I actually wanted to put forward Nassim Nicholas Taleb as well. I think Alain de Botton, together with Nassim Taleb somehow represent a strain in philosophy distinct from both Continental and Analytical philosophy, yet influenced by both by a small degree. Both men are actually hostile to reductionism analytical philosophy is accused of, yet without embracing any of the traditional continental schools like postmodernism, structuralism, existentialism etc. Actually, Nassim is pretty hostile to Postmodernism as well.
I don't know about Nassim. But it's perfectly possible to be an analytic philosopher without supporting "reductionism" (whatever that is - no two people seem to use the word to mean the same thing). Analytic philosophy is a method rather than any set of doctrines, I think.
There was plenty of crossovering between (Analytical) Wittgenstein and (Continental) Nietzsche. So, it the distinction may indeed have been a false dichotomy for starters. Though Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore would arguably be the quintessential 'stereotypical' analytic philosophers. Pretty much all other so-called analytical philosophers are to some degree indebted to continental philosophers and vice versa.
In what way? I see precious little citation of continental philosophers in analytic philosophy. I see far, far more citation of continental philosophers in
theology! Indeed continental philosophy seems to my untrained eyes to be basically the same thing as theology, but without God. When contemporary theologians talk about "philosophy" they almost always mean continental philosophy and typically have virtually no knowledge of analytic philosophy. This irritates me since it means they all assume that because I'm a philosopher I must know about continental philosophy.
I'm sure it's possible to point to some individuals who draw on both traditions, but I don't think that that changes the fact that, for the most part, the two traditions are quite distinct and don't really engage with each other.
Because history is able to provide certainty philosophy can't, wouldn't you say history would be an excellent tool for philosophy?
Well, not really, because the discipline of history has developed tools that can provide certainty (for some value of "certainty") only in answering historical questions. They can't be used to answer philosophical questions. We can, for example, assess the evidence to decide whether Caesar conquered Gaul, but there's no way to apply this method to decide whether there are moral facts or whether the mind necessarily supervenes on the body.
There are various methods that different disciplines have developed to answer questions in those disciplines such that they are beyond reasonable doubt. This applies not just to history but to science and mathematics, and perhaps other areas too. Philosophy is, pretty much by definition, the study of problems for which none of these methods works satisfactorily.