Alt History: Spain

Stalin gives the communists the OK to form a common anti fascist front with the socialists and Republicans, Franco is eventually defeated and dies in exile in Morocco when an assassin picks his brain with an ice pick.

How does Spain, and the rest of Europe develop with Spain as a Yugoslavian style socialist economy, but not politically in Moscow's sphere of influence? Or, if you like, if it had been allied to Moscow?

RedRalphWiggum said:

Stalin gives the communists the OK to form a common anti fascist front with the socialists and Republicans, Franco is eventually defeated and dies in exile in Morocco when an assassin picks his brain with an ice pick.

How does Spain, and the rest of Europe develop with Spain as a Yugoslavian style socialist economy, but not politically in Moscow's sphere of influence? Or, if you like, if it had been allied to Moscow?

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Fair question, which I will pass on for now, and just point out that...

You know, I'm pretty sure Stalin did exactly what you just suggested.

In the 30's Moscow's policy was not to aggressivly push Komintern socialist take-overs, but to play nice. The Spanish Communist Party was told to cool it, toe the line, and only indirectly attempt to gain control over things, but not to challenge the Republican govt.

So Stalin did exactly as you suggest, and it went to pieces anyway. Madrid was pretty much totally dependant on Soviet military aid. Mind you, since the Spanish Communists had persuaded the govt. that it was a good idea to deposit the entire national currency reserve in Moscow, they didn't have much choice in the matter.

Had the Republic survived, it would probably have been a some kind of federal entity. That or there might have been a Komintern putsch to make it a Soviet socialist republic.

If the first happens, I can't say it looks like set to change much in the development to WWII.

If the second happens, it would truly put the fear of the Big Bolshies into everyone not feeling sufficiently Bolshy themselves, perhaps to the point of seriously deciding to back Fascism and Nazism as a less odious alternative (not exactly my personal feelings, but common enough in Europe in the 30's).

AFAIK, Verbose (and I'm quite open to being corrected here), Stalin only encourage dthe communists to cooperate with the other leftist forces at the very end when it became clear Franco was going to win anyhow.

Yeah that ain't alt-history. That's exactly what happened with the other team winning somehow anyway.

The PCE was a tiny faction in 1936, Spanish socialism was dominated by anarchism and second international socialism and was quite different to the rest of Europe (as a general rule, communist parties became big parties only where there was already a super strong socialist party, such as in Germany).

The PCE was part of the Popular Front government that was elected in February '36, but only a small one compared to the socialists and republicans (I've got the electoral statistics around somewhere, but it was about 70% republicans of different stripes including catalanists and 25% socialists of the PSOE and federated parties, essentially the same coalition that won the elections in 1931). What changed was that the PCE had the mother of all bargaining chips - their control of Soviet armaments. This put them in a strong position to increase their power during the war, and things like the absorption of the militias into the republican army was largely their idea. Essentially the idea was win the war first, socialism later. And winning the war for the communists and many republicans required discipline and centralistion (while for the anarchists and many socialists the revolution and the war were the same thing). Within the kaleidoscope of interests and parties the PCE steadily gained ground arguing the centralisation and discipline and moderate-image line.

Another consideration for the republic was the need for moderate appearances to get the UK and France onside. This was probably a major reason for the purges of the militias, the ending of the collectivisation in factories and farms by the UGT and CNT (the socialist and anarchist trade unions) and so forth. The French would have been persuaded more easily than Britain but France put its alliance with the UK ahead of solidarity with another popular front government.

The Comintern agenda was as Verbose puts it--win the war through a Popular Front with the socialists, regionalists (including Basque conservatives) and liberal bourgeois republican parties, but gain control over the apparatus of said popular front. What happened in Spain was a similar process to the post-war Eastern European countries. Started with multi-party systems and popular front governments, but gradually the popular fronts got hollowed out, over a couple of years, as communists gained power by genuine popularity and by subterfuge, and infiltrated the other parties, until eventually it was either a one party state in law or in name. Spain never reached that stage but remained a fairly hollow popular front right up until the end.

I'm going to post again about points of departure and some of the possible outcomes for a republic surviving the nationalist coup attempt.

