America's First Forgotten War: The Philippine-American War

[El Justo]

The Katipunan was the name of the secret rebel organization that Bonifacio founded. Not sure of its connection with Freemasonry.

At one time they approached Jose Rizal (while he was in exile in Dapitan and before he was executed) and offered him leadership but he declined. Rizal was a reformist but loyal to Spain at heart. Now he was a Freemason.

yes, you're right. i would say that the connection between the 2 groups is the secretive and ritualistic nature of both. that's all.

Rizal, imho, was the most fascinating of all of the actors of the Philippine Revolution. his demise was a sad one

 

[El Justo]

The title of the book is Sitting in Darkness by David Bain. You can have my copy if I can ever find it. It's boxed up in the garage with the rest of the unshelved portion of my library. If you don't want to wait Amazon has used copies starting at $1.55.

Here is the Washington Post's book review:
"The Washington Post, February 24, 1985

IN WHICH WAR was the term "****" invented? When did American soldiers conduct their first body count and pioneer the use of the "water cure" to persuade Asian guerrillas to betray their comrades?

After which battle did a young rifleman write home to the folks in Kingston, New York, "I am in my glory when I can sight my gun on some dark skin and pull the trigger"?

Modern as it all sounds, the answer is not Vietnam, or even Korea or World War II. The American conquest of the Philippines barely rates a mention in school history books, usually as a cryptic footnote to the short war which President William McKinley and publisher William Randolph Hearst waged on Spain in 1898 for the independence of Cuba and the circulation of Hearst's newspapers. Yet 126,458 Americans fought in the Philippines between 1898 and 1902, of whom 4,234 died, while 16,000 Filipinos died in battle and another 200,000 in "reconcentration camp." There were in addition massacres of civilians in reprisal for guerrilla attacks and similar sideshows all too familiar in subsequent Asian wars.

The story of how, and why America liberated the Philippines from Spain and then took the islands back from their inhabitants two weeks later is a complicated one, already well told in one of the classics of American historiography, Leon Wolff's Little Brown Brother, published in 1960. But the writing of history is never finished, and David Haward Bain has managed another fine book on the subject, not disagreeing with Wolff's conclusions, but making them fresh and vivid for a generation which has seen yet another Asian war.

This is not, however, simply another tale of savagery in the rice paddies. Almost as if he could read tomorrow's newspapers, Bain has brought his account up to the minute, with perceptive entries, for instance, indexed under Aquino Benigno and Ver, General Fabian (the latter currently on trial for complicity in the former's assassination). This energetic young historian has thus pulled off that rarest of publishing coups, a scholarly historical work of bang-on topicality. He has, what's more, found a most original way of bringing his story to life.

From this distance, and even at the time, the American conquest of the Philippines has always been difficult to fathom. But, then and now, two figures jump forth from a cast of thousands: Emilio Aguinaldo, not quite 30, brave and passionately patriotic, the president of the republic of the Philippines proclaimed as the beaten Spaniards departed (and the first republic in Asia) and Colonel Frederick Funston, six years older, who drove the last nail into the republic's coffin by capturing Aguinaldo on March 23, 1901, after a long and daring hunt through the jungles and mountains of northern Luzon.

Aguinaldo, who looked remarkably like his current successor, Ferdinand Marcos, survived his capture and lived a long life, long enough to welcome the arrival of the Japanese in 1942 (understandably, perhaps; the new invaders also promised liberation), to march in the Manila independence parade of 1946, carrying the flag he first raised against Spain in 1896, and to see a new American war just getting under way in Asia in 1964, the year of his death. A largely forgotten figure now, even in the Philippines, Aguinaldo emerges from Bain's book an authentic hero and his republic a tragically missed chance for the United States to have been the protector of Asia's first genuine democracy.

His captor, the adventurous son of a Kansas politician known as "Foghorn Funston, the farmers' friend" was plainly just as archetypal a figure. "I am afraid that some people at home will lie awake nights worrying about the ethics of this war, thinking that our enemy is fighting for the right of self-government" he told a New York Times correspondent. "The word independent, which these people roll over their tongues so glibly, is to them a word, and not much more . . . . they are, as a rule, an illiterate, semisavage people, who are waging war, not against tyranny, but against Anglo-Saxon order and decency." Funston's feat, a mixture of reckless daring and ingenious double-cross, or what used to be known in Vietnam as a "John Wayne stunt," was the stuff of movies, and would have made a splendid vehicle for James Cagney (Funston was 5 feet 4 inches tall and touchy about it) if Hollywood had blossomed before American imperialism went out of fashion.

BUT, LIKE MANY a veteran from the East, Funston could not settle down to life back home, took to the bottle and died at 51 in 1917, when he was being seriously considered for command of the American Expeditionary Force that went to France that year. But for his heart attack, in fact, we would very likely now be debating the merits of the Funston rocket instead of the one named for his deputy, General John Pershing, who got the job instead.

Here, unmistakably, we have the Green Beret, or cowboy turned romantic military stuntman. In fact, Funston's boss, General Arthur MacArthur, father of the even more famous Douglas, was an old Indian fighter, and so were many of his buddies in the 20th Kansas infantry he led to the Philippines. The fact that the Far East is West of the Wild West has profoundly shaped America's wars there, a point made in the insightful and absurd movie The Deer Hunter.

It is hard to quarrel with Bain's conclusion that the years of American rule did little or nothing to solve the basic political problem of the Philippines. After three centuries of Spanish colonial government, the islands had none of the institutions of self-rule and no experience of it. All the new rulers achieved was a superficial Americanization of the illustrades, the Hispanicized native upper class, leaving the masses in pious poverty and the way open for a native-born dictatorship to follow the authoritarian rule of slippery Spaniards and decent Anglo-Saxons. People learn self-government by governing themselves and making their own mistakes, and America put off the Philippines' fateful day for 50 years, failing, in the end, even to supply the military protection that is the only justification for empire.

But Americans are still well thought of in the Philippines, as Bain and a group of friends, including his photographer-brother Christopher, discovered when they repeated Funston's epic trek through the Luzon jungle in 1982, talking to the same locals, fording the same streams, and being bitten by descendants of the same mosquitoes which bit the pint-sized adventurer and his party 80 years earlier. Melding past and present, and interweaving the historical background with present politics brings vividly home the long shadows still cast by America's first adventure in Asia. This is an important story, honestly researched and well told -- a second classic, in fact, on a fascinating subject."

that's great info 7ronin. thanks for sharing.

no need to dig through the garage my friend. the title of the book is all i need

i hope they had good anti-malaria pills for that repeat of Funston's trek!

 

[El Justo]

The Manila Conflict

Or Germany's role in the Spanish American War

After the Monroe Doctrine was no longer part of the US political agenda also the German and US interests clashed in several occasions before WW1. One of them is called Manila Conflict or Manila Crise.
This is an amendment to El Justo's posts here. He was so kind to allow me to post it here.

The war with Spain brought the Phillipines at least for a short time into the flash light of the international policy. These islands were suddenly claimed not only by the US and Spain but also France, Britain and Russia. And also the Japanese were in the race. Wilhelm II. and the German foreign secretary, v. Bülow, made clear that Germany, despite British press reports, did not have any claims about the islands. (The British press however, like today, went on with her anti German reports and soon the US press followed. This should be known as background information.)
However since so many states had claims on the islands and the situation there was everything else than clear, the Kaiser sent Vizeadmiral Otto von Diederichs to Manila to look after the situation there. His only instruction however was the news Germany had no claims. So v. Diederichs went to Manila to investigate the situation.
In this moment v. Diederichs was the commander of the German East Asian squadron. Following ships belonged to it:
SMS Kaiser as flagship, an old battleship, now rated as Großer Kreuzer (Large cruiser ~Armoured cruiser)
SMS Deutschland, SMS Kaiser's sister
SMS Kaiserin Augusta, a new armoured cruiser
SMS Irene, a light cruiser
SMS Prinzeß Wilhelm, light cruiser
SMS Arcona, light cruiser
SMS Gefion, light cruiser
SMS Cormoran, also a light cruiser

Several nations did have sent already warships to Manila with the same task like v. Diederichs, when he arrived on June 12th on SMS Kaiserin Augusta, as SMS Kaiser was in repair. SMS Cormoran and SMS Irene were already waiting there. None of these three ships had trouble so far entering the port.
V. Diederichs made his first report: The situation was described as chaotic. The US would rule the seas and the shores, but only so long the ship guns would fire. On the islands the Spanish would still fight and also another party, the Phillipinos, would fight both not willing to exchange one colonial master for the other.
However soon nearly another party would have been involved in the war: the Germans. Until the 18th there were no problems with the US ships. However this changed dramatically when SMS Prinzeß Wilhelm and two days later SMS Kaiser arrived. Although the US commander, Rear Admiral Dewey, was told the ships would only bring fresh crews, the relationship between the Germans and Americans became colder and colder. Although v. Diederichs again made clear that Germany has no own claims on the islands, rumors, one of which saying Konteradmiral (rear admiral) Heinrich Prinz von Preußen would soon arrive with the rest of the squadron, and some small struggles between German and US ships nearly lead to an escalation of the situation on July 10th. Admiral v. Diederichs flag officer, Kapitänleutnant Hintze, had the order to make the German position clear, as the US demanded an inspection of the German ships as they flamed the Germans to break the blockade. In the following communication Admiral Dewey got more and more furious. He "forgot himself (er fiel aus der Rolle)" as v. Diederichs wrote in his official report. Dewey threatened with war: "... and this means war, young man!"
V. Diederichs at once talked personally with Dewey. He complained about the situation and the threat. He was mild in the words but strong indeed. Dewey's behaviour is even more unexplaineable as SMS Irene left already the harbour and SMS Cormoran would follow soon, on July 15th, as also Dewey knew (in the US however the NY state Newspaper wrote, Dewey should destroy the German squadron and the other US forces the rest of the German fleet).
Nevertheless the situation soon calmed down after a meeting of the international commanders with Dewey. After that an agreement was made and the crise was over (in my sources it is said between the words that Dewey was taught in law of the seas in this meeting).
So a war with the US was avoided. For this time.

