The Ethics of Nuclear Warfare

All very well said. On the point of imperial intervention, though - I thought it was generally agreed that the Emperor had very little 'real' power in Japanese government by the end of the war, so exactly what importance are we saying that his coming out in favour of surrender had?
 
Not sure, wouldn't pretend to be an expert on Japan in the Second World War (or Japan, or the Second World War), but my impression is that the Emperor tended to go with the flow, so his coming out for peace probably represented a shift below the surface of the regime. The hard-liners continued to preach war to the death, but most accepted surrender when it came, even when it meant suppressing an abortive coup and stillborn uprising by their ideological fellow-travelers. One could argue that such was their reverence for the Emperor, contradicting him directly was impossible- but these are not men who had previously taken the Emperor very seriously, or had any reservations about manipulating him to their own ends. The fact that the Emperor was able to make his declarations strongly suggests that the tide had already turned against the hard-liners, and that they knew it; the Emperor, less than forcing their hand, probably allowed them to accept the inevitable with their honour ragged but intact.
 
This thread returns to life again...and disappoints me again. I guess it shouldn't, since this is the history forum. But every time I see it I look for analysis of nuclear warfare rather than the same tired examination of the nub end of WW2.

No doubt it is just distortion caused by my personal involvement in Mutually Assured Destruction, but the "ethics" of popping off a couple of firecrackers that in the scale of WW2 weren't even the most destructive raids don't seem all that complex to me.

Various firebombing air raids were bigger deals, if you don't cower at the word nuclear. There were land battles with higher daily casualty counts. Obviously there were death camps, which are much further removed from the "norms" of warfare.
 
Here is my theory on the nukes used in WW2.

55 million or so died in WW2 mostly from 1941-onwards. Its around 10 million average per year or 200k per week.

If the nukes sped up the war by 1 week they saved lives.

Japan was dragging its feet in the surrender terms and even after the peace treaties were signed people kept dying. Survivors in the camps for example died after liberation, a similar thing was happening in China and part of Asia. Japan had lost the war the bombs were not needed to win the war.

However it was the when. Allied casualties for an invasion of Japan were in the 500k-1 million range excluding Japanese civilians. The Americans had broken the Japanese codes and they had a rough idea of how many Japanese troops were in the landing zones of Japan. They got those estimates based on battles in Okinawa, Iwo Jima and Saipan they extrapolated upwards and used the assumptions the Japanese would be more fanatical in the defence of the home islands.

They knew virtually nothing about internal Japanese politics though or behind the scenes.

Beyond that you are really splitting hairs on who gets to die. The Allied leaders had a choice between their own troops+ Japanese civilians+ all the others in the world or making the war shorter by nuking the Japanese. It was not just people in the combat zones or occupation that dies it was flow on effects like shipping being diverted for war material instead of things like trade. People starved in places like Bengal.
 
one or two almost random "contributions" . Seversky was a former Czarist pilot that had founded and then lost an aviation company in the US , he was the first to claim the damage done to Hiroshima was about equal to 200 B-29s might have done , no doubt within the specific context of so flammable Japanese cities and stuff . There seems to be a public outcry at him for his belitting of the super American bomb , "final" official calculations might have shown 220 or so . When all the radiated Japanese appeared in print and the first seeds of discontent were like sown . Then it was natural to portray the superbomb as just another thing that went ka-boom .

and there was no lack of imagination on any single leader of the WW II or something ; on the power of nuclear weapons . You know , it's just a r16 claim that the Japanese were all for hanging out there until they finished their own . And the Americans went into high gear "conventional" campaign after August 12th , to convince the Japanese that they had not run out of ordinary bombs and had to resort to the "uglies" .


All very well said. On the point of imperial intervention, though - I thought it was generally agreed that the Emperor had very little 'real' power in Japanese government by the end of the war, so exactly what importance are we saying that his coming out in favour of surrender had?

decisive , his clear stance justified destruction of the "hardliners" by all means possible . It seems the Kanto Plain held 20 divisions , how many of them could have joined a coup , when the "god" or something directly ordered stuff .
 
There was a tradition of non-interference in state/military matters by the emperor and Hirohito himself was a introvert who was heavily manipulated by the military.

But I don't think there was ever a point where his "devine right" was ever in question. The military leadership refused to join the coup against the emperor even though they agreed with the rebels in principle and wanted to continue the war.
 
ı would go on to say the surrender was the only thing his intervention ever decided . Emperors , even when "god-like" tend to have so much knowledge of how they might be easily poisoned and the lot .
 
The bomb was referenced by the Emperor when he said the war was over. In effect it was a face saving measure by the government and military for losing the war.
 
it was proof the Americans had cornered the last advantage the Japanese might have used , with the fall of Germany opening the use of nerve gases . The Japanese might have still used biological weapons , but there were signs their supposed leadership in the field was not decisive . That the signs might be negative propaganda or something does not alter the fact that when the Emperor spoke there was no argument that could be used . Apart from accidentaly killing him , which was the aim fo the coup attempt or the Tokyo mission of August 15th , which was nullified by the widespread wireless orders and stuff that the Emperor would speak on the radio at noon , so much signals that it could not be buried by the American hardliners .
 
Ethics? Are you kidding me? The reason WMD are "prohibited" is because they are impossible to defend against so those with power "prohibit" them to weaker powers so they don't get on equal footing with minimal effort, like for example North Korea. If WW4 will ever start, the first thing that will be flying are nukes. Ethics.. :D
 
Maoist theory is actually pro-middle class. They call it the "national bourgeoisie", whole Leninist theory of capitalist development under a "people's government". You couldn't have government bodies with names like "the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce" if anyone suspected of engaging industry and commerce was cannibalised on the spot. The middle classes suffered badly in the Cultural Revolution, that's true, but that was part of a generalised outburst of violence against anyone perceived as being part of the Old Guard: teachers, government officials and academics were also heavily persecuted, despite the impeccably socialist credentials of their professions.

My idea was that this only came after Mao's death, in that Deng Xiaoping revised Chinese communism into accepting capitalism as a transitory state from feudalism towards socialism and eventually communism - or that's how the rethoric goes at least.

And speaking about China in regards to the OP: The Chinese constitution mandates nuclear attacks in the case of a foreign invasion.
 
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My idea was that this only came after Mao's death, in that Deng Xiaoping revised Chinese communism into accepting capitalism as a transitory state from feudalism towards socialism and eventually communism - or that's how the rethoric goes at least.
Nah, the Culture Revolution was the exception in the development of Marxism-Leninism in China, and not even that much of an exception, because Mao never disavowed the "national bourgeoisie", he just asserted that the existing political structure wasn't doing enough to keep them in line.

The thing to remember is, outside of Western Europe, Marxism-Leninism is a theory of national development first, revolution second. It was primarily concerned with the development of national economy in the "imperialist stage of capitalism"; Mao's innovation was asserting that the "Third World" could only maintain its independence by rapid industrialisation and self-sufficiency, while Deng's was asserting that, on the contrary, China's best bey lay in beating the capitalists at their own game of international commerce.
 
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