Sea fight between ironclads!

[privatehudson]

Further, from what I understand both the French and British were only considering joining the US Civil War ont eh condition that the other was fighting.

I think the Russell and Palmerston might have contemplated recognition and/or intervention without France, but only when the South had all but won the war anyway. They certainly would have tried to get some consensus with the other European powers, but I don't think it would have been the deciding factor. I'm not sure about French government felt on the matter but I doubt they would have been so keen to act alone.

However to my knowledge there was no definitive understanding between the two powers about intervention since the South never satisfactorily demonstrated to the European powers that it was worth the risk.

 

[Dachs]

The unfortunate thing is we've entered a period where productive capacity matters more than anything else. Sure the UK could produce more ships, but then this would no longer be about the Warrior vs. the Monitor.

Productive capacity - or, more precisely, the effective mobilization of resources for war, including manpower - remained as important as it was at any given point in history: obviously relevant, but not the be-all end-all.

 

[Louis XXIV]

See, I still disagree there, although I disagree to a lesser extent that I probably would have in the past. The productive capacity of the US vs. Japan in World War II is, imo, all that's really conclusive to determining who would have won. It's just so dominating I don't see a way around it. However, in other situations, such as various points in European history, productive capacity could be marginalized by quick victories. On the other hand, I feel the manpower reserves of Rome were significant in defeating.

Maybe this is a big complicated way of saying "it depends." But I do think the nature of the conflict will dramatically affect whether productive capacity is necessary. However, in post-industrial revolution conflicts, it seems that more and more depends on the weapons of war, which seems to create a greater impact on productivity.

 

[History_Buff]

See, I still disagree there, although I disagree to a lesser extent that I probably would have in the past. The productive capacity of the US vs. Japan in World War II is, imo, all that's really conclusive to determining who would have won. It's just so dominating I don't see a way around it. However, in other situations, such as various points in European history, productive capacity could be marginalized by quick victories. On the other hand, I feel the manpower reserves of Rome were significant in defeating.

Maybe this is a big complicated way of saying "it depends." But I do think the nature of the conflict will dramatically affect whether productive capacity is necessary. However, in post-industrial revolution conflicts, it seems that more and more depends on the weapons of war, which seems to create a greater impact on productivity.

Productive capacity and efficient mobilization of resource are the be all and end all, but only in long coalition style wars. To choose contemporary examples, the financial resilience of Great Britain is what won them the Napoleonic Wars. It's not what won them the War of 1812 (to the extent that they won, offended Americans go now).

 

[Dachs]

See, I still disagree there, although I disagree to a lesser extent that I probably would have in the past. The productive capacity of the US vs. Japan in World War II is, imo, all that's really conclusive to determining who would have won. It's just so dominating I don't see a way around it. However, in other situations, such as various points in European history, productive capacity could be marginalized by quick victories. On the other hand, I feel the manpower reserves of Rome were significant in defeating.

Maybe this is a big complicated way of saying "it depends." But I do think the nature of the conflict will dramatically affect whether productive capacity is necessary. However, in post-industrial revolution conflicts, it seems that more and more depends on the weapons of war, which seems to create a greater impact on productivity.

Bolded part relevant. I strongly disagree that this is just a "various points in European history" thing; it's universal. And it's not even just a quick victory. Any attempt to claim that, say, North Vietnam, even including its allies, outproduced the United States in the 1960s and 1970s would be ridiculous. The most overwhelming advantage in productive capacity didn't, for instance, help Russia in Manchuria 1904-5, Russia in Eastern Europe in 1914-8 or Japan in China in 1937-45 - all modern wars, both industrialized wars, neither one of which was won by the power with the greatest ability to produce war materiel. Of less industrialized, albeit semi-recent conflicts of obvious relevance, the Russians notably defeated the French and their allies in 1812 in a very long conflict despite a grave shortage of manpower and arms compared to their enemies.

Saying that "it depends...on the nature of the conflict" is kinda what I was getting at. My bugbear is Big Overarching Historical Dicta, usually created in order to be a magical predictor of everything, and I strongly disagree with the notion that whoever makes the most guns, possesses the biggest battalions, and so on automatically is guaranteed to win whatever conflict he fights. Why fight wars at all, then?