Adler

ahh! now i remember!

i do indeed recall this incident. i did not review any German sources though.

in a nutshell, i believe that the USN felt "disrespected" b/c the German fleet you mentioned failed to yield and honor the American flag of the US squadron in Manila Bay. i reckon that Dewey took it quite personal. i'll dig through my sources right-quick to see if i can find any additional info.

however, this was certainly an interesting turn of events. thanks for sharing!

 

[El Justo]

Adler:

okay - i've found it in Zimmermann, pp 301-2.

a further search reveals that Zimmermann attributes his assertions to Dewey's autobiography. anyway-

i will type the exact text from the Zimmermann passage (it's not too long):

this is during the exact period Adler describes and it's wrt the USN blockade going on around the port of Manila.

Dewey's reinforcements found the newly minted rear admiral in what he himself called "a period of deep anxiety" as he blockaded Manila Bay. Warships from Britain, France, Japan, and Germany, all interested in the newly vulnerable strategic archipelago, had swarmed toward the harbor after the battle. Most of the ships observed the protocol of a blockade, reporting to Dewey and anchoring where they would not impede his blockading operations against the Spanish. But the Germans, who had brought in five warships comparable in power to the American squadron, got shirty about recognizing American authority. They often failed to report, anchored where they chose, and displayed ostentacious chumminess with the Spanish officials in Manila, even exchanging visits with the Spanish captain general. When a German warship interfered with Filipino rebels operations against the Spanish, Dewey decided to get tough with the German commander, Vice Admiral Otto von Diederichs.

By the account of both German and American eyewitnesses, the American admiral lost his temper with Diederich's flag lieutenant and threatened war if the Germans did not stop violating the blockade. The confrontation never got beyond rhetoric, and Dewey chose to play it down. Perhaps embarassed that his temper had nearly propelled him into an unauthorized conflict with a powerful adversary, he did not even report it to Washington. President McKinley heard of it but chose to pass it off lightly the first time he met Dewey face to face. From a more spartan president the feisty little admiral would have merited a reprimand, but McKinley knew better than to take on a war hero.

The skirmishing in Manila Bay demonstrated Germany's predatory interest in the Philippines; v. Diederichs told Dewey that he was there "by order of the Kaiser. It also showed the British in a favorable light. The skipper of the one British ship in the harbor strongly backed Dewey in his successful effort to face down the German commander. The German challenge in the Philippines, though weakened by British cooperation with the American squadron, added complexity to Dewey's problems and made him increasingly anxious for reinforcements. It was becoming difficult just ot "sail away"; Manila at least had to be taken.

 

[Adler17]

I do have problems with autobiographies. They are mostly biased, even if the author tried to be as objective as possible. I don´t think the Germans did not respect the US flag. However Diederichs was sent to investigate the situation and so needed to have contact with ALL parties. The US saw in this because of the rumors perhaps a violating of their interests although the German government did reject all claims on the islands, what also was known the Dewey.
Also to my sources Dewey was faced down, however this passage is missing some valuable informations for the whole picture, as Germany did not have any claims and some German ships already sailed away or were ordered to do so.
However this is a good topic for a further investigation. I mean that the infos we have seem too few to make a whole picture of the situation.

Adler

 

[YNCS]

Diederichs was sent to "investigate" the situation and take as much advantage of it as possible. The Kaiser was anxious to get an overseas empire but most of the prime real estate had already been grabbed. Then the Philippines appear ripe for taking from Spain. If Deiderichs could force Dewey to stand down, then Germany would finally have an overseas empire worth something.

 

[El Justo]

yes, autobiographies most definitely have a tendency to be biased.

i think that their importance as primary resources is that they are often able to uncover the 'humanistic' apsects of event; like Dewey's apprarent rage and temper tantrum.

what would anger me if i was Dewey was the German "chumniess" w/ the Spanish officials in Manila. i mean, there's a blockade going on after all.

however, Adler is correct. instances like these could use some more uncovering and a closer examination of both German and American sources in order to get a more clear picture.

maybe we shall co-author a book my friend?

 

[7ronin]

Here's that banknote I was talking about earlier.

I will put something together about Moros and .45's when I get a chance.

 

[YNCS]

There isn't much to Moros and .45s.

During the Philippine War, the standard sidearm (pistol) of the U.S. Army was a .38 caliber (9 mm) revolver. It was discovered that a Moro could be hit six times with .38 slugs and keep on coming. So the U.S. Army decided to change to a pistol firing the largest bullet available, .45 caliber (11.43 mm). The .45, which had been used by some soldiers in the American Civil War, was a known manstopper. For over 80 years, the U.S. Pistol, .45 caliber, M1911A1, was the standard sidearm of the U.S. military. In the 1990s, bowing to NATO pressure for standardization, the U.S. military changed again to a 9 mm pistol.

I understand that, because of experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. Army is considering changing again, to a 11.5 mm pistol.

 

[El Justo]

well, i think that in the nature of the thread that, yes, the Moros and the .45 is indeed interesting.

 

[El Justo]

Smith’s next significant step for civil reconstruction in Negros consisted of what Linn declared was “unique to the occupied areas”[41]. A two hundred man local constabulary force was raised by Smith upon his arrival to the island. He “constantly sought to improve its pay, rations, medicine, uniforms and weaponry” and as a result, its members were used by the Army in a variety of roles; many were used as scouts and as guides. The “Battalion of Native Reserve” was raised in August of 1899 by Smith and put under the command of Sime. Competent officers were sought by Smith and Sime and at the end of the summer of 1899, this local constabulary in and around Bacolod were capable of conducting traditional police-force patrols thus freeing up American soldiers from the mundane and sometimes dangerous aspects of such work. Smith is even quoted as saying that the native battalion was “among the most successful scout-police forces the U.S. Army raised, without a single deserter or lost rifle in its entire existence.”[42] Their assistance clearly made it easier for American forces to safeguard the eighty mile wide area bordering the island’s interior where the banditti and ladrones operated. [43]

Resistance in Negros paled in comparison to that on other islands within the archipelago. The banditti and ladrones were comprised largely of “guerillas, bandits and Babylanes” and their attacks were done primarily to inflict terror on the peaceful inhabitants of the island’s interior.[44] By late-May of 1899 however, the raids had become such a nuisance to the 1st California and the local constabulary that Smith requested more troops.[45] By July 1899, ten companies of Charles W. Miner’s 6th Infantry arrived on Negros to relieve Sime and the 1st California. Companies H and K, under the command of Captain Bernard A. Bryne, launched a series of daring raids into Negros’s interior in order to destroy the guerilla strongholds and stem the wave of terrorism they were spreading throughout the country sides.[46]
The resistance on Negros was waning by the end of the summer, 1899. Smith had a clear plan for the Negrenses at this point and it was to prepare them for self-government and the forthcoming elections in October. In an August 13, 1899 proclamation, Smith assured local Negrenses that the October elections would establish a local government where all citizens would enjoy “the full measure of human liberty which they may be capable of enjoying.” It was intended to make all of the island’s inhabitants, both rich and poor, “equal before the law.”[47] Smith addressed the newly elected officials on November 9, 1899. Linn stated that this particular address forms the foundation of the ‘benevolent assimilation’ that the Americans so intently were trying achieve in the Philippines.[48] In it, Smith emphasized public order, suppression of “men who live by the bolo” and that the local officials ought to end their “petty extortions and illegal exactions” against the “poor and ignorant.”[49] Furthermore, it was the responsibility of the newly elected officials to “provide honest and efficient government, trim bloated bureaucracies, and collect taxes equitably.”[50] Free public education and a local department of public health were advocated as well. Finally, the commercial aspects of Smith’s reconstruction plan in Negros also demanded the continued promotion of the telegraph and the economic benefits that accompany it. Accordingly, Linn notes that Smith’s actions in Negros form the “hallmarks of U.S. Army civic reform” during the American-Philippine War.