POINTS OF DEPARTURE

Seizure of power, 1936

The intention was never to start a civil war. The conspiring generals (the right wing parties mostly just assumed a coup was coming and were ready to support it) intended to enact a pronunciamiento, a very Spanish political phenomenon wherein the military steps in to "correct" the political system, mostly without much violence. Happened frequently during the liberal vs absolutist confrontations of the 19th century and was a well known part of politics. The generals anticipated a quick change of power, but didn't figure on mass mobilisation in defence of the republic(or their own necks) by socialist and anarchist militias. The rising was defeated in some places and successful in others and there were sieges that lasted for weeks or months, and this formed the battle lines of the civil war.

Sections of the military remained loyal, others vacillated. The key for Franco was his control of the best troops, the africanos, which proved to be invaluable for actually making offensives of the sort the republican militias weren't capable of doing. Blocking their transport from North Africa would have swung things decisively in favour of the Republic which, on the peninsula, had all the big cities, the big industrial centres and 2/3rds of the territory. Keeping the Army of Africa out of play would have prevented the early pushes in Extremadura and Andalucía and changed the outcome of many of the sieges where nationalists held out against republican militias. For example, it would have prevented the relief of the garrison in Oviedo (northern coastal strip, strongly republican but fell early to the nationalists) and especially the morale and propaganda victory of the Alcázar in Toledo.

It was entirely possible that things could have swung decisively one way or the other in those first hours, with either a totally successful seizure of power by the nationalists, or a decisive defeat by the Republic. Particularly if the republican government had have helped arm the militias, or made more efforts to purge the officer corps between February and July, they could've headed off the coup. More likely, there could have been a quicker and more mismatched civil war going in favour of one faction or the other.

International intervention

Basically the key variable is what the big powers do in terms of arming, recognising and blockading the two sides. The non-intervention pact was a farce and it quickly became clear that it was objectively pro-nationalist because the Italians and Germans ignored it. A more robust defence of the republic by France and the UK could have evened things out in military terms, as well as given some of their units more experience in WW2-style warfare, with consequences in the war 5 years later.

Or it could have started a wider war, which is probably something many Republicans would have welcomed. They were always trying to link their battle with the broader clash with international fascism. If anyone saw Pan's Labyrinth set in 1944 they'll have seen not just the resemblance between Spanish Maquis and the French resistance, but also the touchingly naive hope that liberation of Europe meant liberation for them too.

Alternatively, it's entirely possible that stronger Anglo-French resolve would have given Hitler pause to reconsider his series of gambles that led to expansion and war and delayed or averted a European war altogether.

Battle of Madrid, Republican offensive doctrines

Once it became clear that the Republic was isolated and the Nationalists had strong foreign support, a couple of times during the war, military decisions had a massive influence on the outcome. Franco tried to take Madrid in 1936, got close, but was repulsed. This put him into an ultra-cautious mindset that said "take everything else first and purge the country area-by-area". His German advisors were frustrated with his timidness and caution and it probably hampered the war effort. He really wasn't a brilliant general, all things considered.

Likewise, there was some massive idiocy on the Republican side, a lot of it foreshadowing the propaganda-driven slaughters of the Eastern Front. Basically they (under a socialist premier, Negrín, and strong communist influence) felt that even though they were now clearly outmatched by the nationalist war machine, they had to make offensives and actively fight to gain ground and improve morale. Propaganda moves which they always lost, at great expense. Cases in point are the attacks on Belchite, Teruel, and the Ebro which were spectacular stupid wastes which directly undermined capacity to resist in a time when the republic was clearly outgunned. A more defensive, guerrilla-style war rather than big set-pieces, or even a more defensive guerrilla-style war in addition to big set-pieces, would have helped the Republicans maintain their capacity to resist for much longer. Possibly until a European war broke out.

Franco enters the war

There was one brief window in which Franco may have entered the war on the Axis side, during the height of German dominance of the continent. Franco, for whatever reason, demanded French North Africa and a lot of resources the Germans couldn't spare (oil and rubber and the like) and as a result the Germans told him where to stick it. Franco and Hitler didn't like each other, and the Spanish nationalists knew if they entered the war they'd lose the Canary Islands quite quickly. The war would have needed to have gone better than it ever did for Germany, for Spain to seriously consider entry.

Plus you know the country was pretty exhausted from the civil war and in no shape to fight another one.

I hope someone actually bothers to read this...

