Crisis Update 1793
Peace in Hungary
With the Hungarians on the march and the Bavarians believed to be waiting only for secret signals to rise, it seemed the Habsburg monarchy was beginning to falter. Emperor Joseph bedridden and his health failing could do little. With no firm hand at the tiller, even one so hated as Joseph, and the enemy at the gates the government had all but ceased to function. It came therefore as a relief to all when the Emperor expired. His last words in his diary were a fitting epitaph: “the world shall not miss such a cruel, viscious, and incompetent tyrant”.
Under normal circumstances, the death of an Emperor in a time of crisis would have caused panic. In Vienna, by contrast, the mood lifted. Joseph alone, it was felt, bore responsibility for alienating the Bavarians and the Hungarians. Joseph’s brother, the new Emperor Leopold, had as it transpired already been on his way Vienna at his brother’s request with a mandate to save the situation. Leopold had ruled Tuscany as enlightened ruler but he was much more amenable to compromise than his unbending brother.
The new Emperor immediately reached out to the Hungarians to seek terms. The Hungarian magnates proved amenable to negotiate. They proclaimed that their problem had been with the Emperor Joseph and not the Empire. There was some truth to this, but other reasons could be found. The Prussian entry into the war with Poland had ended hope for aid from the quarter. The Bavarians had also declined to rise, perhaps in the hopes of securing concessions from the new Emperor.
With both sides prepared to talk, negotiations moved quickly. The two parties had almost come to terms the previous year. The sticking point had been serfdom. The Hungarians had wanted it returned and Joseph had not. Leopold’s terms were no different to his brothers, but he was an accomplished negotiator. With negotiations in progress, he soon realized that the Hungarian camp was a divided one. The magnates and lesser nobles could not bring themselves to agree on much. The magnates’ interests were in controlling Hungary, the lesser nobles opposed that. Leopold set about splitting the Hungarian tent along its seams.
The strategy yielded some results. The Hungarian diet was restored and Hungarian consent required for Imperial laws to have force there. But the Emperor won the gratitude of the magnates and lesser nobles by agreeing that the throne should have the right to veto the diet on matters that might touch on the entire empire. This might seem absurd but both the magnates and lesser nobles were concerned that the other party might seize control of the Diet and use it against the other and saw the Emperor as a neutral party. This understandably pleased the Emperor who gained considerable influence he would not have otherwise had in Hungary but ran the risk of dragging the monarch into the fractious world of Hungarian politics in the future.
The Diet was given the right to tax and spend as it saw fit. Foreign policy was to be retained in Vienna. The Hungarians were required to maintain Hungarian regiments for imperial use with only those regiments permitted within Hungary without the express permission of the diet. For their part, the Hungarians agreed to maintain laws regarding the end of serfdom and continued religious freedom. The Austrians also secured a promise that the Hungarians would not enact undue reprisals minorities who had sided with the Emperor. In a purely symbolic gesture, the Crown of Saint Stephen was return to Hungary and all future kings of Hungary were to be crowned in Hungary. Hungary autonomy has put an end to Joseph’s dreams of a unified empire. Hungary now only shares a monarch, foreign policy and an army with Austria. But the Hungarians are satisfied and believe they got the better end of the deal.
Following the peace, the Austrian and Hungarian armies went their separate ways, to restore order in Bavaria and Hungary respectively. In the former, the arrival of fresh troops helped to calm the situation but the Bavarians are now demanding that Joseph’s reforms be rolled back in Bavaria too. Leopold has given the move serious consideration, reckoning that he could reconcile the Bavarians at a stroke to Austrian rule if he were to do so. Some within the court have argued against such a move, noting that the Bavarians are to weak to fight back. For the Hungarians, things were a bit more brutal. Many who had taken to brigandry were either put to the sword or imprisoned and set to work. One group that had received special provisions from the Emperor, the Serbs, were mostly allowed to return to their homes unmolested, with the Hungarians realizing they were too valuable on the frontier against the Turks to make a permanent enemy of them.