The island of Samar is located south-east of Luzon on the eastern side of the archipelago. It remained a “backwater”[51] in the war for quite some time. Resistance was light and unorganized and Otis did not put much importance on garrisoning any large contingent of forces on the island. By July 1900, the U.S. had tenuously held only the port cities of Calbayog and Catbalogan in the western half of the island. However, Samar would become what Linn described as the “best known” incident of the war, the “Balangiga Massacre” and Jacob H. Smith’s “howling wilderness.”[52] Extremely “controversial at the time,” the incident on Samar “became lodged in both popular and the academic mind as the microcosm of the entire war.” Furthermore, the “many textbooks view the entire war through the prism of these final regional conflicts.” [53] Thus a good portion of the public accounts and perceptions of the Philippine War, even to this day, revolve primarily around the “Massacre.” U.S. Marine Corps lore in Samar had become “symbolic” of the perceived “sacrifice and heroism” performed by these soldiers during the conflict.[54] This aside, it is “one of the greatest historical fallacies” of the entire war that this tragic occurrence is seen as “representative of both U.S. Army pacification and Filipino resistance.”[55] The task of the following analysis is to uncover the truth behind the incident on Samar.



By May 1901, Gen. MacArthur, now in command of the 8th Corps, had decided to transfer Samar back to Gen. Hughes and the Department of the Visayas. Hughes was instructed to take “drastic measures” against “Samar’s ferocious rebels” that were under the command of the insurgent leader Vicente Lubkan.[56] They had been conducting raids from the interior that were similar in nature to those that were being done on the other Visayan Islands. Hughes concluded that the situation had indeed begun to spin out of control due to the lack of American manpower. The aforementioned ‘scorched-earth campaign’ was the method of choice for Hughes as he sought to starve the guerillas out by destroying the countryside’s livestock and crops. The naval blockade around Samar was also heightened. Civilian sea vessels were seized save for those used exclusively for fishing. Of primary concern for Hughes at this time was the illicit smuggling that was occurring in and out of Samar. Most of the activity was coming from the island of Leyte which lye only several miles across the narrow San Juanico Strait. Leyte had recently been turned over to Taft’s Philippine Commission in May of 1901 and as a result, MacArthur pulled the all remaining forces off of this island.[57] In an effort to stem the tide of illicit smuggling into and out of Samar, Hughes stationed a battalion of the 9th Infantry along the coastal towns of Balangiga, Lanang, Santa Rita and Basey. They were also ordered on extended patrols up the Oras River in order to trash the country sides and deny the enemy refuge and sustenance. One particular patrol under the command of Captain Mark L. Hersey claimed to have “burned houses by the hundreds for the next twenty miles.”[58] The American garrison at Laguan estimated that they alone had destroyed 145 houses and 5,025 bushels of rice all in only one month.[59] In August of 1901, Captain Henry Jackson and the 1st Infantry moved “completely across the northern half of the island” in an effort to destroy Lubkan’s rearguard. They succeeded in capturing several members of the insurgent leader’s family as well as “most of his papers.”[60] By the summer’s end, Samar’s interior was devoid of sustenance not only for the insurgents but for many of its peaceful inhabitants. Hughes’s policy of destruction warranted the need to construct resettlement zones for the displaced and war-ravaged locals. Thus the coastal cities were teeming with starving and bewildered Filipinos. “Mass starvation” was becoming a very real possibility, even in the pacified coastal towns.[61] Hughes, sensing an impending calamity, loosened the grip of the naval blockades and allowed for limited trade with Leyte. Agents were put in charge to deal with the Commission in Leyte in order to secure the much needed provisions for the cities.



Samar’s fearsome reputation was born in June 1901 when a twenty-six man patrol under Lt. Edward E. Downes attempted to traverse the narrow peninsula at the extreme southern tip of the island. It consisted primarily of hills, mountains and dense jungles and had not yet been mapped by the U.S. military. During the midst of their destructive path northwards, they suddenly found themselves lost in the dense thickets. The non-commissioned officers urged Downes to make haste for the coast in order to regroup and determine their location. Downes declined and ordered the soldiers on when all of a sudden, “a horde of bolomen” appeared and “chaos” erupted for several minutes as the Filipino swordsmen slashed away at close range.[62] Two Americans died and another two were wounded. Among the dead was Downes who was fatally stabbed in the hand-to-hand fighting. The survivors were “badly shaken” and abandoned their dead and forged on without their leader. It wasn’t for three more days without food or water until they were found. Hughes’s strategy of pillaging and burning seemed to have “increased the ferocity and desperation of the resistance.” [63]

These types of ambushes were beginning to become the norm in Samar. Insurgents attempted to cut American supply lines and raided and terrorized the outlying towns. Hughes’s troops in Samar were stretched dangerously thin and the rebels knew it. An ‘us-against-them’ mentality was prevalent amongst the U.S. troops. Everything finally came to a head on September 28, 1901 in the small coastal town of Balangiga where the seventy-four man garrison of Company C, 9th Infantry was stationed. In the first weeks of September, Captain Thomas W. Connell ordered a “misguided project to clean up the town.”[64] He had concentrated dozens of Filipinos in tents at the city’s outskirts in an effort to clean up and rebuild the town. Hundreds of insurgents began infiltrating into the city. Some came as “laborers, as members of a wedding party, or even dressed as women.”[65] The insurgents had infiltrated the work camp. The soldiers began their Sunday breakfast early on that morning of 28 September when the local police chief approached an American sentry and suddenly pulled out a bolo and cut him down. A “mob” of bolomen charged out of the town’s church and the tents and they went directly for Company C. The soldiers began scurrying, some nearly naked. Connell and his subordinate, Lt. Edward A. Bumpus were killed. The desperate soldiers began grabbing whatever they could to defend themselves whether it was a “Krag, kitchen implements and even cans of food.”[66] Several members of Company C actually managed to flee for the beach and the barcas that would ferry them away to the near-by garrison at Basey. They left behind 100 rifles, 25,000 rounds of ammunition, and large supplies of medicine, food and equipment. Furthermore, forty-eight of their comrades were killed in the sneak attack.[67] Hughes was furious and blamed Connell for his overly conciliatory and nurturing approach. Hughes was quoted as stating that Connell “treated the Filipinos with compassion, and they responded with treachery.”[68] Linn described the sequence of events as “duplicitous and barbaric” and captured letters later revealed that the event had been planned for months.[69] A varying array of accounts of the encounter began to circulate. The Americans claimed that the Filipinos mutilated corpses. A heroic slant was molded out of the American accounts. The insurgent leader denied this claim and also declared that Company C had been “needlessly antagonizing the villagers by stealing, brutality and at least one rape.”[70] Combine this with the famine-like conditions on Samar and a recipe for disaster in most definitely in order.

