What if FDR listened to General Marshall?

[Truth Bleeds]

Hi,

First post!!

I've recently learned to my dismay that Brits voted for Churchill as the greatest brit. What?? Couldn't they think of Darwin, Shakespeare, Newton, or even Elizabeth I? What I am about to post is exceedingly controversial and may offend many Brits but I assure you my aim is not to stir up trouble but rather use Churchill as a contrast to a very under-rated General that history seems to have forgotten about.

Introducing General George Catlett Marshall, WWII general and the central figure of the rebuilding plan for post-war Germany and Japan which bears his name, "Marshall Plan." He was also a 1953 Nobel Peace Prize winner.

Some notable facts:

1. Major General James F. Bell described Marshall as the greatest military genius since Stonewall Jackson.

2. He served in WWI and distinguished himself in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives with excellent leadership.

3. He was the chief administrator of resources in both the Pacific and European theatres of War in WWII.

4. Most generals and world leaders alike wanted Marshall to lead the European theatre but FDR found him too valuable an administrator to take that role. Eisenhower was to lead instead. However, I believe FDR didn't want Marshall to deal with Churchill directly on military matters as it might have resulted in British embarassment.

Now the controversial part. Don't read further if you are sensitive.

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I believe the number of Jewish dead could have been greatly reduced had FDR listened to the advice of Gen. Marshall instead of the pleadings of Winston Churchill. Now some facts about Churchill:

1. He led a disasterous naval campaign at Gallipoli/Dardanelles which included forcing ships through the mine fields. Churchill was removed from command.

2. The British were easily winning against Italian forces in North Africa and by January 1941 they were in position to remove the Italians from all of Africa. However, the Italians had invaded Greece in October 1940, failed, and the British knew the Germans would be involved before long. Churchill insisted strong forces from North Africa be sent to Greece when Premier Metaxas died on January 29, 1941, who was against British assistance. British forces began withdrawing from NA beginning in February. The Germans began the invasion of Greece in April and completed the mission before month's end.

3. Following the failure in Greece Churchill insisted the Crete be defended, instead of evicting the Italians from Africa. That too failed.

4. Churchill insisted that the Battle of Alemein be completed before the Americans were to land in North Africa in November 8, 1942, for prestige reasons (to show the world the British didn't need American help). The Battle of Alamein began October 23, 1942 and won on November 5, 1942. Rommel would have been forced to retreat regardless (imminent American landings and fuel shortage) but the British forced the Germans with callous disregard for British casualties, driving tanks through mine fields and pre-sighted enemy artillery fire, for example, all to make a deadline.

5. Churchill insisted on the invasion of Italy and further invade Germany from Italy. The allies did invade but this resulted in strong German forces occupying Italy and the consequent round-up of Italian Jews (wasn't happening before the Germans invaded).

Now the contentions:

1. Had Churchill allowed for his generals to complete the eviction of Italian forces from Africa, there would be no need to retake North Africa from the Germans.

2. Had Churchill not lobbied for the invasion of Italy Italian Jews would have been saved much hardship.

3. General Marshall pleaded with FDR to not bother with the invasion of North Africa and instead amass forces in England for a cross-channel invasion in 1943. Had FDR listened, perhaps 4 million Jews would have been spared. Most of the Jews were killed in 1944. The Holocaust was greatly accelerated after the July 20, 1944 failed assassination attempt.

4. The invasion of Italy gave Germany time to recover from Operation Citadel in the East (July 5 - 13 1943, Italian Invasion July 9, 1943 - May 2, 1945). Had the Allies not invaded NA and amassed for D-Day July 1943 (instead of June 6, 1944) the war would have been won one year sooner and therefore one year less for the Holocaust.

5. The Italian Invasion itself cost the Allies dearly. It took the Allies 4 separate attempts to take Monte Cassino, with very heavy casualties. Casualties for the rest of the campaign were also very high. Troops were depressed over the campaign precisely because of its lack of strategical value.


As you can see, General Marshall was overshadowed by Churchill. It was only after Churchill losing the vote in 1945 and forced to private life before Marshall was able to exert his influence in the postwar period. His Marshall Plan was introduced in June 5, 1947. He was also instrumental in checking the postwar USSR demands. He served as Defense Secretary during the Korean War and succeeded in establishing peace in the region. He even managed to obtain a brief peace between unyielding enmies: Communist China vs Nationalist China in November 1945. He died in 1959, two months before his 79th birthdate.