Reconciliation in Sweden and a Quiet War
With the Danish poised to invade Sweden, many within the Riksdag began making plans to deal with the potential invasion. A few members of the Riksdag began quietly reaching out to the royalist camp in hopes of reconciliation. Secret negotiations were opened between the two camps, but quickly broke down. Gustav was unwilling to become a roi fainéant or abdicate while the Riksdag felt that the former king was the reason the country was in the midst of civil war in the first place. In their view, inviting Gustav back would merely result in a second civil war in the near future.
While the proposal to reconcile with Gustav was rejected, word of the negotiations were leaked to a restless populace. The decision to negotiate was viewed with contempt among the bourgeois and tradesmen of the capital who had in recent months begun to organise themselves into democracy clubs along the Polish model. Whispers of a ‘patriotic coup’ carried out by elements of the officer corps, with the support of the people, became loud. The Riksdag entered into a hurried debate to decide what to do, fearful that if something was not announced the people might well force a decision on them.
Fearing both the chaos of what a republic might bring and wary of crowning a foreign king, the well-respected Count Charles von Stauden declared had been advised by Mamsell Arfvidsson, Sweden’s preeminent fortune teller, that if the Riksdag waited a week God himself would intervene to deliver peace at home, defeat for the Danes and prosperity abroad.The Riksdag didn’t much care for Arfvidsson’s prediction, but von Stauden’s recommendation of waiting for a week found favour. The waiting crowds were disappointed but dispersed when asked by officers who promised, in an ominous sign, that a result would be known soon.
Mamsell Arfvidsson might not have been able to tell the future, but she was well-connected with a great many powerful men (and women) coming to her for advice which she passed along to others when it suited her. What she knew, and nobody else knew, was that Prince Karl, brother of Gustav, had sent her a letter.
In the letter, Karl confessed that while the King’s forces did indeed include hard-line loyalists, most were ambivalent to the King. He also reported that there unease among the royalists about what precisely they were fighting for. Defending the dynasty was important. But the nobleman had no no desire to support the ambitions of the new men while the new men opposed the ambitions of the nobleman. The Finns were pleased with their newfound autonomy, but were not interested in going down alongside the King. The Swedes meanwhile distrusted the Finns and saw in their autonomy as a threat to the unity of the state.
What Karl left unsaid in his letter but Arfvidsson intuited was that most everyone in the royalist camp, including Karl, agreed that things would be better if the King were out of the way. Arfvidsson replied to Karl offering a summary of the goings on in the Riksdag and suggested further that if Karl had a plan, she left unsaid what that plan was or should be, the timing was right to execute it. It is not clear if von Stauden was aware of the plot, or was a genuine believer in Arfvidsson’s powers. But whatever the case, King Gustav was assassinated not long afterwards by a disgruntled army officer who fled across the border to Russia.
With the King dead his son aged 12, Gusatv IV, was crowned with Karl as regent. The news shifted opinion in the Riksdag firmly behind peace. Terms were quickly decided on which saw the restoration of some noble privileges, the Riksdag given control over the public purse and its legislative functions returned. The King meanwhile retained control of the ministers and was allowed a significant amount of executive power. Finally, the courts were made independent of both.
The compromise was not without its detractors though. The new men of Gustav’s reign were allowed to return to their positions, but the final terms of the compromise did not fully satisfy them, and they feared that birth, not ability, would determine their future prospects. The democracy clubs which had hoped for a reform along Polish lines took the restoration of the monarchy badly and have become more strident in their calls for change. The Scanians felt themselves cheated and there have been persistent rumours of a rising against Sweden rule. The Finns meanwhile got nothing and the only thing stopping a revolt is Karl who enjoys good relations with the Finns and has promised to resolve Finland’s issues upon conclusion of the war with Denmark. This promise might have stopped the Finns taking up arms, but it did not stop them withholding aid to the crown.