The American public and the Army alike were outraged. The military brass in Manila was convinced that a full-fledged insurrection was imminent. The Navy bombarded Balangiga until it was a hulking ruin. By November 1, 1901, four thousand troops of the newly-created 6th Brigade were sent to occupy the town. Gen. Hughes selected Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Smith to lead them. It would turn into “one of the gravest errors of the war.”[71] Smith’s “muddy ethics, his limited military skills, and his intemperate character” would unfortunately be one of the most remembered incidents of the entire war. The first task for Smith was to recapture the lost rifles and ammunition. It is said that Smith interpreted this order as a green light to not only hunt down the remaining elements of resistance but to also exact revenge for the massacre at Balangiga.[72] Thus the scorched-earth campaign continued. Between 10 October and 31 December 1901, U.S. forces had killed or captured 759 insurgents, 587 carabaos (draft animals) and destroyed tons of rice, 1662 houses and 226 boats. Riverine patrols also increased.[73] Smith continued his aggressive approach in a memo to U.S. Marine Maj. Littleton W.T. Waller whose battalion had landed ashore after the naval bombardments. In it, he urged Waller to “kill and burn” and to spare absolutely no quarter for the enemy. Furthermore, he was to regard every Filipino male over the age of ten as a possible combatant. Smith wished Waller to make Samar’s interior a “howling wilderness.”[74] From 31 October until 10 November, Waller set out on this path of destruction. His troops burnt 255 houses, destroyed one ton of hemp, a half a ton of rice, thirteen carabaos, and thirty boats. Thirty-nine insurgents were killed and another eighteen were captured.[75] By January 1902, Waller’s Marines had reached the coastal town of Basey where they conducted a series of summary executions for what Waller described as the purported “treachery” of the captured spies and double-agents of the city.[76] More incidents of retribution were occurring on the island at the same time. Maj. Edwin F. Glenn was alleged to have kidnapped, tortured and conspired to murder twelve Filipinos between October 1901 and January 1902.[77] Cpt. William Wallace was accused of ordering the execution of seven prisoners on 4 December 1901. These incidents would produce an immediate outrage back in the States. The American public demanded answers. Waller and his adjutant, Lt. John H. A. Day, were court-martialed for their actions in Samar. Day claimed that Waller had ordered him to conduct the executions. Accordingly, Waller testified that Gen. Smith had given him the order to murder and torture thus making the directive to make Samar’s interior a “howling wilderness” a reality. It is this term that the American pacification efforts on Samar became to be known. Linn noted that “the trials seem to embody the brutality, ambiguity, and frustration of our first Asian guerrilla conflict.”[78] It is unfortunate that these are the images of the Philippine-American War that seem to have found their way into mainstream American accounts. There are however, more pleasant and successful episodes of military pacification and civic reconstruction in the archipelago.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
[41] Linn, The Philippine War, 76.
[42] Cited in Linn, The Philippine War, 77.
[43] banditti: bandits, ladrones: thieves. Resistance on Negros was concentrated in the island’s interior and the extent of their offensive capacities consisted of foraging, kidnapping and sniping.
[44] Linn, The Philippine War, 77. The Babylanes are a particular race or tribe found on Negros.
[45] Linn, The Philippine War, 77.
[46] Linn, The Philippine War, 79, 81. Byrne led a few raids. One was a “risky night-time raid” against the Babylanes on 18 July 1899. On 31 August, Byrne led another expedition to root out an enemy arsenal. Most importantly, Byrne crushed the remaining elements of resistance on 2 October 1899 when he smashed Santillana, the insurgent leader, in open combat. As a result, numerous other guerilla bands surrendered later that month. In total, his raids proved immensely successful with very few U.S. casualties.
[47] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 82.
[48] Linn, The Philippine War, 82.
[49] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 82.
[50] Linn, The Philippine War, 83.
[51] Linn, The Philippine War, 306.
[52] Linn, The Philippine War, 306.
[53] Linn, The Philippine War, 306.
[54] Linn, The Philippine War, 306. The author notes that, upon entering mess halls years after the incident, Marine veterans were always promptly saluted. “Stand, Gentlemen, he served on Samar!”
[55] Linn, The Philippine War, 306.
[56] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 306.
[57] Linn, The Philippine War, 307. MacArthur and the Commission did not see eye-to-eye on many matters both political and military. This particular instance is typical of friction that existed between the military and civilian authorities in the Philippines.
[58] Quoted in Linn, Ibid., 308
[59] Linn, The Philippine War, 308.
[60] Linn, The Philippine War, 308.
[61] Linn, The Philippine War, 309.
[62] Linn, The Philippine War, 309.
[63] Linn, The Philippine War, 308. Linn noted that “Samar’s fearsome reputation” was born out of incidents exactly like this one.
[64] Linn, The Philippine War, 310.
[65] Linn, The Philippine War, 310.
[66] Linn, The Philippine War, 311. Krag: Krag-Jourgenson rifles were the primary fire arms issued to U.S. soldiers in the Philippines.
[67] Linn, The Philippine War, 311.
[68] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 311.
[69] Linn, The Philippine War, 311. It is noted that the captured letters were addressed to Lubkan and they detailed the “deceptive policy” toward the occupying Americans. On another note, this same cache of captured records revealed a plan for Balangiga’s infiltrators to mutilate the corpses of the American dead. The letter was dated May 31, 1901 and was written by “P. Ayabar” and addressed to the “Commanding Gen. of this Province, Samar.” It later caused quite a stir in lieu of the varying accounts and accusations that followed the massacre.
[70] Linn, The Philippine War, 311. Lieutenant Colonel Daza, the insurgent leader of the uprising, “strongly denied” the American accusations of corpse mutilation by saying that “there was no time to lose for such acts” during the bedlam and confusion that occurred. However, it is still not known for certain whether Daza’s insurrectos actually committed such acts.
[71] Linn, The Philippine War, 312.
[72] Linn, The Philippine War, 312.
[73] Linn, The Philippine War, 312.
[74] Quoted in Linn, Ibid., 312. Gen. Smith could not give an order to Waller to conduct these murderous raids because he was under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Navy as a Maj. in the Marine Corps.
[75] Linn, The Philippine War, 316.
[76] Linn, The Philippine War, 316.
[77] Linn, The Philippine War, 316. Glenn was reported as implying that his company of the 6th Brigade was seeking revenge for the Balangiga massacre. Twelve Filipinos were summarily executed under Glenn’s orders. He kidnapped suspects from both Samar and Leyte and initiated tortuous interrogations – among them, three priests. The official court-martial documents concluded that Glenn possessed a “reckless disregard for human life.”
[78] Linn, The Philippine War, 319.

 

[El Justo]

The actions of Lt. Col. James Parker in the Philippines deserve mention. Between August 1899 and April 1901, Parker commanded six important expeditions and participated in twenty total engagements.[79] Parker arrived in Manila aboard the transport Valencia on July 30, 1899 with two troops of the 4th Cavalry and two companies of the 24th Infantry. By September 1899, he was promoted from Captain to Lieutenant Colonel and placed in command of the 45th Infantry where he saw action in the Laguna de Bay coastal city of Calamba. Not satisfied with the backwater nature of the Calamba assignment, Parker petitioned to be transferred back to the front lines in northern Luzon. On October 19, 1899, he arrived back in Manila and was ordered to head in the direction of San Isidro, the location of Gen. Samuel B. M. Young, the Cavalry’s commanding general in northern Luzon. Parker had numerous engagements with the enemy along his route from Manila. He earned significant distinction in one particular engagement in November 1899. In it, Parker, along with another troop of cavalry and two companies of Macabebe scouts, dispersed a large concentration of insurgents around the town of Cabanatuan in central Luzon. The press later dubbed it “Parker’s Raid” because of his valiance and swift decision making in the heat of battle.[80] Over the next seven months, Parker and his cavalry troops engaged in a wide-ranging search-and-destroy mission all throughout Luzon in order to nullify and wipe out what had remained of Aguinaldo’s Army of Liberation. By June of 1900, with much of the aforementioned accomplished, Parker was ordered to dislodge enemy resistance in the south-eastern Luzon city of Lagonoy. Parker’s actions in this region are the focus of the next section.
Lt. Col. Parker, along with three companies of infantry, three troops of cavalry and two guns from the Astor Battery, disembarked from Nueva Caceres towards the southern edge of Mount Isarog on the eastern side of southern Luzon. They were also assisted by the steamboat Montanes which loitered off the coast of Lagonoy. Under Parker’s direct command were two of the aforementioned infantry companies, the two troops of cavalry and the two guns, one hundred eighty-eight men in total. Maj. Dennis E. Nolan and a troop from the 11th Cavalry approached Lagonoy from the north side of Mount Isarog. The third infantry company came from the south and south-west respectively. Their task was to capture the city and disperse any resistance that the city may harbor. As the Montanes approached the coastal defenses of Lagonoy, the insurgents were seen fleeing from their trenches. Parker noted that he and his troops were on the enemy’s “right, their rear and their left rear. It was too much for them; they fled and separated into small bands!”[81] Thus resistance was minimal as the Americans entered the city.


Lagonoy is located on the Caramoan Peninsula

Upon hearing of Parker’s relatively easy entry into and around Lagonoy, Gen. Bell recalled half of Parker’s total forces from the city thus leaving him with only one troop of cavalry and one company of infantry. Parker was now responsible for protecting several of the region’s villages and the “four large towns and the port, and keep the rest of the country free of the enemy” with only half of his original man-power.[82] Parker promptly dispatched a corporal and six men to hold the port of Sabang, a lieutenant and twenty men each were sent to both Tiagon and Goa. Baybay was garrisoned with only a corporal and six men and Sangay was defended by a sergeant and six men. San José, located only two miles from Lagonoy and where Parker’s headquarters were erected, was protected by the “remainder of the infantry company, the two guns and the cavalry troop,” about ninety-two men in total including the attendants and porters.[83] A seventeen-mile long telephone line was constructed and it linked all of the towns of the Lagonoy District. The city of Lagonoy, however, was left unoccupied. Thus Parker faced a “problem” in the Lagonoy District in that his troops were stretched thin and he was responsible for pacifying a rather populous district. He admitted that “only by continuous aggressiveness could I keep my garrisons from being beleaguered.” In other words, “the best defensive is the offensive.”[84] Patrols were sent out throughout the district in order to squash what remained of the enemy resistance. Pacification in the Lagonoy District was beginning to take shape.