I'm uncomfortable with such claims because they rest on, well, nothing at all. Some dude just makes a judgment call, perhaps by looking over some statistics (although usually not), and deciding that Party A just had soo many more dudes than Party B that no manner of incompetent generalship on the part of Party A would permit Party B to reverse the outcome. This is prima facie ridiculous; it is not historical inquiry in the least sense. It would be like me looking at the Warrior vs. Monitor image, deciding that Warrior was just way too huge for the Monitor to survive, and making that the end of it.

Yes, the production of war materiel is important; but it must be used correctly, for one thing, if it is to be effective at all. Russia notably failed to make use of its impressive economic explosion in the First World War whatsoever; Russian factories could supply their forces with more shells than the Germans and Austrians could, more artillery gun-barrels, more uniforms, and whatnot, but that Russian war materiel never got to the front lines in most cases, and when it did it was poorly apportioned. The mere existence of productive superiority must go hand-in-hand with institutional maturity in order for it to be relevant on the battlefield in the first place, and even if it does become relevant, that does not mean it will win out.

It's not what won them the War of 1812 (to the extent that they won, offended Americans go now).

If the war had ended in the summer of 1813 at status quo ante bellum, it'd be impossible to argue that the British hadn't won. Then the Americans annihilated the Brits' native allies in the Midwest at the Thames, the British invasion was turned back at Plattsburgh, and there was some back-and-forth raiding that resulted in some towns or other being burned, and the pendulum started to swing. I think it's most reasonable to say that Britain scored a partial defensive victory, the Americans scored a partial offensive victory, and the Prophet and Tecumseh lost the war.

 

[Antilogic]

Offline for a day and the conversation wasn't, so I'll just throw a handful of comments out on the discussion.

You know the answer to that last question before you even said it dude.

And I agree with you this post, as well as questioning the distance at which this engagement would take place. I just believe that the British would take every option into account in this mythical encounter. The Warrior's speed, overall firepower, and plethora of options would carry the day.

True, PH posted something very similar to what I was going to post afterwards. There is a big difference between boarding an active warship and an already-surrendered merchantman.

Perhaps some where, but nowhere near as heavily armed as most commerce raiders. Its not like the average merchantman had the fire power or the inclination to duke it out with the likes of the CSS Alabama. That would be like expecting the average WW2 tanker to go toe to toe with the Graf Spee.

...

I'm not saying that boarding was obsolete by then, frankly I don't know if that is true or not. My gut feeling was that it certainly wasn't common practice in most engagements by the time of the Civil War. The Crimean War is another matter, especially since naval technology had moved on quite considerably since then.

Anyway you were originally talking about boarding in the sense of occupying a moving, fighting vessel and overpowering or incapacitating its crew. To then argue that this type of boarding was not obsolete by the time of the Civil War you really need to cite evidence of that type of action.

I was going to compare it to a Q-ship fighting a cruiser, but the analogy holds.

Given the introduction of longer-range guns (and very soon explosive shells), I would argue boarding is in the process of becoming an obsolete tactic during this time period. I know of no similar engagements where boarding has occurred between two active ironclad warships, but if anyone knows something I don't please post it.

There was an unsuccessful boarding action between the Peruvian ironclad Huáscar and the wooden Chilean ship Esmeralda. Although I think the boarding was a last ditch effort after the wooden ship was rammed, not usual practice I'm sure.

BTW, rather than boarding, I don't see why ramming wasn't an option? Maybe I'm underestimating the durability of Warrior's armor, but it seems Monitor didn't take much of a push to bring under water. Or would that be more analogous to running aground and probably not something that should be attempted?

I think the main issue would be the Warrior's ability to ram the Monitor to begin with. I don't think a big lumbering ship like the Warrior could pull it off unless the Monitor was sitting dead in the water.

Perfect lead-in to my next comment on ramming and boarding. I was thinking of the Italians and Austrians at Lissa, where ramming proved to be an effective tactic in a mixed fleet of ironclad and wooden ships. But that's not applicable here (two ironclad-type ships). The battle Renner mentioned is the last time an enemy ship was sunk by a ram. The ramming tactic, though overblown by the papers of the day, was not to make a comeback, and only a handful of hostile ships were sunk by ramming.