POTENTIAL OUTCOMES FOR A SPANISH REPUBLIC

This is harder to say, because the balance of forces within the republic was quite fluid and the post war situation would have swung on who had the power. I think RRW's assessment of a Yugoslav-style system and international position is entirely possible, but equally is a more multi-party system or a more Stalinist one and beyond major land reform and some nationalisation of industry there's no reason to assume the imposition of a full-on command economy. The variables named in my previous "points of departure" thread all have an influence here because they determine the relative strengths of the different forces within the Republic. I can't see the anarchists having much power in any post-war set up unless they decide to abandon their anti political stance, but the balance between republicans, regionalists, socialists and communists is open for speculation.

Basically there's three possibilities: status quo from 1936, a swing leftward or a swing rightward. The status quo option is the return to rule by the republican left as represented by people like Manuel Azaña... pluralist but socialist and essentially continuing the project of secularisation, land reform and social legislation instituted by the republican left during 31-33 and 36. If the rebellion was defeated in 1936 the republicans and moderate socialists simply wouldn't have needed the revolutionaries like Karensky did and could have utterly shut the more leftwards groups out. This possibility becomes less likely as the war drags on and the PCE gains power, but with British and French support and the lack of a monopoly on arms it's once again still entirely likely.

The second possibility, in the early days, was a more moderate coalition including more of the republican and liberal parties in greater positions of authority. Again, not very likely once the country was cleft in twain along the political spectrum with liberal republicans on one side and conservative republicans on the other. Maybe in a post-war situation the rehabilitation of more moderate nationalist supporters would have become possible, but I can't see that extending very far rightwards.

The other possibility is of course a much more revolutionary situation with who knows what outcome, though the anarchists / libertarian socialists were far stronger in Spain than anywhere else in Europe in the 30s... basically they never disappeared like they did in other European countries. Again the level of PCE power is key, as is the relative strength of different factions within the PSOE, as well as that of the republican but not marxist left. With the strongly libertarian and anti political nature of socialism in Spain at that time, the presence of a social revolution alongside the outbreak of war that had some degree of success, and the absence of the military threat of the nationalists, there's probably a very real chance of libertarian socialism getting a chance to survive. If it could avoid being crushed by the PCE, the centralising elements of the PSOE and left-republicans.

And of course a Stalinist state was always a possibility, though I think distance from the East and the Red Army, plus the presence of a France and Italy with strong non-Stalinist lefts, (often serving as points of reference and examples to follow), probably mitigates the chances for complete isolation and totalitarianism.

If it had happened after several years of war, a victorious republic would probably have been nearly as repressive as Nationalist Spain, but probably not as thoroughgoing in its persecutions as the Nationalists were. It would've sucked to be clergy or rich for a while, particularly in the cities.

I think even with a point of departure fairly late in the war, it's unclear how much control the PCE could have retained post-war. Even moreso if the civil war had have lasted long enough to link to the wider European war. Remember the French and Italian Communist Parties had massive prestige and influence but were quickly marginalised, relatively speaking. With republicans and socialists among the victors, and the emerging liberal/social-democratic orthodoxy in Western Europe, it's not a stretch to imagine that PSOE and PCE dominance wouldn't necessarily have led to a non-democratic system.

One point to consider is that a Republican Spain that was any more independent than a Stalinist puppet state would have almost certainly taken Marshall Aid if it was offered, and given that it was theoretically available to countries like Czechoslovakia I don't see why the same American sphere-of-influence, market-securing logic wouldn't have applied to Spain. Assuming a reasonably Marxist, socialist, but geopolitically independent (or Allied) Spain, what we could well have seen was a very early example of a pro-market experiment within the socialist world, and an earlier and more complete integration into Europe on the part of Spain. Maybe somewhere between Yugoslavia and Sweden.

Another important question is the regional issue. There's every chance a Republican Spain would have resulted in an independent Basque Country and an independent Catalan Republic or further civil wars over their status. I think with the conservative and Catholic nature of Basque nationalism at that time, they were a more likely candidate for complete separation, the Catalans would likely have accepted a federal framework.

Jesus... cant ask for more than that, you, sir, know what you are talkig about!!!! and youre telling me English isnt your first language!!!!

Hahahaha, is that a slight against Australians or do you think I'm Spanish?

Arwon said:

Hahahaha, is that a slight against Australians or do you think I'm Spanish?