 

[sydhe]

One of the purposes of the invasion of Italy was to divert some German forces from the Eastern Front. It's not obvious that an cross-channel invasion would have been successful in 1943.

 

[Evie]

Moreover, it's not obvious that a cross-channel invasion in 1943 would have led to victory in time to spare all those jews, especially considering there's only so much the Russian could have done in 1943, rather than all the work they pulled in 1944-45.

 

[Truth Bleeds]

@sydhe

Wouldn't a cross-channel invasion in 1943 also divert some German forces from the East?

@sydhe & Oda Nobunaga

Around July 12, 1943 the Soviets began a counter-attack in the Orel area, part of the general area where Citadel took place. Not only did the Germans suffer a major defeat in Citadel, the greatest tank battle in history involving over 3,000 tanks, 17 panzer, 3 panzergrenadier, and 16 infantry divisions (compare with Battle of the Bulge, 11 panzer and 15 infantry divisions), the Soviets went on to take Orel (Aug. 5), Kharkov (Aug. 20), and Kiev (Nov. 13). In fact, the Soviets established an unbroken string of major victories after Citadel, though marred with a few minor battle defeats, the largest of which was the Warsaw uprising by General Bor where the Soviets failed in an attempt to assist. This doesn't sound like a weak Soviet war machine in 1943.

The chance of a successful cross-channel invasion in 1943 seemed certain. Afterall, the Allies succeeded in taking Sicily easily (July 10, 1943), landed on the Italian mainland at Reggio di Calabria (Sept 3) and at Salerno (Sept 9). By the time of the Anzio landing, January 22, 1944, the Germans were well entrenched on Italian soil. The Anzio landing failed in its strategical objective of cutting supply and communication to the German 14th Corps, but it held on to its beachhead despite heavy counter-attacks. A cross-channel D-Day July 1943 would at least be as successful as the Anzio landing, namely, just holding on to the beachhead. Furthermore, the Anzio landing managed to put ashore 34,000 troops out of 40,000 that was scheduled on the day of the invasion. This despite the entrenched Germans. On D-Day June 6, the Allies scheduled some 240,000 troops and supplies to put on shore in all five beaches, Juno, Sword, Gold, Omaha, Utah, achieving 70-80% of scheduled. If Anzio succeeded in holding the beach with 34,000 troops, certainly a cross-channel D-Day in July 1943 would have succeeded in holding with 240,000 troops and in expanding the beachhead.

No, I don't buy the argument that a cross-channel invasion in 1943 was doubtful of success. It was not a question of resources either. The Americans were conducting a war in the Pacific and supplying the Soviets with war materials under the Lend-Lease Act at the same time throughout WWII, and it was agreed the European Theatre would take first dibs on resources. What's more, Germany was gaining strength and its war production didn't peak until Summer 1944. By the time of June 6, 1944 the Allies were at peak strength but so were the Germans. At 1943 the Allies were more than strong enough to take on Germany and if need be take resources from the Pacific War. Americans were at the Solomons (not that important, just another stepping stone to assuage McArthur's big ego of returning to the Philipines) at the time of Citadel, would be more than a year, October 20, 1944, before US 6th Army was to invade Leyte.

Interesting is the argument the Italy Campaign drew German strength from the East. By the time of D-Day June 6, there were 25 German divisions in Italy but the Allies needed 20 divisions to pin them. The year before 19 German and 15 Allies divisions were in Italy. Granted, the Germans were tricked into sending 4 or 5 more division to Italy than needed but those 4 or 5 or even 25 would not have made a difference in the East because the Red Army outnumbered the Germans at least 3 to 1 in manpower, 7 or 8 to 1 in everything else, tanks, artillery, supplies, etc.

 

[Evie]

If you had read my post carefully, you'd see that I did not question whether a landing in France would have suceeded in 1943 ; what I questioned was whether a landing in 1943 would have allowed the allies to win the war in time to save all those Jews.

You seem to assume the Allies would have been able to achieve victory as quickly following landings in 1943 as they did in 1944 (less than a year). This is a rather doubtful position.

Moreover, you note that the Germans achieved peak strength in 1944. This is false. This site http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=3633 identifies 1943 as the moment the Wehrmacht had the most manpower in service ; beyond that, casualties simply overtook the recruitment abilities of the Germans.