However, the Virginia tried to ram Monitor and did more damage to Virginia than the target. Is there a particular reason why anyone would expect another taller ship with lighter armor would be any more successful at ramming Monitor, even if the Warrior could pull it off?

I think if I was the CO of the Warrior with a moderate understanding of the Monitor's specs, I'd attempt to negate its maneuverability with my speed. Which is to say, stand off as much as is reasonable (probably end up doing big circles) and throw broadsides in the hopes of lucky damaging hits. And get as many rifles distributed as possible - if the Monitor does get in close enough to where some cannon cannot depress enough to have a chance of hitting the target, then the crews can at least find a decent small arms shooter among them that can wait until Monitor's cannon shields are open and try to get some bullets into the turret.

Fair enough, but at long range the guns lose the momentum required to punch through armor, and that's a department where the Monitor again has an advantage. Thing is, the Warrior has lighter guns and lighter armor, so it is simultaneously more vulnerable to the Monitor's 11" guns as well as lacks the ability to punch through the Monitor's armor at any range. Going close at least gives the Warrior a chance to inflict damage on Monitor while taking hits in return.

Ultimately, I think a stalemate is likely, with a damaged Warrior sailing off to the high seas where it can't be chased, and a Union victory possible, with good gunnery punching enough holes near the waterline to capsize the Warrior or causing a magazine explosion.

The Union navy was quite capable. How many iron ships did Great Britain truly have? Did they have enough to make the United States tremble? I'd like to see some evidence.

Sure she could. But it will take time (depending on how much pre-planning there is) that features the potential loss of Halifax and Caribbean ports. Further there was little capacity for production in the Americas (there wasn't the metalworking and advanced shipyards to put a lot together) necessitating moving notoriously unstable vessels across the Atlantic Ocean.
They need to design and build superior vessles (similar combat capabilities and more stable) or a dedicated counter vessels.

Britain had too few ironclad warships vs. the rather large number of Union monitors to effect a close blockade of the USA. The battleships with armament required to break Monitor's armor were a decade or two down the road at this point. To build her own monitor-type ships would require substantial shipyards in Canada and her other American possessions which Britain did not have.



Regarding the International Situation:

The French were most likely to support the Confederacy, trading for recognition of their possessions in Mexico, but their army was quite small at this point, and (depending on when) was already bogged down in Mexico. Not to mention they need to keep an eye on their German front in case Prussia made a move on Alsace-Lorraine. I suspect this is why the French were not seriously contemplating intervention.

As mentioned before, Russia and Prussia were both pro-Union, and the tsar of Russia declared he would re-occupy Crimea if Britain and France got involved in America, which would basically restart the Crimean War 10 years later along with the ACW. So although the Confederacy may have allies, so would the Union... it would basically be an early WW1.

 

[Dachs]

Regarding the International Situation:

The French were most likely to support the Confederacy, trading for recognition of their possessions in Mexico, but their army was quite small at this point, and (depending on when) was already bogged down in Mexico. Not to mention they need to keep an eye on their German front in case Prussia made a move on Alsace-Lorraine. I suspect this is why the French were not seriously contemplating intervention.

As mentioned before, Russia and Prussia were both pro-Union, and the tsar of Russia declared he would re-occupy Crimea if Britain and France got involved in America, which would basically restart the Crimean War 10 years later along with the ACW. So although the Confederacy may have allies, so would the Union... it would basically be an early WW1.

France was more gung-ho for intervention than Britain was, so long as the British were already in the mix. (Which was pretty outrageously unlikely unless, as private_hudson noted, the South had already won the war anyway.) You could expect the French fleet to participate pretty significantly, although French supplies would probably be more important.

The French weren't worried about Prussia "making a move on Alsace-Lorraine" until after 1867.

I think that it wasn't Crimea that the Russians would reoccupy, since Crimea notably still belonged to Russia and wasn't demilitarized except for the navy; it was the Danubian Principalities that Russia would reoccupy instead. But yes, grounds for war, potentially. Probably not, though, as when the Russians did the same thing in the 1870s there was no war (although it came sorta close at one point).

