... The new Scandinavian undertaking was to consist of two separate but related operations, WILFRED and Plan R 4. WILFRED involved the laying of two mine fields in Norwegian waters, one in the approaches to the Vest Fjord north of Bodo, and the other between Ålesund and Bergen, with the pretended laying of a third near Molde. It was to be justified by notes delivered to Norway and Sweden several days in advance protesting the inability of those nations to protect their neutrality. The supposition was that WILFRED would provoke German counteraction, and Plan R 4 was to become effective the moment the Germans landed in Norway "or showed they intended to do so." Narvik and the railroad to the Swedish frontier formed the principal objectives of Plan R 4. The port was to be occupied by one infantry brigade and an antiaircraft battery, with the total strength to be built up eventually to 18,000 men. One battalion, in a transport escorted by two cruisers, was to sail within a few hours after the mines had been laid. Five battalions were to be employed in occupying Trondheim and Bergen and in a raid on Stavanger to destroy Sola airfield, the largest in Norway and the closest to the British Isles. The plan depended heavily on the assumption that the Norwegians would not offer resistance; and, strangely, the possibility of a strong German reaction was left almost entirely out of account. [41]
On the German side, after the Finnish-Soviet peace was announced, Hitler hesitated temporarily as he cast about for means of justifying the operation, but the time for decision had come. From the point of view of the Navy, an early execution was imperative because all other naval operations had been brought to a standstill by the preparations and because after 15 April the nights would become too short to afford proper cover for the naval forces. Reporting to Hitler on 26 March, Raeder declared that the danger of an Allied landing in Norway was no longer acute, but since he believed WESERUEBUNG would have to be carried out sooner or later he advised that it be done as soon as possible. Hitler agreed to set the day for sometime in the period of the next new moon, which would occur on 7 April. [42]
On 1 April Hitler approved the plans for WESERUEBUNG after a detailed review; on the following day, after having been assured by the Commanders in Chief, Navy and Air Force, that ice would not impede naval movements in the Baltic and that flying conditions would be satisfactory, he designated 9 April as WESER Day and 0515 as WESER Time. The first supply ships sailed on 3 April and the warships began putting out from German ports at midnight on the 6th. [43]
It was not until after the first German ships were at sea that the Allies reached an agreement on their own operation. The execution of WILFRED and Plan R 4 was at first tied to Operation ROYAL MARINE, a British proposal for sowing fluvial mines in the Rhine. The French objected to this on the ground that it would provoke German bombing of French factories. WILFRED had been scheduled for 5 April, but it was not until that date that the British Government agreed to carry out the Norwegian operations independently of ROYAL MARINE; consequently, the mines were not laid until the morning of 8 April, by which time the German ships were advancing up the Norwegian coast. When it became known on the morning of the 8th that the German Fleet, which had been sighted by aircraft in the North Sea on the previous day, was at sea in the vicinity of Norway the mine-laying force was withdrawn and Plan R 4 was abandoned.
In the end the Allied venture accomplished nothing and gave Hitler the excuse he needed for WESERUEBUNG. The coincidence of Allied and German forces heading toward Norway at exactly the same time reinforced the myth of Hitler's "intuition" and gave rise to the post hoc, ergo propter hoc argument that WESERUEBUNG was forced on Germany by the aggressive intentions of the Allies. Actually there is no evidence that Hitler knew of WILFRED or Plan R 4, and it appears highly unlikely that he would have risked his Navy in Norwegian waters if he had known or suspected that the British Navy would be engaged in major operations in that area at the same time.