Lt. Col. Parker consulted with a man named “Forregrosa”, the alcalde of San José, on July 1, 1900 and urged him to have the local priest give a sermon to the natives preaching “peace and conciliation.”[85] The alcalde assured Parker that the ringing of the town’s church bell would bring San José’s inhabitants back to their homes and send the message that all was safe. Parker and the alcalde then took to the streets of San José and were then led to the church by a native brass band and hundreds of Filipinos. Parker admitted that “the church filled rapidly” and that one huge cultural boundary was hurdled during the subsequent mass.[86]

By mid-July 1900, Parker had decided that “it was time to have a baile.”[87] Although there still remained a minor resistance in and around the Lagonoy District, Parker declared that the best “way to pacify is to dance.”[88] Furthermore, he said that “a dance is a great help toward bringing about more cordial relations” between the Americans and the Filipinos. The hall of the San José headquarters was the venue and Parker, along with the alcaldes of several of the district’s towns, gathered the “forty horns and drums” for the principal entertainment.[89] The officers’ stash of beer and whiskey were broken out. The bands had assembled by 5 p.m. and “many guests were making their appearance.” Among them were “native officials of the various towns” and several “priests and a number of the principales.” However, as Parker noted, “not a woman appeared!”[90] He noted this to a local police chief who advised him that the insurgents had warned that they’d kill any woman who attempted to go the dance. By 6:30 p.m., Parker was beginning to doubt the arrival of the towns’ women. However, a message was received from Goa that Lt. Odell had passed “four wagonloads of bailerinas” on his way back from a patrol in Tigaon.[91] As it turned out, Lt. Odell “had become very influential and popular at Tiagon and Sangay” and that he had convinced the towns’ “belles” to go to San José and enjoy the baile. Soon thereafter, “the ladies of Goa and San José hastened to imitate their example.”[92] Among Parker’s recollections of the ladies’ arrival, he noted the “rather antique and very picturesque” appearances of them. The “waltz, two-step, and an ancient square dance called the rigadon” were danced. The ball had opened with the “rigadon,” which Parker described as “a somewhat complicated dance.” The officers gleefully tried to stay in-step with this indigenous jig but Parker admitted that they “made various and ludicrous mistakes.”[93] As a result of the officers’ silly and awkward blunders, “the Filipinos, who at first had been looking rather sour and solemn, burst out laughing, the ice was broken and the ball became a merry one.”[94] The dancing, drinking and laughter continued until 7 a.m. the next morning! An officer who had served in San José ten years later confided to Parker that his “grand military ball” of July 1900 was still being talked about. Furthermore, a prominent street in San José had been named after Parker. To make matters even more complicated, another had been named after Aguinaldo. Parker’s response upon hearing that both he and Aguinldo had streets named after them: “I am not sure…that I like the association of names!”[95]

By the end of July 1900, Parker sought to “re-establish the schools in the district.”[96] He ordered a soldier in San José to organize English lessons for the local school children and Parker stated that “they seemed glad to learn” it.[97] One other feature of the pacification of Lagony that should be revealed is the actions of Parker’s chief surgeon, Dr. Frederick Sparrenberger and his “extremely gallant” actions of shuttling from one town to the next aiding Americans and Filipinos alike by administering medicines, conducting surgical operations, and providing specific measures to improve sanitation. Sparrenberger often rode alone and unescorted through the hostile countrysides in an effort to ply his trade. Parker suggested that “his work was an important element in the pacification of the district.”[98] The successful establishment of the telephone line by Lt. Frank P. Lyman also played an indispensable role in the region’s pacification. By October 1900, the insurgency in the Lagonoy District of south-eastern Luzon was nearly extinct.
Lt. Col. Parker departed San José and the Lagonoy District for good on October 16, 1900. He would eventually reach Manila for court-martial duty until embarking back to southern Luzon on December 14, 1900. His destination was the city of Iriga, located about twenty-five miles south of Lagonoy. As soon as he took command, he immediately reversed the standardized rule of two companies of infantry for guard duty. Instead, he took a more pro-active initiative and installed ten man cavalry detachment. This allowed Parker to free up extra man-power for other more productive tasks around Iriga. In the process, school text books were updated; more arithmetic and geography were added as well as less of an emphasis on religion. As in San José, soldiers were “detailed” to teach English in the schools “with promising results.”[99] In addition, the issue of sanitation was addressed by Parker in Iriga. He issued fines to the city’s inhabitants who failed to keep their homestead up to standard. The money generated from the fines was given out to residents who kept the tidiest and sharpest properties. Parker admitted that he had “made a practice of inspecting the conditions in the various towns” of the district.[100]

Lt. Col. Parker was advised in February 1901 that there was a good chance that Taft and the Commission were to be touring the region soon and that Iriga was a possible stop on the tour. Parker, over bottles of champagne, urged the mayors of the five towns within the district to help coordinate a massive civic cleanup in order to “make a good showing” for Taft and the commissioners.[101] Following up on this initiative, Parker suggested that all the homes in the downtown area be painted. Soon thereafter, “not only all the wooden houses” were painted “but all the bamboo houses” as well; “not even in the woods or in the mountains that was not covered in a virgin white.” Unfortunately for the townspeople, Taft and the Commission never arrived. In their place, Gen. Bell inspected the region on February 27, 1901. Parker proclaimed that the “general was truly surprised” at how far and how fast the people of Iriga had reconstructed their town.[102] The locals threw a ball for Gen. Bell during his stay in Iriga. Parker wrote that it was completely of the natives’ doing and that neither he nor his officers had anything to do with it. Townspeople hung out windows waving American flags and the bands played. It was quite a joyous occasion.[103]

A March 1, 1901 directive from Manila advised Parker that alcohol on the Islands would soon be outlawed.[104] He admitted that the officers’ quarters still had a “large quantity” of beer, whiskey and champagne on hand. He decided that he needed to get rid of it and what better way to do so than to have another baile? Parker declared that “we gave a series of bailes” in order to reduce the rations of the soon-to-be contraband beverages. Song and dance was then gleefully conducted throughout Iriga.[105] Shortly thereafter, “in the interests of pacification and commerce,” Parker organized a fifteen-hundred man local work crew to rebuild the road leading from Bato to the Province of Albay. On March 27, 1901, a twelve-mile long, twenty-four foot-wide road was completed linking up the provinces of Caceres and Albay for the first time in twenty-four years.[106] On March 22, 1901, Parker was relieved of his duties in Iriga and ordered back to Manila where he would depart the Philippines and head back to the States. However, it is clear that “Galloping Jim” Parker left and definitive and progressive mark on American pacification efforts in the Philippines.

In sum, the American military efforts to pacify the Philippine Islands varied greatly from one region to the next. Different measures were employed for a variety of reasons and the results differed. Gen. Hughes’s and Lt. Stotensburg’s actions in and around Manila were shown to have a considerable effect on the pacification of Manila. It is clear that the hostilities and carnage in the Visayas required the Americans to not only root out the resistance but to also have to reconstruct the hulking ruins of Iloilo City. The model of American benevolence in the Philippines can be traced to their actions on the island of Negros. Facing a less-than-hostile resistance, the military was able to jump right into civic reconstruction and portray to all Filipinos the benefits of assimilation. The unfortunate events on Samar clearly show the effects that the ‘scorched-earth’ policy can have upon pacification. Lastly, Parker’s excellent narrative leaves the reader with the impression that the United States did actually accomplish something in the Philippines and that his creative and thoughtful applications of pacification are quite unique.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------
[79] James Parker, The Old Army - Memories, 1872-1918, with a new introduction by Sandy Barnard. 1st ed. (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2003) 232.
[80] See Parker, pp. 250-251. The highlight of the Cabanatuan encounter was Parker’s daring assault on the insurgent perimeter in which he found himself encircled by the enemy. However, his initial charge on the entrenchments caused enemy confusion and retreat and it enabled U.S. forces to capture the rebel stronghold and disperse a large contingent of enemy troops and weapons.
[81] Parker, 322.
[82] Parker, 326.
[83] Parker, 327.
[84] Parker, 326.
[85] Parker, 328. alcalde: mayor
[86] Parker, 329. It ought to be noted that several officers, Parker included, attended the mass. Parker made mention of the instance where the locals observed him responding during the mass and many of them approached him afterwards clamoring “El coronel dice amen! El coronel dice amen!” (The colonel says amen! The colonel says amen!) The insurgents had spread rumor and innuendo that the invading Americans were heretics. Much to their surprise, the locals were overwhelmed to see that the Americans believed in the same God as them. Thus a huge cultural barrier was broken down between the Americans and the Filipinos.
[87] Parker, 331. baile: a dance or ball.
[88] Parker, 331.
[89] Parker, 331.
[90] Parker, 332. principales: the elite class.
[91] Parker, 332. bailerinas: female dancers.
[92] Parker, 332.
[93] Parker, 333.
[94] Parker, 333.
[95] Parker, 334.
[96] Parker, 334.
[97] Parker, 334.
[98] Parker, 335.
[99] Parker, 351.
[100] Parker, 352.
[101] Parker, 353.
[102] Parker, 354.
[103] Parker, 354.
[104] Parker, 356. Under the pressure of the “Prohibitionists” back home, booze in the Philippines was to be prohibited beginning in the spring of 1901.
[105] Parker, 356.
[106] Parker, 356.

 

[7ronin]

El J, you're doing a fine job with this. I've emailed you a suggestion which you might find interesting.