 

[fing0lfin]

However, the Virginia tried to ram Monitor and did more damage to Virginia than the target. Is there a particular reason why anyone would expect another taller ship with lighter armor would be any more successful at ramming Monitor, even if the Warrior could pull it off?

As far as i know the matter is that Virginia couldn't actually ram Monitor, it missed close and both ships scratched one another. The armor of the ramming ships does not have significant impact on the outcome of a possible ramming. Even a ship with thiner armour could have sunk Monitor on a succesfull ram. The issue is whether such hit could be delivered.

 

[say1988]

However, the Virginia tried to ram Monitor and did more damage to Virginia than the target. Is there a particular reason why anyone would expect another taller ship with lighter armor would be any more successful at ramming Monitor, even if the Warrior could pull it off?

I think the idea is more that the mass and greater speed of Warrior will have a decent chance to capsize a notoriously unstable ship design. Further the Warrior could probably take far more damage from the Monitor before being crippled or sunk.

 

[privatehudson]

I was going to compare it to a Q-ship fighting a cruiser, but the analogy holds.

Yeah I might have overstated the comparison a little since Alabama wasn't that heavily armed. It was certainly more than enough to overpower any merchant vessel it ran into though. Quite often just the threat of what a commerce raider's guns could do would be enough since the merchantman's crew knew that upon surrender their lives would not be in danger. Even if the raider's captain chose to burn their ship he would usually take on the crew temporarily until he could find another ship or port to dump them on.

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

Bolded part relevant. I strongly disagree that this is just a "various points in European history" thing; it's universal. And it's not even just a quick victory. Any attempt to claim that, say, North Vietnam, even including its allies, outproduced the United States in the 1960s and 1970s would be ridiculous. The most overwhelming advantage in productive capacity didn't, for instance, help Russia in Manchuria 1904-5, Russia in Eastern Europe in 1914-8 or Japan in China in 1937-45 - all modern wars, both industrialized wars, neither one of which was won by the power with the greatest ability to produce war materiel. Of less industrialized, albeit semi-recent conflicts of obvious relevance, the Russians notably defeated the French and their allies in 1812 in a very long conflict despite a grave shortage of manpower and arms compared to their enemies.

Saying that "it depends...on the nature of the conflict" is kinda what I was getting at. My bugbear is Big Overarching Historical Dicta, usually created in order to be a magical predictor of everything, and I strongly disagree with the notion that whoever makes the most guns, possesses the biggest battalions, and so on automatically is guaranteed to win whatever conflict he fights. Why fight wars at all, then?

I'm uncomfortable with such claims because they rest on, well, nothing at all. Some dude just makes a judgment call, perhaps by looking over some statistics (although usually not), and deciding that Party A just had soo many more dudes than Party B that no manner of incompetent generalship on the part of Party A would permit Party B to reverse the outcome. This is prima facie ridiculous; it is not historical inquiry in the least sense. It would be like me looking at the Warrior vs. Monitor image, deciding that Warrior was just way too huge for the Monitor to survive, and making that the end of it.

Yes, the production of war materiel is important; but it must be used correctly, for one thing, if it is to be effective at all. Russia notably failed to make use of its impressive economic explosion in the First World War whatsoever; Russian factories could supply their forces with more shells than the Germans and Austrians could, more artillery gun-barrels, more uniforms, and whatnot, but that Russian war materiel never got to the front lines in most cases, and when it did it was poorly apportioned. The mere existence of productive superiority must go hand-in-hand with institutional maturity in order for it to be relevant on the battlefield in the first place, and even if it does become relevant, that does not mean it will win out.

If the war had ended in the summer of 1813 at status quo ante bellum, it'd be impossible to argue that the British hadn't won. Then the Americans annihilated the Brits' native allies in the Midwest at the Thames, the British invasion was turned back at Plattsburgh, and there was some back-and-forth raiding that resulted in some towns or other being burned, and the pendulum started to swing. I think it's most reasonable to say that Britain scored a partial defensive victory, the Americans scored a partial offensive victory, and the Prophet and Tecumseh lost the war.

Excellent post sir! A voice of reason much needed.

