A Few Punic Sciblings

[markdienekes]

Hannibal: Reforms and Cities

Hannibal was much more than a general, and it is a shame his activities after Zama are not as well documented as his activities during the Second Punic War. He did much for Carthage after the war - remaining as a general after Zama for about two years (up to 200BC) and before he was a sufete, he spent his time reimposing Carthage's control over her Libyan subjects inland at least as far as Sicca and eastwards to the Gulf of Sirte.

He also started repairing the damage done by Scipio and Masinissa's campaigns and began replanting olive trees. Not only would this restore state authority, it would keep his remaining troops usefully busy until they could be paid off.

Before Hannibal was a sufete, in 197 the treasury was close to collapse, due to the corruption of some members of the court of 104, they had even tried to fool the Romans by giving them serious adulterated talents in 199, strained relations with their own people, and even worse, Masinissa. Citizens had to pay out of their own money for the year's war-indemnity, making up for the self-enriched idiots of the court of 104.

In 196, Hannibal took office and acted swiftly, investigating the corrupt court, hauling the recalcitrant before the citizen assembly, and passing a new law that removed judges lifetime tenure, made membership annually electable and also banned re-election for a second consecutive year.

He next enacted reforms that cleaned up the treasury and recovered much of the stolen money. The special tax was dropped, enriching the public.

He oversaw the physical development of a new residential and commercial district which was built on unused ground on the southern slope of the Bysra hill. It had carefully laid out, well-drained streets lined by shops and apartments with Greek style peristyle courtyards. This area was named the 'quartier Hannibal' by archeologists and prospered until the fall of Carthage.

His reforms succeeded, and really, he achieved more for his country in one year than he did for the twenty he was in Spain and Italy.

When he was forced into exile, he even helped design and build a couple of cities:

It is said that Hannibal the Carthaginian, after Antiochus had been conquered by the Romans, left him and went to Artaxas the Armenian, to whom he gave many excellent suggestions and instructions. For instance, observing that a section of the country which had the greatest natural advantages and attractions was lying idle and neglected, he drew up a plan for a city there, and then brought Artaxas to the place and showed him its possibilities, and urged him to undertake the building. The king was delighted, and begged Hannibal to superintend the work himself, whereupon a very great and beautiful city arose there, which was named after the king, and proclaimed the capital of Armenia.
(Plutarch, Lucullus, 31,)

which has survived and is called Artashat today, lying 20 miles south of Yemen.

When in Bithynia, King Prusias too asked him to design and foresee the building of another city, which was named Prusa and today stands as Bursa, and is reminiscent of Artaxata.


Bibliography

Hannibal: Rome's Greatest Enemy by Dexter Hoyos


Hannibal's Invasion Force: By the Numbers

When Hannibal left New Carthage during the late Spring of 218 BC, according to Polybius his army amounted to 90,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry (Polybius, 3.35), while Appian adds 37 elephants to the number. Clearly, the size of his infantry and cavalry are exaggerated, and the true size of Hannibal's invasion force will not be known with certainty, but there are a few considerations – particularly logistical – to take into account when viewing these figures.


First we must discover the reported figures for the size of the Carthaginian army before Hannibal took over – when Hasdrubal the Fair was in charge. According to Diodorus, in retaliation for the betrayal and killing of Hannibal's father, Hamilcar in 225 BC, Hasdrubal moved against the Oretani with an army made up of 50,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 200 elephants (Gabriel, Hannibal, p.72). Four years later, after his assassination and Hannibal took command, that number had increased to 60,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry - in a four year time period (225-221 BC) the number had risen 10,000 and 2000 respectively. It was with this army Hannibal conducted two successful campaigns against the Spanish between 221-218 BC, along with the siege of Saguntum before retiring his troops to winter quarters. If we take Polybius' numbers, we have to believe that Hannibal had just a matter of months to raise 30,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry to make up this number over the course of the winter.

Polybius tells us that Hannibal also left behind a force with his brother, Hasdrubal, made up of 12,650 infantry and 2550 cavalry to guard the Spanish coast. In order to do this Hannibal would have had to make up 42,000 new infantry and 6,550 new cavalry in the winter to be able to raise the force for Hasdrubal and still have 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry declared by Polybius in the few months of winter. Gabriel believes new reinforcements could not have come from Carthage. The reported troop transfers were nothing more than swapping Spanish infantry for more reliable African infantry with no real gain of numerical strength. (Gabriel, Hannibal, pp.101-3).


Engels (Alexander the Great, pp.3-18)has estimated that there was one mule per 50 men for transport, and one camp follower for every three soldiers – which would increase the total number of people to 136,000 for Hannibal's march. Per day per man would need 3 pounds of rations. This would make it necessary that a total of 408,000 pounds of rations had to be obtained daily to feed the troops. Add to this the 120,000 pounds of grain needed for the horses per day. Around 2700 pack animals would be needed to carry this amount of food for a day, plus another 2000 or so for equipment and heavy baggage. To feed these pack animals, troops and horses for ten days, one would need 55,520 pack animals:

(Shean, Hannibal's Mules, p.171 Table 1)


Gabriel has calculated the length of Hannibal's column would have been more than 100 miles long based on American logistical calculations that an infantry brigade comprising 6310 men and 1021 animals occupied a road space of 4.8 miles, (Gabriel, p.103) – a column of Hannibal's length could not make the reported 80 stades (9 miles) a day that Polybius implies was Hannibal's rate of movement (Polyb. 3.50)


What then, were his numbers? We have to take into account of attrition during Hannibal's campaigns in Spain from 221-218 BC – but we have very little to estimate casualty figures. Gabriel assumes that we should look at a 10 percent casualty figure for these campaigns (including Saguntum) which would make the figure of Hannibal's army before he dispersed for winter around 54,000 infantry and 7000 horse. From this we can deduct the force given to Hasdrubal Barca leaving Hannibal's invasion force a much more manageable 40,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry.
With this force he supposedly fought four tribes north of the Ebro river; the Ilurgetes, the Bargusii, the Aerenosii and the Andosini, leaving Hanno in command of a force made up of 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry (along with his heavy baggage) to defend the region. The only tribe of significance were the Ilurgetes, and even coming up against token resistance Hannibal could not have marched an army 100,000 strong in the time Polybius and Livy imply Hannibal took to cover the distance from the Ebro to Emporion.


