Navies need more power.

[Thlayli]

Masada and Dachs are correct. The Napoleonic blockade was easily run, and essentially made the British feel good about themselves, but the products of France's 1800-era colonial empire that they were denied from blockade didn't impede the French ability to wage war.

Hey, how about that total British naval superiority over the American rebels in the American War of Independence? And their blockade of the American coasts? That blockade was fairly effective in crushing that rebellion, right? Right?

So, to make this discussion somewhat relevant to CiV, you should get a marginal monetary hit in game terms from a pre-modern blockade, but your ability to wage war would be essentially unchanged. Again, before the 19th-20th century essential goods were not typically imported from overseas. Due to this and other factors, the use of a blockade as an effective warfighting tool is very much limited to the 20th century and the second half of the 19th.

 

[Brutoni]

Quite frankly, my posts while strong in opinion did not accuse people of having limited understanding, knowledge. Living on platitudes and generally being considerably condesending. If anyone took my posts to be like this I, as stated before, apologise for this and did not intend it.

That said you are both beginning to be quite rude and are demonstrating a real ignorance around how a blockade is strategically and tactically implemented. Let us start from the beginning.

A blockade is a relatively inefficient means of waging war upon another nation, especially before the 19th and 20th centuries. From your replies these are the dates for the first successful blockades being implemented, though you still hold that it is an inefficient way of waging war.

Although only wikipedia, this definition for blockade fits the bill. It also agrees well with these dictionary definitions here and here.

So from this we can establish that a blockade is not just a restriction of trade and revenue from overseas into your ports. War material and communications are included in this and your troops are most certainly a part of the war material. Additionally a blockade is governed primarily by your ability to restrict the enemies movements NOT by how close your ships are to port, or were they are positioned. While some people may call this "raiding" the fact of the matter remains that if your actions on an enemies maritime cause them to be unable to access their ports then they are under an effective blockade.

For example, you argue that I have not provided in depth examples of how the blockade had any effect on the French before the Treaty of Amiens, or indeed afterwards. Well to quote directly from Mark Adkin's, The companion to Trafalgar

"Napoleon used the peace to prepare for war... Economically, militarily and diplomatically. He replenished scores of warehouses that have been emptied by the British blockade and re-filled arsenals."

This is a clear indication that the French had suffered to the British blockade. Not only that but in the same section of his book "Section one, The campaign Europe in early 1805" he goes on to explain the the French had lost several naval battles (1794, 1797, 1798 and 1801) that resulted in them being unable to retain the Caribbean islands. Additionally the British naval supremacy was undoubtedly a massive aid in the victory in Egypt. Only through the Treaty did the French regain these assets.

This is further reinforced, again by Mark Adkin's when he explains how much of the captured French military supplies and war stores where sold off by the British prime minister Henry Addington. To quote him directly again.

"During this period he succeed in halving the army, pating of 60 per cent of the Navy's ships of the line and discharging 40,000 trained sea men - the hardened veterans of long years of blockade duty.... Huge quantities of war stores were auctioned off cheaply, much of them to French agents who, scarcely able to contain their glee, shopped them over the channel to their astonished but grateful previous owners, the French government."

This hammers home an additionally important matter concerning the blockade, it is as a tool of naval warfare exceptionally important in denying an enemy access to his home ports. They must then resupply else where or risk being trapped at home and unable to act in naval warfare. "A ship in port is safe, but that is not what ships are made for." Very true words.

So the blockade, clearly had had an effect on the French military arm. Furthermore it had ensured that proper deployment of large quantities of troops was not possible, or if it did occur as in Egypt was likely to end up with a chain of supply liable to being cut at any given moment.

A book, well worth a read by the way, that clearly illustrates not only effective blockades but also the need for a strong Navy if you have global aspirations is "To rule the waves" by Arthur Herman. An example of how dangerous a blockade could be is referenced in the 1739 action of the Second Battle of Finisterre, this battle mainly established Edward Hawke his place in history for his innovations in a flexible line of battle. However the battle was a result of the French fleet trying to break a blockade established by the Royal Navy. That is to say

"Desperate to break the Western Squadron's strangle hold on its Atlantic trade, the French government was orderning every warship in Brest harbour it could spare to be fitted out and to escort more than 250 merchantmen to the West Indies."

The French as can be seen by documented evidence are trying to break out of a blockade established almost 50 years before the 19th Century. In fact we go on to find out

"The second battle of Finisterre established Edward Hawk as.... It also left the French fleet divided and the French Atlantic trade at a standstill. Louis XV and his ministers lost heart as they realised how vulnerable this British Superiority at sea really made them.... Although the occasional ship got through no large scale help could.

This was obviously a time when the French were also trying to aid Prince Charlie in his rebellions and the blockade is once again proving it's worth in protect Britain from falling. Though in this case it was a situation of civil unrest, however the fact remains that the blockade was ensuring that French troops could not properly aid Prince Charlie. This is a tangent to the main point though, that the British blockade at sea ensured that they were able to gain superiority in the Indian Ocean and even begin to be effective in the west Indies.

Furthermore due to the blockade, and also due to privateering to be fair. The French and Spanish lost

"More than 1,200 French and Spanish prizes, while the French caught half as many. With its rapidly expanding merchant marine, the British hardly missed their loses; for the French, the losses spelled economic disaster unless the war stopped.

I think here, I can provide finally a hard piece of fact that you will struggle to refute. This is a documented example of an incident almost half a century before the 19th century showing how important overseas trade had already become. The peace signed in 1748 at Aix-La-Chapelle quickly established that the Spannish had lost all economic power because of the British blockades and naval actions. The Dutch were kicked out of the running. The French had to spend a decade rebuilding before they could declare war while the British used that time to expand.


So, in conclusion I believe that with a quick look through both Arthur Herman's and Mark Adkin's books I have demonstrated that not only was trade already an established and vitally important concept to the nations of Europe before the 19th century. But also that a naval blockade had in two wars before 1805 against France proven to be the one thing that stopped Britain from being defeated at the hands of a French invasion and ALSO pushed the French to the point of economic breakdown so that they had no choice but to draw up a peace treaty.

That is before establishing the effectiveness of a blockade in ensuring superiority at Sea so you can have freedom to move your naval assets how you wish.

I'm in the middle of my physics exams at uni, so sorry if this is a little fragmented. I will continue to address the issues you raised when I have time.

That said, I will concede that a blockade was not an effective way of waging war before the 17th century. However this is only because I have little knowledge of Naval warfare before the 17th century.

As to a list of the books I have read and studied,
To rule the Waves, Arthur Herman
Trafalgar, Roy Adkins
Battle of Trafalgar, Nicholas Best
The war at Sea, 1939-1945 Stuart Robertson, Stephen Dent
Safeguarding the Nation, The story of the Modern Royal Navy, John Roberts
The Trafalgar Companion, Mark Adkin
Through Fire and Water, HMS Ardent the forgotten frigate of the Falklans, Mark Higgitt
Battle A visual Journey through 5,000 years of Combat, R.G Grant
History the Definitive guide Adam Hart Davis
The times complete History of the world, Richard Overy
Nelson, A dream of glory John Sudgen,
The Rules of the game, Jutland and British Naval Command, Andrew Gordon
Dreadnought, Britain, Germany and the coming of the great war, Robert K Massie
The War for all the Oceans, Roy Adkins
Cochrane the Dauntless, the life and the adventure, David Cordingly
The Falklands War, The full story, Sunday Times
One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander,Sandy Woodward, Patrick Robinson

Now, your all being considerably rude here... Except for Dachs, I would ask that those who reply with "Read some history articles" to perhaps suggest some articles for me to read. I have not, up until now, been impolite or rude or nasty. However jumping on the band wagon with someone who obviously has historical knowledge (even if I disagree with some of his assessments) and going "read articles" is pretty sad. At least attempt to provide me like Dach and his companion with examples or links to were I can go.

