History questions not worth their own thread IV

[Traitorfish]

As enticing as communism can sound to many people, I believe that in essence it is just as far fetched and even more of an Alice-in-the-goddamn-wonderland philosophy. It does a wonderful job of pointing out every shortcomings of its oppositions, but if you ever read Karl Marx, he does not even devote a single chapter, no a single paragraph into explaining how such a worker's utopia should be run or governed in detail. It is as if he is saying "Happily ever after" when certain problems were killed, washed out, convinced out, or debunked.

Have you read Marx?

 

[overkill9]

Have you read Marx?

Yes. I think you might be confusing 'proper' advise in detail for running such a country with meaningless pipedream speeches that boils down to 'trust in other proletariat and live happily ever after'.

 

[Dachs]

Yes, I think the sarcasm got lost in just the text Thanks for clarifying it for everyone.

It's so hard to tell sometimes on the internet.

With the post I just quoted, though, it wasn't hard to tell at all.

 

[Cutlass]

Overkill9

I did not say that the US got lucky in the whole of the Pacific war. But we certainly got lucky at the Battle of Midway. And that battle very seriously knocked back Japanese naval power much earlier in the war than would have happened otherwise. We were still going to win. But we won more battles earlier because of the crippling damage to the IJN at Midway.

Now you can't really deny that at Midway the advantage was with the Japanese. But due to a number of factors, some mistakes on the part of Japanese leadership, but to a very large extent just the luck of battle where enemies have trouble locating one another, the US victory was a massive one. You cannot deny the luck in that battle.

As for the remainder of the war, the US was unprepared in 1942, but was by far the stronger power overall. And by the beginning of 1943, hell really at any point after Midway, you can't really say that the Japanese had any advantages, even locally temporarily, in the war. They simply took on more than they had any chance of defeating, and hoped that that time window when they were prepared for the war and we were not would be sufficient to force the US to a negotiated peace. It took 6 months to win on Guadalcanal. It's not like we just overwhelmed them all at once.

 

[overkill9]

Overkill9

I did not say that the US got lucky in the whole of the Pacific war. But we certainly got lucky at the Battle of Midway. And that battle very seriously knocked back Japanese naval power much earlier in the war than would have happened otherwise. We were still going to win. But we won more battles earlier because of the crippling damage to the IJN at Midway.

Now you can't really deny that at Midway the advantage was with the Japanese. But due to a number of factors, some mistakes on the part of Japanese leadership, but to a very large extent just the luck of battle where enemies have trouble locating one another, the US victory was a massive one. You cannot deny the luck in that battle.

As for the remainder of the war, the US was unprepared in 1942, but was by far the stronger power overall. And by the beginning of 1943, hell really at any point after Midway, you can't really say that the Japanese had any advantages, even locally temporarily, in the war. They simply took on more than they had any chance of defeating, and hoped that that time window when they were prepared for the war and we were not would be sufficient to force the US to a negotiated peace. It took 6 months to win on Guadalcanal. It's not like we just overwhelmed them all at once.

I would dispute luck simply because battlefield is full of uncertainties, and it is the usual platitude of those looking for any excuse to justify/mollify their defeat. Midway was no luckier than many other battles in history where in the midst of chaos and confusions, better prepared, more tenacious, and more powerful were there to seize the opportunity when it arose. Luck is a typical term for the excuse of the defeated. It is not as if great storm rose up out of no where and swallowed the IJN whole.

As I said, luck is what the unprepared call it when it really is what happens when preparation, tenacity, and ability meets opportunity.

We may not have overwhelmed them over night, but the fact of the matter is, japanese lost far more people in many more engagements than was warranted given their position, being on the defensive in a difficult terrain favoring defense, and they had more battle experience before going up against US Navy that had comparatively little, which matters a whole lot.