What then, was the purpose of Hanno's force? We have to question its historicity by the actions that followed. Hanno was reportedly more than 150 miles south of the only strategic location in the region; that of the Greek coastal city of Emporion, supposedly fighting rebels. Hanno did not attempt to lay siege to the city that would see Gnaeus Scipio disembark at the head of a Roman army a few months later. Hanno made no attempt to protect the Spanish coast. The answer was his force was unable to conduct offensive operations. It is more likely that Hannibal did not in fact leave such a force behind as it would have achieved nothing of significance in the region, being unable to defend the Spanish coast or capture the strategic Greek city of Emporion (Gabriel, p.105-6). Hannibal only had around 40,000 troops, and could hardly have afforded to leave such a pointless force behind. More likely, his plan was to defend and hold the line at the Ebro River, where Hasdrubal's main force was located, and where there was friendly tribes and well supplied magazines and solid interior lines linking up with New Carthage. Hannibal was well aware that he could not defend the area north of the Ebro sufficiently against Rome's superior numbers of warships and transports.

Naturally, any attempt to discover the true figure is impossible, and the above analysis is flawed due to the nature of reported ancient figures and ancient sources in general - but Gabriel's approach is certainly an interesting and fresh perspective of the numbers - despite the unreliability of the source figure of Diodorus' in regards to the size of Hasdrubal the Fair's army in 225 BC!


Bibliography

Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, Penguin Classics, 1979

Gabriel, Hannibal, Potomac Books, 2011

Shean, Hannibal's Mules, 1996


The Battle of Zama, 202 BC

A match up in history of arguably the two greatest commanders of their day, and among the best of the ancient world. The battle, fought in 202 BC, was the last battle of the Second Punic War, and one which began Rome's domination of the Mediterranean.


Number of troops and organisation

Hannibal's Forces and Deployment:

Hannibal's infantry were set up in three lines, each line generally agreed to have been made up of 12,000 men for a total of 36,000 infantry and 2000 Carthaginian citizen cavalry.

The Numidian Prince Tychaeus brought 2000 cavalry.

A force of 80 elephants (which has been doubted by Richard Gabriel who suggests as it takes up to 20 years to train war elephants to a sufficient standard, the Carthaginians had already used up their best in the war already. De Sanctis and Gabriel believe there was more likely only about 20 young and inexperienced elephants in Hannibal's army)

Total Strength: 40,000 (though Appian says 50,000, but this is generally rejected by modern historians)

Deployment: Hannibal drew up his infantry in 3 lines, each 12,000 strong (though it's possible his third line of veterans was made up of more, perhaps some 15,000 men). The first line were mercenaries: Ligurians, Celts, Balearic Islanders and Moors, and had been raised by Mago (who had died returning from Italy in 203 BC). In front of this line were light armed skirmishers and 80 elephants. At a certain distance behind the first line, the second consisted of native Libyans and Carthaginians. They were given orders not to support the first line, but to follow behind and keep their distance. The third line was at a greater distance from the second, more than a furlong, and were Hannibal's Old Guard, his veterans from Italy, thought to have been made up of mostly Bruttians, but no doubt some of the old survivors who had marched with him from Spain too, who would have been in their 40s at least by now. They were to act as an independent reserve, and halted when the first two lines advanced, creating an even bigger gap between them. Hannibal posted his cavalry on the wings, with the Numidians on the left, and the Carthaginians on the right.

Scipio's Forces and Deployment:

There are no solid figures for the size of Scipio's army, but it is usually reckoned to have been made up of about 30,000 infantry (including 6,000 Numidians) and over 6,100 cavalry (1,500 Roman and Italian, 4,600 Numidian)

Total Strength: 36,100

Deployment: Scipio deployed his troops in the usual three line formation – but instead of the principes covering the gaps of the hastati maniples, they were set up directly behind them, the triarii forming the final line. The intervals between the front maniples were filled with companies of velites. This created lanes, which he hid from Hannibal with the velites. Laelius' Italian horse was on the left wing, and Masinissa and all his Numidians on the right. (the Numdian infantry are fought to have either been placed with the velites, on the flanks of the Roman legionaries, or mixed in with the Numidian horse. I believe they were most likely mixed in with the velites, sadly it is impossible to determine – maybe just have them on the legionary flanks would be easier!)


The Battle:


Phase 1:

The skirmishers open up the battle in the plain between the two armies, but neither side gains an advantage.

Phase 2:

Hannibal orders his elephants to charge, hoping they will strike a hammer blow against the Roman infantry. The skirmishers on both sides disperse as the elephants charge forward.

Phase 3:

Hannibal orders his army forward following the elephant charge. Scipio orders the horns and trumpets to blast and panics the young elephants, causing some of them to stampede through Hannibal's Numdian cavalry on the Punic left flank.

Phase 4:

Masinissa charges Hannibal's Numdians, and sweeps them from the field. The elephants however have reached the main Roman line. Some are driven back, some are killed, while others are drawn through the lanes and killed. Roman losses are heavy, (thought to be mainly among the velites) but they hold their ranks. Some elephants stampede towards Hannibal's cavalry on the right flank, disrupting formations.

Phase 5:

Laelius charges the disrupted Carthaginian cavalry and routs them. The fight is now an infantry battle. Hannibal orders his first two lines forward and the Romans redress their ranks and advance to meet them.