 

[Nicolas10]

I like all the debate, actually. So thank you to Thlayli and Matsuda for chiming in. And also, given my strident tone in an ealier post, I'll reiterate that I'm glad to see so many of you are pretty well-read in the historical examples you are mentioning.

Secondly, I'd like to formally split our "debate" into two halves: Purely Economic Blockading, and Strategic Naval Power.

In my opinion, admittely not always humble, the Dachs camp is not acknowledging naval power in its proper context.

In the Napoleanic Wars, the only way Britain survived to eventually defeat the French was through its Navy. This is not disputable, is it? Its economic power stemmed from its Global trade, particularly with Egypt and India. Without the money it generated from global trade, it could not have had the financial muscle to continue the war for over a decade. Had Napolean actually been able to do anything about this, it would have hurt Britain economically, hence his campaign in Egypt. The French navy attempted to merchant raid, especially in the Indian Ocean, but generally failed. Conversely, English merchant raiding was reasonable successful (hence all the references to prize money that you see in the historical novels at the time).

The reverse is quasi-true; English blockades hurt the French, somewhat. But obviously, the French could engage in land trade to make up some of the difference.

However, the clear and obvious strategic effect of Naval forces was the English ability to set up a front in Portugal and Spain. Not only were they physically able to transfer the troops when they wished, but they could reinforce them as well. The decisiveness of the French defeat at Trafalgar was quickly followed up the landing in Portugal. Cause and effect.

Also, Dachs refutes Span's "collapse" as a European power by saying it had nothing to with naval weaknesses. I'd politely suggest the work of Henry Kamen. I'll link a quick review, but read the book. I attended a conference with Kamen on empire back while studying at Duke.

http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-e...he-modern-world-by-niall-ferguson-601565.html

Kamen's point is that Spain's financial benefit from all the New World silver and gold was quite minimal, precisely because it depended on other nations to bring that treasure back. Accordingly, everyone else benefited by absconding with the treasures as well. It was like the drug trade, where everyone's taking a cut before any of it gets back to Spain. Had Spain invested its monies not in a massive European land army, or frightfully expensive and massively misguided Armada to attack Britain, but instead invested in a legitimate naval fleet with which to guard its New World Assets and acquire naval dominance in the New World, then Spain's modern history would be very, very different. Spain eventually remained a very rural, agrarian state... financially poor compared to the economic might of Britain and France, two nations who continued to develop economic trade (and naval forces) in the New World.

As to ancient times:


The examples of Salamis, Hannibal's inability to travel from Spain by sea, and other episodes show the value of sea power... but obviously land battles must be fought. Hence, Hannibal crushed the Romans for a time, naval inferiority or not. Likewise, had the Persians won at Platea, their naval defeat could have been absorbed.

As to economic raiding and blockades:

Obviously, no one can ENTIRELY shut off an economy via a blockade. Whether in ancient or modern times. Land trade will increase, and blockade runners will usually be too numerous to stop. But that does not mean that the effect is not noticeable and pronounced. For massive land powers, the effect of blockade is obviously less effective, however. Hence, British blockading of the Colonies or the French is only so effective, by definition.

Taken in context, however, naval power can be an effective advantage. The controller of such power often decided a war, but not always.

In regards to Civ, at the moment, a player can win at any level with ZERO navy whatsoever (just watch themeinteam). But in real life, that would be exceptionally difficult. Not impossible, but the effects of commerce raiding and the threat of naval invastion mattered.

In civilization, the "barbarian" naval threat is limited to the galleys, but if the game allowed "barbarians" to come out of the dark with longships and powerful units, it'd be a serious drain on anyone's economy. They would pillage the cottages and towns, severely damaging a tech race and its commerce. Also, they would force the human player to maintain lots of military units spread around their whole territory... which would be expensive and also be a hinderance in a tech race. You'd struggle to develop as a civilization, unless you were truly massive, if you were suffering from constant sea commerce raids and outright naval attacks to pillage your profitable coastlines.

This echoes the reality of Dark Ages Europe. I refer again to the Viking example: One reason the "dark ages" were dark, is that as European kingdoms were again split up, there was no one to stop the Vikings from picking off weak targets and invading weak areas. Which is why the Danes invaded and nearly conquered England, occupied parts of France, and raided thousands of miles away. This caused a massive economic drain on the region.

Had a naval threat existed to prevent such destruction, the history of Europe would have been far different. Europe would have gotten richer, sooner, and it would not have suffered such an intellectual and economic disparity compared with the far richer and more powerful Arabic, Middle Eastern, and Asian empires.

The impact of navies and commerce raiding has been often definitive in history, but with the geopgraphical caveat the huge land empires could sometimes compensate for a lack of sea power... but not always.

 

[Provost Martin]

Hmm, I use navies heavily in Civ4. What else will protect my precious coast, and they are crucial for amphibious assaults, when the air space is well protected, or when you can't just roll up to the cities with artillery. Not to mention when you must defend against an aggressive island foe. Blockading can also be increadibly useful. But I wouldn't mind if they expanded on all this.

 

[Yared]

Now, your all being considerably rude here... Except for Dachs, I would ask that those who reply with "Read some history articles" to perhaps suggest some articles for me to read. I have not, up until now, been impolite or rude or nasty. However jumping on the band wagon with someone who obviously has historical knowledge (even if I disagree with some of his assessments) and going "read articles" is pretty sad. At least attempt to provide me like Dach and his companion with examples or links to were I can go.

I'm assuming that this is aimed at me. It was a reply to Nicolas who said:

Well, that was an interesting response from Dachs. He's certainly bringing out a lot of historical examples, which, I gratefull concede, at least indicates that he's studied/read a lot. So well done there.

Dachs has written a number of history articles. I mentioned it because Dachs is very much respected around here and to suggest that he hasn't studied a lot sounds very strange to me, considering his history articles, who have pretty much only gotten positive posts (at least the ones I've read).

You can find Dachs' articles in his signature.

 

[Nicolas10]

No, it did not. The Spanish Empire ceased to exist because Spain could not effectively conciliate regional elites to its control and use them as a counterweight to rebellious elements, and because the Napoleonic occupation of Spain effectively destroyed Spain's ability to respond to the seizure of power by these rebels.

His articles on the classical era notwithstanding, I think Dachs is far off base with his commentary on Spain. His point is on the lack of a strong central leadership, but that stems from a lack of strong commerce... which, as I've said above, was linked entirely to its inability to develop seapower and which has made it a bit player in European conflicts ever since.

Most of this applies to the last few centuries of naval warfare, and mostly to the twentieth century at that. It's also extremely uneven.

There are massive practical limitations to naval power in the real world.

Given his articles in the classical era, I find this statement even more puzzling. His point about blockades in the ancient world is one thing, but to overlook one of the principle reasons why Greece withstood Persia's invasion (The Themistocles-inspired naval build-up and subsequent tactical victory at the bottleneck at Salamis), is all the more shocking.

