History questions not worth their own thread III

[Quackers]

You might as well ask how important was Churchill, Roosevelt, or Hitler in the war effort.

If memory serves, Stalin made some disasterous mistakes early in the war when he insisted on having military command. Later, as the war went on, he shifted that responsibility to actualy military generals.
So to answer your question: Stalin was very important in the Soviet war effort.

Alright poorly worded question. Lets say how crucial was Stalin's leadership to the SU's success.

 

[spryllino]

Did the oligarchy of ancient Sparta maintain a state treasury (and, for that matter, a taxation system of any kind) in the middle of the fifth century BC, or did it not really have a need for one, given that, to make war, which is the main point of having a treasury, it relied on its own citizen soldiers and their serfs, and did not equip a serious state navy until the Peloponnesian War?

Equally, how did the Spartan state fund its navy when it did eventually acquire a sizable one?

 

[Karalysia]

...................................

 

[Terrance888]

It sold the rights of its Ionian Allies to the Persians.

EDIT: This would probably be DACHESPWNED, but AFAIK, Sparta didn't fiend a navy until the Peloponnese war when they used it to contain Athens. To do so, they made an agreement with Persia: the Ionian City States that Athens used to protect won't be protected by Sparta when/if she wins. So the persians paid the Spartans the silver for a fleet and took over Ionia.

 

[spryllino]

It sold the rights of its Ionian Allies to the Persians.

EDIT: This would probably be DACHESPWNED, but AFAIK, Sparta didn't fiend a navy until the Peloponnese war when they used it to contain Athens. To do so, they made an agreement with Persia: the Ionian City States that Athens used to protect won't be protected by Sparta when/if she wins. So the persians paid the Spartans the silver for a fleet and took over Ionia.

I know that. It doesn't answer the question, though, which is about before the existence of a sizable Spartan navy.

 

[Dachs]

Did the oligarchy of ancient Sparta maintain a state treasury (and, for that matter, a taxation system of any kind) in the middle of the fifth century BC, or did it not really have a need for one, given that, to make war, which is the main point of having a treasury, it relied on its own citizen soldiers and their serfs, and did not equip a serious state navy until the Peloponnesian War?

Equally, how did the Spartan state fund its navy when it did eventually acquire a sizable one?

Everything I've ever seen about the early Spartan state has indicated that it had either a very small (in terms of value, at least) treasury or a nonexistent one, and did not seriously employ monetary levies. The buildings required to store a treasury of any appreciable monetary value when employing iron coinage would be...uh...prohibitive, to say the least. They didn't maintain a facility at Delphoi like most of the other poleis of import, either.

Sparta itself never maintained or supported a "sizable navy" in a meaningful sense, even during the hegemony, as already noted, but if the Spartans did have to disburse funds for the use of "allied" ships, I would imagine that they would not use their own currency, because nobody else wanted anything to do with it. Sparta acquired a fair amount of legit cash in the form of Attic talents and other hard currency from the campaigns in Aegean after 413 (admittedly, this comes secondhand from Grote because I have no alternative at the moment and suck at classics ) and they may have used this money, but that still gives us a chicken-and-egg problem and I don't know if anybody's resolved it yet.

Hope that helps; it probably doesn't.

 

[civ_king]

Everything I've ever seen about the early Spartan state has indicated that it had either a very small (in terms of value, at least) treasury or a nonexistent one, and did not seriously employ monetary levies. The buildings required to store a treasury of any appreciable monetary value when employing iron coinage would be...uh...prohibitive, to say the least. They didn't maintain a facility at Delphoi like most of the other poleis of import, either.

Sparta itself never maintained or supported a "sizable navy" in a meaningful sense, even during the hegemony, as already noted, but if the Spartans did have to disburse funds for the use of "allied" ships, I would imagine that they would not use their own currency, because nobody else wanted anything to do with it. Sparta acquired a fair amount of legit cash in the form of Attic talents and other hard currency from the campaigns in Aegean after 413 (admittedly, this comes secondhand from Grote because I have no alternative at the moment and suck at classics ) and they may have used this money, but that still gives us a chicken-and-egg problem and I don't know if anybody's resolved it yet.

Hope that helps; it probably doesn't.

WTFH, Why did they use iron coinage

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

It would only be worth something to them, not to anyone else. Lycurgus supposedly banned gold and silver. Iron was also one of the few things Laconia had in abundance.

 

[r16]

re Stalin . He quickly learned wars are too large , far too large , for one man to command .

for Spartans , ı didn't watch 300 in its entirity but ı believe there is a traitor in the parliament and gold coins are found on his body . Is that why nobody cared for his revenge afterwards ?

 

[ParkCungHee]

Why was it Italy didn't consider the Pro-Central Powers option more seriously.
Irredentist claims on France were much wider (Corsica, Nice, Tunisia) and much more strongly based.
It seems to me that Britain was the only really decisive factor, but everyone talks about Italy not backing the Central Powers in the war as a done deal by 1914. Or is all of that overblown?

 

[LightSpectra]

The Entente bribed Italy with promises of huge victory concessions (that never came to fruition, which is what caused the collapse of the liberal government and the rise of the fascists).

Also a huge factor was simply the view that the Entente had a much bigger chance of winning the war. Germany and Austria-Hungary were relatively puny compared to the British and Russian empires.