Phase 6:

The mercenaries of the first rank are broken, Roman short swords and discipline gaining the upper-hand. The mercenaries flee but their path is blocked by the Carthaginian levies in the second line. Fighting breaks out amongst Hannibal's first two lines as the mercenaries try to cut their way through the levies ranks to freedom, (Gabriel belives this is a misunderstanding, and Hannibal ordered the second line forward to engage the Romans, trapping some of the mercenaries). Trapped between the second line and the Romans, the mercenaries are hacked to pieces and are destroyed.

Phase 7:

The Carthaginian line counterattacks and presses the hastati back in some confusion. They rally only because the principes stand firm, and together they drive back the Carthaginian levies until they break. Hannibal's third line rebuffs the broken second line's attempts to force through the line who are driven to the open plains on the flanks.

Phase 8:

Scipio redresses his formation, and lengthens his line so that the principes and triarii are on the hastati flanks. As Scipio was organising his men, Hannibal also reorganised his line, adding those that had survived and not ran from the field from the first two ranks - and deploying them onto the flanks of his veteran line.

Phase 9:

The lines meet, and the battle hangs in the balance, but the return of the cavalry tips the scales into Scipio's favour, and the cavalry charge into the rear of the Carthaginians. Hannibal's veterans put up a final stand but most are killed. Hannibal manages to flee.

Result:

Hannibal suffers his only serious defeat, and it is a crushing one. The Carthaginian losses are around 20,000, with nearly as many taken prisoner. Roman casualties are said to have been 1,500 to 2,500, though we are not told of Masinissa's losses other than they suffered greater losses than the Romans did.

Conclusions and notes:

Two thirds of Hannibal's infantry force were unreliable, a third completely freshly levied, only the third line made up of his veterans of Italy were an instrument of Hannibal's will. The rest were made up of disparate armies that had yet to gel. Scipio's infantry were a homogenous force and very experienced, made up of veterans who had seen constant service since at least 216 BC (made up of the remnants of Cannae, and the two battles of Herdonia, who continued to fight and campaign in Sicily and then in Africa) - Scipio's infantry had the advantage overall - not in numbers, but in organization and overall experience.

Hannibal is also thought to have devised a plan to level the playing field in regards to the cavalry. Both H.H Scullard and Richard Gabriel believe Hannibal gave them the order to give ground and drive the opposition off the field, which could explain the ease of the Roman victory here (though against this they may well have just perused too far, and Lazenby believes that it would have been very risky to expose his flanks like this). With the cavalry off the field, Hannibal's only chance of victory would be to break the Roman centre, thus he threw all his weight against the numerically inferior Romans, starting with the elephants, then three waves of infantry. The strategy almost worked, as we can see the hastati were exhausted after their struggles against the first two lines. It is also thought that Hannibal set up the third line to prevent Scipio's infantry flanking his first two lines,.

Scipio's own tactics were the set up of his maniples and the use of the lanes to funnel the elephants, and the extension of his line to engage Hannibal's veterans. Scipio's tactics relied on turning the phalanx into echelon, which he did by discarding the usual quincunx formation by placing the triarii and principes back from the front line making the last two lines capable of independent manoeuvre, which Hannibal nullified completely with the use of his third line, thus Scipio engaged in the normal Roman frontal slog rather than use his manoeuvres from earlier battles. Hannibal's third line also is considered the first true reserve in history. Gabriel believes out of the two plans, Hannibal's was the most sophisticated (Gabriel, p.199)

Scipio's legions were superior infantry and cavalry wise, disciplined to the degree that they responded very quickly and efficiently to re-calls and re-distributions. But they were stopped in their tracks by Hannibal and his veterans.

Strategically before the battle, both were considering the same objective, to reach their allies from the west (mainly for cavalry support); Scipio was searching for Massinissa, Hannibal for Vermina and both generals moved their armies towards them. It was a risk on both their parts as they had no control over it, but perhaps Scipio had more reliable information where Massinissa was. Massinissa arrived first at any rate. Vermina arrived just a few days too late to help Hannibal, and was bringing a large force to compliment the Carthaginian which Livy puts at 16,200 men. Livy's date that the battle against Vermina happened three months after Zama makes no sense as Vermina would not sally forth to Zama to fight Scipio's army unless he was there to support Hannibal.

The story of Hannibal being too far from water also appears suspicious. According to Gabriel (p.191):

Why Hannibal would have made such a basic mistake in not providing water for his army and animals in the obviously hot and dry climate is not explained...

It's interesting to wonder what just may have happened had Hannibal linked up with Vermina's force in time...


Bibliography:

Carey, Hannibal's Last Battle: Zama & the Fall of Carthage, 2007

Gabriel, Scipio Africanus: Rome's Greatest General, 2008

Gabriel, Hannibal, 2011

Lazenby, Hannibal's War, 1997

Scullard, Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician, 1970

 

[sydhe]

That's interesting. I didn't know anything about his post-war activities. I haven't seen a connection with the building of Bursa, but Prusias I certainly had Hannibal at his court and Prusias founded Bursa so it's quite possible Hannibal had something to do with it,

 

[markdienekes]

Thanks for reading sydhe!

 

[christos200]

Very interesting.

 

[Ataxerxes]

That's a very nice article. Thanks. You're right, a lot of people don't consider Hannibal past his military campaigns in the punic wars (if they get that far, the majority just see Hannibal = Elephants across the alps). I've always considered him one of my favority ancient leaders.

 

[markdienekes]

Thanks for reading guys!

 

[markdienekes]

Hasdrubal Barca - 244 BC to 207 BC

Hasdrubal Barca was one of Hannibal Barca's brothers, and is said to have been about three years younger than Hannibal, thus putting his date of birth around 244 BC. He came across from Africa with his brother-in-law, also called Hasdrubal, at probably around the age of ten or eleven to start training under his father Hamilcar's tutelage in the arts of warfare and leadership. By the end of 229 BC, Hasdrubal Barca was campaigning with his father and elder brother in Spain.

