Domen
Misico dux Vandalorum
Here is a translated interview with Piotr Zychowicz, author of the book "Ribbentrop-Beck Pact":
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Added on 27 September (already cited below during the discussion):
As a counter-argument for thesis of Piotr Zychowicz, here is a translated excerpt from the "Case study of a strategic plan of Poland against Germany", which was written in period 14 November 1937 - 10 January 1938 by Tadeusz Kutrzeba and Stefan Mossor:
This particular excerpt was written by Stefan Mossor.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tadeusz_Kutrzeba
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stefan_Mossor
Krzysztof Rak - Today our guest is Mr Piotr Zychowicz, author of the book "Pact Ribbentrop-Beck".
Piotr Zychowicz - Good morning.
KR - You are a supporter of a thesis, that in 1939 Poland should enter into an alliance with Adolph Hitler, Fuhrer of the German Reich. Why do you think so?
PR - Indeed it sounds desperately. But I think that casualties suffered by Poland during WW2 were so enormous, both political casualties - as we lost half of our territory - as well as purely biological, as we lost several million inhabitants, we lost Warsaw which was demolished - that an alliance with Western powers signed by Joseph Beck on the eve of WW2, was simply a fiasco. And it seems, that such a very unpleasant, difficult alliance - a temporary one, which I underline very firmly - signed with Germany, would let us avoid all those things.
KR - Your thesis could be moderated and it would be more digestible for the audience if we expressed it in such a way - in 1939 we had also other alternative options, not just an alliance with the West.
PR - In 1939 the Polish state found itself in a tragical situation. That is, neither choice which was possible for us to make would be a good choice. Of course it would be the best if noone was accosting us, if we could just for next 100 years live within such borders as we had with Wilno and Lwow. Unfortunately it was impossible. WW2 was in the wind, it was known that sooner or later Hitler would go against the Soviet Union. And either he was going to trample us in his march there, or go together with us.
- Here some doubts emerge. The first doubt is whether Hitler indeed wanted to go with us against the Soviet Union.
PR - Well, paradoxically there is no doubt about this. There is such a huge amount of documents both from Hitler himself and from his surroundings, as well as accounts, memoirs, various staff elaborations. There is no doubt that Hitler wanted Poland to cooperate with him during WW2.
KR - But what was the cause of this? What were Hitler's calculations?
PR - Hitler decided to conquer hegemony on the European continent. In order to achieve this he needed to destroy two states which threatened that supremacy. First of all, France, secondly, the Soviet Union. In order to carry out that plan he wanted to avoid a two-front war and he wanted to attack and defeat the weaker one - that is, France - first, and - after securing his rears - to invade the Soviet Union. Poland in all those Hitler's plans had an extremely important role to play. During the first phase of Hitler's war - invasion of France - we were supposed to secure his rears, in case if for example Stalin would like to intervene. And then - after Hitler would already "put in order" - in his own way - the Western Europe, neutralize France, push out Great Britain into the islands - we were supposed to march together for that anti-Soviet crusade of Hitler's dreams.
KR - But why do you think that Franco-British guarantees were unreal, that we should have refused accepting them?
PR - Accepting the guarantees of Great Britain, as well as France as she also warranted, was madness. The entire "British game" on the eve of WW2 consisted in turning away Adolph Hitler's aggression from their own borders, from Western Europe. By reason of this Great Britain attempted to direct that main impetus of the Third Reich in various directions. Hitler until 6 April 1939 did not have a plan of the invasion of Poland. Only then he decided that he would start that war from us. He decided so because on 6 April 1939 Joseph Beck, in London, accepted the British guarantees and signed a pact with Great Britain.
- So - do I understand this correctly? - the cause of Hitler's decision to wage a war against Poland were the British guarantees for Poland?
PR - Of course.
KR - So in some sense Great Britain manoeuvred, dragged us into the war?
PR - Yes. Of course. It wasn't like the British were supposed to die for German Danzig - on the other hand, Poles were supposed to die for Manchester and London. Mind you in what situation did Adolph Hitler found himself in the moment when Poland signed a pact with Great Britain and he was "surrounded" - as he said - by a powerful Anglo-Franco-Polish coalition. He found himself in a very difficult strategic dillema. In that moment Poland was standing in his way on both of his directions - that is, he could not attack France, because Poland would then attack him from behind and he would have to fight a two-front war; and he also could not attack the Soviet Union, because we were standing in his way again. He had only two solutions from that strategic dillema - either to forgo his wartime plans - and this is what Joseph Beck expected, he expected that Hitler would just give up his plans and in such a way Beck would secure European peace - or, Hitler's second option - to attack Poland together with Stalin. Hitler started his first, survey talks with the Soviets, on 7 April 1939, one day after Joseph Beck signed an alliance with Great Britain. It is very unpleasant for us, but Beck hurled Hitler into Stalin's arms. There was no a Ribbentrop-Beck Pact, so there had to be a Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.