The Hannibal example in the Second Punic War is also on point. He lost 50% of his forces entering Italy, because of Rome's Naval superiority... and Carthage ultimately fell to Rome, and got annihilated, because it couldn't maintain its seapower. Carthage only emerged as a rival to Rome because of its realtive seapower and commercial trade. When Rome negated it that, Carthage ceased to exist.

Lastly, Yared, Dachs' dismissal of my Viking example as being "merely Northern European," and then say that the mediterrean did well in withstanding the Norsemen (i.e. 3,000 coastal miles away from any Viking bases), is likewise not impressive. Again, I expanded on this reality above.

 

[Brutoni]

I have to say it should be interesting to see Dach's and Masada's reply. Given my recent post documenting several events from the 17th Century onwards and showing that experts in the field agree with me that the blockade of France and Spain was extremely important, Coupled with Nicholas10's expansion on the discussion of the ancient and classical era.

Though I do feel we are all arguing in a circular manner, so far as I can see they are not denying the effectiveness of the Navy, just pointing out that it does have limitations (which it does) and that a blockade is not an effective use of it.

Of course I do completely disagree there, the limitations of the Navy are not anywhere near as large as those of the Army, and when it came around the Air force. If anything while the Navy can defend a countries interest independently of the two on a global scale with good success (for example Britain, Japan, USA) it is a rare case that an army can do so without the support of the Navy. There is not a documented case for the Air force. The fly boys like to say how they are the be all and end all in military power... However they have the biggest limitations of the lot.


So yeah, Ball is in your court gentlemen.

 

[trickofthehand]

Thank you Brutoni for taking the time out from this electronic penis measuring contest to address the game issues.

You raise a good point, perhaps then the MC's strength will be in that it has superior range than the BS, and can strike first w/o retaliation. However then we'll have the scenario where a BS in close range is superior to a MC so BS will still be a viable 21st century tool. In the real world this isn't the case (as converting a BS to fire missiles makes it in effect... a MC), so for game terms I think the BS should still be weaker than the MC even at the BS's combat range.

I am interested however in seeing if they do in fact give ships this great a range and if ranged combat will be true combat like we see now where both ships fire on each other; or if instead it'll be 'bombardments' with no retaliation from the attacked ship.

Also I think we should lobby for the MC's attack animation to NOT be the firing of it's tiny little deck gun. It's just horribly underwhelming.

 

[Brutoni]

Thank you Brutoni for taking the time out from this electronic penis measuring contest to address the game issues.

You raise a good point, perhaps then the MC's strength will be in that it has superior range than the BS, and can strike first w/o retaliation. However then we'll have the scenario where a BS in close range is superior to a MC so BS will still be a viable 21st century tool. In the real world this isn't the case (as converting a BS to fire missiles makes it in effect... a MC), so for game terms I think the BS should still be weaker than the MC even at the BS's combat range.

I am interested however in seeing if they do in fact give ships this great a range and if ranged combat will be true combat like we see now where both ships fire on each other; or if instead it'll be 'bombardments' with no retaliation from the attacked ship.

Also I think we should lobby for the MC's attack animation to NOT be the firing of it's tiny little deck gun. It's just horribly underwhelming.

I agree with most of what you say here except that a MC in close could stand up to a BS, as soon as the battle ship is capable of opening fire with it's main arnament on a MC then that MC is dead as a door nail. 14-16" shells hitting a modern warship will provide a hard kill in almost every situation.

The fact remains is that in a modern task force getting a BS t

 

[Dachs]

I didn't say "ceased to exist", I said "decline". Declining is what precede the collapse. The Ottomans have been declining for a long time before the collapse of 1918. The Spanish has been declining a long time before the Napoleonic wars.

Really? The Bourbon Spanish monarchy managed an impressive military-political revival starting at the end of the first half of the 18th century, with successful campaigns in Italy and the Americas; in the war of the American Revolution, Spain contributed to Britain's demise. I've never put much stock in "long decline" assertions; it wasn't true in the case of the Romans, it wasn't true in the case of the Ottomans, and it damned well wasn't true in the case of Spain.

Something that has an impact on the war, especially one that has a major impact on a war, must be important. If an enemy is destroying your tanks you view that as important and seek to remove the threat. Equally deadly is if an opponent removes your supply chain, which is one of the effects of blockading.

If the United Kingdom had maintained its blockade without the formation of a European coalition to stop Napoleon and without successes in the Peninsular War against the French Army, blockade would not have crippled France. Both the British blockade and the French counter-blockading "Continental System" were repeatedly exploited by neutral and combatant shipping, and by 1811 both were intentionally exploited on the orders of both the French and British. Neither blockade proved cost-effective in the long-run and significant amounts of illegal trade went on throughout the course of the wars. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics is a fine introduction to much blockade/Continental System literature; Findlay and O'Rourke, Power and Plenty is practically indispensable.

Don't insinuate that someone knows nothing about naval history before you actually know them. It is quite an insult and I will thank you sir to remove it. Especially after your comments about how you disliked other people calling you ignorant

That aside, the blockade of the French navy was exceptionally successful, their ability to put to sea was severely hampered, which in an age where you needed large numbers of ships to effectively hamper supply routes was a good thing. It also allowed Britain to retain a steady income off the confiscation of goods they did not want the French to receive. It also ensured that the French had little training at sea while our own ships despite being "storm-wracked" gained exceptional experience which in turn allowed them to defeat a numerically superior foe at the battle of Trafalgar

Finally, two or three events do not win a war, mainly because those events in turn are created by smaller events. It is like a ripple, the loss of one battle affects this point, which affects that point, which affects the country. This is why a string of defeats often leads to what seems like an unusually quick collapse of an otherwise still strong force.

Oh, so you are British. That's interesting.

The blockade did not "hamper the French ability to put to sea"; naval victories and the slow speed of French ship construction did that. It has been projected that by 1813-4 or so the French navy would have been ready to take on the British, had they maintained current rates of building from 1806-7. What intervened was the Peninsular War and then the Austrian imbroglio, both of which sucked funds away from shipbuilding, and even then France maintained ship construction at an alarming rate. private_hudson, one of your countrymen who at least used to frequent these forums, has discussed this at some length.

Hand-waving about "everything has SOME effect" and "ripples" still don't indicate to me that the British blockade produced any noticeable impact on the ability of the French army to fight and win during the Napoleonic wars. What destroyed the French army was the Allied coalitions and their armies. It took three years of hard fighting that spanned the length of Europe, not to mention the sizable Anglo-Hispano-Portuguese effort in the Iberian Peninsula, to destroy France's army and enter France. This does not speak for the efficacy of the blockade.

A blockade doesn't just keep things from going in. It keeps things from coming out. The inability to invade Great Britain was due to the close blockade in all weather conditions. Napoleon was quoted I believe for saying that all he needed was one day without the Royal Navy in the channel.
As for its impact in the French conduct of wars in Europe, well we were able to support the coalition at the battle of water loo. Kind of a big contribution no? Not to mention the moral impact on the French and British populace.
Raw materials were also confiscated, you know gun powder, weapons, the things you needed to conduct a war in that time.

All of which were made in sufficient amounts to arm the 600,000-strong Grande Armée for the Russian campaign...good job Royal Navy?

Moral impact on the French populace was minimal; nobody thought seriously of overthrowing Napoleon after his defeat at Aspern-Essling, after the Russian disaster, or even after Leipzig. Napoleon was only overthrown after the Allies occupied Paris itself. His regime was never under serious internal threat after the murder of Cadoudal.