In late 229 or early 228, Hamilcar moved into the hinterland of Acra Leuce, accompanied by his sons Hannibal and Hasdrubal, while Hasdrubal the Elder commanded elsewhere. This was to be Hamilcar's last campaign.

He perhaps began in the Spring, and worked his way towards a town called Helice, starving out and storming Segisa, Ilunum and Turbola. When he reached Helice, he put it under siege. He must have been content to starve them into submission as when winter arrived, he sent the bulk of his army to winter-quarters in Arca Leuce to ease his own problems of supply. With his force weakened, Hamilcar was approached by the king of the Orissi, who had a large army with him who pretended friendship with Hamilcar in order to aid the besieged. Hamilcar was caught off guard when they betrayed him, and his army was defeated and put to flight. In order to save his sons, Hamilcar drew off the pursuit. Hannibal and Hasdrubal escaped, but Hamilcar perished as he plunged into a broad flooding river when he was about to be overtaken.

When Hannibal departed Spain at the outbreak of the Second Punic War, he left it in overall command of his brother, Hasdrubal Barca. The first action as a general we hear of Hasdrubal is in 218 BC, where he hastened to the aid of Hanno, who was attacked and defeated by Gnaeus Scipio who had landed at Emporion (a colony of Marseille and ally of Rome with a force of 25,000 men). Unable to help Hanno, Hasdrubal attacked the crews of Scipio's ships who were milling about the countryside, and then withdrew to Cartagena.

This is the only action we hear Hasdrubal undertaking in 218 BC (Livy reports a second intervention, but has likely misunderstood his sources, as Scipio had already gone into winter quarters at Tarraco by this point). Hasdrubal had failed to prevent the Roman army from overrunning much of the territory north of the Ebro to the Pyrenees.

Hasdrubal's next move took place the following year. Hasdrubal commanded a fleet of 40 quinqueremes and advanced to the Ebro. It was a sound strategy intended to destroy the Roman fleet thus severing Scipio's communications with Rome. Hasdrubal could then attempt to crush the Romans on land. The Romans had originally had 60 quinqueremes for the war in Spain, but Polybius reports that he only had 35 ships with him (3.95). One explantation by Lazenby is that they were undermanned. Scipio had realised his land army needed bulking up, and had drafted them into it, and also Hasdrubal's attack the previous year may have been quite devastating to some crews. The Romans however, with the aid of warships from Marseille won and we have a tantalising glimpse of this naval battle from a fragment surviving from Hannibal's Greek historian, Sosylus (Jacoby, FGH 176 F 1):

they all fought outstandingly, but most of all the ships of the Massilians, who were the first to join battle and were wholly responsible for the success of the Romans. In sum, their leaders encouraged the others and made them bolder, while they themselves attacked the enemy with exceptional bravery. The Carthaginians suffered a two-fold defeat, because the Massilians knew their particular style of fighting. If the Carthaginians are facing some ships prow to prow, they advance as if they are going to attack, but instead of attacking immediately, they sail through the enemy line, turn round and ram the enemy's ships from the side.
The Massilians had found out about a tactic which is said to have employed at Artemisium by Heracleides of Mylasa, who was one of the cleverest men of his time. When they drew up their line, they ordered the front ships to face forwards, but to leave other ships waiting behind them at suitable intervals, which as soon as the first ships had been passed could take the opportunity to attack the enemy's ships as they were still advancing, without moving from their original formation. This is what Heracleides did in past times, and as a result he was responsible for the victory. And now, as we said, the Massilians followed the description of this ancient event. As the Carthaginians advanced in the anticipated fashion . . . they fought alongside . . . the Carthaginians turned to flight . . .
Book 4 of the Deeds of Hannibal, by Sosylus.

Hasdrubal's force fled to the shore having lost 6 warships in the process. They were followed by the Romans, who captured a further 19 warships. Hasdrubal had lost half of the Carthaginian Spanish fleet in one battle. Rome would remain unchallenged at sea in Spain for the rest of the war.

Livy goes on to say that Rome followed up this attack by taking a few Spanish towns south of the Ebro, and persuading no less than 120 tribes to join them. Scipio advanced to the pass of Castulo, and Hasdrubal retired to Lusitana by the Atlantic coast. When he moved next, according to Livy, was to aid the Ilergetes who had been fighting punitive forces of Scipio on their territory. Hasdrubal moved to the Ebro, but heard that Scipio's allies, the Celtiberes, had attacked Carthaginian Spain. Hasdrubal apparently hastened to meet them, and was twice defeated by the Celtiberes. However, this whole detailed account by Livy is perhaps unhistorical, as we do not hear of this in Polybius, who stated the Romans did not venture across the Ebro after their naval victory. Polybius says with the news of the naval victory, Rome dispatched his brother, Publius, to Spain with 20 warships. Livy adds 8000 men and supplies.

The brothers advanced to Saguntum with no challenge from Hasdrubal. Through treachery they managed to convince the Carthaginian commander Bostar into releasing hostages, which the Scipio's promptly returned to their homes to garner political support from the Iberian tribes.

In 216 BC, Hasdrubal's problems intensified. Unable to challenge the Romans until he received reinforcements, he was unable to take the offensive due to a serious uprising of the Iberian tribe called the Tartesii, which he crushed in some vicious fighting. After this he received word from the Carthaginian senate that he should advance to Italy and aid his brother there. Hasdrubal's response to this request is recorded by Livy:

Hasdrubal at once sent a despatch to Carthage pointing out what mischief the mere rumour of his departure had caused, and also that if he did really leave Spain it would pass into the hands of the Romans before he crossed the Ebro. He went on to say that not only had he neither a force nor a general to leave in his place, but the Roman generals were men whom he found it difficult to oppose even when his strength was equal to theirs. If, therefore, they were at all anxious to retain Spain they should send a man with a powerful army to succeed him, and even though all went well with his successor he would not find it an easy province to govern. (23.27)

The senate sent a considerable force to Spain under the command of an officer called Himilco, and Hasdrubal set off for Italy in late 216 BC early 215 BC.