 

[Antilogic]

France was more gung-ho for intervention than Britain was, so long as the British were already in the mix. (Which was pretty outrageously unlikely unless, as private_hudson noted, the South had already won the war anyway.) You could expect the French fleet to participate pretty significantly, although French supplies would probably be more important.

The French weren't worried about Prussia "making a move on Alsace-Lorraine" until after 1867.

I think that it wasn't Crimea that the Russians would reoccupy, since Crimea notably still belonged to Russia and wasn't demilitarized except for the navy; it was the Danubian Principalities that Russia would reoccupy instead. But yes, grounds for war, potentially. Probably not, though, as when the Russians did the same thing in the 1870s there was no war (although it came sorta close at one point).

I should have mentioned "acted alone"--not an oversight, but an unfortunate omission. I also seem to have confused my German chronology when I posted--they were busy in Denmark at the time of the ACW.

My source on the Russians comes from the NY Times "Disunion" blog, I think, might have mis-remembered the details on it.

Also should give my compliments to your earlier post--it's an argument I've tried to make to other determinists off-line on a few occasions, and something I failed to understand fully until recently. Nothing really to add but a "+1" though.

As far as i know the matter is that Virginia couldn't actually ram Monitor, it missed close and both ships scratched one another. The armor of the ramming ships does not have significant impact on the outcome of a possible ramming. Even a ship with thiner armour could have sunk Monitor on a succesfull ram. The issue is whether such hit could be delivered.

I think the idea is more that the mass and greater speed of Warrior will have a decent chance to capsize a notoriously unstable ship design. Further the Warrior could probably take far more damage from the Monitor before being crippled or sunk.

I didn't look it up, just went on what I remembered from the OP. However, with the thinner armor on the Warrior (and as far as I can tell, the lack of a proper ram), I'd be concerned with damage to the bow if it attempted to ram.

 

[Bugfatty300]

So assuming it could be done, would it be a wise move to risk a major fleet battleship to destroy what was essentially a little coastal defense/river boat in a ramming action?

 

[fing0lfin]

That would depend on the strategic situation, and as far as it's Monitor vs Warrior we don't have any further knowlage of it.
Also tha ramming ship usually don't take serious damage.

 

[nokmirt]

That would depend on the strategic situation, and as far as it's Monitor vs Warrior we don't have any further knowlage of it.
Also tha ramming ship usually don't take serious damage.

I wonder what would have happened if the CSS Virgina was able to ram Monitor with its iron ram still attached. Virginia had lost it, when she rammed the Cumberland. I imagine it would have done a hell of a lot of damage to the Monitor's wooden understructure, possibly even critical damage, causing it to sink. That of course, is if the Virginia was able to get a good ram on her opponent, much easier said than done. The other thing I am not so sure about is, would Virginia's ram have been low enough in the water, to get under USS Monitor's armor?

The monitor's designer John Ericsson was reportedly furious that Monitor had not been supplied with explosive shells, which he was sure would have sunk Virginia had they been employed by firing at Virginia’s waterline. I wonder if Virginia could have done the same? I wonder how tough armor-piercing ammunition of the time was?



Confederate
Dahlgren




DIAMETER: 6.9 inches
GUN: 7-inch Brooke Rifle
LENGTH: 16 3/4 inches
WEIGHT: About 111 pounds
CONSTRUCTION: Common Shell
SABOT: Lead
FUZING: Missing


Another in the series of Confederate variants of the Federal Navy Dahlgren system. This specimen has two bourrelets and the base of the lead sabot is flat. This pictured projectile is located in the West Point Military Academy Museum in New York.

 

[xchen08]

Hmm, missed most of this discussion.

The point has already been made that this is a gross mismatch, between a little gunboat and a first class battleship, but I don't think people quite understand the ridiculous disparity in firepower. Not only has Monitor but 2 guns, but the the XI in Dahlgrens are designed to be operated by >3x the guncrew that could fit within the turret. This is a massive handicap with the result that a monitor's sustained rate of fire is about 1 volley every 20 minutes. Compare that to the USS New Ironsides armed with the same weapons which was giving a broadside a minute at Charleston Harbor. The Warrior with her lighter guns should manage a bit better than that.