 

[privatehudson]

He led a disasterous naval campaign at Gallipoli/Dardanelles which included forcing ships through the mine fields. Churchill was removed from command.

I'd say that led would be rather inacurate, whilst he was its biggest promoter he was not directly responsible for decisions on the ground. The campaign probably would have met with sucess if the British and French high commands had given it a high enough priority or sent officers to command the expedition who were suited to the task ahead of them. Churchill was made responsible for the disaster and whilst he deserves some of the blame I'd be reluctant to treat him too harshly over it.

General Marshall pleaded with FDR to not bother with the invasion of North Africa and instead amass forces in England for a cross-channel invasion in 1943. Had FDR listened, perhaps 4 million Jews would have been spared. Most of the Jews were killed in 1944. The Holocaust was greatly accelerated after the July 20, 1944 failed assassination attempt.

What makes you think that attempting an invasion of the continent in 1943 would not bring forward the timeline of the holocaust by a year?

 

[TrailblazingScot]

The Italian Front did tie down a far more proportional number of German men than any other front and did initially remove a major player rather cheaply from the equation.

What it avoided was the major risk of a failed cross-Channel invasion that with a whole extra year was still a major risk and could have failed had the Germans played it right.

Churchill was very reluctant to lose much British blood once America was on board...the idea of taking a major chance in 1943 when there was every chance of a major disaster costing a huge number of British forces was not appealing.


Given what a muddle operation Torch proved, having two extra major amphibious landings to put into practice and so have a proper test wasn't a bad thing prior to the big one.

 

[Truth Bleeds]

@ Oda Nobunaga

According to General Jodl, in November 1943 there were 3.9 million German soldiers in the EAst; 177,000 in Finland; 486,000 in Denmark and Norway; 1,370,000 in France and Belgium; 612,000 in the Balkans; and finally 412,000 in Italy. This totals to about 7 million. At the time of the Allied invasion of France, Summer 1944, there were 10 million German soldiers. Hitler had lowered and extended the draftable age of men in that year. Thus, I'm not convinced that German peak strength was reached in 1943. Even were this be true, this is peak strength manpower numbers, not peak military strength (number of tanks, artillery pieces, supplies, manpower training, etc) which is what really counted. According to Paul Kennedy, author of, "The Rise And Fall Of The Great Powers," German aircraft production in 1943 was 24,807 and for 1944 it was 39,807, a rise of 15,000 more aircraft from '43 to '44. Recall also that the Germans produced the world's first jet powered aircraft that year ('44). In tank production the figures are harder to come by because the Germans would sometimes produce assault guns in its place. However, there was a general rise from 125 tanks per month in May 1940, to 600-800 per month during 1942-1943, and almost 2,000 per month beginning in May of 1943. In 1943, the Americans produced 29,500 tanks, dropping to 17,500 tanks in 1944.

Thus, had the cross-channel invasion occurred in July 1943, the Allies would have had a large superiority in tanks as the Germany war production in tanks and aircraft was just switching to high gear. The Allies already had overwhelming superiority in the air, US alone producing almost 86,000 aircraft in '43, against Germany's 24,807.

On the other hand, in 1944 Germany would have 15,000 more aircraft and a year's worth of training of pilots to fly them. This issue is significant. Both Germany and Japan discovered they were producing aircraft faster than they were producing pilots. For example, on a June 29, 1944 staff meeting with Hitler, Goering promised to supply 800 fighter aircraft if Sperrle could find the pilots to fly them. Sperrle could only deliver 500 pilots. Similarly, Japan, at the time of Pearl Harbour, was producing 5,100 aircraft per year but only slightly over half that in pilots (2,750). Japan's pilot production issue was particularly egregious because their mainstay, the Zero, offerred no armour protection to pilots, while the heavier and shorter ranged fighter craft the Americans had offerred armour-plated cockpits. Thus, a year's delay gave Germany time to train pilots.

Furthermore, Germany's V1 and V2 rockets were still under development in 1943 and didn't make an appearance until a year later.