 

[El Justo]

thank you 7ronin

here is the final substantive chapter:

The Filipino identity for this examination begins with the Philippine Revolution against the Spanish between 1896 and 1898. Fought on many different fronts throughout the Islands, the rebellion finally subsided in late 1898 after Spain, the Filipino rebels and the United States all agreed to cease hostilities. However, the political developments of the Islands were beginning to take shape. Aguinaldo officially declared the independence of the Islands and the formation of the Philippine Republic in June of 1898. Achútegui and Bernad consider this timeframe, 1896 until 1901, to be the “yardstick” in Philippine history in that it defines “the mark of a great historical event” for the Filipino identity.[1]

What is a “great historical event” and how can it have “such a profound effect upon the mind of an entire nation?”[2] John Kenneth Galbraith is said to have declared that England’s “yardstick” or defining moment for their national identity was World War I because “this was a war in which no man posted to active service on the western front could reasonably expect to survive.”[3] For that reason, it had a monumental impact on the English identity. For the United States, it was not the World Wars but the Civil War and the Depression for they both involved the whole of the peoples and it forever changed the identities of the country. For the people of the Philippine Islands, it was the Revolution against Spain that produced similar thoughts. In total, the Philippine Revolution lasted five years, from the “Cry at Balintawak” in 1896 until Emilio Aguinaldo’s capture in 1901.[4] It is most definitely their “yardstick.” Galbraith, quoted in Aguinaldo and the Revolution of 1896, stated that “the mark of a great historical event is that it changes the people and their way of thinking, so that they are never again what they are before.”[5] Achútegui and Bernad declared that though the Philippine Revolution was “not one single event”, it was clearly a “great upheaval involving the entire national life of the Philippines” and that “that those five years changed the course of Philippine history.”[6]

Andrés Bonifacio was “drastically different” from the other Filipino revolutionaries of his era.[7] He was a man “attracted by nationalistic ideas” and in 1892, he founded a secret Filipino revolutionary group called Kataastaasang Kagalanggalang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan, or Katipunan for short. It is also referred to as KKK. Katipunan, translated into English, means “The Exalted and Most Honorable Society of the Sons of the People.” The group was composed mostly of “clerks and workers” and they “borrowed slogans and symbols of the Catholic Church, the Freemasons, and the Triads.”[8] They had “mystical rituals, sealed blood pacts, used covert names, exchanged arcane passwords, wore colored masks and sashes, invented secret codes and ciphers and memorized aphorisms.”[9] The Spanish officials initially dismissed Bonifacio and the Katipunan. However, depressed sugar and hemp prices as well as rice shortages all throughout central and southern Luzon was beginning to drive the peasants to “desperation.”[10] Bonifacio capitalized on the agrarian discontent and the masses began to perceive the Katipunan “as an instrument for redemption.” [11] He then declared that “violence…was the only option.”[12]


Andres Bonifacio

By August 1896, the Spanish officials began to suspect Bonifacio and the Katipunan of conspiring against them after they raided a warehouse in Manila that was being used to print revolutionary material. “Exhorted by the archbishop, Spanish vigilantes fanned out across the city, wantonly slaughtering or rounding up natives.” One report suggested that “hundreds of Filipinos” were suffocated to death by their Spanish captors at Fort Santiago, near Manila.[13] Bonifacio began rallying the “underpaid, lower-class expatriates” and the local officials behind him and the Katipunan ideals. However, the merchant, proletariat classes were not grasping Bonifacio’s class-driven ideals. These tensions that existed between the upper-class Filipinos and the worker-classes were beginning to produce a divide between the local populaces of central and southern Luzon. Members of the Katipunan began rounding up local merchants and wealthy Filipinos in an effort to forcibly enlist them into the revolutionary cause. Bonifacio and his followers “took a perverse satisfaction in arresting, humiliating, or even killing” the mostly merchant and upper-class Filipinos who resisted them. This ilustrado class “found themselves with no choice except to rally behind Bonifacio.”[14] Thus he and his followers initiated a “wholesale repression” against anyone who opposed them and these ranks included both Spanish and Filipinos. On August 29, 1896, Bonifacio declared war against the Spanish and “thousands heeded his call.”[15] However, he would prove to be much less effective as a military commander.

Andrés Bonifacio led an ill-fated assault on a Spanish garrison around Manila at the end of August 1896. Despite his fiery rhetoric, he and his troops were “repulsed with heavy losses” and the defeat “made clear his delinquency” as a military leader.[16] The initial results of the war versus Spain were quite different for one of Bonifacio’s lieutenants and fellow Katipunan member, Emilio Aguinaldo.[17] He was fighting with more success than Bonifacio in his home province of Cavite which was the center of the insurrection. He “scored a major victory” against the Spanish on 3 September 1896 when he and his troops ambushed five hundred Spanish soldiers attempting to cross a bridge leading into the Manila suburb of Imus. The insurgent troops “cut them to shreds” as the Spanish hurriedly retreated across the river and marshy terrain surrounding the town.[18] In the process, Aguinaldo captured seventy Remington rifles and a sword dropped by a retreating Spanish commander. It had inscribed on it “Made in Toledo – 1869,” the year of Aguinaldo’s birth. “Seeing it as an omen,” he kept the sword at his side until his capture in 1901 when the American forces disarmed him and forced him to declare his oath to the United States. It was not until a “nostalgic ceremony” in 1960 that the sword was returned to him by Charles Bohlen, the U.S. ambassador in Manila. Aguinaldo was ninety-two years old when the sword was presented back to him![19]


Charles Bohlen

By early 1897, Spanish forces had recaptured large portions of Luzon. The rebel leaders, however, had begun to jockey for power within the insurgent ranks. In March 1897, Aguinaldo took it upon himself to promote his rank to that of a “generalissimo.” Bonifacio, upon hearing the news of Aguinaldo’s self-promotion, was furious and Karnow notes that “tensions between them rose.” A meeting was then arranged between Bonifacio’s representatives and Aguinaldo’s at an abandoned estate in Cavite Province in an attempt to resolve the differences between the rival factions. What happened next is clearly a subject of uncertainty but it is noted that the meeting between the two groups resulted in an agreement for the official formation of a Philippine Republic with Aguinaldo as its first president.[20] Bonifacio “angrily” rejected the decision that was reached in Cavite and promptly formed what Karnow describes as a “rival regime.” In an act of spite, he then ceded “several areas of control to Spanish troops, who in one undefended spot killed Aguinaldo’s brother Crispulo.” Bonifacio had begun to unravel. Bonifacio’s actions caused Aguinaldo and his supporters to track him down, try him in an impromptu kangaroo-court and to sentence him to death.[21] Aguinaldo would soon thereafter attempt to commute the pre-arranged death sentence but his message arrived too late.[22] Andrés Bonifacio and his brother Procopio were shot and killed by Aguinaldo’s men in May 1897. “Aguinaldo’s command was now secure.”[23] The war against Spain continued until a truce was declared on December 14, 1897 which is also known as “The Pact of Biyaak-na-bato.” Aguinaldo and his followers agreed to voluntarily exile themselves in Hong Kong. However, Aguinaldo had now consolidated his power among the Filipino revolutionaries. His next task was to transform the foundations of the Katipunan into a working government.


Emilio Aguinaldo - note the sabre at his hip.

Filipino-American diplomacy began in late 1897 when Aguinaldo’s foreign diplomat, Felipe Agoncillo began conferring with the American consul in Hong Kong, Rounseville Wildman. Agoncillo, sensing the possibility of war between the U.S. and Spain, offered a Filipino-American alliance in the case that war erupted in the archipelago. Dialogue was again resumed in early 1898 when “Aguinaldo and his companions” corresponded directly with Dewey’s fleet.[24] With war looming between the United States and Spain, the exiled Filipinos once again initiated contact with the Americans. E. Spencer Pratt, the American consul to Singapore, met with Aguinaldo on 7 April 1898. Pratt urged Aguinaldo “to arrange for cooperation against the Spaniards” in the event that war breaks out.[25] Meanwhile, under the orders of President McKinley, Dewey and his fleet was steaming towards Manila. Soon thereafter, Ambassador Wildman received one hundred fifteen thousand pesos from Aguinaldo and guaranteed him that the cash would be used to provide arms to the Filipino rebels in an effort to renew the hostilities against Spain. On 4 May, 1898, Aguinaldo was urged to return to the Islands in an effort to renew hostilities against Spain, who was now reeling from Dewey’s destruction of their fleet.[26] On 19 May, 1898, Aguinaldo and thirteen other insurgent leaders arrived back in Cavite Province aboard the McCulloch, an American gunboat. He was then dispatched to Dewey’s flagship, the Olympia, to once again confer with the commodore. Alip raises a series of very interesting questions regarding these meetings between the insurgent leaders and the American naval brass. He asks the following questions:

- “What was the understanding between Aguinaldo and the American leaders?”

- “Was Aguinaldo promised the independence of his country?”

- “Under what conditions did he renew the war against Spain in alliance with the United States?”[27]

The answers to these questions deserve a closer look. Alip states that “Aguinaldo’s own testimonies categorically state that Pratt and Dewey promised him the independence of the Philippines under an American protectorate.”[28] Isidro de los Santos, a Philippine rebel who claimed to have been present during the conferences between Aguinaldo and Pratt, stated that he was “ready to swear to this.”[29] Dewey and Pratt, however, claimed that the promise of an independent Philippine republic was a “tissue of lies” and that they advised Aguinaldo and his men that they did not possess the authority to promise independence. Furthermore, it was expressed that the United States Congress held this authority.[30] Aguinaldo, asked later why he did not get the alleged agreement in writing, claimed that the Americans had told him that “American verbal promises were more binding than the written promises of the Spaniards.”[31] Nevertheless, the Americans did not yield to the rebels and Gen. Merritt and the 8th Corps arrived in Manila and set up the American perimeter surrounding the fifteen thousand Spanish soldiers that were garrisoning the old city. For the rebels, capturing Manila was clearly “the most important military and strategic objective.”[32] However, a series of other developments began to unfold and it began to complicate the situation even further.

