British Mediterranean Fleet

[Harvin87]

I was reading over the Mediterranean theatre of opperations in the Second World War . . most of the action was maritime besides the invasion of Kreta.

And I was thinking... was is it really a SUPREME performance of Admiral Cunningham's fleet or it was just that the italian admiralty was naive and not well prepared to go face to face against the old sea lion ... the British?

I find that some of the battles were brilliant tactical victories... like Matapan , even though the Italian fleet was superior in numbers and also had at least the same firepower . . that would make one think that they could had engaged the British... they were were always avoiding action... and the British chasing them... like mouse and cat.

what do u guys think?

 

[r16]

so far the general explanations ı have seen mention that Mussolini was so concerned about his military position after the inevitable Axis victory that he refused to commit his navy into actions that might result in casualties , meanwhile for the British it was a matter of life of death especially in the case of a then probable Pasific war .This explains the British zest for action in the early parts of the war . '42 -'43 was no contest as the Italians had already lost a lot .

 

[PhroX]

so far the general explanations ı have seen mention that Mussolini was so concerned about his military position after the inevitable Axis victory that he refused to commit his navy into actions that might result in casualties.

Pretty much my understanding. The Italian's were using the "fleet in being" theory (that a fleet is a threat even in harbour - it ties up large amounts of enemy resources - but is itself pretty safe). Then came Taranto, which proved the second part of the theory - safety - wasn't true. For the loss of a couple of aricraft, Britain destroyed or crippled half of the Italian battleship fleet. The result was the Italian fleet rebased to Naples, reducing the threat to British shipping. From that point on, Italy was forced to actively use their fleet, resulting in the battles of Cape Spartivento (inconclusive - partly again to an unwillingness on the Italian's behalf to really commit) and Cape Matapan (Allied victory). After the latter, the Italian navy was mainly limited to convoy raiding (at which it achieved some sucess).

That's not to say Britain didn't fight the naval war in the Mediterranean very well, but had the Italians been prepared to risk their fleet, particularly before Taranto, things could have been different.

 

[Harvin87]

On my understanding... if you are at war... and you have a fleet... why dont u use it? ... I mean .. in a war like the Second World War.... it was do or die.

 

[PhroX]

On my understanding... if you are at war... and you have a fleet... why dont u use it? ... I mean .. in a war like the Second World War.... it was do or die.

The theory behind "fleet in being" is this:

If you have a fleet and use it, you run the risk of losing the fleet, particularly if the enemy has a stronger one.

On the other hand, if you have a fleet but don't use it, you don't run the risk of losing the fleet, and you enemies must deploy large amounts of resources in case you do use the fleet.

Say your navy is outnumbered and outgunned, but you have a battleship, in a harbour, within range of your foes convoy routes. Were that battleship to leave port to hunt those convoys, then the enemy would probably be able to destroy it with their superior fleet. However, by leaving it in port, but threatening to go after the convoys, your foe is required to post a large enough force to detroy that battleship on guard nearby, as they can't risk losing their convoys. That force is essentially taken out of the war. If that force is worth more than a battleship, then you're up on them. The real problem comes when your enemy has a way of striking at your ships in harbour. The demonstrations of how effective air strikes can be on anchored fleets during WWII (Taranto, Pearl Harbour etc) spelled the end for the fleet in being.

It's not actually a bad tactic, if you are outnumbered/outgunned - eg the German fleet in WW2, in particular the Tirpitz, had no chance at all of significantly hurting the RN, but did occupy huge amonts of Allied resources. However, the Italian fleet wasn't massively outclassed. Though a bit weaker than the Allies, they had the strength to come and fight and with some luck could've won - or at least caused such heavy casualties to the RN that Britain would be unable to control the Med. They were just too scared of losses to take the risk, and by the time they did start taking risks, they had already suffered significant losses.

 

[Harvin87]

The theory behind "fleet in being" is this:

If you have a fleet and use it, you run the risk of losing the fleet, particularly if the enemy has a stronger one.

On the other hand, if you have a fleet but don't use it, you don't run the risk of losing the fleet, and you enemies must deploy large amounts of resources in case you do use the fleet.