@ PrivateHudson

What you say is in direct contradiction to Churchill's personality. He was a bulldog. If Churchill led a campaign you could be sure his fingerprints were all over it, from the generals right down to the private. When he was Prime Minister, he directly interfered with military decisions of his generals, as well as argued with FDR in everything. Just a reminder, Churchill ordered his generals to send strong forces to Greece, against protestations to the contrary. He berated the American general, John Lucas, commander of the Anzio Landing, over his failure to expand the beachhead with the words, "We must have a great superiority of chauffeurs," a reference to the 18,000 plus vehicles Lucas had amassed. Oh, Anzio was also Churchill's baby (he probably faked the illness he had during this time, to gain sympathy therefore support for the landing). It took FDR a threatened discussion with Stalin to get Churchill to agree to an invasion of South France (Marshall's idea) which involved removing a few divisions from Italy. Invasion of Sourthern France, August 15, 1944 was completely successful. You can read all about Churchill's interference in the Desert War, where he fired a number of his generals (Wavell & Auchinlek, eg) when he was at fault. Only one British general stood up to him, Bernard Montgomery, who, after winning against Rommel in the Battle of El Alam Halfa, September 7, 1942 two months before the US landing in NA, was ordered to pursue Rommel but adamantly refused, citing a possible Axis trap, but was forced to gurantee a victory later (Battle of El Alamein) to placate him.

If Churchill only had executive control of Gallipoli/Dardanelles, his personality would not tolerate it.

On the issue of bringing the Holocaust timeline forward a year had the invasion of France began a year earlier, I would say this is unlikely. It took enormous effort just to round up the Jews. The very roads and railways needed to transport Jews were also the very roads the military needed and they took precedence. Not only that, Jews were forced to work in war production. A fastforward timetable invariably would result in much lower production.

 

[privatehudson]

What you say is in direct contradiction to Churchill's personality.

And what you suggest is in diect contradiction to the level of power he had back then. He wasn't Prime Minister but First Lord of the Admiralty. He had no control over the delay in assigning troops to the operation (off the top of my head I think that was Kitchener who believed the western front took priority) and probably even less control over who was appointed to command it. The army wouldn't have taken kindly to being handed orders directly from a politician in charge of the Navy, so your claims about his constant interference in the campaign are at best exaggerated and at worst smacks of bias.

I would say this is unlikely. It took enormous effort just to round up the Jews. The very roads and railways needed to transport Jews were also the very roads the military needed and they took precedence. Not only that, Jews were forced to work in war production. A fastforward timetable invariably would result in much lower production.

Doing both didnt seem a problem for them in 1944 which you mentioned was the harshest year. There's no reason to suspect that it would be any different a year before. Given how much inter-camp movement took place in 1944-45 I would not necessarily suggest that the Nazi state were inclined to halt the death trains simply because they could be employed more effectively elsewhere.

 

[Evie]

Lowering and extending the draftable age does not add noticeably to strength, though - at least not in the short term. We're dealing here with untrained greens either really too young for active service, or too old for it. That was a desperate ploy on Hitler's part to make up for mounting losses, and one that did not work well. Some of the early young recruits would probably start being battle-ready at Normandy, but not the majority of them.

As far as production goes, the question is not how high German production in late 43 and early 44 was, but how well it held up against the mounting casualties in the East, and normal operational attrition. Building ten tanks a week instead of five the year before is all fine and good, but if you lose 12 tanks a week instead of 5, you're actually at a disadvantage.

In addition, I prefer the number from what appears to be a relatively neutral source (Penguin history book on WWII) to one that has quite sufficient reason to be biased (Jodl).

 

[AdrianE]

A couple of point to consider:

In 1943 the British/American airforce was still growing. The Luftwaffe was still a potent force in the West. An allied invasion of western Europe in 1943 would not have had the advantage of air superiority like it did in 1944.

The American army of 1943 was still very inexperienced. The North African, Sicilian and Italian campaign allowed the American army to learn the finer points of war. Incompetent generals were weeded out. This made the 1944 era American army a much better and more powerful army.

The American army was also still in the process of creating, training and shipping divisions and other units over to England. There isn't enough combat power in England to guarentee a successful invasion of North West Europe.

The logistical support was not available in 1943 to supply a large invading army in a cross channel invasion. Landing craft, transport ships etc still needed to be built. Things like the mulberries and the cross channel fuel pipeline hadn't been though up yet.

Furthermore the Tunisian campaign resulted in the complete destruction of several first class German formations (10th, 15th and 21st panzer). If these forces had been allowed to escape the German response to a cross channel 1943 invasion would have been very strong.

The best case for a 1943 invasion would be a self sustaining pocket (a bigger Salerno somewhere in France). The worst case would be failure and the destruction of several allied divisions.