Sweden now looks to the south to prepare to fend off a Danish invasion. The Danish fleet has managed to seize control of the seas in the absence of a Swedish fleet willing to fight it. However, this advantage was completely squandered as the main Danish army left to twiddle its fingers in Copenhagen. With the Swedish navy now forming up in Stockholm, the early Danish advantage at sea is now completely gone. Fortunately for the Danes, Prince Charles of Hesse-Kessel, in charge of the Norwegian army saw an opportunity and attacked. The Swedes had little to respond to Charles thrust with. The royalist foot was in Kalmar while the Riksdag’s foot was in Stockholm. Both sides cavalry meanwhile was spread all around central Sweden. With nothing to stop him, Charles seized the great Swedish fortress of Gothenburg with scarcely a shot fired.
The arrival of peace one would think should have helped the Swedes organise their resistance but it ended up causing no end of confusion. Gustav III death had deprived the royalist army of a leader. His second in command was Karl, but the Regent left immediately after his brother’s death for Stockholm to negotiate and neglected to appoint anyone to overall control in his absence. This led to bickering, which was compounded by the refusal of the royalist officers to accept orders from the republican Minister of War. The arrival of a new commanding officer who had served on the other side did not help matters. Efforts on his part to get army to move were frustrated by royalist officers who were suspicious that the Riksdag might be playing a trick on them. The fact that the Riksdags forces were not moving themselves only confirmed the impression of perfidery.
The fall of Gothenburg made things worse. The royalists embarrassed by the debacle choose to believe that the city had been betrayed by Riksdag sympathisers. The Riksdag meanwhile accused the royalists of betraying the city. The truth of the matter was that the reduced garrison was simply too small to hold the city and was caught off guard by the rapid Norwegian advance. Both sides refused to budge and it was only through the heroic efforts of Arfvidsson that a renewed civil war was avoided.
Charles had wanted to capitalise on his good fortune by seizing the strategic port of Helsingborg which would have allowed Danish troops from the mainland to land in strength. But short of men and realistic about his prospects, he instead fortified Gothenburg against the Swedes. Gothenburg was a strong fortress, well provisioned and a valuable bargaining chip to hold. It also kept the Swedes from marching on Oslo.
With confusion reigning on both sides, the Swedes have offered to Denmark a white peace. Many in the Danish establishment are keen on accepting considering that Denmark is the weaker power and that its only possibly ally, Russia, is distracted in Poland. Charles has argued that he might be able to seize Helsingborg and Malmo should he received reinforcements before the Swedes start to arrive in strength. But he is not confident he could hold out against the Swedes or defeat them in the field without aid, particularly with most of Denmark’s forces remaining in Sjælland. But even with those reinforcements, Charles fears that Danish and Norwegian manpower is simply inadequate to the task to fight a united Sweden.
The Song War
The Genoans knew that the French, Spanish and Austrians had interests in Northern Italy. Therefore, Genoa’s strategy was to delay the Sardinians in the hopes that the international situation would change in their favor. Of the three, the Genoans pinned the most hope on the French. The French had saved the city from the Sardinians and Austria during the 1747 siege. The French crown had remained silent but the Estates-General was strongly supportive of the Genoan cause. Some supported Genoa on idealistic grounds, but most hewed to the far more practical line that a stronger Sardinia would complicate future French campaigning in Italy and benefit Austria. This support was not negligible, and while the Estates-General could not declare war, it could make threats and agitate; when it was heard that the Papacy supported the Sardinian cause, they made further noise against the pact with Rome.
The Spanish meanwhile had holdings in Parma, Lucca, and Modena that a stronger Sardinia might look askance at. The arrival of Spanish troops in Italy was viewed in a hopeful light, but the Spaniards kept to barracks. Quite what the Spanish intended by moving troops to Italy was anyone’s guess. Some suspected that they might be intended for use against Naples.