Hasdrubal met the Romans at the mouth of the Ebro. Hasdrubal appears to have attempted a Cannae, and placed his Spanish infantry in the centre (without the curve), flanked by Phonei (likely Carthaginian and Phoenician levies from settlements in Spain) and on the right, Africans and mercenaries. On his flanks he set up his cavalry.

Just as at Cannae, the Phonei and Africans and mercenaries wheeled in at the Roman flanks as they chomped through the Spanish centre, but unlike Hannibal's victory, Hasdrubal's centre collapsed and the Romans were able to drive outwards and attacked the Phoeni, Africans and mercenaries. Hasdruba's army was destroyed, but he managed to escape. This was a critical time for the war. Had Hasdrubal managed to win, he would have arrived in Italy to reinforce his brother, along with reinforcements led by Hannibal's other brother, Mago, intended for Italy, which had to be diverted to Spain instead. With things going badly in Italy, this may well have been what Hannibal needed to win the war.

In 215 BC, Livy records further Roman victories in Spain. The first sees another massive Roman victory against Hasdrubal, who had been joined by two other Carthaginian armies led by Mago and Hamilcar son of Bomilcar. Hasdrubal lay siege to the Iberian town of Iliturgi (who had obviously joined Rome by this point). If we are to believe Livy, 16,000 Romans took to the field against Hasdrubal's 60,000 strong army. The Romans won an 'undisputed' victory, killing more than 16,000 Carthaginians, taking 3000 prisoners, capturing 1000 horses and seven elephants (along with killing 5 elephants). Apparently the Romans captured all three camps. The numbers here are ridiculous. He continues to say that Hasdrubal's defeated army made good their losses by recruiting heavily from a friendly province, and attacked Intibili. There was a second engagement against the Romans, who again beat Hasdrubal, killing more than 13,000, taking over 2000 prisoners, and nine elephants. According to Livy, due to these victories, nearly all of Spain allied with Rome (Livy, 23.48).

Livy records in 214 BC that Hasdrubal and his brother Mago destroyed a large Spanish army before the Romans could cross the Ebro to aid their allies. Publius Scipio continued across the Ebro, and encamped at White Fort (where the Barca's lost their father, Hamilcar years before), though his column was attacked and a few stragglers were killed. Publius moved his camp from White Fort and encamped by Mount Victory, and was joined by his brother, Gnaeus and his army. Hasdrubal received further reinforcements when he was joined by Hasdrubal Gisgo and his 'full' army. The Carthaginians set up position across the river and opposite the Roman camp. Hasdrubal almost managed to kill Publius Scipio as the Roman went out to reconnoitre 'with a party marching light', and had to hold up on a hill as he was surrounded by Carthaginians, being rescued later by his brother Gnaeus (Livy, 24.41).

Next, we hear from Livy a further attempt on Iliturgi, but Gnaeus came promptly to the town's aid, killing 12,000 Carthaginians in two engagements and taking 1000 prisoners. The town of Bigerra was also being attacked by Carthaginians, but was relieved by Gnaeus Scipio. A further battle ensued at Munda, where the Carthaginians lost 39 elephants (to pikes) 12,000 men and captured 3000. This was followed by another defeat with the Romans pressing their advantage from their previous victory, killing a further 6000 Carthaginians. After these defeats in a matter of days, Hasdrubal sent his brother Mago to raise fresh troops. Mago returned quickly with a force of Celts, but again the Romans defeated the Carthaginians, killing 8000, and capturing nearly 1000. After this victory, the Romans marched to Saguntum and captured the city.

For the next two years there appears little activity in Spain. The Romans did not further their offensive until 213-212 BC according to Livy, but as he asserts that they did nothing for two years, it must have been in 211 BC that the Scipio's made a move south of the Ebro. According to Appian (History of Spain, 15) Hasdrubal Barca was recalled to Africa during the years 213-212 BC to deal with a Numidian rebellion led by their king Syphax, who had apparently gone over to the Romans. Upon succesfully dealing with the sitaution, Hasdrubal returned to Spain with fresh reinforcements from Afica. Livy says that the Scipio's had formed an alliance with Syphax before their deaths in 211 BC, and sent him some centurions to help train his soldier's in infantry tactics. He also states that the Carthaginians allied themselves with a Numidian enemy of Syphax, called Gala (Massinissa's father) who helped them beat Syphax (Livy, 24.48).

In 211 BC, the Scipio brothers were faced by three Carthaginian generals (Hasdrubal and Mago Barca, and Hasdrubal Gisgo). They divided their forces in an attempt to crush the Carthaginian forces. Perhaps they had incorrect information about the Carthaginian army sizes, but one force made up of two-thirds of the total Roman and allied troops led by Publius Scipio went to deal with Mago and Hasdrubal Gisgo, who were joined leading one army, while Gnaeus went to hunt down Hasdrubal Barca with one third of his army, including 20,000 Celtiberian troops that had joined the Romans in the winter of 212 BC (Livy, 25.32). We now see Hasdrubal Barca intelligently dealing with the Roman army. Aware that Gnaeus was relying on his Celtiberian allies, he arranged secret conversations with the Celitberian leaders (Livy, 25.33). He paid them off at a high price to abandon the Romans and the Celtiberians returned home to their families. Whether this is a Roman fiction to explain Gaenus' defeat at the hands of Hasdrubal is unknown, but Livy's prejudice against barbarian cultures is quite evident. Gnaeus, now faced with a superior Carthaginian force, moved off, but Hasdrubal crossed the river hot on his heels. Before Gnaeus' retreat, Publius' force had also suffered defeat at the hands of Hasdrubal Gisgo and Mago Barca, and they met up with Hasdrubal Barca. Gnaeus Scipio and his outnumbered force took up position on a hill, making a rampart out of their pack-loads, but Hasdrubal's bolstered army made short work of them. Gnaeus was killed either in the fighting, or at a watch tower he had fled too.