Like I said, that 'stronger power' was divided up with more weight given to europe. The battle of the pacific, during 1942 when japan was at the peak of its power and we were still getting ready, was much more evenly matched with many more advantages favoring japanse including better planes, better equipment, more experienced soldiers, and rough equal numerical parity. The usual excuse of 'you won simply by numbers and equipment' would gain traction if US only started winning after 1943 later on, but this is clearly not the case: We beat them in 1942 while they were at the peak of their power, and it proved that neither crutches of superior materials or equipment were necessary to defeat the japanese on even footing. They cannot even claim that we only won by replacing ours while they could not, because we won even when the materials and training for reserves were in inferior quality to theirs. This is the point we need to fully recognize. Suppose we did not have full superiority of materials and men after 1942. The results at guadacanal proved that while it may have taken longer, US would eventually have prevailed in the pacific simply because we were better soldiers, with greater tenacity and fighting abilities of our people. This proved to be a severe psychological as well as material blow to the imperial japanese, who were relegated to hopeless defense on the path to humiliating defeat on the war they started. Not underestimating your enemy is all well and good, but encouraging this myth of 'they were more tenacious' without separating tenacity from self-comforting acts of suicides and idiocy to that effect really doesn't do anyone credit.

Your point is understandable however, and it has its merits.

 

[xchen08]

I did not say that the US got lucky in the whole of the Pacific war. But we certainly got lucky at the Battle of Midway. And that battle very seriously knocked back Japanese naval power much earlier in the war than would have happened otherwise. We were still going to win. But we won more battles earlier because of the crippling damage to the IJN at Midway.

Now you can't really deny that at Midway the advantage was with the Japanese. But due to a number of factors, some mistakes on the part of Japanese leadership, but to a very large extent just the luck of battle where enemies have trouble locating one another, the US victory was a massive one. You cannot deny the luck in that battle.

Overkill might not be able to, but I definitely can.

First, the Japanese did not have the advantage. The U.S. had far more planes thanks to heavy use of deck parks on the carriers and land based planes from Midway, and the initiative since they knew Japanese strength from code breaking while the Japanese didn't know U.S. strength. The vast Japanese superiority in surface assets was completely irrelevant, a fact that Japan had yet to realize but the U.S. understood quite well. Task Force 1 had from repaired Pearl survivors and Atlantic transfers, a battleline comparable to that Yamamoto brought along to Midway, but it was consciously not committed so as to free up more escorts for the carriers and not slow them down.

Next, the particulars of the battle were very much determined by doctrine rather than luck. The Japanese never had anything like the interwar U.S. Fleet Problems, particularly the carrier on carrier duels between the Lexington and Saratoga, meaning the U.S. was actually the one with experience in carrier on carrier warfare. In particular the U.S. concluded (for a pre-radar era, as indeed the Japanese were still in) that finding and hitting the enemy carrier first trumped all else. Thus, every U.S. carrier had a squadron of scout bombers for this purpose, while the Japanese left scouting to floatplanes off cruisers, which were limited in both numbers and performance and had the problem of not being directly connected to the carrier commanders. Combined with the PBYs from Midway, and the codebreaking, there was no luck in the Japanese having a terrible time finding their enemies while the U.S. didn't. This wasn't all good of course, the emphasis on hitting first above all else meant the U.S. carriers were sending off individual squadrons as soon as they could be prepared and launched, which led to a lot of them being slaughtered individually, but certainly the Japanese emphasis on massed strikes helped keep their planes on deck until it was too late.

There was luck of course, as in any battle, but it can't be said to have particularly favored the U.S. The Akagi nearly went down to a kamikaze from Midway, for instance. It was certainly possible for all luck to go one way or the other, but how it went down historically is pretty much what you'd expect. Which was why the U.S. committed to the battle. Midway was a worthless island for Japan that it couldn't possibly hold and most likely couldn't take. If it didn't think it would win with its full knowledge of what strength the Japanese had, the U.S. wouldn't have fought there.

 

[overkill9]

Overkill might not be able to, but I definitely can.