The final and least welcome option were the Austrians. Everyone knew Austria had long desired to reduce Genoa to subjugation and in doing so expose the south of France to assault in a future war. While that was far from a desirable outcome, it would ensure French intervention in defense of Genoa. News of the war in Hungary was a setback, but the sudden resolution of the conflict occasioned joy. Leopold, it seems, was not as impulsive as his brother.
Genoese strategy was helped by the Sardinians. The Sardinian general, Charles-Francois Thaon, Count of Saint-André, was familiar with Genoa’s extensive fortifications. That familiarity made Charles-Francois cautious. True, the Sardinians had a qualitative and numerical edge, but their numbers were insufficient to force the city. That meant a siege if Charles-Francois could not pull something out of his hat. Charles-Francois’s first hope was to destroy the Genoese army in the field which the Genoese General Michelangelo Alessandro Colli-Marchi, a veteran of Austrian service, did his best to avoid fearful that his army would not survive a battle. This proved mistaken with the Genoese rearguard giving a good account of themselves in a sharp action at Busalla. Busalla did much to reassure Colli that his army would fight and while he declined to give battle again, instead opting to retreat behind the walls of Genoa, the ‘victory’ had done much to build morale.
The Genoese had need of it because Charles-Francois’ second trick was to try and break the morale of the city by drowning it in shot. The Genoans however took the assault in their stride. For ten days, the Sardinians fired at the walls with cannon and used howitzers and mortars to shell the city proper. The howitzers and mortars proved destructive, but the Sardinians had few (and none in the larger calibers) and soon exhausted their store of shells. The Sardinians were better provisioned with cannon, but they had little effect on the Mura Nuove which had been built with just such an eventuality in mind.
Left with no choice, Charles-Francois settled in for a siege. He chose to approach from the east. To even reach the walls he first had to reduce the redoubts of Santa Tecla and Quezzi which sat at some remove from the walls. Colli had reinforced their garrisons, provisioned them well and the officers in command had proven energetic men who had done much to improve the strength of the fortifications by throwing out earthen breastworks around the fort and digging trenches within for shelter. Charles-Francois set his sappers to digging trenches to bring his men close and began, by increments, to choke the life out of the redoubts. Sallies by the defenders at night from the main walls equipped with axes, spikes and torches succeeded a number of times in spiking guns, setting powder alight and damaging siege works. These nocturnal raids did much to improve morale and were greatly aided by an intensive program of training that Colli forced on the defenders. No amount of raiding however could stop the Sardinians reducing Santa Tecla and Quezzi. They fell after three weeks, providing a boost to Sardinian morale. But the length of their survival was greatly aided by Charles-Francois having to reluctantly detach some of his men to reduce remaining holdings on the mainland.
With the redoubts reduced and the threat to his flank neutralized, Charles-Francois’ men set began digging trenches towards the Romana and Pila Gates. Work remained slow as the Sardinians struggled with manpower shortages. Efforts to get civilians to dig the trenches floundered with few workers to be found, most having fled within the walls. The bigger problem was the Sardinian dearth of shelter and supplies. Powder and shot was once again plentiful, but food was scarce and there was little shelter, Colli having burned what he could not take within the walls. This made life a misery for the Sardinians who soon began to die of typhus. Charles-Francois was not to be dissuaded, however, and continued to dig.
The Genoese for their part remained in good health and humor. The Genonese citizenry in the midst of Charles-Francois’ barrage held a public vote that found the Sardinian effort inferior to the French bombardment of 1684, the pockmarks of which scarred many of the city’s buildings, to the considerable embarrassment of Charles-Francois. Pamphlets made light of the siege and provided news, usually within hours, of the goings on. News of the fall of Santa Tecla and Quezzi was widely covered in Europe and closely followed in Italy.
Efforts by the city to evacuate citizens made little progress. Abandoning one’s city, fellow citizens, friends, family and indeed entire life — including much of one’s wealth, much of which was in their homes, which could hardly be moved — proved unpopular. Some men did leave but they were cursed as cowards, and the mob riled up with propaganda was apt to jump anyone trying to leave who, in their eyes, should remain. Those with friends or family outside of the city and money evacuated their women and children. Paying for Genoese women and children to evacuate has become a popular cause elsewhere in Italy, especially in Milan, Venice, Lucca, and Florence. Some wealth was moved outside the city, but more was secreted away within the city.