The blockade of an enemy port is a colossal war crime? Or do you mean ensuring that normal civilians cannot access food? Personally I don't see how thats any worse than burning raping and slaughtering people like in the dark ages, or gassing soldiers on the front line, or torpedoing a defensless passenger liner. Or sinking convoys so that the opposition also runs out of food.
All war is a crime. No war is pretty, we just pretended otherwise until the world wars when the media was around to ensure that people actually had to acknowledge the human suffering.

It was a war crime because it was a violation of the Hague Conventions that the British signed only a few years earlier. It was a war crime because it continued after the armistice of November 11, 1918 for political reasons, to force the Germans to sign the Treaty of Versailles while forcing them to give up any chance of responding to it militarily. Your moral attitude towards the deliberate starvation of the population of a state with which you are at peace, even if it is adopted only to maintain some kind of opposition to me, is frankly sickening.

You can't set up a blockade without the ability to project power.

That is correct. You can project power without being able to set up an effective blockade, however. Power projection, especially modern power projection, is irrelevant to my argument on premodern blockades and naval power.

A blockade is not restricted to restricting money or supplies. It is an act that prevents one from putting resource to sea or receiving resource. While you are right in that the Greek city-state did not blockade the Persians as such, they did prevent them from landing an insane amount of troops. Actions like this probably lead to the concept of the blockade... "Hey, those troops didn't get to land and it made a huge difference. How about next time we just try and bunch them right in so they can't get out."

Additionally resource in war is not just material or revenue. It is of course food and people as well.

The allied Greek fleets did not cut the Achaemenids off from any resources by blockading them. Naval power in the Greco-Persian War was indeed a critical and important factor, but it was not through resource deprivation or the severing of revenues. What the Greeks - chiefly the Athenians - managed to do with their fleet was first destroy the Persian military's offensive capability to outflank the Isthmian Lines at the Battle of Salamis, then score an easy victory by catching the rest of the Aegean fleet unaware at Mykale; neither of these involved blockade. The Athenian fleets, in the later prosecution of the war, successfully permitted amphibious assaults on Ionian cities, adding them to the Athenian Empire, and supported a major rebellion in Persian Egypt. Neither of those involved blockade. A blockade of all of the Achaemenid coastline on the Mediterranean was impractical, impracticable, and counterproductive, as it would force the Athenians to disperse their fleet beyond any reasonable possibility of massing it against any Persian battle-fleet.

Again you are wrong, that wooden wall stopped Napoleon invading. It did so by blocking his troops from leaving port... I would consider that, as many would I'm sure, a blockade. As such we were able to gain revenue from the illegal (in our sense of the word) trade with France, build up an army and defend our coast. Meanwhile while it is all looking good for us the French are busy elsewhere, however when it came down to it they found it difficult to move serious amounts of trade/troops/supplies to anywhere.

In actual fact, a ship now a days is much harder to put on sustained deployment than back then. For a modern fighting ship to retain combat effectiveness as a stable weapons platform it must contain 60% or more of it's fuel load. The fuel is calculated as ballast as an attempt to make our ships as "efficient" as possible. Below that fuel level the ship will begin to suffer from accuracy and sea keeping problems.
Additionally it must constantly be refuelled and the technological side of it means that taking supplies is much more difficult.

A sail ship on the other hand can move as long as it has wind, resupplying it was considerably easier from a food and water point of view and more often than not after a battle it could replace ammunition with that from a captured ship if absolutely needs be. Obviously a lack of fridges and electricity made it slightly more difficult.

Preventing the French from invading the United Kingdom did not win the wars. It did not even prevent the French from winning the wars. Considered ceteris paribus, a state of being in which France controlled western Europe and Britain retained a blockade would mean that the two states were roughly in equilibrium, diplomatically. The British had occupied several (but not all) French colonies; the French had occupied British Hannover. They were essentially at an impasse, which the negotiations in 1808 demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt. Even with the impact of the Peninsular War, the gradual lessening of both blockade and Continental System by 1811-12 argues that, ceteris paribus, the French and British would both cease their blockades within a few years.

Well, that was an interesting response from Dachs. He's certainly bringing out a lot of historical examples, which, I gratefull concede, at least indicates that he's studied/read a lot. So well done there.

As the Punic Wars... It would appear that Hannibal's march through the Alps, losing all his War elephants and half his troops, was a direct reaction to not having transport and food capacity to make a landing onto Italy.

Hannibal probably did that more to pick up Gallic mercenaries than to avoid the Roman navy. By the time he reached Placentia in 218 BC, his army had been significantly bolstered by the presence of mercenaries he'd hired along the way from Saguntum.

I think you're being a bit formalistic on the term "blockade" and a bit too dismissive of coastal actions world-wide. But, if you think navies are of little importance, and you're decently well-read on certain periods of history, then any quick examples I give now aren't going to dissuade you.

I do not think that navies are of little importance. I think that blockades, for most of human history, are not effective.

A blockade is a relatively inefficient means of waging war upon another nation, especially before the 19th and 20th centuries. From your replies these are the dates for the first successful blockades being implemented, though you still hold that it is an inefficient way of waging war.

This is incomprehensible. I do not think that blockades are an inefficient way of waging modern war. I am of the opinion that the British blockade of Germany in the First World War won the war practically by itself. I argue that blockades are not efficient before that. Please stop consistently misinterpreting what I say. It's almost as though it's intentional.

Although only wikipedia, this definition for blockade fits the bill. It also agrees well with these dictionary definitions here and here.

So from this we can establish that a blockade is not just a restriction of trade and revenue from overseas into your ports. War material and communications are included in this and your troops are most certainly a part of the war material.

Matériel has in fact a quite specific definition that does not include troops; it is chiefly used for equipment. Men and matériel is what you say when you mean...men and matériel. Transportation of troops for an amphibious invasion is not defended against by a blockade. It is a simple question of concentration of force. Blockades inherently necessitate dispersal of one's fleet. An invasion fleet and accompanying battle fleet would concentrate at a point where it would be possible to protect that invasion fleet during its crossing. A blockading fleet would thus be defeated in detail, as it would be unable to mass sufficient numbers to repel an invasion fleet. It is the same case on land; Napoleon famously derided a plan to disperse troops about the frontier of France, guarding every possible weak spot, as a plan for "stopping smuggling" because it attempted to be strong everywhere, and thus was strong nowhere.

Additionally a blockade is governed primarily by your ability to restrict the enemies movements NOT by how close your ships are to port, or were they are positioned. While some people may call this "raiding" the fact of the matter remains that if your actions on an enemies maritime cause them to be unable to access their ports then they are under an effective blockade.

Um, right. That's not how the British blockade of Napoleon's fleet worked. Not sure what relevance this has.

For example, you argue that I have not provided in depth examples of how the blockade had any effect on the French before the Treaty of Amiens, or indeed afterwards. Well to quote directly from Mark Adkin's, The companion to Trafalgar
This is a clear indication that the French had suffered to the British blockade.

I argue that he said those things for rhetorical purposes. It is a simple fact that although the blockade had a clear economic impact on the French, it did not seriously damage their capacity to make war and did not have a recognizable impact on the course of the war. Fundamentally, blockade in the Napoleonic wars was not conducted to prevent states from importing raw materials or war matériel, because they did not acquire significant stores of these things abroad. Blockade was conducted to attempt to deprive enemies of specie gained through selling export goods. The problem was that, overall, the French economy did not rely on exports for revenue, and the French government was not funded through trade surpluses. Any shortfalls that might theoretically have been seen were easily made up by Napoleon's "land piracy" on the Continent, and his levies from defeated allies that the British failed to aid militarily. An assertion that the French were materially deprived of warmaking supplies by the blockade thus seems out of place, and I would tend to ignore Adkins' statement here as rhetorical flourish more than anything else.