KR - You write that - well, and this is also our common historical knowledge - that those main forces the West - democratic Western powers from one side, the Soviet Union on the other side, and we - at least as long as Joseph Pilsudski was responsible for Polish foreign policies -, each of those forces wanted to enter the war as late as possible, and such was also the testament of Pilsudski. Joseph Beck's mistake consisted in the fact that we let the others to drag us into a war against Hitler as his first target.
PR - Indeed. What we should have done on the eve of the war, was to do the same as all other states did - that is, to play for time. Because whoever enters the war first - as Marschall Pilsudski warned - is the one who loses it. While who enters the war during its subsequent stages, preserves his forces and has a chance for some profitable conclusion of this armed conflict. Beck backslided the political testament of his master.
KR - In your book you underline that in 1939 Poland could play a particular role. I would even use such a term, that we could call Poland a geopolitical kingpin - so a country that was not a military power, but had a significant influence on how the European balance of power would look like. And probably in 1939 we played such a significant role in the system of European powers for the last time. Do you agree with this?
PR - No. I think that we played such a role not only for the last time, but also for the first time. Never in our entire long history, Poland played such an important role in the world history, and never Poland had such a politician as Joseph Beck whose decision would have so colossal effects for the entire world. Please imagine the following situation - Beck makes a different decision, he sticks up his nose, and with his second hand he signs that unpleasant alliance with the Third Reich - an undesired alliance, but that would be a marriage of convenience, not a love match. At First France falls, so history flows the same way as it really rolled, then we invade the Soviet Union together. It seems that those our additional 40, maybe even 50 divisions, well rearmed during those 1,5 year, could be a decisive factor. So in 1941 / 1942 the Soviet Union collapses. But then Germany would most likely lost a war against Americans on the Western Front, maybe with help of Poland which would betray the Third Reich. And the entire conflict would end in such a way, that in year, let's say 1945, we would have year 1991. There would be no Soviet Union.
KR - Oh, I think you go even one step further in your book. You write that after 1945 there is no Soviet Union, Germany is defeated, and in the Central-Eastern Europe with have a large and only power, and this power is Poland. And indeed such a situation in the history of Central-Eastern Europe never occured.
PR - Well, it occured when a Union between Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was signed for the first time. But the main thesis of this book is as follows...
KR - But we didn't manage to conquer Muscovy at that time. We didn't finish that.
PR - Well, indeed. History gave us later further chances, which we didn't exploit. But the main thesis of this book is as follows - WW2 could end for us with a "happy end" and any kind of success if and only if the scenario similar to that of WW1 would take place once again. By the end of WW1 a political situation dreamed by generations of our Polish grandfathers and great grandfathers took place, that is - both of our partitioning powers collapsed. First Russia collapsed, defeated by Germany in 1917. And then, one year later, German Western Front collapsed. Only thanks to the fact that those two military powers collapsed, Poland could regain its independence and even "muscle in" a bit on the map of Europe. If the course of WW2 was similar, Poland would emerge victorious by its end.
KR - This scenario, and such a tough "Realpolitik", induces among the audience, among the readers of your book, very impetuous reactions. They say about a scandal, some reviewers say that it is a scandal that such a person who writes such books emerged. And I have such a question to you - why for us Poles it is so hard to get rid off thinking in categories of honor, prestige. Why is it so hard for us to think in categories of raison d'Etat? Because whatever to say about your book, you certainly try to use this one category. And for example British people, Russians, Germans, etc. operate with this category every day and it is for them an obvious motive of actions. Why is this category so non-obvious for us?
PR - Well, you rightly mentioned the British people, who - in my opinion - during World War 2 gave us exactly such a brutal lesson what the real international politics is. The British people during WW2, at the beginning attempted to direct the first of Hitler's strikes in various other directions, they were sacrificing one state after another, the British people during WW2 were betraying their allies, they were not keeping agreements, the British people during WW2 signed an alliance with an awful, totalitarian regime - the Soviet Union, not because they loved Communism, but because they understood that such an alliance was in their best national interest. If it comes to the matters of year 1939 then I think that a problem with exists and the cause why a calm and prudent debate about this is today so difficult in Poland, results from two things. The first of them is for me absolutely understandable. This thing is the extent of gruesome, genocidal policies on territories of Nazi-occupied Poland. Indeed, what they were doing here, after 1939, was a horror. And now, if someone talks that we should have signed an alliance with those same Germans, it naturally causes very emotional reaction. But the problem lies in the fact that emotions are not good feelings when we speak about major political matters. Just a short analysis is enough to understand that Hitler murdered so many Poles, because we dared to fight a war against him, and then we lost that war and fell under his total occupation. All these three things would simply not take place if we signed an alliance with him, so this is obvious. So that difficult German-Polish alliance, which would have to be ransomed by unpleasant concessions, harming our prestige, would be a remedy, a resort of preventing a hecatomb of the Polish nation. This is the first matter. Secondly, ...