First, the Japanese did not have the advantage. The U.S. had far more planes thanks to heavy use of deck parks on the carriers and land based planes from Midway, and the initiative since they knew Japanese strength from code breaking while the Japanese didn't know U.S. strength. The vast Japanese superiority in surface assets was completely irrelevant, a fact that Japan had yet to realize but the U.S. understood quite well. Task Force 1 had from repaired Pearl survivors and Atlantic transfers, a battleline comparable to that Yamamoto brought along to Midway, but it was consciously not committed so as to free up more escorts for the carriers and not slow them down.

Next, the particulars of the battle were very much determined by doctrine rather than luck. The Japanese never had anything like the interwar U.S. Fleet Problems, particularly the carrier on carrier duels between the Lexington and Saratoga, meaning the U.S. was actually the one with experience in carrier on carrier warfare. In particular the U.S. concluded (for a pre-radar era, as indeed the Japanese were still in) that finding and hitting the enemy carrier first trumped all else. Thus, every U.S. carrier had a squadron of scout bombers for this purpose, while the Japanese left scouting to floatplanes off cruisers, which were limited in both numbers and performance and had the problem of not being directly connected to the carrier commanders. Combined with the PBYs from Midway, and the codebreaking, there was no luck in the Japanese having a terrible time finding their enemies while the U.S. didn't. This wasn't all good of course, the emphasis on hitting first above all else meant the U.S. carriers were sending off individual squadrons as soon as they could be prepared and launched, which led to a lot of them being slaughtered individually, but certainly the Japanese emphasis on massed strikes helped keep their planes on deck until it was too late.

There was luck of course, as in any battle, but it can't be said to have particularly favored the U.S. The Akagi nearly went down to a kamikaze from Midway, for instance. It was certainly possible for all luck to go one way or the other, but how it went down historically is pretty much what you'd expect. Which was why the U.S. committed to the battle. Midway was a worthless island for Japan that it couldn't possibly hold and most likely couldn't take. If it didn't think it would win with its full knowledge of what strength the Japanese had, the U.S. wouldn't have fought there.

I would dispute your conclusions based on putting too much weight on the advantage of a particular element (reconnaissance, intel, more # of inferior aircraft) in lieu of disadvantages US suffered (obviously less number of carriers, lesser firepower due to lack of 2 battleships japanese possessed which offset US support ship numerical superiority, inferior quality of planes and training for pilots, and most importantly, battle experience compared to japanese who participated in pearl harbor and many other carrier attacks in south east asia). The carrier to carrier duel program, or the lack there of in part of the japanese was more than offset by this and stringent training regimen of their pilot programs, which incorporated all elements into at least in theory, and practice carrier duels cannot be compared to actual combat experience against real ships, even if they are not carriers. Also, being able to see the enemy cannot make up all the way for lack of fighting tactics due to rushed training and lack of actual battle experience.

I would also dispute that 'outcome was obvious' simply because the US had great deal of trouble locating the japanese fleet until a flight commander and his squadron risked all of their fuel to the last drop looking for the japanese, knowing that mid way cannot fall and this was the last chance they had at blunting their offensive before japanese's resources taken from southeast asia came into full force to supply potential landing forces for midway and even pearl harbor, from which US mainland could be threatened. It was in many ways the sharp eyes from this flight crew and the recon planes which were all sent out according to US tactics, and their attack on the carriers which laid the foundation of victory, and the amazing efficiency and tenacity of Yorktown crews which still kept the ship afloat even after two successful wave of japanese attack that cemented the victory.

US had the eyes, but lacked the muscle to be as proactive as possible. The land based bombers were of inferior quality planes, and that they were able to inflict that much damage on the japanese planes on air indicate a good deal (it was 7 to 16 of ours, but some of that 16 of ours went down on the ground) of tenacity, making up for the loss of fighter planes by diverting japanese attention to midway, with B-26 suicide run, although unsuccessful, unnerved nagumo enough to make a tactical mistake, which is one of the best blow one can land at the enemy.

The point is, US bested the peak of japan's strength both physically and psychologically in ways that no one would plausibly make excuses for other than occasional muttering of 'you just got lucky'. This is not really one-sided conclusion: Simply by looking at the advantages and disadvantages, one can see it was clearly stacked in favor of japanese for various reasons not limited to better training and planes.