Aguinaldo declared Philippine independence from the Spanish on 12 June 1898. A constitutional assembly was to be organized and a whole-sale mobilization for war versus Spain was initiated. Insurgent soldiers were to be initially equipped with the two thousand rifles and several hundred thousand rounds of ammunition that were purchased from the American consul, Rounseville Wildman as well as arms not turned over by insurgents after the December 1897 ceasefire. Four thousand more rifles were provided by Commodore Dewey. In sum, the insurgents were armed with an estimated ten thousand rifles, hand guns and various other weapons.[33] By the end of June 1898, the insurgents had dislodged the Spanish in four of Manila’s suburbs. They now had the city surrounded as well. The insurgent forces now formed a second layer of entrenchments outside of the American lines that were already ringed around Manila.

Meanwhile, the revolution was beginning to “receive the support of the best minds in the land.”[34] While the Americans and Spanish were negotiating for the surrender of Manila, Aguinaldo and his troops, now firmly entrenched on the outskirts of Manila, were poised to assault the city and defeat the Spanish once and for all. Gen. Merritt, however, “categorically informed the Filipino leaders that his government permitted him to discuss the affairs with the Spanish government alone” and that the Spanish, fearful of the frightful reprisals that the Filipino rebels could unleash on them, insisted that the “Filipino troops should be excluded from participating” in negotiations for surrender.[35] Merritt did, however, inform the rebels that they should prepare to go to Washington to consult with McKinley and his staff. The surrendering of Manila by the Spanish to the Americans finally occurred on August 13, 1898. The Filipinos had been kept completely out of the loop.

Despite the setback, Aguinaldo called for the first constitutional congress of the Republic to meet on 15 September 1898 in the Central Luzon city of Malolos, some thirty miles north of Manila. One hundred ten total delegates were appointed from the various provinces. Eighty-five of them attended the first session. The composition of the congress consisted of forty-four lawyers, eighteen physicians, five pharmacists, and one priest. The remaining were either farmers or merchants. “Many of them were educated abroad” while others were alumni from the Filipino universities Santo Tomas, Letran College and Ateneo Municipal. They formed what Alip described as “the cream of the Filipino intelligentsia.”[36] Three constitutional drafts were put forward to the delegates. One drafted by Pedro Paterno, another by Felipe Calderón and a third by Apolinario Mabini. Calderón’s version won out and on 29 November 1898, it was approved by the congress.[37] A provision to the draft that would have established Catholicism as the official state religion was debated among the delegates but it was eventually voted down.[38] Mabini, however, vehemently disapproved of the Calderón draft. Being a close aide to Aguinaldo, he advised the president not to sign the draft because, in his estimation, it did not provide the executive branch of the Philippine government enough power. He insisted that an option be available to the president that allowed for the dissolution of the natively-elected legislature and also advised that the constitutional congress was simply an “advisory” council and that they do not and should not represent the majority of the Philippine populace.[39] Mabini argued that the “safety of the state during war time” required absolute power for the president. He also stressed for the state-sponsored religion clause which was voted down. Surrounded by “militarists” and “absolutists”, Mabini heavily influenced Aguinaldo and the president subsequently sent the constitution back to the delegates un-signed and demanded for more executive power. However, Aguinaldo gave in and signed the Calderón draft on 21 January 1899. He proclaimed that he relented on the previous demands of more executive power in order “to prove that he was not a militarist at heart but a lover of democratic processes” instead.[40]


Apolinario Mabini picured here on the Filipino 'ten spot'

The Calderón draft became known as the “Malolos Constitution” and it established ten main principles for the Philippine Republic. It called for a parliamentary composition with a uni-cameral legislature. Sovereignty rested entirely with the federal branch thus leaving the provinces very little authority in national matters. The executive branch, however, was subordinate to the National Legislature. Particular rights and liberties of the citizens were also established. It called for the formation of an emergency legislative committee to be formed during the current recess. Parliamentary immunity was granted to its members. Penal codes were drawn up and codified. The official formation of the executive branch of government was established – the Council of State and finally, the official formation of the legislative branch – the Constituent Assembly, were decreed at Malolos. On 23 January 1899, the official inauguration ceremonies were to be held. Alip notes that Aguinaldo’s Republic was now receiving “the support of the entire country.”[41]

The outbreak of war between the Americans and the Filipinos of 4 February 1899 was not what Aguinaldo and his followers had in mind while they sought to get the fledgling Republic up and running. It should be noted that “Aguinaldo had informed Gen. Otis that the Filipinos had acted without his orders” and that he was “desirous of putting an end to hostilities.”[42] Otis stated that he would not entertain any negotiating and that the hostilities must continue “to the grim end.”[43] Meanwhile, the Treaty of Paris was in the process of being ratified by the U.S. Congress. On 6 February 1899, the Treaty of Paris was ratified by Congress thus ceding the Islands completely to the United States. Open warfare between the Americans and Filipinos was only two days old. This left Aguinaldo with no other choice but to attempt to mobilize for war despite having to simultaneously manage the affairs of the fledgling Republic. It will be shown how Aguinaldo and his subordinates performed this daunting task.

John R.M. Taylor declares that “the character of a government, like that of a corporation, may be judged by an inspection of its account books.”[44] Taylor takes a very close look at the “transmittal of funds, records of their receipt, memoranda, cash books, and treasury ledgers” of the insurgent government.[45] These documents were among those captured by American forces as they tracked Aguinaldo from central Luzon into the northern reaches. The “carefully written volumes” were “packed in haste” during Aguinaldo’s flight but Taylor notes that a close examination of them may enable “the investigator to form a definitive idea of what the government really was as distinguished from what it pretended to be.”[46] The primary feature of this examination is the insurgent tax revenue that was collected by Aguinaldo and his appointed collectors.

Between 28 May and 2 September 1898, Aguinaldo appointed twenty-seven tax agents throughout the archipelago and made them responsible for gathering the funds, accounting for them and finally, sending them forward to the Republic. However, as Taylor notes, these funds were “arbitrarily” gathered by Aguinaldo’s agents. Specifically, the Tagalogs, of which Aguinaldo was one of, paid very little in taxes in comparison to the other regions of the Islands.[47] Furthermore, “the funds of the insurgent government were considered property of the men who had established it and not a trust to be managed for the benefit of the people of the country.”[48] As a result of these methods, the tax revenue generated by Aguinaldo throughout the Islands was “much larger than the amount which reached the treasury of his government.”[49]

According to tax records from a nine month period between 1898 and 1899, insurgent government receipts totaled 2,056,265.66 pesos. However, it should be noted that 367,606.76 pesos were “never entered upon the cash books” of the federal government despite their receipts being present. An additional 317,280.12 pesos were “noted upon the cash books and memoranda of receipts” but was not on the “general ledger of the government” thus implying that Aguinaldo or his staff members had either skimmed from the funds or simply misallocated them. In addition to these non-accounted-for funds, 213, 187.70 pesos were mysteriously “omitted” from the “final ledger.” In sum, 896,074.58 pesos were marked as accounted for but they did not appear on the so-called “final ledger.” This amounts to a whopping forty-three percent of the total receipts that were collected yet remained unaccounted for. Furthermore, it left what amounts to only 1,160,191.08 pesos remaining from the recorded receipts of 2,056,265.66 pesos. This data does not include any of the taxes or funds collected at the local levels that weren’t accounted for. In other words, the forty-three percent deficiency rate could theoretically be much higher than what it already is. To muddle the picture even further, Taylor notes “some of the insurgent leaders had found that a revolution might be used for private profit.” Thus if the “character of a government…may be judged by an inspection of its account books,” the insurgents were either thoroughly corrupt, wholly dishonest, or maybe they were simply poor record keepers. Either way, it is clear that this form of taxation is not only inefficient but ill-prepared and ineffectively conducted.[50]

The five year period between 1896 and 1901 most definitely reshaped Filipino identities. The formation of the Katipunan by Andrés Bonifacio was the first in a series of events that permanently changed the Filipino character. The mystical and secret society is shown to have evolved from a mysterious and clandestine society into the groundwork for Aguinaldo’s Philippine Republic. However, several features emerge from Bonifacio’s rise to prominence. His harsh methods of adherence and propensity for violence display an alarming trait. It is clear that a class-driven ideology had emerged as a result of Bonifacio’s actions. Emilio Aguinaldo quickly distinguished himself as a leader during the revolution against Spain. It appears that he maneuvered himself and his faction to the forefront of the revolution. In the process, he displayed certain tendencies such as political strong-arming and a desire to concentrate and solidify his role as the leader of the revolution. His failure to secure the guarantees of independence from the Americans, as he and his followers insisted had occurred, was a grievous error. Despite the lack of guarantees from the Americans, Aguinaldo and his followers managed to set the framework for their own government. However, a closer examination of the fledgling Republic and its taxation schemes suggest that Aguinaldo’s government was both inefficient and dishonest.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Pedro S. de Achútegui and Miguel A. Bernad, Aguinaldo and the Revolution of 1896 A Documentary History, (Manila: Ateneo de Manila, 1972), 1.