Say your navy is outnumbered and outgunned, but you have a battleship, in a harbour, within range of your foes convoy routes. Were that battleship to leave port to hunt those convoys, then the enemy would probably be able to destroy it with their superior fleet. However, by leaving it in port, but threatening to go after the convoys, your foe is required to post a large enough force to detroy that battleship on guard nearby, as they can't risk losing their convoys. That force is essentially taken out of the war. If that force is worth more than a battleship, then you're up on them. The real problem comes when your enemy has a way of striking at your ships in harbour. The demonstrations of how effective air strikes can be on anchored fleets during WWII (Taranto, Pearl Harbour etc) spelled the end for the fleet in being.

It's not actually a bad tactic, if you are outnumbered/outgunned - eg the German fleet in WW2, in particular the Tirpitz, had no chance at all of significantly hurting the RN, but did occupy huge amonts of Allied resources. However, the Italian fleet wasn't massively outclassed. Though a bit weaker than the Allies, they had the strength to come and fight and with some luck could've won - or at least caused such heavy casualties to the RN that Britain would be unable to control the Med. They were just too scared of losses to take the risk, and by the time they did start taking risks, they had already suffered significant losses.

I understand the concept... yea and specially I was thinking about the Tirpitz... but I think that in the Mediterranean the situation was not comparable to the Atlantic... The Regia Marina outnumbered the already over-strech British fleet... wich had to watch the entrance to the Mediterranean in Gibraltar, then somehow prevent an invasion of Malta and watch for themselves in Alexandria where was their main fleet... Im just saying that maybe the Italians with a little of bit more aggressive tactics... the outcome would had been different.

Of course that the Royal Navy prestige played a major role in the Mediterranean... dont you think? . . ... I think the Italians were "intimidated" so to speak...

 

[lumpthing]

I vaguely remember learning in my history A levels that Mussolini's administration was grossly incompetent, that the Italian military was both badly equipped and badly managed and that this was why the Italian war effort was not up to much. But from the posts above it seems that the Italians simply made a not-unreasonable gamble with a strategy that might well have worked in slightly different circumstances. Is that right?

 

[dosed150]

I vaguely remember learning in my history A levels that Mussolini's administration was grossly incompetent, that the Italian military was both badly equipped and badly managed and that this was why the Italian war effort was not up to much. But from the posts above it seems that the Italians simply made a not-unreasonable gamble with a strategy that might well have worked in slightly different circumstances. Is that right?

i think the poor equipment mostly refers to their almost useless light tanks and lack of anything heavier, the navy may not have been as poorly equipped as the army

 

[PhroX]

The Italian navy was pretty good actually, particularly early in the war, before defeats like Taranto and Matapan had hit their morale and confidence hard, though in general, their personel were not as well trained as their British counterparts. They had a lack of carriers - IIRC, they got about halfway through building their first by the time they surrendered - but from what I know their battleships were of comparable quality to the other major navies, and their small ships were excellent. In particular, their fire control was very good, though, like the Axis in general, their lack of radar was a weakness.

As for the choice of strategy, FiB can be a good in some situations. WWII Mediterranean was quite clearly not a good situation - instead, it was one where bold use of the fleet was called for. I don't really know enough to know whether it was the decision of the navy, or if it was Mussolini not wanting to put his battleships at risk. The latter wouldn't suprise me, as this wasn't just an WWII Italian flaw. Pretty much the entire history of Deadnought battleships came down to them being too vauable to lose in the eyes of those in charge, and as such they never got risked unless there was no other option.

 

[Harvin87]

Something like this also happened in the "Trafalgar Campaign" when Nelson in the months prior to the battle of Trafalgar... had a long run chasing the Franco-Spanish fleet across the Atlantic, Caribbean and the Mediterranean... the Franco-Spanish fleet altough at sea... was avoiding to engage Nelsons Fleet...

 

[vogtmurr]

The Italian navy was pretty good actually, particularly early in the war, before defeats like Taranto and Matapan had hit their morale and confidence hard, though in general, their personel were not as well trained as their British counterparts. They had a lack of carriers - IIRC, they got about halfway through building their first by the time they surrendered - but from what I know their battleships were of comparable quality to the other major navies, and their small ships were excellent. In particular, their fire control was very good, though, like the Axis in general, their lack of radar was a weakness.

The Bismarck pioneered surface radar gunnery in an outstanding way.