So I counter your contentions with the following:

1. The British in December 1940 to April 1941 did not have the logistical capability to take all of North Africa. Benghazi was about as far as logistics lets them go.

2. no comment

3. The allies did not possess the combat power to successfully invade north west Europe in 1943. Hence your premise is flawed greatly. A 1943 invasion might have accelerate the holocaust just as much if not more.

4. Germany never recovered from the battle at Kursk. Read Ziemke's Stalingrad to Berlin.

5. Knocking Italy out of the war did have strategic value.

 

[Naskra]

In the minds of American planners, a 1943 invasion was feasible and desirable.
Marshall was even prepared (mentally, at least) to go in 1942 if the Russian situation became dire enough. The German collapse in Tunisia and Sicily led the Allies to believe that the opportunity in Italy was to good to pass up,
entailing the postponement of Overlord til '44.

 

[AxiomUk]

You have to look at Churchill in a context outside of his roles during the war to see why he was voted the most popular 'Brit' (I dislike the term Brit, but there we go). It's not as such his actions that made him famous.

First of all, the victory of the British Empire over Nazi Germany validates the government of that time as superior to the losers. It's an unwritten rule, but to the winners of a war, their system was better. It is with retrospect you can criticise but contemporaries will rarely criticise the government which won the war - maybe due to the patriotic ideal.

Second - Churchill is popular for the fame of his name, and the exploits of most of the others are not as widely considered to be important. Churchill gets the title of 'saving Britain from the Nazi threat'. It is no surprise that anyone born in the 20th Century would vote him as the 'greatest Brit'.

I have to apologetically confess I am slightly confused as to what your overall argument is as you open up discussing how Churchill shouldn't be voted greatest 'Brit', but a comparison to a US general does not appear to have any effect on your opinion other than to say Churchill had more authority than a US general, which in a context of how he shouldn't have been voted 'greatest Brit' does not tell me at the very least what you are trying to put across. Sorry if this sounds offensive, I don't mean it to be.

 

[Truth Bleeds]

@ PrivateHudson

Kitchener was Secretary of War (George V was King, Herbert Asquith was Prime Minister) and yes, Churchill was First Lord of Admiralty. However, it was Churchill who had most strongly lobbied for and for the continuation of the Dardanelles Campaign. Not only did he lobby for it and its continuation, it was actually planned by him; Kitchner was only the sponsor.

As Secretary of War Kitchener was not only responsible for the Dardanelles/Gallipoli area, but also of the Western Front. The Dardanelles Campaign began March 18, 1915 with a disastrous naval campaign that cost the loss of 6 six ships due in part to Turkish coastal guns but also to mines. On the Western Front, the Allies attacked Neuve-Chappelle eight days earlier, March 10. Following the failure of the naval attack in the Dardanelles, the Allied amphibious attack began April 25, landing on several points in the region (Cape Helles, Ari Burun, Kumkale). However, on the Western Front the war's first gas attack was launched (April 22), the ensuing panic and heavy casualties eventually forced the Allies to retreat (2nd Battle of Ypres). Evidently, Kitchener was rather busy.

As casaulties mounted at Cape Helles, Lord Fisher, First Lord of the Sea, resigned in protest against the Dardanelles Campaign, resulting in a political crisis which forced Asquith to form a coalition with the Conservatives (Asquith was Liberal and Churchill was once a Liberal MP), May 25. Whatever responsibility Churchill had over the Dardanelles/Gallipoli Campaign, it was enough that the Conservatives demanded he be fired as condition of the coalition. Two days later he was. Kitchener, however, remained, despite public outcrys of shortages of artillery ammunition in the Western Front (he was also responsible for munitions but Lloyd George soon took over).

After the dismissal of Churchill, a second effort at Gallipoli was undertaken and it too failed. It is true in your original post that Churchill was only partly responsible, but during his watch he was mostly responsible, imo.

On death trains, significant numbers of Jews and other prisoners were simply worked to death. Others were shot, gassed, starved to death, died of disease, or accidentally killed (collateral damage from bombings, etc). Most of these deaths occurred in 1944-45. It takes time to be worked to death, time to be starved to death. It takes time to be rounded up and put in concentration camps. The fact that most of the deaths occurred in the last two years of the war meant that the rounding up process was mostly completed and the work-to-death process took over.