[2] Achútegui and Bernad, 1.

[3] Achútegui and Bernad, 1.

[4] Achútegui and Bernad, 2. “The Cry at Balintawak”: this was when the rebels declared war against the Spanish colonial regime in the Philippines.

[5] Achútegui and Bernad, 2.

[6] Achútegui and Bernad, 2.

[7] Karnow, 72.

[8] Karnow, 73. Triads: secret Chinese brotherhoods.

[9] Karnow, 73.

[10] Karnow, 73.

[11] Karnow, 73.

[12] Quoted in Karnow, 73.

[13] Karnow, 73.

[14] Karnow, 73.

[15] Karnow, 74.

[16] Karnow, 74.

[17] Aguinaldo was inducted into the Katipunan on 1 January 1895 in an elaborate and secretive ceremony in his hometowm of Kawit, in Cavite Province.

[18] Karnow, 74.

[19] Karnow, 75. This exact sword can be seen at Aguinaldo’s side in many of the photographs taken of him during this time.

[20] Karnow, 75-76. The author notes that “Aguinaldo’s supporters maneuvered the group into agreeing to form a republic with him (Aguinaldo) as president.” This is rather ambiguous in that there are no specifics given as to the final agreement or even the process of deliberating between the two groups.

[21] Karnow, 76.

[22] Karnow, 76. Aguinaldo is said to have had a last-minute change of heart and attempted to commute Bonifacio’s death sentence. Members of the firing squad were said to have received the last-minute order too late.

[23] Karnow, 76.

[24] Alip, Eufronio M., In the Days of General Emilio Aguinaldo A Study of the Life and Times of a Great Military Leader, Statesman, and Patriot Who Founded the First Republic in Asia, (Manila: Alip & Sons, Inc., 1969) 47. It is noted that Aguinaldo, “through the initiative of Edward P. Wood, the commander of the American gunboat Petrel” met and “conferred” with Commodore Dewey early in 1898.

[25] Alip, 47.

[26] Alip, 48. At Ambassador Wildman’s urging, Aguinaldo and his fellow exiles in Hong Kong began preparing for a return to their homeland.

[27] Alip, 48.

[28] Alip,, 48.

[29] Quoted in Alip, 49.

[30] Quoted in Alip, 49.

[31] Quoted in Alip, 49.

[32] Quoted in Alip, 56.

[33] Alip, 55-56. It should be noted that the insurgent group in Hong Kong paid the American consul, Rounsville Wildman, fifty thousand pesos for the initial shipment of two thousand rifles and ammo. A second deal between Aguinaldo and Wildman, in the amount of sixty-five thousand pesos, never materialized and the money was never returned nor was any more arms delivered to the insurgents. Furthermore, the initial insurgent arsenal was also bolstered by guns turned over by Filipinos who defected from the Spanish army.

[34] Alip, 57. Filipino nationalists of the time, such as Mabini, Rianzarez, Bautista, Apacible, Ponce, Agoncillo and Buencamino, all gave their blessings to the formation of the Philippine Republic. Alip notes that “these men greatly strengthened the leadership of Aguinaldo.”

[35] Quoted in Alip, 58-59.

[36] Alip, 60.

[37] For more on the origins of the Filipino constitutional debates, see Eufronio, 64-66.

[38] Alip, 60. The author notes that the Calderón draft’s state religion provision was shot down on a tie-breaker vote by Pablo Tescon, a late-arriving delegate to the congress.

[39] Alip, 65.

[40] Alip, 66.

[41] Alip, 70.

[42] Alip, 79.

[43] Quoted in Alip, 79.

[44] Taylor, John R.M., The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States, A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction, Volume II May 19, 1898 to July 4, 1902, (Pasay City, Philippines: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1971) 453.

[45] Taylor, 483.

[46] Taylor, 483.

[47] For more on this topic, see Taylor, 483-485. It provides for the provincial breakdowns and the accompanying statistics.

[48] Taylor, 453.

[49] Taylor, 484.

[50] For more information on the tax receipts, statistics, and regionalized taxation schemes of the insurgent government, see Taylor, 453-458 and 483-485.

 

[Dann]

Bravo!

If I may just add something. There was another man in the revolution that you failed to mention (but perhaps understandable because his role wasn't that big): Emilio Jacinto, Bonifacio's own Mabini i.e. intellectual advisor. Jacinto was the true brains behind the Katipunan. Had he not suffered an early death perhaps Bonifacio's later fortunes might not have been so grim.

It is most definitely their “yardstick.” Galbraith, quoted in Aguinaldo and the Revolution of 1896, stated that “the mark of a great historical event is that it changes the people and their way of thinking, so that they are never again what they are before.” Achútegui and Bernad declared that though the Philippine Revolution was “not one single event”, it was clearly a “great upheaval involving the entire national life of the Philippines” and that “that those five years changed the course of Philippine history.”

And how. Prior to the revolution even the idea of Philippine nationhood did not exist. There were no major empires or sultanates prior to the arrival of the Spanish to look back to, unlike Srivijaya and Madjapahit for the Indonesians or Malacca for the Malayans. The people living here in the late 19th century knew that they were living in Las Islas Filipinas, but considered themselves Tagalogs, Ilocanos, Pampanguenos, Bicolanos, Cebuanos, Warays, Chabacanos etc. etc. In fact other rebellions in the previous 300+ years all failed because they were always localized affairs, and the Spanish could safely draft troops from somewhere else to put down these rebels, thus driving intercultural animosity even further. This revolution was the very first time all regions in the Philippines were fighting against Spain. The revolution itself created the very concept of a Filipino people.

 

[7ronin]

Excellent point Dann. This seems to be partly the case even today. When I talk to Philippinos about where they are from it never seems to be that they are from the Phillipines. They are always more concerned about being perceived as being from Illocos Norte or the Visayas or someplace else. And the smaller the island or the remoter the province the more they identify with it.

 

[Dann]

Sadly old habits die hard. This lack of patriotism is a major flaw in the Filipino character. There are millions of us in the US, and yet they can't form an effective "Filipino Chamber of Commerce" or suchthat unlike the Chinese. Instead you have Samahang Ilocano, Samahang Pampangueno etc. etc. The Chinese have individual associations too, but divided into surname-based clan associations or, rarely and remarkably, based on the individual villages where their ancestors originated. But these are always all organized and subservient to an even bigger "all-Chinese" organization that bends over backwards to avoid anything political, focusing instead on economics and mutual help. (Chinese overseas communities are always apolitical, partly because they don't want to get mixed into the whole China-Taiwan issue.)

I know other Filipinos are going to hate me for saying this, but I feel that our country is an artificial construct, a legacy of colonialism. The Spanish did too well a job, destroying our original culture, language, writing, religion, everything. What culture we have today is closer to that of Mexico despite the fact that appearances wide we are almost identical to the Muslim Indonesians and Malaysians next to us. Is it a wonder then why our Muslim countrymen to the south (who were never conquered by the Spanish and were incorporated only under the Americans) hate our (majority Christian) guts and wish to secede?

 

[Plotinus]

This lack of patriotism is a major flaw in the Filipino character.

I'm not going to start this again, but come on! Surely this is a major virtue to the Filipino character. Patriotism is a bad thing - all countries are artificial constructs, one way or another.

 

[El Justo]

Plotinus:
one man's garbage is another man's treasure.

who are you to say that a fractured and non-patriotic sentiment is a good thing for the Filipinos?

it is not about patriotism; at least with regard to the most recent passage of the article. it is about identity. and whether or not you want to lump patriotism into that mix is a matter of debate i presume.

i think what Dann is trying to say is that the Filipinos were stripped of their nationalist identity and i agree. it is not about nationalistic fervor, blind nationalist loyalty, or political loyalties. it is about character, identity, culture, and ancestry and i reckon that the Spanish and the Americans stripped a piece of this away from the P.I. and this is sad.

 

[Dann]

Prior to 1521, we never had a national identity in the first place. The Spanish were the ones who gave us the idea of Las Islas Filipinas. Before Legaspi's conquistadores came all there was here was "Datu Kalantiaw's domain", "Rajah Humabon's domain" etc. etc.

But basically we felt cheated. Christian Filipinos today, being the devout and God-fearing Catholics that they are, are actually grateful to the Spanish for bringing along Christianity and making them different from the neighboring Muslims. But they hate the abuses, the mismanagement, and the long time being kept in the dark, uneducated and ignorant.

Come a successful revolution (somewhat) and then what happens? We get denied a hard won victory, get betrayed by our ally, and SOLD out by the ex-master!

If an independent Phillipines had been allowed to exist in 1898, two things might have happened: 1) It could have been another Thailand, another wedge of neutrality between several colonial possessions. or 2) Somebody else would invade anyway and we'd still lose our brief independence. Given the global situation in the late 19th century (it was the height of colonialism) I have a feeling option 2 would have been the most likely result.