Your conclusion is valid to an extent, but I would re examine the emphasis and impact of factors involved, including the human ones, which have always been the deciding final force in battles.

 

[Plotinus]

I sometimes wonder if Rand would be anywhere near as well known today without games like Bioshock prompting interest in her philosophy. I'd certainly never heard of her before playing the game, but I'm not terribly interested in philosophy to be honest, so perhaps she's well known to people who study the subject?

No, Ayn Rand is not studied by philosophers or taught in philosophy courses. She's not a philosopher.

She's virtually unknown outside the US.

 

[privatehudson]

Interesting, I've seen her described as one on a few websites, but would have no idea whether that is accurate or not.

 

[Plotinus]

The kind of people who like her think she's a philosopher, in that I suppose she's what they think of as philosophy. It's a bit like calling Nickelback a heavy metal band. They might be some people's idea of what heavy metal sounds like, but not anyone who's actually into heavy metal.

 

[privatehudson]

Wow, that's two for two, I don't really like Heavy Metal either

 

[Bowsling]

People outside of Canada have heard of Nickelback?

 

[Dachs]

People outside of Canada have heard of Nickelback?

Uh, yeah. They're fairly popular among the subset of people that can't tell that all their songs are the same. And they're extremely unpopular among the subset of people that is everybody else.

 

[Dreadnought]

I recently saw a pretty awesome emblem for a nation that looked like this:



except it was a black background. Does anyone know what country used (uses?) this symbol?

 

[Louis XXIV]

The kind of people who like her think she's a philosopher, in that I suppose she's what they think of as philosophy. It's a bit like calling Nickelback a heavy metal band. They might be some people's idea of what heavy metal sounds like, but not anyone who's actually into heavy metal.

I think she qualifies as a moral philosopher. She's a terrible moral philosopher, but I think it's a fair description of what her work is.

I think Nickelback is a terrible hard rock band rather than a terrible heavy metal band, fwiw. Fans of music have problems with them, though, not just Metal fans.

 

[Lord Baal]

No, he didn't. He didn't field a military capable of standing on its own and winning on its own against Germany. Who cares about personal politics?

FDR?

? Sorry, you meant the french method in Africa?

Yes.

Well, the problem is that the "soft underbelly" was actually much more defensible terrain than most of France is. So it wouldn't have been easy under the best of circumstances.

Most of Churchill's argument was around controlling the Mediterranean for the British Empire in the post-war period. The idea of using it as a springboard to the conquest of Europe itself was ridiculously stupid.

No, Ayn Rand is not studied by philosophers or taught in philosophy courses. She's not a philosopher.

She's virtually unknown outside the US.

I'd certainly never heard of her until I came here.

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

FDR?

Churchill. Dachs is basically saying that he couldn't win the war by himself, so any power awarded to him by FDR (the 400 pound gorilla in the war room) in the alliance was either out of respect for our "Anglo-Saxon heritage" or because we really liked the idea of an unsinkable aircraft carrier to bomb the crap out of Germany from.

I'd certainly never heard of her until I came here.

It's comforting to know her insanity hasn't infected some parts of the world (or apparently most of it, since both Plot and Atticus profess that she is beyond irrelevant outside of the US).

She's routinely on high school reading lists in our God-forsaken country.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Even then, it's only part of this God Forsaken country.

 

[Louis XXIV]

I've never had to read her, fwiw. I knew of her starting some time in College, iirc, and I know people who have read her, but I didn't think anyone was required to read her.

I understand her books to be terrible from a purely literary point of view. Then again, works of fiction designed to convey a strong fringe political view usually suffers because of this (I think Sinclair's The Jungle suffers because of this too and he could at least write powerful descriptions and evocative imagery).

 

[Tee Kay]

It's comforting to know her insanity hasn't infected some parts of the world (or apparently most of it, since both Plot and Atticus profess that she is beyond irrelevant outside of the US).

Our so-called "political discourse" is crazy enough as it is. I can't imagine how it would be with Randism *shudder*