An overall view of the economic point of blockade during the Napoleonic Wars is easily found in Findlay and O'Rourke (2007), p. 366-368.

Not only that but in the same section of his book "Section one, The campaign Europe in early 1805" he goes on to explain the the French had lost several naval battles (1794, 1797, 1798 and 1801) that resulted in them being unable to retain the Caribbean islands. Additionally the British naval supremacy was undoubtedly a massive aid in the victory in Egypt. Only through the Treaty did the French regain these assets.

This isn't about blockade. Please attempt to restrict your argument to points I have made.

This is further reinforced, again by Mark Adkin's when he explains how much of the captured French military supplies and war stores where sold off by the British prime minister Henry Addington. To quote him directly again.


This hammers home an additionally important matter concerning the blockade, it is as a tool of naval warfare exceptionally important in denying an enemy access to his home ports. They must then resupply else where or risk being trapped at home and unable to act in naval warfare. "A ship in port is safe, but that is not what ships are made for." Very true words.

So the blockade, clearly had had an effect on the French military arm. Furthermore it had ensured that proper deployment of large quantities of troops was not possible, or if it did occur as in Egypt was likely to end up with a chain of supply liable to being cut at any given moment.

Trained British seamen did not defeat Napoleon, unless there were a few divisions' worth at the Battle of Leipzig that nobody noticed. That is all well and good for the purposes of the Royal Navy's personal upkeep and training. It has nothing to do with efficacy of blockade against a land enemy that does not rely on overseas trade for either money or resources.

A book, well worth a read by the way, that clearly illustrates not only effective blockades but also the need for a strong Navy if you have global aspirations is "To rule the waves" by Arthur Herman. An example of how dangerous a blockade could be is referenced in the 1739 action of the Second Battle of Finisterre, this battle mainly established Edward Hawke his place in history for his innovations in a flexible line of battle. However the battle was a result of the French fleet trying to break a blockade established by the Royal Navy. That is to say

France and Britain were not at war in 1739. The Second Battle of Cabo Fisterra (also styled the Battle of Ouessant, 1747) was well and good for the British in terms of a concrete military victory against the French navy. It did allow the British to seize a sizable prize in the form of the convoy that the French were attempting to get into Brest. Its chief worth as a bargaining chip at the negotiations at Aachen was, however, in its demonstration that the Royal Navy had basically shredded the French fleet. It was not the blockade that did this. Blockade's economic impacts on France were negligible at best in the War of the Austrian Succession. The Royal Navy destroyed most of the French fleet by bringing it to battle and defeating it. Taking the convoy was almost an afterthought.

In concrete terms at the peace of Aachen, in any event, neither of Hawke's victories turned out to be particularly useful, as the British essentially traded their New World conquests in Acadia for France's conquests in the Austrian Netherlands.

A useful work as regards the War of the Austrian Succession is Browning (1993). He even gives a fair shake to the naval war, you Brits would love that. The description of Fontenoy is not so flattering, but hey, if you're commanded by idiots, you're probably going to lose no matter whether you're crummy British soldiers or good Prussian ones.

The French as can be seen by documented evidence are trying to break out of a blockade established almost 50 years before the 19th Century. In fact we go on to find out



This was obviously a time when the French were also trying to aid Prince Charlie in his rebellions and the blockade is once again proving it's worth in protect Britain from falling. Though in this case it was a situation of civil unrest, however the fact remains that the blockade was ensuring that French troops could not properly aid Prince Charlie. This is a tangent to the main point though, that the British blockade at sea ensured that they were able to gain superiority in the Indian Ocean and even begin to be effective in the west Indies.

Your geopolitical assessment is nonsense. The "Forty-five" was long over by the time Hawke scored his victories in 1747. Neither victory seriously hampered a French invasion of Great Britain, as after 1745 none was seriously planned in favor of a concentration on the Netherlands and Italy. (Which paid considerable dividends. Those blockading British ships sure did a lot to prevent the pro-French Genoese Revolution, didn't they? Oh, wait. Well, at least they stopped Maurice de Saxe from capturing Maastricht! They didn't?? No way!) As earlier noted, a blockade is a barrier to trade, not an invasion.

I think here, I can provide finally a hard piece of fact that you will struggle to refute. This is a documented example of an incident almost half a century before the 19th century showing how important overseas trade had already become. The peace signed in 1748 at Aix-La-Chapelle quickly established that the Spannish had lost all economic power because of the British blockades and naval actions. The Dutch were kicked out of the running. The French had to spend a decade rebuilding before they could declare war while the British used that time to expand.

Funny, the Spanish were the ones who really won the Peace of Aachen. Since they, you know, got what they wanted in Italy, and everything. And they stopped the British attacks on their colonial empire decisively, starting with the utter British disaster at Cartagena in 1741. I guess that's what happens when you attempt to generalize based on a few specific books.

 

[Dachs]

So, in conclusion I believe that with a quick look through both Arthur Herman's and Mark Adkin's books I have demonstrated that not only was trade already an established and vitally important concept to the nations of Europe before the 19th century. But also that a naval blockade had in two wars before 1805 against France proven to be the one thing that stopped Britain from being defeated at the hands of a French invasion and ALSO pushed the French to the point of economic breakdown so that they had no choice but to draw up a peace treaty.

That is before establishing the effectiveness of a blockade in ensuring superiority at Sea so you can have freedom to move your naval assets how you wish.

I'm in the middle of my physics exams at uni, so sorry if this is a little fragmented. I will continue to address the issues you raised when I have time.

That said, I will concede that a blockade was not an effective way of waging war before the 17th century. However this is only because I have little knowledge of Naval warfare before the 17th century.

As to a list of the books I have read and studied,
To rule the Waves, Arthur Herman
Trafalgar, Roy Adkins
Battle of Trafalgar, Nicholas Best
The war at Sea, 1939-1945 Stuart Robertson, Stephen Dent
Safeguarding the Nation, The story of the Modern Royal Navy, John Roberts
The Trafalgar Companion, Mark Adkin
Through Fire and Water, HMS Ardent the forgotten frigate of the Falklans, Mark Higgitt
Battle A visual Journey through 5,000 years of Combat, R.G Grant
History the Definitive guide Adam Hart Davis
The times complete History of the world, Richard Overy
Nelson, A dream of glory John Sudgen,
The Rules of the game, Jutland and British Naval Command, Andrew Gordon
Dreadnought, Britain, Germany and the coming of the great war, Robert K Massie
The War for all the Oceans, Roy Adkins
Cochrane the Dauntless, the life and the adventure, David Cordingly
The Falklands War, The full story, Sunday Times
One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander,Sandy Woodward, Patrick Robinson

Now, your all being considerably rude here... Except for Dachs, I would ask that those who reply with "Read some history articles" to perhaps suggest some articles for me to read. I have not, up until now, been impolite or rude or nasty. However jumping on the band wagon with someone who obviously has historical knowledge (even if I disagree with some of his assessments) and going "read articles" is pretty sad. At least attempt to provide me like Dach and his companion with examples or links to were I can go.