Hasdrubal, through bribery and luck in regards to the Roman forces splitting up, averted catastrophe in Spain at a point when Rome was beginning to get a firmer grip on the land south of the Ebro river. Why Hasdrubal Barca did not press his advantage and attempt to cross into Italy at this point was said to be down to the actions of the remnants of the Scipios armies, some 8000 men who holed up at the Ebro river led by Lucius Marcius, a Roman knight nominated by the survivors to take over. Hasdrubal Barca appears to have withdrawn from the Ebro, leaving Hasdrubal Gisgo and Mago to hold the line there and try and finish the Romans (more on this in Mago's section!)

In late Autumn of 211, Lucius Marcius' beleaguered force who had managed to hold the line against both Hasdrubal Gisgo and Mago's attacks was reinforced from Rome. Claudius Nero arrived with 12,000 infantry and 1,100 cavarly, and took over in command from Marcius. Apparently, they managed to trap Hasdrubal Barca in a valley as he was encamped at a place called the Black Stones, in the country of the Ausetani between Iliturgi and Mentissa (this pass has been identified with the defile still called Monte Negro between Cabanes and Barriol). Hasdrubal entered negotiations with the Romans for safe passage of his army in return for parts of Spain, which Nero was delighted by. Hasdrubal used these negotiations to secretly evacuate his men from the pass, starting with the heavy troopers during the first night, and not in large numbers. This is what Livy has to say on this event:

He was careful to see that not very many went out that night, as a small body would make but little noise and be more likely to escape observation. They would also find their way more easily through the narrow and difficult foot-paths. The next day he kept the appointment, but so much time was taken up in discussing and writing down a number of things which had nothing to do with the matters they had agreed to discuss, that the whole day was lost and the business adjourned till the morrow. So another opportunity was afforded him of sending off a fresh body of troops by night. The discussion was not brought to a close the next day, and so it went on; several days were occupied in discussing terms, and the nights in despatching the Carthaginians secretly from their camp. When the greater part of the army had escaped, Hasdrubal no longer kept to the conditions which he had himself proposed, and there was less and less desire to come to terms as his sincerity diminished with his fears. Almost the entire force of infantry had now got out of the defile when, at daybreak, a dense fog covered the valley and the whole of the surrounding country. No sooner did Hasdrubal become aware of this than he sent a message to Nero begging that the interview might be put off for that day as it was a day on which the Carthaginians were forbidden by their religion to transact any important business. Even this did not arouse any suspicion of trickery. On learning that he would be excused for that day, Hasdrubal promptly left his camp with the cavalry and elephants, and by keeping his movements secret, emerged into safety. About ten o'clock the sun dispersed the mist, and the Romans saw that the hostile camp was deserted. Then, recognising at last the trick which the Carthaginian had played upon him and how he had been befooled, Nero hurriedly prepared to follow him and force him to an engagement. The enemy, however, declined battle; only a few skirmishes took place between the Carthaginian rear and the Roman advanced guard. (Livy, 26.17)

Next we hear of Hasdrubal Barca is in 210 BC. A new Roman commander had been appointed in charge in Spain to take over from Nero. Most likely in the summer of 210 BC, P. Cornelius Scipio, son of Publius and nephew to Gnaeus Scipio killed the year before, landed at Emporion with a force of 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, bolstering the Roman army in Spain to 28,000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry. He marched to Tarraco and spent the rest of the year garnering further support of the Iberian tribes and touring the areas under Roman control, congratulating the Roman troops there. He also spent time figuring out where the Carthaginian armies were. The information we have on Hasdrubal's whereabouts comes from Polybius, who has a very important source; a letter from Scipio to Philip V of Macedon on the capture of New Carthage. According to the letter, Hasdrubal Barca, Mago and Hasdrubal Gisgo had been quarreling and had separated into three respective armies. Hasdrubal Barca was besieging a city among the Carpetani in what is now the modern province of Toledo (Polybius, 10.7).

In only what can be described as a gross strategic error, and possibly one that lost Spain for Carthage, New Carthage was left vulnerable to attack. Why Hasdrubal Barca or no Carthaginian army was within easy reach of the most important city for their interests in Spain can not be known, or why the city was poorly garrisoned with 1000 men. Perhaps Hasdrubal Barca, whom Hannibal had left in overall command, had lost control of his younger brother Mago, and Gisgo, who appear to have now been operating separately if we are to believe Scipio's letter? Perhaps they couldn't believe capturing New Carthage could be done, as it was in a solid defensive position? Either way, Scipio boldly attacked in 209 BC, and with inside knowledge, a land and naval attack, succeeded in capturing the city. Livy presents us with a detailed description of the result of captured people, and materials, which had a huge impact on the ability of Hasdrubal Barca to maintain the war in Spain:

As many as 10,000 freemen were made prisoners. Those who were citizens were set free and Scipio gave them back their city and all the property which the war had left them. There were some 2000 artisans; these Scipio allotted to the public service, and held out to them hopes of recovering their liberty if they did their best in the tasks which the war demanded. The rest of the able-bodied population and the sturdiest of the slaves he assigned to the fleet to make up the complement of rowers. He also augmented his fleet by five vessels which he had seized. Besides all this population there were the Spanish hostages; these he treated with as much consideration as though they had been children of the allies of Rome. An enormous amount of munitions of war was also secured; 120 catapults of the largest size and 281 smaller ones, 23 of the heavier ballistae and 52 lighter ones, together with an immense number of scorpions of various calibre, as well as missiles and other arms. 73 military standards were also captured. A vast quantity of gold and silver was brought to the general, including 287 golden bowls, almost all of which were at least a pound in weight, 18,300 pounds of silver plate and coinage, the former comprising a large number of vessels. This was all weighed and counted and then made over to the quaestor C. Flaminius, as were also 10,000 bushels of wheat and 270 pecks of barley. In the harbour 63 transports were captured, some of them with their cargoes of corn and arms, as well as bronze, iron, sails, esparto grass, and other articles required for the fleet. Amidst such an enormous supply of military and naval stores, the actual city itself was regarded as the least important capture of all. (Livy, 26.47)