As counterintuitive as it may seem considering the way naval technology developed after, the complete dependence on manpower to operate guns meant that during the period of the Civil War, a small number of heavy guns is not necessarily superior to large numbers of lighter and turrets not necessarily superior to broadside because of the tremendous difference in actual throw weight. The majority of Union admirals, most notably Adm Farragut strongly favored designs like New Ironsides (and thus like Warrior) over the monitors, and were overridden due to the monitor fever infecting the public after Hampton Roads and admittedly, the fact that monitors were much cheaper.

There's practically no way the Warrior could lose a medium range gunnery duel. Her superior speed lets her dictate the range, and while penetration is unlikely, it is also unnecessary as monitors are relatively easy to mission kill. Their turret traverse mechanism is fragile, the gun shudders were never actually made to work, the forced draft system unreliable and dangerous (thus necessitating a vulnerable funnel), the laminated armor vulnerable to spalling, and the pilothouse necessarily less armored. All these vulnerabilities were demonstrated at Charleston Harbor when the SecNav infected with monitor fever forced DuPont to take his squadron against the harbor defenses. The monitors quickly got their turrets jammed and had guns knocked out by shots through the gunports, while the crews suffered from rivets sent flying by each hit, and their slow rate of fire achieved basically nothing in return. Half the squadron was disabled in 40 minutes, and DuPont was forced to retreat in disorder. New Ironsides, despite taking the second heaviest fire of any ship in the squadron, remained fully operational.

The only way Warrior could lose, in fact, is if her commander were stupid enough to try boarding or ramming. She was a battleship of unprecedented size and length, but still only had a single rudder, making her a complete pig at turning. There's absolutely no way she could successfully ram or board, and any attempt at doing so would give Monitor a chance at her primary vulnerability, her unarmored ends.

 

[7ronin]

Could the Warrior's guns have hit the Monitor below the waterline?

 

[xchen08]

Could the Warrior's guns have hit the Monitor below the waterline?

Unlikely. Monitors were flat bottomed rafts with very little draft and the belt extends underwater for a good deal of that. Given the hull shape and the angles of fire from the much higher Warrior, I'm not sure it's even theoretically possible. If the Warrior wants to inflict sinking damage, a better option would be closing to point blank range and firing down on the deck, which was only thinly armored. That would also be stupid, as it turns a sure win into a possible defeat should Monitor outmaneuver Warrior at close range and get a shot at the ends.

 

[Yeekim]

The point has already been made that this is a gross mismatch, between a little gunboat and a first class battleship, but I don't think people quite understand the ridiculous disparity in firepower. Not only has Monitor but 2 guns, but the the XI in Dahlgrens are designed to be operated by >3x the guncrew that could fit within the turret. This is a massive handicap with the result that a monitor's sustained rate of fire is about 1 volley every 20 minutes. Compare that to the USS New Ironsides armed with the same weapons which was giving a broadside a minute at Charleston Harbor. The Warrior with her lighter guns should manage a bit better than that.

If that is true, then I will have to reverse my earlier vote. Is it, however? Did they really build turrets with such abysmal rate of fire?

 

[xchen08]

If that is true, then I will have to reverse my earlier vote. Is it, however? Did they really build turrets with such abysmal rate of fire?

Yup. The XI Dahlgren was designed for a guncrew of 25 on an open gundeck, like that on the New Ironsides. The Monitor had a guncrew of 14...for both guns, and too tightly squeezed for full efficiency. Actually, the guncrew can't even pretend to man both guns, what they do is load one gun then load the other, and finally fire both at the same time. The turret was a great idea, no doubt, but it's a terrible idea for heavy muzzle loaded smoothbores with no mechanical assistance. The implementation wasn't great either. No hydraulics, pneumatics, electrics, or internal combustion, so the turret uses a small dedicated steam engine to turn, with all the hassle that implies. In practice, monitors never actually turned their turrets to aim. Instead, they either set the turrets turning very slowly, firing as the gunports face the target and then reloading as the turret turns away, or just locked the turret down facing a single direction to limit shock damage on the mechanism, making them not much different from a broadside vessel in practice except for a much lower rate of fire.

Still, they are cheap and fast to build, and useful enough against the Confederate casemate ironclads they faced which didn't have much firepower themselves either. It's just they weren't much use in any other role.