel in the face of the RAF, land them at a major port, seize that port in the face of armed resistance - and if the Germans were invading, the British civilians would likely fight as well, as happened in Crete, where German paratroopers were often shot and stabbed, and even had dogs set on them, while still in their parachutes, by the locals - then hold the ports long enough for a large force of German soldiers to cross the English Channel in non-existent troopships without being destroyed by the Royal Navy, and launch a conventional campaign in Great Britain without being destroyed by the British Army, which was a hell of a lot larger than the 300,000 men at Dunkirk, is beyond me. I can only assume you have absolutely no knowledge of logistics. This is not a game of Civ II where you can conquer London in the second turn. The German Navy did not have enough troopships to invade the UK. The end. In fact, wargames during the 1980s and 1990s have conclusively proven that Germany could not possibly have launched Operation: Sealion, regardless of how badly Britain messed up the defence.
The only risk was that Britain might prematurely make peace; Lord Halifax wanted to do this.
Why would Hitler renege on a peace deal with a state he couldn't actually conquer, and which he himself considered to be Germany's natural ally? He wrote about this in both Mein Kampff and its unpublished sequel; Germany and the British Empire would join forces against the USSR, and later invade and conquer the United States.
This is humbug. The battle of Britain - taking place after Dunkirk, obviously - wasn't about 'bombing Britain into surrender' at all. It was about taking out Britain's aerial defenses prior to an invasion.
Yes, I'm sure. Except, Mein Kampf didn't have an 'unpublished sequel'. (Not to mention it was written before Hitler even took control of Germany.)
James Stuart
King
Primarily, yes. But since Germany did not have the capacity to invade Britain - and Grand Admiral Raeder told Hitler this - a bombing campaign to prepare for an invasion makes no sense, and would only be a waste of resources. There is a school of thought - which, for the record, I happen to only partly disagree with - that the goal of the bombing campaign was more to frighten Britain into surrendering, rather than to actually soften it up for an invasion.
Zweites Buch.
I get it, Agent327. You read a bit of history in high school, think you know it all, and are prepared to defend that viewpoint in the face of factual proof that you are wrong. I was similar at your age, though I usually backed down when confronted with incontrovertible proof of my wrongness. But behaving like a child will only get you treated like a child. No one on these boards, or any other discussion forum, will ever take you seriously until you stop acting so petulantly, and start doing a little research before you rubbish other people's claims, especially when they happen to be correct.
There may be such a 'school of thought', but the actual bombing campaign was directed at taking at Britain's aerial defenses. Since this already failed the rest is, as they say, history.
Zweites Buch.
Unlike you, I've actually read Mein Kampf, Krshaw's monumental Hitler biography, and studied history at university.
Try and keep your personal attacks under control, son. Your quote above suggests you have no clue what actual research means.
James Stuart
King
I have read both Mein Kampff and its sequel. Refusing to acknowledge a Wiki source whose sole purpose is to prove somethings existence is quite pitiful (one might as well deny the existence of gorillas because their Wiki page has issues), and have Masters in History. Not that the latter means anything; I've met plenty of really bad historians, including those with doctorates. And I stand by my accusation about your behaviour.
But you have trouble reading This page has some issues.
At any rate, your Zweites Buch (never published, by the way) focuses entirely on foreign policy.
And frankly, I don't quite care about what you stand by. If you post humbug, I will point out it for what it is.
At any rate, your Zweites Buch (never published, by the way) focuses entirely on foreign policy.
And frankly, I don't quite care about what you stand by. If you post humbug, I will point out it for what it is.
I am guessing that he meant "never published, by the way" when he said it was "unpublished."
It's also of very little relevance to the battle of Britain, which is what the comment was about. It's not like Hitler used his private notes to decide how to battle an enemy that wouldn't surrender or sue for peace - something which he actually expected after the fall of France.
JohannaK
Heroically Clueless
I believe this is obvious, but if you are bombing someone, you sure would rather take out their aerial defences first so they can't hunt your bombers down. I don't see the incompatibility between the two views.
sarahramdave
Chieftain
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does this all occur for the battle for dunkirk
JohannaK
Heroically Clueless
Did you even read the whole post?
sarahramdave
Chieftain
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well me and my friends are writing an essay about dunkirk thats why i asked i see like five other battles in there
ParkCungHee
Deity
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Not very carefully, since you seem unfamiliar with the Second Book.
Ian Kershaw's Hitler: Hubris said:
Ian Kershaw's Hitler: Hubris said:
Ian Kershaw's Hitler: Hubris said:
It also shows up in his list of works cited on page 796.
James Stuart
King
The citation is to prove the existence of a book. The citation proves the existence of said book. I don't really give a toss about anything else on the page, as I'm not referencing anything on the page. Your clinging to the (relatively standard, for Wiki) statement that the page has issues in a sad attempt to avoid having to admit you were typing out of your arse about a subject you don't actually know about. As in the De Gaulle discussion in the MacArthur thread.
This discussion is like trying to teach Japanese to a monkey. Without knowing Japanese. But then again, this is a poster who is too stupid - or, more likely, a first year uni student who took a history class and now thinks they know everything there is to know about all history everywhere - to understand that, in another thread, when I say that the French military instigated a coup in favour of De Gaulle, I am in no way saying that De Gaulle, who was not a military officer at the time, was instigating the coup. Of course he doesn't realise that "never published" and "unpublished" are the same thing. And, for that matter, Mein Kampff II - as the version I read was known - has been published since Hitler's death, just not in his lifetime.
You're posts are so nonsensical people from outside of the forum are literally posting into the discussion just to point out their flaws. bhsup never posts here, and JoanK posts barely more often. I think it's quite conclusive which one of us is posting humbug.