Total mobilisation for the war did not begin until after Albert Speer took over from Dr. Todt, the then Minister of Armaments, who was killed, probably murdered by Speer, in an aeroplane accident, February 8, 1942 (Todt was a moderate). Even then, Speer's job, being an architect, in the early days was to build the Third Reich with all sorts of magnificent buildings, roads, and public works. It wasn't until Sixth Army was surrounded November 19, 1942, 9 months after the death of Todt, that total mobilisation really began and that concentration camps inmates jumped in number. For example, at the time of the Stalingrad disaster, the Economic-Administrative Main Office, aka slave labour administrators, had around 90,000 prisoners (Jews & other enemies of the Reich). This jumped to a quarter million by the time of the Italy Campaign, doubled again at the time of D-Day. Had the cross-channel invasion began a year earlier, the Nazis would need to speedup the round-up process, not trivial (many were on foot), and speedup the slave labour production, also not trivial considering there were only so many factories, so many equipment and tools, and so many raw materials to go around. All this to just try to speedup the holocaust. Some sources give the figure of 10 million holocaust victims, split between Jews and others. It must have taken massive effort to process so many people.

Even if the Nazis could have sped up the holocaust in the event of a 1943 cross-channel invasion, they could not have sped it up much, and even supposing they could speed it up as much as they had in 1944-45, surely a 1943 cross-channnel invasion could not have prolonged the war past May 7, 1945, and could not have caused an even greater suffering of the Jews than they suffered when the Allies delayed the invasion by a year. At the very worst, if a 1943 cross-channel invasion completely failed they could try again a year later...

 

[Truth Bleeds]

@ Oda Nobunaga

The too young and the too old recruits were usually put in defensive roles, given little ammunition and second hand equipment. This was still a valuable contribution because it freed up fighting quality men from filling these roles.

If Jodl, Colonel-General and Chief of the General Staff of the Combined Forces, was not a trustworthy source, then who would be? A third party historian would have to obtain facts and figures from somewhere, who better than Jodl whose job was to know these very figures, troop numbers in the Reich? Look in the bibliography of your Penguin book. It cites generals.


@ AdrianE

Point by point, paragraph by paragraph response:

a) Allied airforce was still growing in 1943, no argument there. However, as stated before, Axis airforce reached its max in 1944, 15,000 more aircraft than in 1943. Also, the world's first jet-powered fighter aircraft made its appearance in 1944. They didn't exist in 1943. Plus the V1 and V2 didn't exist in 1943 either. Both technologies were still experimental.

b) US army combat experience was gained only by one corps, the famed US II Corps, in NA, the Kasserine Pass area. A full army, the US 5th was involved in Italy. However, the Americans employed 4 armies in Europe, 1st, 3rd, 7th, and 9th. Some troops from the US 2nd Corps and the US 5th Army did make their way to Europe but that still meant three US armies were green. I don't believe greeness of the troops was an issue. The only generals who were fired that I can think of from the top of my head were Patton, for a slapping incident, and Lucas, for stockpiling chaffeurs, as Churchill accused. General Mark Clark of the 5th Army, the man responsible for the Rapido disaster and had to face Congress over it, stayed in Italy right to the end.

c) The Americans were amassing strength (again) in England precisely because they shot their bolt in the NA invasion.

d) The invasion of Sicily, to date still the largest amphibious invasion, involving 7 divisions as opposed to 5 in the D-Day invasion, amassed 3,300 ships (D-Day, 5,000 ships), requiring no mulberries or floating fuel lines. It seems the logistics question was solved in 1943.

e) Yes, invasion of NA eventually destroyed those German divisions. Had the Allies not bother with NA and invaded France in 1943 instead, those divisions would have little to do but lie in the Sun and get a tan. Upon learning a 1943 France invasion Hitler would have pulled those divisions from NA, saving the Allies 6 months of time (November 8, 1942 to May 13, 1943) and effort. That these divisions could be used against the Allies in Europe is no different than facing them in NA in terms of casualties, but a big difference in time savings (at least 6 months). Also, these divisions could not be used to face the Allies at the beaches should the invasion occur in '43, because it would have taken several weeks to retreat them to Tunis, thence to Italy, then up the Alps, and finally France. Germany didn't have the resources to directly ferry them to France, would have been risky anyway.

f) If the best case scenerio was an enlarged Salerno and the worst case be the destruction of several Allied divisions, the Allies could always try again a year later.