 

[markdienekes]

The next we hear of Hasdrubal Barca, it is 209/208, and it is more bad news. Two supposedly staunch allies of Carthage and powerful Spanish chieftains Andobales and Mandonius abandoned Hasdrubal's camp. Apprently, according to Polybius, they disliked the arrogance of the Carthaginians and were dissatisfied with their treatment by Hasdrubal, who had at some point demanded a large sum of money and that they hand over their wives and daughters as hostages (10.35). Aware of the increasing negative disposition of Carthage's Iberian allies, Hasdrubal Barca decided it was time to bring the Romans to battle. Hasdrubal's decision is told by Polybius:

Surrounded by such difficulties Hasdrubal was agitated by many conflicting emotions and anxieties. He was vexed by the desertion of Andobales; vexed by the opposition and feud between himself and the other commanders; and greatly alarmed as to the arrival of Scipio, expecting that he would immediately bring his forces to attack him. Perceiving therefore that he was being abandoned by the Iberians, and that they were joining the Romans with one accord, he decided upon the following plan of action. He resolved that he must collect the best force he could, and give the enemy battle: if fortune declared in his favour he could then consider his next step in safety, but if the battle turned out unfavourably for him, he would retreat with those that survived into Gaul; and collecting from that country as many of the natives as he could, would go to Italy, and take his share in the same fortune as his brother Hannibal. (10.37)

In the Spring of 208 BC, Hasdrubal Barca had moved to a town called Baecula, strategically blocking Scipio's advance to the Baetis Valley. Upon Scipio's arrival, and after a brief skirmish between his cavalry and Scipio's advance of light troops, Hasdrubal withdrew to a strong defensive position with a flat-topped hill with steep front and sides protected by a river at the rear. Hasdrubal was probably tempting Scipio to attack while he awaited for Mago and Gisgo's armies to arrive and whom were marching towards his position. The Battle of Baecula is another rare battle where we do actually have the tactical dispositions of Hasdrubal's army compared to Livy's sketchy years of battles and defeats between 217-212 BC.

Hasdrubal set up his Numidian cavalry and light armed Balearic and African troops on a slope surrounded by a wall-like rim in the front (Livy, 27.18), which Scipio attacked first with his skirmishers and a picked infantry force. Hasdrubal waited to see the outcome of the fight, and when his men became hard-pressed, he ordered forward his main forces to occupy the height above the slope to support his men, which was what Scipio had been hoping for. Scipio reinforced his attackers with the rest of his skirmishers, then quickly moved around the hill to the right while he order Laelius to move around the hill to the left. When Scipio attacked Hasdrubal's flanks, Hasdrubal had not yet deployed his whole force and had realised he had been outmanoeuvred. With haste, Hasdrubal withdrew, sacrificing his light troops as he moved away with the treasury, elephants, and perhaps up to two-thirds of his army. According to Livy he lost 8000 men. Hasdrubal had lost, but he had not lost his whole army. He now marched towards the Tagus River. Livy records a meeting between Hasdrubal and his fellow generals to discuss what the next move should be. It was decided to continue on to Italy to meet up with his brother:

A council of war was then held. Some of those present urged the immediate pursuit of Hasdrubal, but Scipio thought it hazardous in case Mago and the other Hasdrubal should join forces with him. He contented himself with sending a division to occupy the passes of the Pyrenees, and spent the remainder of the summer in receiving the submission of the Spanish tribes. A few days after the battle of Baecula, when Scipio had descended from the pass of Castulo on his return to Tarraco, the two Carthaginian generals, Hasdrubal Gisgo and Mago, came from Further Spain to join forces with Hasdrubal. They were too late to prevent his defeat, but their arrival was very timely in enabling them to concert measures for the prosecution of the war. When they came to compare notes as to the feeling in the different provinces, Hasdrubal Gisgo considered that as the distant coast of Spain between Gades and the ocean still knew nothing of the Romans, it was so far faithful to Carthage. The other Hasdrubal and Mago were agreed as to the influence which Scipio's generous treatment had had upon the feelings of all states and individuals alike, and they were convinced that the desertions could not be checked until all the Spanish soldiery had either been removed to the furthest corners of Spain or transported into Gaul. They decided therefore, without waiting for the sanction of the senate, that Hasdrubal must proceed to Italy, the focus of the war where the decisive conflict would be fought. In this way he would remove all the Spanish soldiers out of Spain far beyond the spell of Scipio's name. (Livy, 27.20)

Hasdrubal spent the rest of 208 BC in preparation for an invasion of Italy, and joining up with Hannibal. Marseille discovered his whereabouts in France when he arrived and sent word to Rome, along with Roman agents who passed on that Hasdrubal intended to cross the Alps in the spring. The Roman consul Salinator was given command of a consular army to face him, made up of two legions and their respective Roman allies, while they sent the other consul, Nero to face Hannibal with a further consular army. Further armies similar in size to the armies of the consuls were spread out across the Italian peninsular; one under the command of Terrentius Varro was in Etruria, another led by L. Porcius Licinus was positioned in ager gallicus. In the south of Italy, Q Fulvius Flaccus commanded two legions in Bruttium, Q. Claudius Flamen two legions in the region of Tarentum, and C. Hostilius Tubulus one legion at Capua. This is now what Hannibal and Hasdrubal would have face in Italy alone and along with the two freshly raised legions urbane, in all that year Rome had 23 legions in the field spread out across the various theatres of war! (Lazenby, Hannibal's War, p.181)

Hasdrubal set out of winter quarters having conscripted into his army 8000 Ligurians who would meet him when he arrived in Italy, forcing the consuls who had heard of this move to complete their levy quickly and leave for their provinces. Livy describes Hasdrubal's march through the Alps as rapid, that the Gallic, Averni and Aline tribes not only allowed him to cross their borders, but joined forces with him. Hannibal had helped Hasdrubal by rendering the route practical, and Hasdrubal emerged into Cisalpine Gaul much earlier than expected, and with his army intact and healthy. Livy, however goes on to say that Hasdrubal squandered what he gained by speed by laying siege to Placentia. There may well be a practical reason for this, and that Hasdrubal had hoped to attract more Gauls into his army my the attack of Placentia, and to give sufficient time for forage for his army, particularly for the cavalry.