Hitler's foreign policy manifesto is of no relevance to his foreign policy? Righto.
Because they are not incompatible. This is the reason why this particular historical debate has not been decided, and likely never will; Hitler never wrote down his exact goal for the Battle of Britain, so it is open to interpretation.
The traditional view was that he was softening up Britain for an invasion, but we know from Raeder's notes that he told Hitler that Operation: Sealion was untenable, even if both the RAF and RN were dealt with, due to Germany's lack of transports. So it makes no sense for Hitler to prepare for an invasion of a state he physically cannot invade. Hence, the theory that he wanted to force a capitulation, rather than invade.
It basically comes down to how much credit you give Hitler's military abilities; I give him more than most, because while not a natural general, he did possess remarkable instincts, probably honed during his years of political warfare, and several of his close friends were generals. Keitel in particular was close to Hitler. Hitler seldom made mistakes in offensive planning, but also had problems with understanding logistics; you see this in Barbarossa, where he often made very good tactical decisions, such as at Kiev, but failed to adequately supply his troops for attrition.
My personal view is that he would have taken a capitulation if it was offerred, but that he was probably counting on the Vichy Fleet falling into his hands, with which he may have believed an invasion feasible. I have no evidence to support this view, however.
Yes, the references to Stalingrad, Antwerp, Iraq, WWI, all of those things are directly to do with the retreat from Dunkirk. Jesus. I am clearly making an overall point about the situation, not a direct discussion of the battle.
Because he hasn't read it, PCH. He quickly Googled "Biographies of Hitler," found the most widely respected book, and claimed to have read it. He may have looked at a quick excerpt somewhere. But that's all. He reminds me of myself at 17.
r16
not deity
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what follows is not intented as a "help" or a signpost for those who have to prepare an article as an homework , for it would be really confusing and sort of unproductive . Rather it's pointless kind of rant of mine that one of my "theses" includes the notion that de Gaulle was chosen to be the saviour of France , being aware of Manstein's Sicklecut , aware of the forces involved , aware of the German view that the operation would not succeed in its "intented" goal but "What the heck!" and so on . But de Gaulle had no clue on "tank speed" .
as for rbkingb doing the necro , how cool it would be for CFC to discuss Rotterdam and Arras in the same sentence .
James Stuart
King
Your posts are seldom comprehensible r16, but are you trying to say that De Gaulle was part of some sort of long-term plot to take control of the French state, possibly in collusion with Vichy and/or Germany? Or that he had no idea what he was doing when he attacked the German force in 1940? Because, as a man who wrote a book on tank warfare that was read by both Manstein and Guderian before the war, he was possibly the only man in France who did know exactly what was needed to stop an armoured race to the sea.
gyozelemlg
Chieftain
Here is another person who registered just to participate in this discussion.
Having read tons of books on this topic I tend to agree with those who believe that the decision to halt the panzers was due to the following factors:
1. Due to previous personal experiences in ww1 where French moral at least initially was quite high the Germans were excessively concerned about a major French counterstroke and therefore wanted to spare the panzers.
2. It was thought that the terraine was not ideal for the panzers so like so many other instances later on they wanted the infantry to catch up-typical ww1 thinking.
3. There probably was an element of overestimation of the otherwise well-performing Luftwaffe.
However, I suspect that there was an element of political undertone behind this decision.
Hitler still hoped at this stage to make peace with Britain with the idea that Churchill falling a new government more friendly with Germany might come to power. With this his original vision (arising from the failure in ww1 being largely due to the naval blockade) might be realized after all with Britain as ally and Lebensraum guaranteeing raw materials in the East. I strongly believe that Hitler never wanted to destroy Britain and had wishful thinking in terms of the political wind eventually changing in Britain. He was a man of strong beliefs and consistency. Even before Barbarossa he may have thought there might be a silent agreement with Britain's aristocratic circles on his plans to eradicate communism. So the thinking might have been that the BEF at Dunkirk would be a kind of leverage for the negotiations in case the British sued for armistice.
Hitler certainly knew that he had not planned for an invasion-he did not have a navy, he did not have a warplan, it was against his vision so fighting Britain was as uncomfortable and unnatural for him as being temporary friends with the Soviets. He wanted to potpone things and hoped Churchill might fall and an armistice might be possible.
Having read tons of books on this topic I tend to agree with those who believe that the decision to halt the panzers was due to the following factors:
1. Due to previous personal experiences in ww1 where French moral at least initially was quite high the Germans were excessively concerned about a major French counterstroke and therefore wanted to spare the panzers.
2. It was thought that the terraine was not ideal for the panzers so like so many other instances later on they wanted the infantry to catch up-typical ww1 thinking.
3. There probably was an element of overestimation of the otherwise well-performing Luftwaffe.
However, I suspect that there was an element of political undertone behind this decision.
Hitler still hoped at this stage to make peace with Britain with the idea that Churchill falling a new government more friendly with Germany might come to power. With this his original vision (arising from the failure in ww1 being largely due to the naval blockade) might be realized after all with Britain as ally and Lebensraum guaranteeing raw materials in the East. I strongly believe that Hitler never wanted to destroy Britain and had wishful thinking in terms of the political wind eventually changing in Britain. He was a man of strong beliefs and consistency. Even before Barbarossa he may have thought there might be a silent agreement with Britain's aristocratic circles on his plans to eradicate communism. So the thinking might have been that the BEF at Dunkirk would be a kind of leverage for the negotiations in case the British sued for armistice.
Hitler certainly knew that he had not planned for an invasion-he did not have a navy, he did not have a warplan, it was against his vision so fighting Britain was as uncomfortable and unnatural for him as being temporary friends with the Soviets. He wanted to potpone things and hoped Churchill might fall and an armistice might be possible.