I do not think that you have done any such "proof", to be entirely honest. The simple fact of the matter is that economically, blockade did not affect any enemies, certainly not France, badly enough to sue for peace. Trade just wasn't that big a part of state revenues at the time, and it would only change later in the 19th century with the drastic decline in transport costs that spurred general market integration and the celebrated "grain invasion". A blockade to deprive states of revenue would only work with very specific entities before the late 19th century, such as a merchant republic (i.e. Venice or the United Provinces) or a similar thalassocracy, like Srivijaya. And total deprivation of revenues from such a thing was highly unlikely, at that, since blockade was a relatively inefficient approach before the late 19th century, though sheer proliferation in ship numbers certainly helped make it more effective during the 18th. Arms manufacture, especially for the large European combatants like France or Great Britain or Prussia, was also chiefly a native industry, and would not be seriously affected by a blockade of ports.

It's a simple fact that if a state relies on land-taxes for 90% of its revenue, you cannot put much of a dent in revenue by blocking naval trade.

I am not saying that blockade would not make an impact on states before the late 19th century. I am saying that the impact would be negligible to the states' abilities to make war.

The Royal Navy blockade of France is actually somewhat instructive in this regard. France was not "economically crippled" by the Royal Navy blockade. Napoleon's Empire was only defeated after it suffered debilitating military losses on the Continent, which were not caused by economic hardship or an inability to supply troops. It is true that economic sectors close to France's maritime periphery, such as ichthyoculture and (to a much larger degree) shipbuilding, suffered something of a decline in the 11 years of constant blockade inaugurated in 1803. But this was more than compensated by a relative improvement in French sectors in the interior, away from the coast, which if anything boomed during the war years. So both in terms of sheer output and in terms of state revenues to supply military forces, France was not seriously impaired by blockade. And that's ignoring the often previously mentioned fact that by 1812 both the Royal Navy blockade and (to a greater degree) the Continental System were breaking down. Illegal trade already went on; it was merely accelerated in those years.

In the Napoleanic Wars, the only way Britain survived to eventually defeat the French was through its Navy. This is not disputable, is it?

The war was not a contest between Britain and France. Even so, yes, the chief reason the United Kingdom was unconquered was the Royal Navy. Not that it could have been defeated even if Napoleon got to Great Britain anyway, but that's a whole other can of worms.

Its economic power stemmed from its Global trade, particularly with Egypt and India. Without the money it generated from global trade, it could not have had the financial muscle to continue the war for over a decade.

This is incorrect. Napoleon believed that that was true, but in fact Britain made up a great deal of the economic hardship incurred from loss of trade by continental borrowing from Europe (!) - see Neal (1990). Trade surpluses were not inherently necessary even for the British war effort.

However, the clear and obvious strategic effect of Naval forces was the English ability to set up a front in Portugal and Spain. Not only were they physically able to transfer the troops when they wished, but they could reinforce them as well. The decisiveness of the French defeat at Trafalgar was quickly followed up the landing in Portugal. Cause and effect.

And I agree that the Royal Navy proved to be a decisive aid in permitting the Peninsular War to be made that much worse for the French. That was not an issue of blockade. I have consistently avoided painting fleet actions and navies as "unimportant" in grand-strategic terms. I do not believe that navies are unimportant. I do believe that the British blockade of Europe was not effective in damaging Napoleon's ability to make war, his finances, his arms, his resources, his population's will, any of that.

Also, Dachs refutes Span's "collapse" as a European power by saying it had nothing to with naval weaknesses. I'd politely suggest the work of Henry Kamen. I'll link a quick review, but read the book. I attended a conference with Kamen on empire back while studying at Duke.

http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-e...he-modern-world-by-niall-ferguson-601565.html

Kamen's point is that Spain's financial benefit from all the New World silver and gold was quite minimal, precisely because it depended on other nations to bring that treasure back. Accordingly, everyone else benefited by absconding with the treasures as well. It was like the drug trade, where everyone's taking a cut before any of it gets back to Spain. Had Spain invested its monies not in a massive European land army, or frightfully expensive and massively misguided Armada to attack Britain, but instead invested in a legitimate naval fleet with which to guard its New World Assets and acquire naval dominance in the New World, then Spain's modern history would be very, very different. Spain eventually remained a very rural, agrarian state... financially poor compared to the economic might of Britain and France, two nations who continued to develop economic trade (and naval forces) in the New World.

This, of course, ignores the very concrete fact that the Spanish were not in terminal decline in the 18th century in geopolitical terms. Look at the War for the Polish Throne in the 1730s - Spain basically conquered the southern half of Italy. Look at the War of Austrian Succession in the 1740s - Spain conquered principalities in the northern part, as well. Almost the entire peninsula essentially remained dominated by Spain until the end of the century. Look at Spanish performance against the British in the 1780s, as part of the American Revolutionary War. Spanish revival in geopolitical terms in the 18th century is a cold, hard, fact. And it argues against any sort of long-term decline in Spanish fortunes - you can only fob off victories as "temporarily stopping the decline" before something stops to look like a decline.

Concrete discussion of the reasons why Spain lost its American empire can be found in Black (2009), which discusses basically what I said about Spain's inability to manage elites and the damage wrought by the Napoleonic Wars. It also includes an excellent guide to secondary literature on the topic.

As to ancient times:


The examples of Salamis, Hannibal's inability to travel from Spain by sea, and other episodes show the value of sea power... but obviously land battles must be fought. Hence, Hannibal crushed the Romans for a time, naval inferiority or not. Likewise, had the Persians won at Platea, their naval defeat could have been absorbed.

I would like you to stop painting me as somebody who does not acknowledge the power of naval might. I have an appreciation for sea power, trust me. I argue instead that blockades were not militarily or economically effective before the late 19th century.

As to economic raiding and blockades:

Obviously, no one can ENTIRELY shut off an economy via a blockade. Whether in ancient or modern times. Land trade will increase, and blockade runners will usually be too numerous to stop. But that does not mean that the effect is not noticeable and pronounced. For massive land powers, the effect of blockade is obviously less effective, however. Hence, British blockading of the Colonies or the French is only so effective, by definition.

This is my point - you could even ignore "land trade", but the sheer fact that the overwhelming majority of states before the 19th century did not depend on overseas sources for raw materials, war supplies, or income. Cutting off those sources inherently does not deprive states of a damaging amount of money.

Taken in context, however, naval power can be an effective advantage. The controller of such power often decided a war, but not always.

In regards to Civ, at the moment, a player can win at any level with ZERO navy whatsoever (just watch themeinteam). But in real life, that would be exceptionally difficult. Not impossible, but the effects of commerce raiding and the threat of naval invastion mattered.

In civilization, the "barbarian" naval threat is limited to the galleys, but if the game allowed "barbarians" to come out of the dark with longships and powerful units, it'd be a serious drain on anyone's economy. They would pillage the cottages and towns, severely damaging a tech race and its commerce. Also, they would force the human player to maintain lots of military units spread around their whole territory... which would be expensive and also be a hinderance in a tech race. You'd struggle to develop as a civilization, unless you were truly massive, if you were suffering from constant sea commerce raids and outright naval attacks to pillage your profitable coastlines.

This echoes the reality of Dark Ages Europe. I refer again to the Viking example: One reason the "dark ages" were dark, is that as European kingdoms were again split up, there was no one to stop the Vikings from picking off weak targets and invading weak areas. Which is why the Danes invaded and nearly conquered England, occupied parts of France, and raided thousands of miles away. This caused a massive economic drain on the region.