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I thought you were Spanish

Oh, in case anyone wants sources I'm basing this on the classes I've taken and the books I've read, which are especially the following:

Anthony Beevor's Battle for Spain

La historia de España que no pudo ser ("The history of Spain that couldn't be", a discussion of alt-history questions by various historians of Spain, and a wonderful tool for learning the subjunctive.)

Spain At War – the Spanish civil war in context, 1931-1939 by George Eisenwien and Adrian Shubert

...and Raymond Carr's The Republic and the Civil War in Spain which was written in 1971 but the dude's one of the most famous historians of Spain and still gets referenced a lot.

Arwon said:

POINTS OF DEPARTURE
International intervention

Basically the key variable is what the big powers do in terms of arming, recognising and blockading the two sides. The non-intervention pact was a farce and it quickly became clear that it was objectively pro-nationalist because the Italians and Germans ignored it. A more robust defence of the republic by France and the UK could have evened things out in military terms, as well as given some of their units more experience in WW2-style warfare, with consequences in the war 5 years later.

Click to expand...

I think that left to itself France would have intervened in 1938, after Hitler annexed Austria. it was the UK that constantly pressed the French to remain "neutral" (effectively allowing the fascists to win).
A french intervention on the republic's side in 1938 would make a very interesting alternative history. France had the capacity to beat Franco's army on its string attack against Barcelona, but would have to commit a significant force to get more than a stalemate. Probably a first small force would be beaten by the fascists with their borrowed german air force, and this experience would be invaluable for the french in 1940! Franco's alternative to keep fighting was only to give up and go into exile - defeat. And even if he would accept such a thing his supporters certainly would not - too much spilled blood and hate already.

Hitler would not dare declare war on France, but I doubt he would call off the germans supporting Franco either. His plans to annex Czechoslovakia without having to fight a war would not work, so he would bet everything in placing one more ally in a position to surround the french. Deterioration of relations with france, with war looming, would probably lead the french government to make a pact with the USSR, regardless of british support, against Germany. If (arguably when) Hitler was foolish enough to invade one of its neighbors and start WW2 the war would go on a totally different way.

i further recommend this:

http://www.amazon.de/Die-libertäre-Revolution-Heleno-Sana/dp/3894013788

for german speakers.
it focuses on the cnt-fai and the spanish revolution.

apparently it hasnt been translated in english.

Had Republican Spain really won the war, and if it managed to draw enough manpower, an invasion of authoritarian Portugal (in which many Francoists would surely be exiled) could also be possible.

Um. Why would that ever happen?

Well, in the early 20th Century, the Republican movements in Spain and Portugal had a very strong Iberist component, and many members had as long-term objective an Iberian Union with all nations (Portugal, Castille, Galicia, Catalonia, Basque Country) living in harmony and all. IF, a possible Republican Spain victorious of the civil war had both the military power and international support, it could invade Portugal for that reason and also to overthrow an authoritarian regime similar to Franco's. However, not in WW2, with Vichy France right north of them.

Would you stop smoking pot, please? My grandpa fought in the republican side and told me that, with the exception of bourgeoise loyal to the republic and nationalists (both of them minorities in the republican side), they all were a bunch of revolution-dreaming commies and anarchists with no really chances to win.

...

Arwon here you have the seats for the popular front after the elections of 1936:

* PSOE: 88 seats
* IR: 79 seats
* UR: 34 seats
* ERC: 22 seats
* PCE: 14 seats
* Acció Catalana: 5 seats
* ORGA: 3 seats
* Otros: 18 seats

@Thorgalaeg: I don't know if that rolleyes are for me. If they're, I've got to tell you this: my grandpa was a war veteran, so he knew better than anyone here what he was talking about.

Listening to your grandpa is all well and good, but one first hand account is hardly an authoritative or all-knowing source!

Thorg: thanks for those, looks like the PSOE was a little bigger than I'd remembered. Still a minority though.

LS: Sorry but that's incredibly unlikely. The left parties of the Republic, the Republicans and Socialists, were in power from 1931-33 and from 1936 until the war ended. They showed zero interest in invading Portugal. After having just won a bloody internal civil war, they would have been faced with a country in ruins and would have had even less interest than before, and been utterly incapable of waging an external war.

Arwon said:

Listening to your grandpa is all well and good, but one first hand account is hardly an authoritative or all-knowing source!

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What do you mean with this? That a foreigner or a native historian who was born after that war was over (see your own book references) are better sources than a war veteran? Sorry, but I still prefer my grandpa over them.