 

[Masada]

I'm not sure if it was that simple. The Italians seem to have made the call only after it became clear that a swift German victory was unlikely. Up until that point, it was all up in the air. The Entente might have been larger on paper with far more men and munitions but that wouldn't have helped them all that much if Paris had fallen.

 

[spryllino]

Dachs: Thanks; how do you suppose they would have dealt with logistics on long campaigns without much money? For instance, take Brasidas's campaign to Thrace; surely they took a fair amount of provisions with them: how do you think they would have paid for them? Individual contributions from the various Spartan aristocrats?

 

[say1988]

There is a link to a very nice comparison of American and Japanese navies and ship production that I have seen around here a few times, including comparisons of the fleets if Midway (I believe is the battle) had went in Japanese favour. I can't seem to find it googling, does anyone happen to have it on hand?

 

[Dachs]

Why was it Italy didn't consider the Pro-Central Powers option more seriously.
Irredentist claims on France were much wider (Corsica, Nice, Tunisia) and much more strongly based.
It seems to me that Britain was the only really decisive factor, but everyone talks about Italy not backing the Central Powers in the war as a done deal by 1914. Or is all of that overblown?

The short answer is that yes, it is overblown.

During the course of most of the year of 1914, the chief of the Italian general staff, Alberto Pollio, periodically gave assurances to Austria-Hungary and Germany that he would have troops (the Italian Third Army) entrained to Alsace within four weeks of the start of mobilization. Pollio died of stomach problems on 1 July, and Vittorio Emanuele, with the kind of take-charge enthusiasm that was his hallmark, took 26 days to appoint a successor. This left Italian military policy confused and adrift during the July Crisis. When Luigi Cadorna finally got into office, he too affirmed Pollio's promises to Italy's Triple Alliance partners, and put pressure on the prime minister, Antonio Salandra, to enter the war, just like Moltke was pressuring Bethmann-Hollweg at the same time.

Cadorna, however, hadn't been in office long enough to have pull with anybody but the military and the king, and the army was hardly ready for a full-scale war either. He ran up against the opposition of Antonio di San Giuliano, the foreign minister and an avowed disciple of sacro egoismo. Di San Giuliano wanted to wait it out and see which way the wind was blowing, the position usually ascribed to the entire Italian government by lazy people. His arguments in cabinet were bolstered by Dino Grandi, the war minister, who confirmed that Italy's army was short several hundred thousand uniforms and over ten thousand officers, and was not in a state to go to war (although the navy was). Cadorna kept pursuing other options, and managed to convince the king to approve the shipment of three army corps to Alsace on the very same day that the cabinet made its decision for neutrality public. Once the Battle of the Marne occurred, the Italian government was confirmed in its fence-sitting and simply waited for the highest bid.

I'm not sure if it was that simple. The Italians seem to have made the call only after it became clear that a swift German victory was unlikely. Up until that point, it was all up in the air. The Entente might have been larger on paper with far more men and munitions but that wouldn't have helped them all that much if Paris had fallen.

Very much so.

Dachs: Thanks; how do you suppose they would have dealt with logistics on long campaigns without much money? For instance, take Brasidas's campaign to Thrace; surely they took a fair amount of provisions with them: how do you think they would have paid for them? Individual contributions from the various Spartan aristocrats?

Well, one of the primary functions of money in a logistical sense is to pay your troops, which was obviously unnecessary. Food could be seized from local farmers or transported by helots (I would imagine the former, since the Spartan army was never that large until the time of Kleomenes III). The state obviously had access to large amounts of foodstuffs (because otherwise the communal mess would make no sense), perhaps by taxation in kind or by produce from state land. Interesting questions. I imagine Paul Cartledge has something to say about all of them.

 

[spryllino]

Thanks.

 

[Leoreth]

Currently I'm interested in the scientific advances during the Roman era. While there are dozens of prominent Greek nature philosophers etc. which have well known ideas attributed to them, the Romans (and for that, their contemporary Greeks, i.e. post-Hellenistic period) seem to lack that. Sure, there were advances in military technology, but its famous thinkers seemed to concern themselves more with politics and history rather than natural sciences (other than commenting on works of their Greek predecessors).

So my question is this: Did scientific advance slow down during the Roman Empire's time, or is it just my ill-informed perception?

If yes, what were the reasons for it? If no, what am I neglecting?

 

[Dachs]

Define "scientific advance". The stereotype is that it did, and there are many bad historians and Internet posters who have advanced reasons for this based on some kind of Roman cultural explanation.

 

[Leoreth]

Well, the Greeks have some serious insights into geometry, basic algebra and astronomy to show for. I'd be content to know if there were at least some thinkers in the later era that tried to expand on that, instead of just review what their precursors did.

I know scientific advance is probably not a good concept overall, but even by the broadest possible interpretation it seems there wasn't much going on during the Roman Empire.

The stereotype you mention is just what got me thinking, by the way - I watched a rather bad documentary about the fall of the Roman Empire because it seemed to be the only reliable way to get rid of the "royal wedding" background noise, and it concluded with some statements along the lines of "but in some remote places like monasteries, Roman achievements and culture were kept for the following centuries" and I only thought if the Romans actually contributed anything, or only passed ideas along themselves.

 

[Tee Kay]

Well there was engineering and architecture.