By far the more interesting story of the siege was the arrival of volunteers. Idealistic Frenchman and Italians made up most of the volunteers. Among the Italian contingent, politically motivated Neapolitans fleeing political persecution were well represented. The arrival of former Neapolitan officers proved a major boon. Venetian idealists who found the politics of their homeland stultifying were also well represented. A small group of Sardinian dissidents were present and news of the execution of a number of their fellows following the fall of Santa Tecla did nothing to break their resolve. These Sardinians also included a few former officers among their number. The Neapolitans and Sardinian officers, along with men Colli had brought along with him from Austrian service, make up a significant portion of the Genoese officer corps. Some wags within the city have taken calling the Genoese army, with a degree of amusement, the Italian army in recognition of its diverse officer corps.
Charles-Francois’ logistics remained precarious. The typhus outbreak eventually burning itself out as the weather turned cold. But it had taken a toll with two thousand men dead, ten times the number of men who had fallen in battle, and twice that number ill and recovering only slowly. With the siege showing no sign of ending and conditions cooling, Charles-Francois made a decision to construct winter quarters for his men. The wounded he sent away to nearby towns to recover which proved unpopular with the Genoese. Most of his army however remained in place. Digging slowed as rain and the cold conditions took a toll on the sappers. All that broke up the tedium was the dull roar of cannons and occasional sorties by the defenders. Charles Francios believes that he will have his trenches well enough advanced to take down the walls by early next year at which point he believes the city will surrender. At least, that’s what he hopes will happen. Storming the breach would be costly.
For their part, Genoans remain divided on the city’s next steps. Many have spoken of surrendering once the walls fall, showing that Genoa fought with honor, and hope that foreign intervention would force Sardinia to withdraw. There are others, represented most heavily amongst the foreign volunteers, who believe that Genoa should fight to the end but doing so though would guarantee the city would be sacked in the event of a Sardinian victory.
The War of the Constitution
Rather than simply advancing from all directions and overwhelming the Poles with superior numbers, the War Ministry in Saint Petersburg decided on destroying the Polish army in the field. The central army, under Suravov, was to be the striking arm to this end. Suravov was to destroy Poniatowski’s army in the centre and then quick march north to trap Kosciuszko’s army in Lithuania. To this end, the Ukraine and Baltic armies were stripped of men which saw Suravov’s army swell to almost a hundred thousand men. The plan, however, almost immediately fell apart.
Suravov’s first goal was to destroy Poniatowski’s army. To effect this Suravov’s army marched from Smolensk in the direction of Minsk and Warsaw in the hope of forcing Poniatowski to fight him. The problem was Poniatowski had no intention of giving battle and abandoned his positions on the border falling back on Minsk ahead of Suravov’s forces. As Poniatowski retreated, his frustrated men left a trail of destruction in their wake and took any opportunity to attack Russian foragers and scouts. Suravov expected the Poles would fight to hold Minsk but Poniatowski defied expectations again and marched straight through the city but not before he had torched it.
Suravov found himself in a quandary. His men had already marched 300 kms. His logistics were fraught and the Polish campaign of burning supplies and attack his foragers and scouts had scarcely helped matters. The attack on the scouts had also denied Suravov intelligence about Poniatowski’s forces. He had no idea their numbers, disposition and most importantly had only a sketchy understanding of where the Poles were. The capture of Minsk was a welcome success and offered up the possibility of marching on Warsaw and ending the war at a stroke. But his orders were to destroy Poniatowski’s army and Suravov was inclined to keep to them. Leaving the Poles running free in his rear would have been folly.