Had a naval threat existed to prevent such destruction, the history of Europe would have been far different. Europe would have gotten richer, sooner, and it would not have suffered such an intellectual and economic disparity compared with the far richer and more powerful Arabic, Middle Eastern, and Asian empires.

The impact of navies and commerce raiding has been often definitive in history, but with the geopgraphical caveat the huge land empires could sometimes compensate for a lack of sea power... but not always.

You are not reading my posts with a vengeance.

Let me say it again: I do not think that sea power is not and has not been important. I acknowledge the importance of sea power upon history. I even suggested in my second post that using fleets to raid would be a more productive use of them than blockade would be!

His articles on the classical era notwithstanding, I think Dachs is far off base with his commentary on Spain. His point is on the lack of a strong central leadership, but that stems from a lack of strong commerce... which, as I've said above, was linked entirely to its inability to develop seapower and which has made it a bit player in European conflicts ever since.

Commerce is not inherent to the development of strong central leadership - look at Prussia. What destroyed Spain's ability to manage elites in the Empire was the Napoleonic invasion, its devastation (both legitimate kings of Spain were in French captivity), and the aftermath. Spain's own revolution in 1820-1 hurt things that much worse. It's impossible to effectively conciliate people to an empire's reign if that empire is fully occupied with violent events in the metropole, it's just a fact.

Given his articles in the classical era, I find this statement even more puzzling. His point about blockades in the ancient world is one thing, but to overlook one of the principle reasons why Greece withstood Persia's invasion (The Themistocles-inspired naval build-up and subsequent tactical victory at the bottleneck at Salamis), is all the more shocking.

The Hannibal example in the Second Punic War is also on point. He lost 50% of his forces entering Italy, because of Rome's Naval superiority... and Carthage ultimately fell to Rome, and got annihilated, because it couldn't maintain its seapower. Carthage only emerged as a rival to Rome because of its realtive seapower and commercial trade. When Rome negated it that, Carthage ceased to exist.

This is frustrating. Do you intentionally not read my posts? Have you decided that it's easier to argue against a Dachs who thinks that sea power doesn't matter, instead of the real Dachs who acknowledges the importance of sea power but who thinks that blockades aren't particularly useful before the late 19th century? I bolded the bits that are extra confusing to me because I have discussed them in particular.

, Yared, Dachs' dismissal of my Viking example as being "merely Northern European," and then say that the mediterrean did well in withstanding the Norsemen (i.e. 3,000 coastal miles away from any Viking bases), is likewise not impressive. Again, I expanded on this reality above.

This is selective reading of what I have said, and I do not appreciate it. I do not think that Viking sea power was ineffective. I do not think that they only had an impact in northern Europe. I merely pointed out a counterexample to the "lolvikings rool teh wavezzz" stuff that you were saying. I am perfectly aware of Northern European countermeasures to the Vikings, Viking activities outside Northern Europe, e.g. Hautevilles in Italy and Sicily, and so forth.

Though I do feel we are all arguing in a circular manner, so far as I can see they are not denying the effectiveness of the Navy, just pointing out that it does have limitations (which it does) and that a blockade is not an effective use of it.

Thank God...just add in some of the caveats that I mentioned earlier and we might actually be set here.

With all that in mind, you both need a good dose of Power and Plenty (Findlay and O'Rourke, 2007), which should give you a good grounding in economic history and its relation to military power. They prominently discuss the late 19th century decline in transport costs and its effects on world trade, and in their section on the First World War explain why the Royal Navy blockade of 1914-1919 was one of the first really effective ones in history. The poor man's Power and Plenty is The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (Kennedy, 1987), which should only be consulted if you can't get hold of the former. On the specifics of the Continental System, a lot of good secondary literature is synthesized in the overview given in The Transformation of European Politics (Schroeder, 1994), who also provides frankly the best discussion of Napoleon and his methods ever. On the nature of conflict in the 19th century, specifically on the military conflicts in Spain's colonies during and after the Napoleonic Wars, War in the Nineteenth Century (Black, 2009) is superlative, if short; his work has the singular merit of not approaching warfare as a teleological matter with the end point at the First World War, and provides a very good overview of both secondary literature and general histories on the subject.

 

[Nicolas10]

Dachs, your post is heartening.

One of the most amusing parts was that you quoted nearly every line in my last post... except my last one . Namely that this whole conversation, at least on my end, comes from jumping in after you wrote 1) Navies had massive practical limitations in real life, and 2) Most pre-Industrial era naval exertions of power was uneven.

Now, from your most recent post, your perspective, in response to me at least, was detailed in its acknowleding of naval power and its importance. Also, you seemed perplexed as to why I would be critical of your views on the effective importance of naval power. If your last response is the best representation of your views, then we are in greater agreement then before, and my confusion likely stems from different emphases in different posts.

As to our deeper disagreements, such as Spain and the like, those are too nuanced to delve into here. We've read and studied under different scholars, apparently, with different conclusions.

And I thank you for your reading suggestions. I have met and conversed with Jeremy Black, and generally like his works very much. Small quibbles here and there on larger issues.

However, I thank you for the suggestion for Power and Plenty, which I have not read. I'm curious to read their conclusions, and hopefully I can spend some time with it sometime this summer.

 

[Masada]

Nobody dealt with my post

Kamen's point is that Spain's financial benefit from all the New World silver and gold was quite minimal, precisely because it depended on other nations to bring that treasure back. Accordingly, everyone else benefited by absconding with the treasures as well. It was like the drug trade, where everyone's taking a cut before any of it gets back to Spain.

That's a really bad analogy for a number of reasons. Suffice to say that middlemen have always been intergral to trade of that magnitude. We also know that the infusion of New World silver had a substantial impact of prices and the moneterization of the world economy. So, it kind of follows that if the effects were confined then we would expect to see substantial economic disclocation. But whatever, lets suspend the laws of economics for the benefit of a good narrative because money totally doesn't chase the best returns...

Had Spain invested its monies not in a massive European land army, or frightfully expensive and massively misguided Armada to attack Britain, but instead invested in a legitimate naval fleet with which to guard its New World Assets and acquire naval dominance in the New World, then Spain's modern history would be very, very different. Spain eventually remained a very rural, agrarian state... financially poor compared to the economic might of Britain and France, two nations who continued to develop economic trade (and naval forces) in the New World.

With the benefit of a few hundreds years of hindsight that might have been possible even if it requires perfect hindsight and the benefits of fairly recent works of economic history. Its also kind of wrong relying on outdated works but whatever it suits the the preconceptions of the author.

Kamen argues that the Spanish empire was hardly worthy of the name since it was rotten to the core. It was based on dynastic alliances rather than national vigour, starting with the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile in 1469 and growing into an unwieldy European conglomerate under the Emperor Charles V.

Nationalism before Nationalism was even concieved of. I love ma' anarchronisms.

Spain had a small population and large debts.

Great, it wasn't really all that small to be honest and while it held significant levels of debts (sufficient to keep it at a state of semi-insolvency) the underlying fundimentals must have been good if it could, you know, continue to borrow...

It relied on Genoese bankers, German soldiers, Italian and Belgian sailors, Indian allies in the New World, Chinese traders in the Philippines.

Nationalism before nationalism. Besides, the English relied on Jews, Italians, Dutch and later Hugenots, in large part, for their banking sector. And, yet, nobody thinks to criticize England for that. Also, the VOC of all the successful institutions of Imperialism used Chinese traders so extensively it beggars belief. It even imported them for that purpose. I could go on but this is ridiculious.