KR - But when we talk about those national interests, we can read in any handbook, that the most basic raison d'Etat lies in survival of a nation and its people. There are no any more important values in foreign politics. There are no. This is the measure of foreign politics - a good foreign policy is the one which leads to survival of a nation and its people, while bad foreign policy is the one which leads to debunking of this entity. True?
PR - Yes. Winston Churchill once said something like this: "I haven't become a prime minister in order to expose Great Britain to destruction. I have become a prime minister to shield her from destruction." I'm not sure if Joseph Beck could say the same thing about himself, unfortunately. But the second cause of this problem which the Poles have with the year 1939, is Marxism. Even many people who lived in the People's Republic of Poland, even subconsciously, are suffused with such a fatalistic Marxist approach, that history had to flow they way it did. That is, that the role of individuals is unimportant, because the entire course of history is heading toward the victory of communism. And...
- Here we have to do with so called historical determinism.
PR - Yes. And the 2nd Republic of Poland, as a "rotten state", troubled from inside by various problems, by a "capitalist-landed gangrene", ...
KR - But of course such a "underdeveloped, disabled capitalist state" to some extent.
PR - Yes of course. So it had to collapse during the very first turmoil of history, right? In order to concede place for a new, Communist state. But it is rubbish. The 2nd Republic of Poland was not a "rotten state", it was a state with potential, a state that was becoming stronger and developing. It had - contrary to what is said - decent armed forces, and it had all hopes for lasting and existing, as well as achieving successes on the international arena. So it was not any "fate" that was hanging over us. For example some very partiotically-minded historians write that Beck found himself in a situation without any choice. It isn't true. There is always a choice in politics. We don't need to turn this into some huge dispute between supporters of Realpolitik and supporters of some our traditional "romantic" politics - Beck, quite simply, made a bad political decision allying with England and France, and that's all.
KR - So let me summ up our discussion in such a way - There is only one thing in the lives of nations and countries that is without price. That thing is independence & sovereignity. Thank you very much.
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Added on 27 September (already cited below during the discussion):
As a counter-argument for thesis of Piotr Zychowicz, here is a translated excerpt from the "Case study of a strategic plan of Poland against Germany", which was written in period 14 November 1937 - 10 January 1938 by Tadeusz Kutrzeba and Stefan Mossor:
"a) Possibility of signining an alliance with Germany itself:
Positive sides of signing a close alliance with Germany would be very numerous. First of all, a direct threat of an imminent war would dissapear, because Russia, constantly struggling against internal difficulties, at the present moment doesn't pose a threat of external territorial expansion, while other neighbours are not dangerous. Another positive side would be the possibility of gaining access to an output market for Polish agricultural products, which would facilitate the productivity of this important branch of Polish national economy. The third positive side would be a strong and considerable help of Germany in industrial development of Poland, in installing sewer system, electrification, in development of the network of transport and communication, etc. All difficulties in rearmament of our army and its future reserves could for sure be - with help of German industry - easily solved within a period of several years. It would be possible to further continue and take on high level - with help of that industry as well as German specialists - the economic development of such underdeveloped regions like Wilno region, Polesie, etc., etc.
However, all those numerous and extraordinarily positive influences of an alliance with Germany could be implemented only under such a condition, that Germany would consider Poland as an absolutely reliable ally, and this can be achieved only through considerable subordination of Poland to Germany, that is - through concluding with Germany a similar pact to that which existed between Austria and Hungary. Without this certainty of having a reliable ally, Germany would of course not invest even one red cent into Poland's development, in order not to strengthen their potential enemy.
Even assuming, that it is possible to win the Polish public opinion over for such an alliance, we must first thoroughly consider, if it would really be profitable for Poland. So, such an alliance would undoubtedly lead to a rapid economic development of Poland, to increase of the level of wealth and culture of the population, it would remove the danger of discontent and riots among national minorities, etc. That would be a good side to it.
A bad side to it would be the fact, that Poland in order to achieve such a development, would have to enter the sphere of interests of the aggressive German policy. Even if we would be able to avoid being dragged into some "expeditions" for territorial or ideological conquests, for example against Russia, then still a natural consequence of such a close alliance with Germany would be an automatic drop out from us of all other potential allies, in other words - Poland would find itself completely at the mercy of Germany's good will. If for example in some moment Germany would propose Poland a joint conquest of Belarus up to Smolensk and Ukraine up to Kiev - and then expansion of Polish borders in eastern direction, with simultaneous abandonment of Pomerania, Poznan region and Upper Silesia and incorporation of these lands to Germany, then in such case Poland would have only two possible solutions: either to agree (and such a consent, in my opinion, would not be possible to obtain from population by any Polish government), or to begin a solitary, improvised war against overwhelming German power, already deeply rooted into Poland's organism, without any external help."
This particular excerpt was written by Stefan Mossor.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tadeusz_Kutrzeba
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stefan_Mossor
) have won, the next step would simply be the annihilation of Poland. You gotta be a lvl 99 wishful thinker to belive otherwise, that Reich would peacefully coexist with free and prosperous Rzechpospolita. What for?