Hasdrubal did not have many options available to him for movement from Cisapline Gaul: one through the Appenines leading to Etruria was blocked by Varro, while if he marched southeastwards that led to Ariminium and the coastal route south was blocked by Licinus. When he did decide to head for his brother, Hasdrubal moved eastwards towards the coastal route, sending out four Celts and two Numidian horsemen carrying letters for Hannibal, the letters saying they would meet up in Umbria. Perhaps this was an attempt to make the Romans believe he was going to cross the Appenines, and thus draw them away from his intended southern coastal route, otherwise it was quite naïve, and brings to question why he didn't tell the messengers verbally instead. However, whatever his intention, the Romans saw that he did not intend to croos the Appenine route, and thus two Roman armies (Salinator's and Porcius') converged and blocked Hasdrubal's march.

Meanwhile Hannibal was moving through Bruttium advancing towards Apulia, probably surprised by the speed of Hasdrubal's march through the Alps, Hannibal broke winter quarters quite late. His march was dogged by Nero and was he was forced into running fights as he moved. One of Hasdrubal's messengers, and thus, the letter fell into the Romans hands, and Nero handpicked 6000 of his best infantry, and 1000 cavalry and slipped away from his camp with Hannibal none-the-wiser, to join up with Salinator's force against Hasdrubal, sending messengers ahead to Salinator to tell him of his coming, and how best to join up forces.

Nero joined up with Salinator secretly and at night after a swift march, and slipped into the camp, his men sharing the tents of Salinator's army to not reveal new tents, as Hasdrubal's camp was quite close (about seven hundred metres away) and the precaution was thought of as necessary. They deployed for battle the next day, and Hasdrubal accepted the challenge, which leads me to believe that the forces were probably even. Hasdrubal wasn't to be fooled however, as Livy tells us:

Hasdrubal had ridden to the front with a handful of cavalry, when he noticed in the hostile ranks some well-worn shields which he had not seen before, and some unusually lean horses; the numbers, too, seemed greater than usual. Suspecting the truth he hastily withdrew his troops into camp and sent men down to the river from which the Romans obtained water, to catch if they could some of the watering parties and see whether they were especially sunburnt, as is generally the case after a long march. He ordered, at the same time, mounted patrols to ride round the consul's camp and observe whether the lines had been extended in any direction and to notice at the same time whether the bugle-call was sounded once or twice in the camp. They reported that both the camps-M. Livius' camp and that of L. Porcius-were just as they had been, no addition had been made, and this misled him. But they also informed him that the bugle-call was sounded once in the praetor's camp and twice in the consul's, and this perturbed the veteran commander, familiar as he was with the habits of the Romans. He concluded that both the consuls were there and was anxiously wondering how the one consul had got away from Hannibal. Least of all could he suspect what had actually occurred, namely that Hannibal had been so completely outwitted that he did not know the whereabouts of the commander and the army whose camp had been so close to his own. As his brother had not ventured to follow the consul, he felt quite certain that he had sustained a serious defeat, and he felt the gravest apprehensions lest he should have come too late to save a desperate situation, and lest the Romans should enjoy the same good fortune in Italy which they had met with in Spain. Then again he was convinced that his letter had never reached Hannibal, but had been intercepted by the consul who then hastened to crush him. Amidst these gloomy forebodings he ordered the camp fires to be extinguished, and gave the signal at the first watch for all the baggage to be collected in silence. The army then left the camp. In the hurry and confusion of the night march the guides, who had not been kept under very close observation, slipped away; one hid himself in a place selected beforehand, the other swam across the Metaurus at a spot well known to him. The column deprived of its guides marched on aimlessly across country, and many, worn out by sleeplessness flung themselves down to rest, those who remained with the standards becoming fewer and fewer. Until daylight showed him his route, Hasdrubal ordered the head of the column to advance cautiously, but finding that owing to the bends and turns of the river he had made little progress, he made arrangements for crossing it as soon as daybreak should show him a convenient place. But he was unable to find one, for the further he marched from the sea, the higher were the banks which confined the stream, and by thus wasting the day he gave his enemy time to follow him. (Livy, 27.47)

The night march was a disastrous attempt. Hasdrubal's army began to split up and blundered through the dark, and soon found himself being attacked by the Roman cavalry and skirmishers as light broke. Hasdrubal, in face of these attacks and in command of a ragged army that had lost men throughout the night march, tried to set up camp on a hill overlooking the river, but with the arrival of the main Roman host led by Salinator, set up for battle instead. Hasdrubal set up the Celts on the hill on his left, massed his Spaniards on the right, with the elephant corp in front of their right wing. This setup makes it apparent that he wanted to smash the Roman left while the Roman right struggled against his Celts setup on the hill. The struggle was even until Nero with a touch of inspired military genius, withdrew some of his men from the rear ranks of the right wing and marched them to the left wing, falling upon the elephants and Spaniards on the flank and rear. His Spaniards and elephants were annihilated, and Polybius says that Hasdrubal, having done all that a good general should, charged into the thick of the fight and perished. Hasdrubal's severed head would later be flung into an outpost of Hannibal's.

Bibliography:

Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, Penguin Classics

Livy, The War with Hannibal, Penguin Classics

Lazenby, J. Hannibal's War

 

[christos200]

This is just great.

Oh, by the way i just managed to take over Rome, as carthage, in Rome total war.

 

[markdienekes]

Thanks for reading christos! Hehe, you're re-writing history fella!