Now the counter to your counter:

1. The British took Benghazi on February 6, 1941 and the Italians surrendered a day later. However, a small British force made its way to El Agheila, about 200 miles further west by road. General O'Connor was confident of removing the remaining Italians and actually drew up a plan to take Tripoli. It wasn't a question of logistics, nor of sufficient forces (the British were operating fantastically successfully with a force one fifth the size of the Italian army). What stopped the British from taking Tripoli was Churchill had ordered most of the 13th Corps be sent to Greece immediately after the conclusion of Benghazi. The timing was crucial. The Germans arrived in dribbles and pieces in mid February but was not able to mount attacks until March, even then it was mostly bluff. Had Churchill invested just two more weeks to eliminate the Italians the Germans would have needed strong naval forces (they possessed none) to assist in retaking Tripoli.

2. N/A

3. The Allies would have enough combat power had they not shot their bolts in NA and Italy. Remember, US tank production dropped in 1944 while Germany's rose.

4. Whether Germany recovered or not from Kursk is a matter of semantics. If recovery means Germany was able to resume the initiative, then yes, Germany did not recover. If recovery means getting war materials back to what it was in July 1943, then Germany did recover.

5. What strategical value? The invasion freed some Italian troops to fight along side the Allies but they had to be equipped with American weapons and supplies. The Germans raped even more economic goods from Italy than before the invasion. And finally, the Italians had proven they didn't want to fight the British and they certainly didn't want to fight for the Germans. Even Churchill said it offerred only psychological and political rewards.

@ Naskra

In point of fact, when the topic of North Africa was first discussed, General Marshall pleaded with FDR not to bother while Churchill did the exact opposite; FDR agreed to take NA. When the question of taking Italy arose when the Allies were still battling in NA (Capablanca meeting, January 14-24, 1943), Marshall once again pleaded not to bother with Italy and invade France instead but Churchill argued otherwise. The tension between Churchill and Marshall became so great that Marshall actually threatened to pull resources from the European Theatre and place them in the Pacific. FDR had to dissuade Marshall from doing so. It was later agreed that Sicily be taken and then the question of taking the Italian mainland or the cross-channell invasion be decided then. This compromise was reluctantly agree to by Marshall, mainly because taking Sicily would mean a safer passage of Allied shipping to and from Gibralter to the Suez.

Apparently, Marshall believed a cross-channel invasion was doable in Summer 1943 even after the NA Campaign, and even after the Sicily Campaign, doable perhaps late fall or early winter.

 

[Evie]

Generally, historians cite several sources, not only one.

 

[Truth Bleeds]

@ AxiomUK

The thread is about what if FDR had listened to General Marshall instead of Churchill. I made the Greatest Brit comment to contrast Churchill with Marshall and to point out there were better Brits. My opinion of Churchill is, he didn't save England, England survived inspite of him.

 

[Naskra]

We don't disagree, TB, but you are attibuting to Churchill alone what is really
the consensus of his Imperial General Staff, Alan Brooke in particular.

 

[Dachs]

I made the Greatest Brit comment to contrast Churchill with Marshall and to point out there were better Brits.

Perhaps, but saying that the "better Brit" was Monty is stretching things a *little* bit. I really don't feel like maintaining an anti-Monty argument, but saying that he was basically the right general for the wrong war ought to cover it. Like Haig if he'd been born about twenty years later.

 

[AdrianE]

Truth_bleeds

You are confusing production with operational strength. The reason German production kept rising is that the allies were destroying more and more tanks and planes on the battlefield. If you look at German operational strength in tanks and planes you will see it rises throughout 1943, and then begins a decline in late '43 and early '44.

Specifically August and September 1943 you see a catasrophic decline in the LW. Something like 25% of the Luftwaffe's pilots were killed in those 2 months.

Jets and the vengence weapons were operationally and strategically irrelevant. There weren't enough of either to make a significant difference.

Part of the reason for the destruction of the German forces in North Africa was the fact that the allies were able to severely interdict their supply line. This would not be the case if those divisions were in France with secure land based supply lines.

Fredendall (sp?) was relieved after his abyssmal performance in Tunisia. The lessons learned in North Africa were distributed through the entire US army not just the corps in action.

The North African campaign also taught the commonwealth armies how to fight.

Without the North African campaign 10th panzer would be in France. It was part of OKH reserve and was stationed in France until sent to Tunisia.

Overall I think invading North west Europe in 1943 would have slowed down the western allied cause. Thus I think your premise is incorrect.