Poniatowski’s orders were even more difficult to carry out than Suravov’s. Warsaw envisioned Poniatowski sweeping north to link up with Kosciuszko’s men and rout Bagration’s force in the Baltics before turning back and defeating Suravov. The problem was that Suravov’s drive on Minsk was not something Poniatowski could ignore. He worried that if he was to race north, Suravov would be in Warsaw and the war lost before he had a chance to turn around. The other issue was that his men were loathe to abandon the fight as they saw it. They knew Suravov’s forces were the bulk of Russian strength and that whatever was in the Baltic and Ukraine were much reduced in strength. Poniatowski’s solution was to let his men fight Russian foragers and scouts to keep up morale and to play for time by remaining in contact with Suravov but denying battle in the hopes that something would change.
After the fall of Minsk, Poniatowski had headed east guessing that Suravov would prefer to take the Lida and Grodno road to Warsaw which was better in quality and had more people to forage off. Suravov pursued Poniatowski intent on destroying him. Poniatowski then misread Suravov’s pursuit as a drive on Wilno. Poniatowski saw in this a miracle. Wilno was strategically irrelevant, but every step towards it took Poniatowski closer to Kosciuszko’s men. He also perceived correctly that the Russians were tired, short of supplies and that Suravov’s force had been bled from the skirmishing, that he had been forced to detach men to garrison Minsk and the other towns along his line of advance and that sickness had taken a toll.
Suravov, starved of intelligence by the Polish cavalry, believed Poniatowski’s army a spent force that was not willing to fight and was collapsing under the pressure. He, like Poniatowski, viewed every step he advanced as a good thing, in his case because it would further dispirit Poniatowski’s men and bought him closer to Bagration and much needed resupply. To that end he sent messengers to Bagration to prepare a march south to link with his own troops and bring much needed supplies. Together, he believed, the two could pin the demoralised Poles down and destroy them.
The problem was that the Poles were anything but demoralised. True, the loss of Minsk and before long Wilno (also burned) had hurt. But news had arrived that Kosciuszko was marching towards them and that Friedrich Adolf with his Prussians were close, having completed a march of almost 800kms in record time. The Poles also knew that Bagration was unlikely to come to Suravov’s aid having retreated to the comparative safety of Riga, his token forces unequal to the task of confronting Kosciuszko. Kosciuszko, for his part, had been told to avoid battle but upon finding out how small Bagration’s forces were, he pounced, dealing a number of sharp blows to the Russians. Of this Suravov deep into enemy territory knew nothing.
With this in mind, Poniatowski turned his forces and took up positions. His army, following the latest in French military theory, was divided into three corps. It was the independent movement of these corps that had so confused Suravov and led him to underestimate the strength and location of the Poles having only ever come into contact one or two of the corps at a time. Poniatowski’s deployment did nothing to dispel the confusion because only his corp and half of a second was visible to the enemy that morning. The site Poniatowski picked for the battle let him deploy a full corps on a low rise in full view of the Russians. His left flank was anchored by a lake and swamp while his right was flat ground, with a forest some distance away. Poniatowski deployed only light forces on his left, content to rely on the terrain, and left his right on the flat ground weak with only half a corps to hold. He however held back significant reserves. A full corps and half of another was concealed behind the hill in his centre.
Suravov saw Poniatowski’s deployment, noted the weak right and added troops to exploit it. He had no inkling that half of Poniatowski’s men were held in reserve.
The battle began early with a Russian general advance. The fighting on the left flank proved inconclusive with the Russians struggling in the rough terrain against Poles fighting in loose formation. The right went well for the Russians whose numbers soon began to tell, despite the best efforts of the Polish skirmishers and batteries. The latter causing horrible casualties on the advancing Russians. The centre meanwhile was close fought, with the Polish infantry throwing back Russian infantry and cavalry assaults. Polish gunnery, which was concentrated into batteries that moved to where they were needed, proved an even greater scourge in the centre firing from the crest of the rise into the Russians. The Rusisans artillery meanwhile struggled to keep up and spread out into many smaller batteries proved far less capable.
