A little knowledge is dangerous.

[1889]

If the Navy and Army had more faith in Churchill’s Gallipoli plan, cooperated, and moved faster they could have pulled it off before Turk reinforcements arrived couldn't they? Would that have been decisive?

Is that what you mean?

 

[Eran of Arcadia]

I think for Gallipoli to work might have required more knowledge than they had. A combined-arms approach, and knowledge of exactly what dangers they faced, might have knocked Turkey out of the war; what effects that would have produced I don't know.

 

[Ozbenno]

As many people have said, the main problem on the Western Front was that technology had outstripped tactics. Haig was a cavalry man, as was Gough, who was one of his most trusted Generals. They were distrustful of artillery and in 1914-1916, rarely used it effectively.

Another British General, Richard Haking, believed that the war would be won by discipline and "fighting spirit" and also rarely used artillery.

As for Gallipoli, the plan was deeply flawed and lacked any appreciation for the conditions of the land involved. If the plan had been properly thought out, planned and executed and the British Navy had taken a more active role in clearing the Dardanelles, maybe it would have worked.

 

[Eran of Arcadia]

The French were worse for valuing fighting spirit over tactics and technology. As a result, their troops performed bravely and well but were continually let down.

 

[Verbose]

The French were worse for valuing fighting spirit over tactics and technology. As a result, their troops performed bravely and well but were continually let down.

Depends on which part of the war. (This is a favourite topic of mine, and I can wax eloquent.)

The French army starts the war with the doctrine of the "offensive à outrance" (the offensive to the utmost) of Joffre and Foch, but ends the war on a basis of Pétain's "Souvenez-vous, le feu tue" (Remember, fire kills).

The French WWI experience is fascinating in good part because no army involved had a learning curve as steep, even if it was learning the hard way.
It's men in blue coats and red trousers making massive bayonet charges, machineguns at the back so as to not slow them down, in 1914.
In 1918 it's the most mechanised, most fire-power-heavy army around, with more artillery, more auto-fire, more aircraft, more trucks for transport, and more tanks than any other army involved, dedicated to tactics designed to kill as many enemies as possible from a distance through indirect fire, while exposing their own men as little as possible.

This development for the French army was decided at least by 1916. When the British went over the top at the Somme, they were already a couple of years behind the French in the development of the doctrines of firepower and cover. Haig got his mostly British battle at a rate of about 5 British deployed for every 2 French. It lasted five months, and at the end the French took more territory than the British, for a much smaller force deployed, and way lower casualties. It suggests the shape of the French learning-curve in WWI.