The Spanish monarch could never control its far-flung territories or monopolise their wealth.

So, neither could anyone. Its a false standard. The article then goes on to dissect the supposition more fully.

Kamen makes his case incisively, but not altogether convincingly. If Spanish power was illusory, how did Pizarro and 260 countrymen capture Atahualpa, the ruler of Peru, in 1532, massacre 8,000 followers in two and a half hours, collect a king's ransom in treasure and behead the Inca empire? This was exceptional, Kamen asserts. The usual process was to exploit conflicts in the indigenous population, as Cortes did. When he stormed Tenochtitlan (the Aztec capital) in 1521, his army consisted of 900 Spaniards and 300,000 native warriors.

Nevertheless, this was a Spanish victory just as Plassey was a British one, even though most of Clive's troops were sepoys. The point is that both empires employed auxiliaries and ruled with the help of local élites. This did not mean they were impotent. Nor did the insubordination of their own men, and frequent frontier defeats, prove the Spanish empire a chimera. For the British empire was similarly afflicted.

 

[Nicolas10]

Masada,

Look, if you're going to rely on the review (rather then the book) from which to crtique Kamen's work, then I'm sorry I linked it.

Secondly, all you just did was make glib responses. Unhelpful.

Thirdly, it is massively apparent, then and now, that Spain did not develop strong technological prowess comared with its European rivals. Why is this? It's because it did not use its New World riches to invest in infrastructure. And because, as Dachs pointed out, the Spanish never really consolidated its European assets as well as other nations. And the Castille-Aragon rivalry went away slowly... there's a reason why there are two prominent languages in Spain still being spoken, Spanish and Catalan, which contrasts with France and England.

It's not merely "hindsight," to say that Spain did not invest and develop as a technologically sophisticated nation. I'm suprised you take such umbrage with my Spanish example, given you've given no counter-argument, i.e. an argument that says: "Yes, Spain used its New World riches to be super dominant and it declined as a power due to bad luck, rather than a lack of strong sea power."

 

[The_Reckoning]

I slightly disagree here. If you have a surplus of food, you can have more babies.

So, think of your food income as modeling the number of people who *don't* die of famine or malnutrition.

Since I made that post I've done work on the subject, you're both totally right.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition

I didn't realise this, but for much of human history the majority of people would live on a diet which borders starvation.

There's a lot of debate in the area as to why people stopped dying in industrialised countries around 1850 onwards, because at the same time as the quality and quantity of available food skyrocketing, a lot of massive medical advances were made.

I also think that Germ Theory of Disease should be a tech.

 

[Masada]

Look, if you're going to rely on the review (rather then the book) from which to crtique Kamen's work, then I'm sorry I linked it.

I also went by your words. I wasn't impressed either way.

Secondly, all you just did was make glib responses. Unhelpful.

I made some perceptive points. It required perfect hindsight and the benefits of modern economic literature to achieve the end-goal you described. Most of the short-comings of the Spanish economy were not readibly noticable nor discernable and could be papered over with the inflows from the New World which is apparently in this narrative what happened. And even then, economic history research is increasingly contesting the convention that Spains fundimental underlying economy was weak. The whole Mesta 'tradegy of the commons' things for instance is now thought to be highly over done. It used to be a central plank of the 'Spanish economy was terra-bad' arguement. Certainly, it was different, certainly, and didn't evolve into an industrial society but its hardly unique in that respect.

Thirdly, it is massively apparent, then and now, that Spain did not develop strong technological prowess comared with its European rivals. Why is this? It's because it did not use its New World riches to invest in infrastructure.

That's patently absurd. There's plenty to indicate why Spain proper never developed industrially and it has little to nothing to do with state spending on infrastructure. In-fact its entirely possible that the inflows of silver and gold were a major contributing cause via an acute and prolonged case of Dutch Disease. Besides, the supposition that infrastructure is neccessary for industrial development or technological prowess (whatever that means) isn't the case.

And because, as Dachs pointed out, the Spanish never really consolidated its European assets as well as other nations. And the Castille-Aragon rivalry went away slowly... there's a reason why there are two prominent languages in Spain still being spoken, Spanish and Catalan, which contrasts with France and England.

I'll tell that to all the Pre-Revolution Provençal speakers, then.

It's not merely "hindsight," to say that Spain did not invest and develop as a technologically sophisticated nation. I'm suprised you take such umbrage with my Spanish example, given you've given no counter-argument, i.e. an argument that says: "Yes, Spain used its New World riches to be super dominant and it declined as a power due to bad luck, rather than a lack of strong sea power."

You don't get the whole hindsight thing. Okay, I'll run you through it. To gain the benefits you articulated you require hindsight, right? You wouldn't look at the present day American economy and declare that your right with quite so much confidence now would you. So, lets work in the context of a Spanish decision maker circa. 1500. I'm looking at the economy of Spain, all I can see is torrents of gold rolling in, I don't actually know how strong the underlying economy is because like every other state of the period I have weak inefficienct institutions and no means of quantifying anything outside of the bunch of primarily indirect taxes I levy. I don't know anything about modern economics and the tangiable effects of the countries near constant insolvency and bankruptcies. I can guess and draw inferences from what I can see but that's about it. More often than not I'm wrong and badly so. The occassional perceptive policy maker/observer well they're so few and far between that they don't really matter. (The Spanish never got inflation or why it was so pervasive in Spain and policy was often the exact opposite of what you would expect to do now: spend more money hur hur). I also don't have a reliable means of comparing myself to anyone else either technologically or anything. The benefits of infrasturcture spending are unquantifiable and frankly, I don't know all that much about all the awesome stuff that could accrue to me in the future if I invest now. From this mass of uncertainty and what at the time was arcane knoweldge you expect the Spanish state to articulate a nation building scheme akin to I dunno like the lovving Marshall Plan or something. States don't conciously develop themselves or even articulate economically rational policies at this stage of history because the first isn't concievable really till Keynes, to be honest, and the second isn't even methodologically possible at this point. Developmetn historically is kind of a hit and miss parade of continual innovation. The benefits of hindsight might make us cringe at the policies of the past but ultimately they took what they thought was a rational course and sure they crashed and burned for doing it but at the time it seemed like a good idea with all the information on hand. People are not conciously stupid for the most part, misguided and wrong yes, stupid no.

 

[trickofthehand]

K interrupting penis measuring contest 1 more time.

@ Brutoni; I agree with you, however for the sake of Civ I was saying that it will have to be a bit 'unrealistic' and go with MC trumps BS. The reason is simply because in real life I doubt a BS will get the drop on a properly equipped MC. Without adding in fog of war, superior or inferior radar systems, radar jamming, etc... it'll just be simpler to say MC trumps BS even at the BS's firing range.

Though I would love for all those peripheries to be added to the game... but that's just me.

 

[Masada]

Its not a penis measuring contest. But whatever the case feel free to have a poke around our neck of the woods if you'd liike. You would be more than welcome. We seriously need more substantive historical debates with intelligent people.

 

[sophie]

@Masada, I never looked at NES seriously, but that looks very intriguing

 

[Masada]

DaNESII comes highly recommended for the (serious and discerning alternative) historically inclined person. But there's just about something to suit every taste. If you want to have a talk pop just put this address into your browser http://nes-chat.tk/ and select a nickname. The guys (including myself) on here are more than willing to assist you in any way.