I don't know much about the performance of the Italian navy before the early defeats, that was less than a year in to their war. It seems their handling was pretty amateur, being caught with their turrets trained front and rear at Matapan, and unable to protect the pride of their fleet in a naval base from a single squadron of biplanes. dunno: it happened before Pearl Harbour, and with far less permanent effect.) There was a lack of professional experience, but Il Duce had high hopes for his Regia Marina.

The newer Italian battleships were probably the best in the world at the outbreak of war, with good AA, and at least as fast as the later Iowas. The British earnestly wanted to put the Littorio and Vittorio Veneto into service for the Pacific War but they had no spares to maintain them. Both had outfought the RN on occasion, survived torpedo hits and limped home. In the Zara heavy cruisers the Italians finally produced a balanced design able to stand the heat of a battle, and among the best in their class, but 3 went down at Matapan. Lack of aircraft carriers wasn't a big problem in the Mediterranean, if you had decent shore based aircraft, but the Italians had a couple of interesting projects underway before it ended. Like WWI, it was in small special attack teams that Italy enjoyed some success.

As for the choice of strategy, FiB can be a good in some situations. WWII Mediterranean was quite clearly not a good situation - instead, it was one where bold use of the fleet was called for. I don't really know enough to know whether it was the decision of the navy, or if it was Mussolini not wanting to put his battleships at risk. The latter wouldn't suprise me, as this wasn't just an WWII Italian flaw. Pretty much the entire history of Deadnought battleships came down to them being too vauable to lose in the eyes of those in charge, and as such they never got risked unless there was no other option.

Interesting discussion around the 'fleet in being' and 'fleet on the run' scenarios. Admiral Cunningham, as someone mentioned, certainly took the bold approach, or was forced to it by extremity. Malta, off the heel of Sicily, survived 3,000 aircraft sorties and remained an operational base, contributing to the demise of the Afrika Korps. The islanders were given a VC by George VI, and they still celebrate the arrival of the battered convoy on the Feast of St. Mary's Assumption.

 

[Masada]

Malta was the unsinkable aircraft carrier of the Mediterranean.

 

[vogtmurr]

Malta was the unsinkable aircraft carrier of the Mediterranean.

yeah, not Pantelleria as Il Duce tried to claim

 

[Masada]

Lets just ignore everything coming from Il Duce's mouth.

 

[say1988]

They had a lack of carriers - IIRC, they got about halfway through building their first by the time they surrendered

But they didn't really need carriers, especially when the Axis were doing well in North Africa, the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronatica (sp?) dominated the central Mediterranean using land based aircraft. Unfortunately the aircraft didn't show up at some opportune times.

The British crews and command were undoubtedly better, and the Italians did have a fear of the Royal Navy (but I expect that was pretty common at the time). Night actions and the like were dominated by the British, the Italians completely unprepared for them.

Malta was the unsinkable aircraft carrier of the Mediterranean.

Though the Luftwaffe was able to effectively put it out of commission for periods of time. The amount of resources poured into that island by both sides is extraordinary.

 

[Masada]

Though the Luftwaffe was able to effectively put it out of commission for periods of time. The amount of resources poured into that island by both sides is extraordinary.

It was resources that were not going to the Afrika Korps.

 

[say1988]

Not really, I expect most would have went east if they were relieved, which is where they mostly came from. And U-boats would have went to the Atlantic.

The Afrikakorps lost what the British ships and aircraft out of Malta sunk. This was quite considerable at times, though the Malta convoys had some heavy losses too.

 

[Masada]

Not really, I expect most would have went east if they were relieved, which is where they mostly came from. And U-boats would have went to the Atlantic.

All that Luftwaffe planes, Axis naval assets and all the requisite supplies required to try and overtake Malta were not going to the Afrika Korps.

The Afrikakorps lost what the British ships and aircraft out of Malta sunk. This was quite considerable at times, though the Malta convoys had some heavy losses too.

They also lost the resources deployed to invest Malta.

 

[Harvin87]

The Mediterranean certainly was an interesting theater of operations... the thing I dont understand/know... is after the capture of Kreta by the Germans... did they use the island to perform air missions over Alexandria? . .home of the British fleet? . . but at that time the Wehrmacht was totally commited to operation Barbarossa.