At ten the Polish right began to give way. The Russians began to advance, but in advancing the opened a gap between themselves and the centre which had made no ground. Poniatowski seized the opportunity and threw his reserves at the break in the line. The fresh Polish advanced through the gap and fell upon the Russian flanks. Polish artillery batteries redeployed in haste to take advantage of the situation tore holes in the Russian lines. With the right and centre of his two army now threatening to come apart, Suravov threw his own reserves in to plug the gap. He would have been fine had his centre not began to give way. Fighting soon shifted from the heights to the field as the Poles advanced. On the left the Russians were exposed having advanced too fast, leaving another gap and were moreover disorganised. The Russians seeing the potential for disaster as the centre gave way began to reform and turn around. The Russians on the right having come close to sweeping the Poles aside, now found themselves cut off from the centre and with a mass of Poles on their flank. So began a desperate attempt by the Russian right to withdraw and relink with the centre.
It was at this moment that the vanguard of Kosciuszko’s forces began to arrive on the field on the Polish right. With Poles on both flanks and Poles to their fore, the Russian right routed with the Poles in close pursuit. The Russians on the left had by this stage managed to extract themselves and with the Russian centre managed to retire in good order. Poniatowski keen to conserve his forces, saw that the Russians had retained discipline and with the Russian right now, seemingly, in hand declined to pursue. Russian losses total some twenty two thousand men of the eighty four thousand men deployed, seventy guns and thirty standards. The slow pace of the Russian guns helped keep their losses to a minimum. Russian losses on the right were the heaviest, but the centre had suffered losses too. The Russians on the left saw few casualties as the fighting there had been quite light. The Poles meanwhile lost twelve thousand of their sixty thousand men deployed, no guns and one standard. Polish losses were heaviest on the right where fighting had been hardest and many of the units there had ceased to exist as viable formations.
Poniatowski’s victory was greeted with wild celebrations in Warsaw where just days earlier defeatism had reigned supreme. The loss of Wilno and Minsk and the refusal of the army to give battle had been a bitter pill for the Poles to swallow, but the victory washed away those concerns. Some have called upon the King and Sejm to negotiate with the Russians from strength, using the victory and the arrival of the Prussian regulars in great numbers while others believe that with the Prussians at their side, a decisive battle might drive Suratov from Lithuania, and forever end their ambitions on the Commonwealth.
Perhaps the greatest detractor of the Polish situation was the man who was its engineer. The victory seemed nothing of the sort to Poniatowski, who saw it as a disaster for the Commonwealth. While he had inflicted greater casualties, his own were not negligible and he moreover could not replace them as readily as Suravov. He also believed he had been robbed of the chance for a historic victory by the late arrival of Kosciuszko. Kosciuszko had promised he would arrive on the field early that day. As it was, he arrived towards lunch. Had he arrived earlier before the Polish right and centre had been mauled, Poniatowski believes that he could have bagged not only the Russians on the right, but the entire army. Kosciuszko for his part complained that Poniatowski could have simply waited until he arrived before giving battle. Poniatowski countered that had he done so the surprise would likely have been lost and Suravov would have declined battle.
Whatever the case, the loss was an unwelcome blow to Suravov, who thought himself lucky for having extracted himself. He likewise found a scapegoat in Bagration who he blamed for being passive and allowing Kosciuszko to steal upon him. Suravov also conjectured that Poniatowski reserve corps was part of Kosciuszko’s army and blamed Bagration for understating the strength of Kosciuszko’s forces. Quite what Bagration was meant to have done against Kosciuszko’s supposedly much superior forces with his limited numbers, at least according to Suravov, was left unsaid.
In Saint Petersburg, many were surprised about the resilience of the Polish Army, but any concerns that might be aired about the conduct of the war have been at best, whispered. Potemkin is currently in control of the court and few are willing to go against him in fear that the Empress’ next favorite would be in the vein of Zubov. For her part, Catherine is determined to achieve victory to ensure her legacy and to go down as a ruler even greater than Peter.